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( 2026:HHC:44385 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMP(M) No. 203 of 2026
Reserved on: 28.09.2026
Decided on: 09.10.2026
Roshan Chaudhary
...Applicant/Appellant.
Versus
Kiran Aggarwal & others
...Respondents.
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the applicant/appellant
:
Mr. J. R. Poswal, Advocate.
For the respondents
:
Respondent No.1 in person.
Respondent No.2 proceeded
against ex-parte vide order
dated 19.08.2026.
Mr.Deepak Sharma, Advocate,
for respondents No. 3 to 5.
Romesh Verma, Judge
The instant application has been filed under Section 5
of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the Regular
Second Appeal on behalf of the appellant/applicant.
2.
As per the averments made in the application, it has
been stated that the applicant had filed a Civil Appeal against the
judgment and decree dated 15.09.2018 passed by the learned
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the
judgment?
-2- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
Senior Civil Judge, Kinnaur at Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur,
H.P., in the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Kinnaur
District at Rampur Bushahr,HP on 26.04.2019.
3.
The said appeal was barred by limitation, and the
learned First Appellate Court, after considering the pleadings of
the parties had framed the issues on 28.08.2019 in the following
manner:
1. Whether there are sufficient grounds to condone
the delay in filing the appeal, as prayed for ? OPA
2. Relief.
4.
The learned First Appellate Court directed the
respective parties to adduce evidence in support of their
contentions and, vide its impugned order dated 16.07.2024,
dismissed the application filed by the present appellant under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, holding the appeal filed under
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be time-barred.
5.
As per the case set up by the applicant, against the
impugned order passed by the learned Additional District Judge,
Kinnaur, at Rampur Bushahr dated 16.07.2024, he preferred Civil
Revision Petition No. 205 of 2024, titled Roshan Chaudhary vs.
Kiran Aggarwal and others, before this Court in October 2024.
-3- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
6.
Notices were issued in the said Civil Revision Petition
and ultimately this Court, while relying upon the judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2005) 1 SCC 436, titled as
Shyam Sunder Sharma vs. Pannalal Jaiswal and Others, held
that against the dismissal of an application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, a Civil Revision is not maintainable and vide its
order dated 27.08.2025, dismissed the said Civil Revision Petition
No. 205 of 2024 by granting liberty to the present applicant to
pursue such remedies as are available to him in accordance with
law.
7.
After the passing of the order by this Court on
27.08.2025, the applicant instituted the present appeal along with
an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for
condonation of delay in filing the Regular Second Appeal.
8.
It has been contended in the application that the
applicant was pursuing the Civil Revision Petition in good faith,
therefore, the delay that has occurred in filing the present appeal
deserves to be condoned. It has been further stated that the
applicant is not well-educated and does not know the intricacies
of law.
9.
The applicant was informed by his counsel to apply
for certified copies of the judgment and decree passed by the
-4- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
learned trial Court and the order dated 16.07.2024 passed by the
learned First Appellate Court. After receiving the said copies, the
applicant could not contact his counsel as he was not feeling well.
10.
After obtaining the brief, the applicant contacted his
present counsel on 20.12.2025, who told him that the present
appeal was barred by limitation. Immediately thereafter, the
present appeal and the application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act were prepared and filed without any further delay.
11.
It has been prayed in the application that the
principles of natural justice and equity demand that the
application be allowed, as no prejudice would be caused to the
non-applicants/respondents. Therefore, it has been prayed that
the delay of 90 days in filing the present appeal may be
condoned.
12.
The said application has been vehemently opposed
by respondent No. 1 by filing reply to the aforesaid application,
wherein preliminary objections with regard to maintainability, res
judicata, delay, sufficient cause, and lack of due diligence have
been raised. On merits, all the averments made in the application
have been categorically refuted and denied.
13.
It has been contended that there is a delay of seven
years in filing the appeal and the applicant deliberately spent five
-5- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
years for leading evidence on the point of condonation of delay
from 2019 to January 2024 in order to delay the execution of the
judgment and decree dated 15.09.2018, wherein no legal rights of
the applicant were involved.
14.
