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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
PRESENT:
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE UDAY KUMAR
CRR 3513 of 2019
Sri Satyendra Nath Murmu
-VsThe State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioners
: Mr. Abhra Mukherjee,
Mr. Swakshar Kr. Mondal,
Mr. Arpayan Mukherjee,
Mr. Himadree Ghosh
For the Opposite Party No.2
: Mr. Aritra Bhattacharya,
Mr. Suman Dutta
Hearing concluded on
: 06.02.2026
Judgment on
: 13.02.2026
UDAY KUMAR, J.: –
1. The petitioner, Satyendra Nath Murmu, a primary school teacher, has moved
this Court under Section 401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, challenging the propriety and legality of the judgment and
order dated 31.08.2019, passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st
Court, Purulia, in Criminal Revision No. 09 of 2017. By the impugned
judgment, the first Revisional Court set aside an order of dismissal dated
05.12.2016, passed by the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Court, Purulia, in
Misc. Case No. 65 of 2010, which had originally rejected / dismissed the
maintenance claim of Opposite Party No. 2, Smt. Anandi Murmu, for the lack
of the legal status of a "wife." Conversely, the Learned Revisional Court
reversed that finding and granted maintenance in her favour.
2. The factual matrix leading to the present revision reveals that this litigation
stems from a claim filed by Opposite Party No. 2 Anandi Murmu (second wife
of petitioner) in 2010, under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(the Code). She asserted that her marriage with the petitioner was solemnized
on 11.12.1995 via registration under the Special Marriage Act, followed by a
social ceremony as per Santhal Rites on 22.02.1996. She alleged that after
years of cohabitation, the petitioner subjected her to physical and mental
torture and eventually deserted her.
3. The petitioner-husband countered this claim, both on the facts and
jurisdictional threshold, contending that Anandi is not his "legally wedded
wife" because his first marriage to one Jyotsna Rani Murmu, solemnized
in1397 B.S. (1990), is still subsisting. The records indicate that this first
marriage had already been judicially recognized by the parties before the Court
at Bankura, in a prior judicial proceeding of Misc. Case No. 22 of 2004.
4. The Learned Trial Magistrate accepted the petitioner’s defense. He applied the
law strictly. Under section 5 (i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, a man cannot marry
a second time while his first wife is alive. Such a marriage is void from the
beginning (ab initio). If the marriage is void, the woman cannot claim the
status of a "wife." Admittedly, at the time of the alleged marriage with the
claimant, the petitioner had a living spouse. Consequently, the second
marriage was eclipsed / hit by the statutory bar of Section 5(i) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955, making it void ab initio. Following the "Strict Rule" of
interpretation, the Magistrate dismissed the maintenance petition.
5. The first Revisional Court, however, reversed / set aside this finding of
dismissal. Relying on the "Social Justice" approach ruled by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Badshah v. Urmilla Badshah Godse [(2014) 1 SCC 188], the
Court held that the petitioner could not take advantage of his own wrong to
evade financial obligations, especially in light of prior admissions and a
registered marriage certificate.
6. The core question that arises for this Court’s consideration is whether a
woman who enters into a marriage with the knowledge of her husband’s prior
valid marriage, is entitled to claim maintenance as a "wife" under Section 125
of the Code?
7. Mr. Abhra Mukherjee, the learned counsel for the petitioner, underscored for a
strict legal interpretation of the term "wife" under Section 125 of the Code. It
must be interpreted strictly to mean a "legally wedded wife." Relying
thereupon, learned Counsel contended that once the Courts in Bankura
judicially recognized Jyotsna Rani Murmu as the first wife, any subsequent
marriage entered into by the petitioner became void ab initio (invalid from the
very beginning).
8. He argued that such a second marriage is a nullity under Section 5(i) of the
Hindu Marriage Act, as once a union is hit by this statutory bar, the doors to
Section 125 are effectively bolted. He further submitted that there can be no
"estoppel against a statute"; therefore, the prior admission or marriage
certificates cannot validate a union that the law expressly forbids.
9. Conversely, Mr. Aritra Bhattacharya, the learned counsel for the Opposite
Party, submitted that Section 125 is social welfare legislation and the standard
of proof in Section 125 is summary, where the same rigors as of a civil trial
would not be applied. He relied on a suite of documents—the Marriage
Certificate (Exhibit-1), the Ration Card, and the Voter ID—to establish a strong
presumption of a valid marriage.
10. Mr. Bhattacharya described the petitioner’s conduct as "socially and legally
corrupt," pointing out that the husband shifts his legal stance across different
litigations solely to evade his financial obligations.
11. Mr. Bhattacharya eventually argued that the claimant is entitled to the court’s
protection based on years of cohabitation and a formal registration of
marriage, as the same now estopped the petitioner from denying the claimant's
status merely to escape financial liability to maintain her under Section 125
which primarily intended to prevent vagrancy and destitution of wife
12. Indubitably, the controversy is centered around the entitlement of Opposite
Party No.2 for maintenance under social-welfare provisions under Section 125
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is a prophylactic measure enacted by the
Legislature to shield society from the twin evils of vagrancy and destitution.
