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Serial No.05
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
MC (Review Pet.) No.5/2018
Date of Order: 08.03.2022
Seven City Developers Pvt. Ltd.
Coram:
Vs.
State of Meghalaya & ors
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant (s)
For the Respondent (s)
: Mr. H Ahmadi, Sr.Adv
: Mr. A Kumar, Advocate General with
Ms. R Colney, GA
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
This is an utterly frivolous review petition made in complete waste of
time and almost an affront to the intelligence of the Bench.
2.
It has become fashionable to try and take a second bite of the
cherry after failing by way of a special leave petition in the Supreme Court.
Review petitions are filed, apparently, on the ground that there is some error
apparent on the face of the record in the order under review but, really, to
challenge the perceived erroneous findings. And so it has been in this case.
Despite Counsel repeating ad nauseam that the grounds urged reveal that
there are errors apparent on the face of the order under review, merely
perceived erroneous findings have been referred to over and over again.
3.
The facts are not much in dispute and may be captured in a
nutshell. A plot of land in a tribal area has been permitted by the so-called
tribal authority to be used by the petitioner and the petitioner applied for
sanction of the transfer thereof in accordance with the Meghalaya Transfer of
Land (Regulation) Act, 1971. The writ petition was filed since express
sanction had not been accorded in terms of the said Act of 1971. The parallel
case run in the writ petition was that a declaration should be issued in favour
of the writ petitioner that sanction was deemed to have been granted since, in
terms of Section 4 of the said Act of 1971, no objections were received to the
grant of sanction within the statutory period of six months.
4.
According to the review petitioner, the most glaring error apparent
on the face of the record would be evident from the fact that though the said
Act expressly permits sanction to be accorded for transfer of tribal land, the
Division Bench of this Court found that there was an absolute bar to any
transfer. The second ground canvassed is that the Division Bench failed to
take into account that the relevant sub-section in Section 4 of the said Act, in
fact, provided for a mechanism for deemed sanction and deemed transfer.
The third ground urged is that the Division Bench fell into error in holding
that the review petitioner had not acted upon the deemed transfer though the
deemed transfer should be seen to have taken place in 2010 or, at any rate,
pursuant to an order passed by the Gauhati High Court in the year 2012. The
fourth point asserted is that the Court equated sanction with transfer;
overlooking the fact that a sanction was required prior to the transfer and the
mere sanction would not amount to transfer. The fifth ground addressed is
that the Division Bench read much into the fact that the registration had not
been effected. The submission on such count is that since there was no
transfer there could have been no registration. The sixth ground pressed into
service is that neither Section 6 nor Section 4 of the said Act requires the
proposed nature of land use to be a basis for considering whether the sanction
should be accorded; and, the Division Bench committed an error apparent on
the face of the record in holding otherwise. A further submission is made to
the effect that the land was found to be a forest land and a report was called
for, but the sample size taken into consideration in the report was contrary to
the governing statute.
5.
A minor detail has to be mentioned at the outset. The review
petition was lodged some 1220 days after the order under review was
pronounced. The primary excuse proffered is that a special leave petition was
carried and such petition was dismissed at the admission stage without the
Supreme Court exercising any appellate authority, whereupon, the petition
for review was filed. It is also submitted that in view of the judgment
reported at (2000) 6 SCC 359 (Kunhayammed vs. State of Kerala), when a
special leave petition is dismissed at the admission stage without the merits
of the matter being gone into, a review carried to the High Court thereafter
may be maintainable.
6.
There is a distinction between the maintainability of a petition and
as to whether it makes out any grounds in support thereof. A bare-bodied
petition with no allegation in support of the prayer may be maintainable, but
the same may fail on merits. Merely because the petition for review may be
maintainable, it would not imply that the jurisdiction of review has to be
metamorphosed into one of revision or appeal to address the perceived errors
of finding under the guise of there being errors apparent on the face of the
order under review. Qualitatively, a review is quite distinct from an appeal or
a revision. Essentially, a review may be maintained when there is some error
apparent on the face of the record or the order under review; or, when some
material which was before the adjudicating authority was not taken into
account despite it having a significant bearing on the issues involved; or,
when, despite exercise of best diligence, the review petitioner could not
produce some material before the adjudicating authority that would have had
a bearing on the process or outcome of the adjudication; or, on some similar
reasons that would warrant a relook into the matter.
7.
Of the three principal classes of grounds that may be invoked in
course of a review, the most common is the first count of there being an error
apparent on the face of the order. The kind of error that can be regarded as an
error within the meaning of the expression “error apparent on the face of the
order” is a mistake which is obvious and which, ordinarily, is not required to
be brought out with reference to any other material, but the same is selfevident in the sense that it is evident upon a plain reading of the order itself.