It has further been stated in the reply that the
applicant and his counsel deliberately and wrongly filed Civil
Revision Petition No. 205 of 2024 against the order dated
16.07.2024 in order to prolong the litigation as long as possible by
seeking wrong remedies.
15.
It has also been stated that the applicant is well-
educated and well aware of the intricacies of law. He is a chronic
litigant and well-versed in concocting false stories, and that his
son is an advocate.
16.
Therefore, it has been prayed that the application,
being devoid of any merit, deserves to be rejected, as the
applicant is dragging the replying respondent, who is an ailing
lady over 82 years of age, into prolonged, expensive, and
unwarranted litigation, causing serious prejudice to her.
17.
The plaintiffs/respondents No. 1 and 2, namely Ms.
Kiran Aggarwal and Sh. Manoj Bansal, filed a suit for declaration
in the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Kinnaur at Reckong
Peo, District Kinnaur, H.P., on 29.12.2012.
-6- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
18.
As per the case set up by the plaintiffs, defendants
No. 1 to 3 had submitted a house plan to build two-storey
structure with CGI sheets on Khasra Nos. 74, 75, 76, 84, 85, and
86, situated in Kasba Bazaar, Rampur, for sanction and approval
under the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act and the H.P. Town
and Country Planning Act. The house plan was sanctioned and
approved by defendant No. 4 under the H.P. Municipal Act vide
letter dated 08.11.2005, subject to the terms and conditions
mentioned therein.
19.
As per plaintiffs/non-applicants, defendants No. 1 to 3
have raised RCC roof on the second storey in violation and
deviation of the sanctioned house plan and sanction letter dated
08.11.2005. Proceedings in that regard were recorded by
defendants No. 4 to 6 on 28.07.2010, and an order was passed
granting NOC for electricity and water connections for the first
floor, subject to the conditions therein. Defendants No. 1 and 2
submitted an affidavit for laying a CGI sheet roof and deposited
the composition fee.
20.
As per the plaintiffs' case, defendants No. 1 to 3 failed
to lay the CGI sheet roof on the second storey pursuant to the
order dated 28.07.2010 of defendant No. 4. Defendants No. 1 to
3 illegally raised RCC pillars and roofs for a third storey, fourth
-7- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
storey, and fifth storey in the months of September 2011, October
2011, and February 2012, despite notice dated 19.09.2011 under
Section 211 of the H.P. Municipal Act which was served upon
defendant No. 2 requiring them to stop the unauthorized
construction.
21.
According to the plaintiffs, defendants No. 1 to 3 are
chronic law violators who do not believe in the rule of law. The
suit was instituted by the plaintiffs/non-applicants for the grant of
the following reliefs:
“(a) A decree for declaration that the defendants No. 1 to 3
have raised R.C.C. Roof second storey in violation and
deviation of sanctioned house plan, sanction letter NO. 1955
dated 08.11.2005 with the consequential relief to lay C.G.I.
Sheet roof of second storey in conformity with sanctioned
house plan, sanction letter dated 08.11.2005, order dated
28.07.2010.
(b) A decree for declaration that the defendants No.1 to 3 have
illegally raised R.C.C. Pillars and Roof of 3rd storey, 4th storey,
5th storey in Khasra Nos. 74, 75 and 76 and brick wall in
Khasra No. 76 without having the set back towards residential
house of the plaintiff standing partly in Khasra No. 77, in Kasba
Bazar Rampur Building Bye-Laws, defendant No. (4) order
dated 28.07.2010, Notice dated 19.09.2011 under Section 211
of H.P. Municipal Act with consequential relief to demolish the
same or to alter as to leave the set backs towards residential
house of the plaintiffs standing partly in Khasra No. 77 and that
the defendants No. 4 to 6 to act as per its orders dated
28.07.2010, Notice dated 19.09.2011 u/s 211 of H.P. Municipal
Act, sanctioned House Plan, sanction letter No. 1955 dated
08.11.2005."
22.
The suit filed by the plaintiffs was contested by the
defendants by filing separate written statements, one by
defendants No. 1 to 3, and another by defendants No. 4 and 5.
-8- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
The defence of defendant No. 6 was struck off vide order dated
15.07.2014.
23.
