The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
7. Relying upon the said judgment, recently, in Naveen Kumar (supra), a ld. Single Judge of this Court has noted the said judgment and permitted the Petitioner therein to avail of the remedy to appeal. This Court concurs with the interpretation given to Section 16 of the Act by the Punjab & Haryana High Court. The Appellate Tribunal, having been constituted under the Act, anyone aggrieved by an order passed by the Tribunal should be allowed to approach the Appellate Tribunal. Accordingly, the Petitioner is permitted to approach the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act to raise any challenge against the impugned order dated 18th August, 2020.
8. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed. The Petitioner is permitted to approach the Tribunal within 30 days. If the appeal is filed within 30 days, the issues of limitation shall not be raised in the appeal. All pending applications are also disposed of.”
7. Considering the aforesaid decision, and the fact that the petitioners herein have an alternate statutory remedy of assailing the order of the Maintenance Tribunal before the Appellate Tribunal, under Section 16 of the Act, the present writ petition stands dismissed as not maintainable before this Court, with liberty to approach the Appellate Tribunal or any other competent forum.
Full Judgment Text
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*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
#
CNR No. DLHC010422262026
+
W.P.(C) 13024/2026 & CM APPL. 60511/2026
SH. ROHIT KATHURIA & ANR.
Through:
.....Petitioners
Counsel (appearance not given)
versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Ms. Avni Singh, Panel Counsel for
GNCTD with Ms. Harshita Raj,
Advocates.
Mr. G.P Singh, Advocate for R-2 and
R-2 in person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA
ORDER
08.09.2026
%
CM APPL. 60512/2026 (exemption)
1.
Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2.
Application stands disposed of.
W.P.(C) 13024/2026
3.
By way of the present writ petition, the petitioners are seeking
following prayers:
“a. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or
direction, quashing the Order dated 13.08.2026 passed by Respondent
No.1 in F.No.(09)/ADM(C.N.)/Maintenance Tribunal/34/2026/124148;
b. Pending final disposal of the present petition, stay the operation and
implementation of the impugned Order dated 13.08.2026, and in
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particular restrain the Respondents from taking any coercive steps
towards dispossession of the Petitioners, or any consequential
mutation/registration action pursuant to the impugned Order.”
4.
At the outset, the learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 2
disputes the maintainability of the present writ petition, in view of alternate
statutory remedy being available to the petitioners.
5.
In this regard, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners argues
that the statutory remedy being referred to by the respondent no. 2, i.e. an
appeal under Section 16 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and
Senior Citizens Act, 2007, can only be availed by „senior citizen or a parent‟
who is aggrieved by the order of Tribunal, and not by any other party.
6.
The learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 2, however, draws
this Court‟s attention to the decision dated 06.01.2021 in Shri Amit Kumar
v. Smt. Kiran Sharma & Anr: W.P.(C) 106/2021, wherein this issued has
been settled, and the relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:
“6. Interpreting this provision, the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Paramjit
Kumar Saroya (supra) has held that the remedy to appeal can be availed of
by any affected party, which would include the children of senior citizens.
The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:
“An appeal is envisaged “against the order of the Tribunal”. This is how
Section 15 reads. It does not say an appeal only by a senior citizen or
parent. However, sub section (1) of Section 16 refers to any senior
citizen or a parent “aggrieved by an order of the Tribunal”. This seeks
to give an impression on a plain reading as if only a senior citizen or
parent can prefer an appeal and, thus, restricting the appeal to only one
set of party, while denying the right of appeal to the opposite side who
are liable to maintain. However, this is not followed by the first proviso
which deals with the operation of the impugned order during the
pendency of the appeal and clarifies that the pendency of the appeal will
not come in any manner in the way of the children or relative who is
required to pay any amount in terms of any such order to continue to pay
the amount. Now it can hardly be envisaged that in an appeal filed by the
senior citizen or parent, there could be a question of absence of stay.
Such absence of stay was only envisaged where the appeal is preferred
by a children or relative. It is that eventuality the proviso deals with. The
proviso is, thus, consistent with what has been set out in Section 15 of the
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said Act.