It must also be added that the fourth class of grounds has to be seen to be
ejusdem generis with the three classes of grounds that precede it. In short,
any or every mistake or any or every error, particularly an error in the
interpretation or an error in the analysis or perception may not be an
appropriate ground to invoke the jurisdiction of review.
8.
For the completeness of the discussion, it must also be pointed out
that a review, like an appeal, is a creature of statute. However, a High Court
being a Court of records has inherent jurisdiction to entertain a review
petition and even to correct its own apparent mistake suo motu.
9.
When a Court spells out the facts in such detail as in the order
under review herein, copiously quotes specific provisions of the statute
which are relevant for adjudication and deals with several features which
weigh with the Court as relevant considerations, the Court may still end up
committing an error, whether in erroneously applying a provision or in
erroneously interpreting another provision or in committing an error of
judgment in arriving at the conclusion; but such errors would not constitute
grounds that can be canvassed in a review before the same forum for the
matter to be revisited. Errors in findings, as in error of judgment, need to be
carried for correction to a superior forum, whether in the revisional or
appellate jurisdiction, depending on the scope of the revision and the extent
of authority to be exercised in the appeal. Certain provisions for revision set
down the parameters for assessment at such level, whereas the appellate
provisions indicate whether the appeal would be both on facts and law or
purely on law.
10.
In the judgment and order under review dated March 31, 2015, the
Court referred to Sections 3 and 4 of the said Act, on which much emphasis
has been placed on behalf of the petitioner. In fact, both the provisions have
been quoted in the judgment under review. It is not as if the Division Bench
was unmindful of the fact that a sanction for transfer could be accorded;
however, what it perceived was that the grant of a sanction was an exception
to the rule and not the general rule as such. It is in such sense that the
relevant finding in the impugned judgment has to be read and not as if the
adjudication was made de hors the statute. It also weighed with the Court that
a relevant consideration for according sanction under the applicable
provision was as to whether the person applying for sanction – the non-tribal
– required the relevant land for his residence. Indeed, Section 4 of the said
Act provides the circumstances and stipulates the considerations which are
relevant. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act deals with
whether the non-tribal holds any other land in Meghalaya. Clause (b) deals
with whether there is any other tribal willing to take the land on transfer at
the market value. Clause (c) deals with the matter as to whether it is
necessary for the applicant to reside in the area, amongst others. Clause (d)
pertains to whether the proposed transfer is likely to promote the economic
interests of the scheduled tribes in the locality.
11.
Thus, on a reading of Section 4 (1) (c) of the said Act, it cannot be
said that an altogether outlandish consideration weighed with the Division
Bench in passing the impugned judgment; or, whether or not it was necessary
for the applicant to reside in the area, was not a part of the consideration for
the purpose of according sanction under Section 4 of the Act. It is
conceivable that there is another interpretation. It is possible that the manner
in which Section 4(1)(c) was read by the Division Bench may have been
inappropriate, but it does not follow that an altogether irrelevant
consideration was taken into account or a relevant consideration was
overlooked or that there is an error apparent on the face of the order in the
discussion relating to such aspect of the matter.
12.
Similarly, the Division Bench considered the nature of the land
involved and found, even if erroneously, that it would be deemed to be a
forest and the sanction of the Central Government would be necessary for
such purpose. It is possible, as the review petitioner urges, that such a
conclusion could not have been drawn from the facts and by applying the
relevant statute; but that would be an error of a judgment amenable to
correction in appeal or revision, not capable of being subjected to a review.
13.
The Division Bench also noticed that in respect of a forest land,
agriculture would be permissible as long as such activity was needed to be
taken up by the local tribals. According to the Division Bench, as evident
from the impugned judgment, a non-tribal desiring the transfer of the land in
his favour could not seek sanction for transfer on the ground that the land
would be put to use for agricultural purpose. That is how the Division Bench
perceived the law to apply to the facts of the case. Again, it may have been
an error of judgment; but surely not an error which is capable of correction
before a coordinate Bench in course of a belated review.
14.
This was an avoidable misadventure and the review petitioner was
put on notice at the outset. Yet, the matter was pursued with considerable
vigour for which the review petitioner should be appropriately rewarded. It
must be recorded, in all fairness, that despite the obvious impatience of the
Court, the matter was impeccably conducted on behalf of the petitioner.
However, the lengthy exercise was eminently avoidable and amounted to no
more than flogging a dead horse.
15.
In the light of the review petition having been found to be devoid
of any merit for reconsideration of the matter by way of review, and without
going into the veracity of the findings rendered in the judgment and order
under review, the present petition is dismissed. Since the merits of the matter
have been gone into, the application for condonation of delay is disposed of
upon the same being deemed to have been allowed. Review petition No.5 of
2022 pertaining to WA No.46 of 2013 is dismissed with costs assessed at
Rs.2 lakh to be paid to the State in course of a fortnight. In default, the State
will be entitled to proceed against the writ petitioner and its assets by way of
execution as in arrears of land revenue.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
08.03.2022
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