The learned trial Court had framed the issues on
18.11.2015 and thereafter on 19.08.2016 in the following manner:
“1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of
declaration that the defendants No. 1 to 3 have illegally
constructed third and forth storey of their house without
leaving set backs towards the house of plaintiff, as
required by law?......O.P.P.
2.
If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, whether the
plaintiff by way of consequential relief is entitled for
decree of demolition/alteration of brick wall of third and
forth storey of defendants house towards the residential
house of plaintiff, as to leave the specified set backs, as
alleged?......O.P.P.
3.
Whether suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable, as
alleged?......O.P.P.
4.
Whether plaintiff has no cause of action to file the
present suit, as alleged?......O.P.D.
5.
Whether suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder
of necessary parties?......O.P.D.
6.
Whether this court has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide the present suit, as barred under H.P. Municipal
Act?......O.P.D.
7.
Whether plaintiffs are estopped to file the present
suit?......O.P.D.
8.
Whether this court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to
entertain this suit, as alleged?......O.P.D.
9.
Whether this suit is not properly valued for the
purpose of court fee and jurisdiction?......O.P.D.
10.
Relief.”
-9- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
24.
As per judgment and decree dated 15.09.2018, the
learned trial Court decreed the suit as filed by the plaintiffs/nonapplicants by holding that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of
declaration to the effect that defendants No. 1 to 3 have illegally
constructed the third and fourth storeys of their house. As a
consequential relief of mandatory injunction, defendant No. 4,
who was seized of the matter qua illegal construction, was
directed to take action against defendants No. 1 to 3 in
accordance with law within a period of six months from the date
of passing of the judgment and decree.
25.
Feeling
aggrieved,
defendants
No.
and
approached the Court of learned Additional District Judge,
Kinnaur District at Rampur Bushahr on 26.04.2019 by filing an
appeal under Section 96 of the CPC along with an application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 151 CPC
for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
26.
The First Appellate Court, vide its impugned order
dated 16.07.2024, dismissed the application under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act read with Section 151 CPC as filed by the
applicants/defendants No. 1 and 2.
27.
Feeling dissatisfied, defendants No. 1 and 2 earlier
filed Civil Revision Petition No. 205 of 2024, which was dismissed
-10- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
on 27.08.2025 by this Court by holding that the Civil Revision
Petition is not maintainable. However, liberty was granted to the
present applicant to pursue the remedies as are available to him
in accordance with law.
28.
After the dismissal of the Civil Revision Petition,
defendant No. 1, Roshan Lal Chaudhary, instituted the present
Regular Second Appeal along with an application under Section 5
of the Limitation Act.
29.
It is contended by Mr. J.S.Poswal, learned counsel for
the applicant/appellant that the impugned order as passed by the
learned First Appellate Court is erroneous and liable to be
quashed and set aside. He submitted that the First Appellate
Court has erred by rejecting the application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act without appreciating the material placed on record.
He submits that there is ample material/evidence placed on
record which strengthens the case of the applicant and entitles
him for condonation of delay in filing the appeal before the First
Appellate Court. He further submits that after accepting the
present application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the
appeal preferred by the applicant may be allowed, and after
setting aside the order passed by the learned Additional District
-11- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
Judge, the said Court may be directed to decide the appeal on its
own merits.
30.
On the other hand, it is contended by Ms Kiran
Aggarwal, who appeared in person before this Court, that the
impugned order as passed by the learned Additional District
Judge is legal, valid, and sustainable, and does not suffer from
any infirmity. She submits that the application filed under Section
5 of the Limitation Act does not disclose any sufficient grounds for
condonation of delay, therefore, the present application, being
without any merit, deserves to be rejected.
31.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
gone through the case file.
32.
The applicant, in the application filed under Section 5
of the Limitation Act, has averred that after the passing of the
impugned order by
learned Additional District Judge, Kinnaur
District at Rampur Bushahr, H.P., dated 16.07.2024, Civil
Revision Petition No. 205 of 2024 was filed immediately before
this Court, which came to be dismissed by this Court by granting
liberty to avail appropriate remedies in accordance with law.
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that since liberty had
been granted to the applicant to pursue the remedies as are
available to him in accordance with law, therefore, after the
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dismissal of the said Civil Revision Petition, the present appeal
and application are well within the period of limitation and the
delay deserves to be condoned.