…
We may add at this stage that in order to have assistance to this Court in
view of the complexity in the matter involved, we considered it
appropriate not only for the counsels to assist us, but to appoint Amicus
Curiae to have dispassionate view of the matter. We, thus, appointed Mr.
Puneet Bali, Senior Advocate as the Amicus Curiae to be assisted by Ms.
Divya Sharma, Advocate. They have done a comprehensive research on
various aspects of the matter and this includes the Parliamentary debates
when the Bill for enactment of the said Act was introduced. A perusal of
these debates reflect that there has been no debate qua Section 16(1) of
the said Act, nor has any intent been reflected to exclude the right of
appeal to persons other than the senior citizens or parents, unlike the
debate on Section 17 of the said Act where the right of legal
representation has been excluded.
…
Now coming to the conspectus of the discussion aforesaid, we have no
doubt in our mind that we would be faced with the serious consequences
of quashing such a provision which deprives the right of one party to the
appeal remedy, while conferring it on the other especially in the context
of the other provisions of the same Section as well as of the said Act. We
have to avoid this. The only way to avoid it is to press into service both
the principles of purposive interpretation and casus omissus.The
Parliamentary discussions on the other provisions of the said Act do not
convey any intent by which there is any intent of the Parliament to create
such a differentiation. There is no point in repeating what we have said,
but suffice to say that if nothing else, at least to give a meaning to the
first proviso of Section 16(1) of the said Act, the only interpretation can
be that the right of appeal is conferred on both the sides. It is a case of
an accidental omission and not of conscious exclusion. Thus, in order to
give a complete effective meaning to the statutory provision, we have to
read the words into it, the course of action even suggested in N.
Kannadasan's case (supra) in para 55. How can otherwise the proviso to
sub section (1) be reconciled with sub section itself. In fact, there would
be no need of the proviso which would be made otiose and redundant. It
is salutary role of construction of the statute that no provision should be
made superfluous. There is no negative provision in the Act denying the
right of appeal to the other parties. The other provisions of the Act and
various sub sections discussed aforesaid would show that on the contrary
an appeal from both sides is envisaged. Only exception to this course of
action is the initial words of sub section (1) of Section 16 of the said Act
which need to be supplanted to give a meaning to the intent of the Act,
other provisions of the said Act as also other sub sections of the same
Section of the said Act. In fact, in Board of Muslim Wakfs Rajasthan's
case (supra), even while cautioning supply of casus omissus, it has been
stressed in para 29 that the construction which tends to make any part of
the statute meaningless or ineffective must always be avoided and the
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construction which advances the remedy intended by the statute should
be accepted. This is the only way we can have a consistent enactment in
the form of whole statute.
We are thus of the view that Section 16(1) of the said Act is valid, but
must be read to provide for the right of appeal to any of the affected
parties.”
7. Relying upon the said judgment, recently, in Naveen Kumar (supra), a ld.
Single Judge of this Court has noted the said judgment and permitted the
Petitioner therein to avail of the remedy to appeal. This Court concurs with
the interpretation given to Section 16 of the Act by the Punjab & Haryana
High Court. The Appellate Tribunal, having been constituted under the Act,
anyone aggrieved by an order passed by the Tribunal should be allowed to
approach the Appellate Tribunal. Accordingly, the Petitioner is permitted to
approach the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act to raise any
challenge against the impugned order dated 18th August, 2020.
8. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed. The Petitioner is permitted to
approach the Tribunal within 30 days. If the appeal is filed within 30 days,
the issues of limitation shall not be raised in the appeal. All pending
applications are also disposed of.”
7.
Considering the aforesaid decision, and the fact that the petitioners
herein have an alternate statutory remedy of assailing the order of the
Maintenance Tribunal before the Appellate Tribunal, under Section 16 of the
Act, the present writ petition stands dismissed as not maintainable before
this Court, with liberty to approach the Appellate Tribunal or any other
competent forum.
8.
The order be uploaded on the website forthwith.
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
SEPTEMBER 08, 2026/vc
TD
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The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 14/09/2026 at 17:54:47
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