33.
In the application, it has been averred that the
applicant was pursuing the revision petition in good faith. The
applicant is not well-educated and does not know the intricacies
of law. Therefore, the applicant was informed by his counsel to
apply for the certified copies of the judgment and decree passed
by the learned trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court, and
after receiving the same, the present appeal has been filed.
34.
On the other hand, the application has been
vehemently resisted and opposed by respondent No. 1, Ms. Kiran
Aggarwal, who submits that the applicant is bent upon dragging
82 years old lady into an uncalled-for litigation. She further
submits that the suit filed by her was decreed way back on
15.09.2018, and till date, on one pretext or the other and in order
to avoid the execution of decree, the applicant has been able to
drag the respondent into uncalled-for litigation. She submits that
the applicant openly proclaims that since the non-applicant is an
old lady and will not survive anymore, he is trying to prolong the
litigation in order to prejudice the rights of non-applicant.
-13- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
35.
The learned Senior Civil Judge, Kinnaur at Reckong
Peo, vide its judgment and decree dated 15.09.2018, decreed the
suit filed by the non-applicant by declaring that defendants No. 1
to 3 have illegally constructed the third and fourth storeys of their
house, and relief of mandatory injunction was granted by directing
defendant No. 4 to take appropriate action qua the illegal
construction in accordance with law within a period of six months
from the date of passing of the judgment.
36.
The applicant had preferred a Civil Miscellaneous
Petition bearing No. 85 of 2019 on 26.04.2019. It shows that
though the judgment and decree was passed by the learned trial
Court in the month of September, the applicant approached the
learned First Appellate Court after the lapse of the period of
limitation for filing the appeal. Since the appeal before the learned
First Appellate Court was time-barred, the application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act came to be rejected by the learned
Additional District Judge, Kinnaur at Rampur Bushahr on
16.07.2024.
37.
Thereafter, the applicant preferred Civil Revision
Petition No. 205 of 2024, which was dismissed on 27.08.2025,
and liberty was granted to the applicant to pursue the remedies
as are available to him in accordance with law. Though the said
-14- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
order was passed on 27.08.2025, the record shows that the
appeal was filed by the applicant after a lapse of more than four
months, having been filed on 20.12.2025 before this Court.
38.
The certified copy of the impugned order passed by
the learned Additional District Judge was applied by the applicant
on 05.09.2025, prepared on 05.09.2025, and delivered on
08.09.2025. Similarly, the certified copy of the judgment and
decree passed by the learned trial Court was applied on
21.08.2025,
prepared
on
29.08.2025,
and
delivered
on
30.08.2025.
39.
Though it has been contended by the learned counsel
for the applicant that since the applicant had filed the Civil
Revision Petition within the period of limitation in October 2024,
the time spent during the pendency of Civil Revision Petition No.
205 of 2024 deserves to be excluded, especially in view of the
provisions of Sections 2(h) and 14 of the Limitation Act, which
reads as under:“2. Definitions.—
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— (h) “good
faith”— nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which
is not done with due care and attention;
14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without
jurisdiction. —
(1)In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time
during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due
-15- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first
instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be
excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in
issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from
defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to
entertain it.
(2)In computing the period of limitation for any application, the
time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due
diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first
instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the
same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is
prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of
jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain
it.
(3)Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXXIII
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions
of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted
on permission granted by the court under rule 1 of that Order
where such permission is granted on the ground that the first
suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the
court or other cause of a like nature.”
40.
Though this Court is in agreement with the learned
counsel for the applicant that the period spent by the applicant
during the pendency of Civil Revision Petition No. 205 of 2024
has to be excluded. In the present case, the facts and
circumstances which emerge are that although the order was
passed on 27.08.2025 by this Court, the certified copy of
impugned order was applied on 05.09.2025 and delivered on
08.09.2025.
41.
The record shows that the certified copy of the
impugned order dated 16.07.2024 was delivered on 08.09.2025,
but no plausible explanation has been given in the application as
-16- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
to why no steps were taken by the present applicant from
08.09.2025 till 20.12.2025 for filing of the present appeal.
42.
The averments made in the application are completely
silent on that count. The only explanation which has come in the
application is that the applicant is not well-educated and does not
know the intricacies of law.
43.
To this submission, it is contended by respondent No.
1 that the said fact is factually incorrect. She submits that the son
of the applicant is a practicing lawyer and she has drawn the
attention of this Court to the copy of the C.D.-1 form for obtaining
certified copies of the PWs, the copy of the judgment and decree,
documents, etc., wherein the name of the son of the applicant
has been shown as Shri Shubham Chaudhary, Advocate.
44.
The said fact has also been noticed by the learned
First Appellate Court while dealing with the application,
especially, in paragraph 16 of the impugned order. Therefore, the
contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that he is a
simpleton person and does not know the intricacies of the law is
not believable. Once the son of the applicant is a lawyer himself,
it cannot be presumed that the applicant was not aware that after
obtaining the certified copy of the order passed by the First
-17- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
Appellate Court, the Regular Second Appeal was required to be
filed immediately.
45.
It has been contended by respondent No. 1 that when
the Civil Revision Petition was pending before this Court, there
was an observation in the said proceedings that the Civil Revision
Petition is not maintainable. Realizing the fact that the said
petition was likely to be dismissed, the present applicant had
applied for the certified copy of the judgment passed by the
learned Senior Civil Judge, Kinnaur well in advance on
21.08.2025, i.e., prior to the passing of the order by this Court
dated 27.08.2025 in Civil Revision Petition No. 205 of 2024.
46.
This Court is in agreement with the contention raised
by respondent No. 1 that the applicant has failed to show and
demonstrate sufficient cause, due diligence, care and caution.
47.
The contents of the application are vague and non-
explanatory, it seems that the thrust of the applicant is to prolong
the litigation in perpetuity, as the decree was passed in the year
2018 and the endeavour of the applicant is to drag the replying
respondent/non-applicant into an uncalled-for litigation.
48.
Respondent No. 1 is an old lady of more than 82
years of age, therefore, the applicant cannot be permitted to drag
a senior citizen by subjecting her to multifarious litigations and
-18- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
evade the execution of the decree which was passed way back in
2018.
49.
Generally, the Courts have adopted a very liberal
approach in construing the phrase 'sufficient cause' used in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in order to condone delay to
enable the Courts to do substantial justice and to apply the law in
a meaningful manner that sub-serves the ends of justice.
Notwithstanding the above, no matter how liberal an approach is
adopted in condoning delay, the existence of sufficient cause for
not filing the appeal in time is a condition precedent for exercising
the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases 'liberal
approach', 'justice-oriented approach', and 'cause for the
advancement of substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat
the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or, as a matter of
fact, dead matters to be revived and reopened by taking aid of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It must always be borne in mind,
while construing sufficient cause in deciding applications under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that on the expiry of the period of
limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, a substantive right
accrues in favour of the decree-holder, and this right ought not to
be lightly disturbed.
-19- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
50.
The Hon'ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that
even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not
filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay as a matter of right, as excusing the delay is
within the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court. The Court,
despite the establishment of sufficient cause, may for various
reasons refuse to condone the delay, depending upon the bona
fides of the party. The liberal approach in considering the
sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override
the substantive law of limitation. The concept of a ‘liberal
approach’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of
limitation. It is a well-settled principle of law that though limitation
may harshly affect a particular party, it has to be applied with all
its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power
to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. Where a
case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the
applicant has to explain to the court what the sufficient cause was
which means an adequate and enough reason that prevented him
from approaching the court within the period of limitation. No
Court would be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by
imposing any condition whatsoever, as in the present case where
there is inordinate and unexplained delay.
-20- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
51.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Pathapati
Subba Reddy (died) by LRs and others vs. The Special
Deputy Collector (LA), Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31248
of 2018, has laid down the parameters for condonation of delay in
the following manner:
“12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is
preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be
dismissed. The use of the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision
connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the
exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be
given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is
taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In other
words, it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss an
appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general
law of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections
4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned
only with the exception contained in Section 5 which empowers
the courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the
prescribed period provided the proposed appellant gives
‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the period
prescribed. In other words, the courts are conferred with
discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the expiry
of the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant is
able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it within time.
The said power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal
preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature and
may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based
upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to
exercise due diligence etc.
13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should
not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the
applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and
rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice.
14 to 20 xx xx xx xx
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh &
Ors.6, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation
for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for
condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed
to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner.
High Court should have exercised the discretion in a
-21- ( 2026:HHC:44385 )
systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in
considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be
allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court
observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justiceoriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be
employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.
22. xx xx xx
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer
8, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has
to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’
as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be
liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is
writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may
harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with
all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have
no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no
power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.
24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the
aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in
which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting
liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it stands,
Paragraph 12 reads as under:
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all
its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
“A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A
Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it
considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular
party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full
effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which
means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in
such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while
interpreting a statute.”
52.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment
has held that the applicant is required to establish sufficient cause
for not filing the appeal within time. The power to condone the
delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time is
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discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient
cause is shown, based upon a host of other factors such as
negligence and failure to exercise due diligence. In the present
case, the case file reveals that there is sheer negligence and
failure to exercise due diligence on the part of the applicant,
therefore, no relief can be granted to the applicant under the
attending facts and circumstances of the case.
53.
In terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, discretion
is vested in the Court to admit an appeal or an application after
the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation if the appellant
shows sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the
prescribed period.
54.
The law of limitation may harshly affect a particular
party, but it has to be applied with all its rigor when the statute so
prescribes, and the Courts have no power to extend the period of
limitation on equitable grounds.
55.
The words "sufficient cause" should be understood
and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, and practical manner,
depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The
delay should not be condoned on mere asking by the applicant.
56.
The law of limitation is a substantive law, and it has
definite consequences on the rights and obligations of the parties
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to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied
appropriately. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one
party as a result of failure of the other party to explain the delay
by showing sufficient cause and expose conduct, it will be
unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the
applicant, particularly when the delay is directly the result of
negligence, default, or inaction of the party. Justice must be done
to both parties equally, then alone the ends of justice can be
achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in pursuing its
rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other
party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of
its acting vigilantly.
57.
The said exposition of law has been laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court, in the judgment reported in (2010) 8 SCC
685, titled as Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh &
Others, wherein it has been held as under:
“ 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has
definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to
arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied
appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a
given case. Once a valuable right, as accrued in favour of one
party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the
delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be
unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the
applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of
negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be
done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can
be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in
implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to
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deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it
in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.”
58.
In the present case, the conduct of the applicant
speaks for him. The appeal which was preferred before the First
Appellate Court was also time-barred, and that came to be
dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge and feeling
dissatisfied, the present appeal alongwith application under
Section 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay has been
filed.
59.
As observed earlier, though the Civil Revision Petition
came to be dismissed on 27.08.2025, the certified copy of the
impugned order passed by the Additional District Judge, Kinnaur
at Rampur Bushahr dated 16.07.2024 was very much available
with the applicant on 08.09.2025. Thereafter, there is no
explanation as to why there is a delay in filing the appeal. As per
the calculation of the Registry, there is a delay of 1 year, 5
months, and 4 days in filing the appeal. Since copy was applied
after the period of limitation as such 90 days grace was not given
to the applicant. Even after excluding the period from the date of
filing of the Civil Revision till its dismissal on 27.08.2025 there is
no valid or plausible explanation or sufficient grounds that what
prevented the applicant to file the instant appeal within the period
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of limitation. After passing of the order in Civil Revision on
27.08.2025 the certified copy of impugned order passed by
learned First Appellate Court was delivered to applicant on
08.09.2025. Thereafter, there is no explanation why appeal was
filed after considerable period i.e. 20.12.2025. The approach as
adopted by the applicant is very casual and the same cannot be
said to demonstrate due diligence and sufficient cause.
60.
This Court is not convinced with the explanation and
the contentions as raised in the application. Therefore, the right
which has accrued to the non-applicant cannot be taken away in
a routine manner.
61.
Accordingly, the present application, being devoid of
any merit, deserves to be rejected. Ordered accordingly.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stands
disposed of.
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
October 9, 2026
(Nisha)
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