Within this framework, the Court must examine whether the claimant, Smt.
Anandi Murmu, qualifies for the legal status of a "wife."
13. The expression "wife" in Section 125 has been the subject of extensive judicial
scrutiny. It is a fundamental canon of interpretation that words in a statute
must be given their ordinary legal meaning unless the context suggests
otherwise. While the Code is a piece of social justice legislation, it cannot be
read in a vacuum; it must be interpreted in harmony with the substantive
personal laws governing the parties. Under Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955, as well as the Special Marriage Act, 1954, the "monogamy rule" is a
condition precedent for a valid marriage. Consequently, in the context of
matrimonial status, the term "wife" refers strictly to a person who has entered
into a legally valid marriage.
14. As observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Savita Kumari v. State of Haryana
[(2003) 3 SCC 357], the court must maintain a distinction between a "legal
marriage" and "long-term cohabitation" for the purposes of different statutes.
Where the law requires a specific status, that status must be proven through
the prism of substantive law.
15. Historically, the law has favoured a strict interpretation. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court established the "Strict Rule", in the landmark case of Yamunabai
Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav [(1988) 1 SCC 530], where it was
categorically held that "The expression 'wife' in Section 125 of the Code should be interpreted to
mean only a legally wedded wife. The marriage of a woman with a man
who has a living spouse... is a nullity and the woman is not entitled to
maintenance."
16. A marriage in contravention of the monogamy rule is a nullity and generally
cannot sustain a claim for maintenance. This view was further fortified in
Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat (2005) 3 SCC 636, where it
was observed that however desirable it may be to protect a woman, the
legislative intent behind the word "wife" cannot be ignored to include a woman
in a void marriage.
17. However, the Supreme Court carved out an exception for the "Innocent Victim"
based on Estoppel in Badshah (supra). The Apex Court held that where a man
fraudulently conceals his first marriage to dupe a woman into a second
marriage, he is estopped from pleading the nullity of that marriage to avoid
paying maintenance. This prevents a man from taking advantage of his own
fraud. The relevant paragraphs defining this exception are:
"13.2. ...at least for the purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C, it would be treated
as a 'marriage' and the woman would be entitled to maintenance. We are
of the opinion that when the husband wants to take the benefit of his
own wrong by raising a contention that the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage is void... such a husband cannot be
permitted to rely on the said contention."
"13.3. ...The husband, in such circumstances, cannot be allowed to take
advantage of his own wrong and turn around or say that the
respondents are not entitled to maintenance... This is based on the
principle of 'estoppel'."
18. Where a woman enters into a marriage with the full knowledge (scienter) that
the
man’s
first
interpretation"
marriage
and
is
"deception"
subsisting,
required
the
for
element
the
of
"purposive
Badshah
exception,
conspicuously absent. The law does not protect a person who knowingly
enters into a bigamous relationship. As held by the Apex Court in the same
judgment (Badshah):
"15. ...The court has to give a very meaningful interpretation. However,
at the same time, it is to be kept in mind that for the purpose of Section
125... 'wife' means a 'legally wedded wife'. The exception is created
only where the husband has duped the victim by concealing the earlier
marriage."
19. In any event, a judgment is not a statute; it must be read in light of its specific
facts. This Court finds a fundamental distinction between the facts in
Badshah and the instant case. The records indicate that Anandi Murmu was
neither an innocent victim nor a stranger to the petitioner’s history. She was a
witness in prior litigations involving the first wife, Jyotsna Rani Murmu. This
confirms she had full knowledge of the subsisting marriage. Where a woman
knowingly enters into a bigamous relationship, she cannot later claim the
equitable protection of "innocent deception."Consequently, the shield of
"innocent deception" is unavailable.
20. In this regard the view of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vimala (K.) v. Veeraswamy
(K.) [(1991) 2 SCC 375], is relevant where it was held that "the object is to
prevent vagrancy... but where the second marriage is performed with the
knowledge that the first marriage is subsisting, the woman cannot take
advantage of the beneficial provisions of Section 125."
21. The first Revisional Court committed a patent error of law by applying the
Badshah ratio where the element of deception was conspicuously absent.
Status is a matter of law, not of admission. The petitioner’s prior admissions
cannot validate a status that the law declared void ab initio. To hold otherwise
would render the "monogamy rule" under Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage
Act a dead letter.
22. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the Criminal Revisional Application being
CRR 3513 of 2019 is allowed.
23. The judgment and order of the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Court,
Purulia, dated 31.08.2019, is hereby set aside and quashed.
24. The original order of dismissal passed by the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st
Court, Purulia, dated 05.12.2016, is restored and affirmed.
25. It is clarified that while the claim under Section 125 fails, the opposite party is
not precluded from seeking recourse under the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, where the definition of a "domestic relationship"
is wider.
26. Any interim maintenance stands vacated.
27. There shall be no order as to costs.
28. Any application, if any, is also disposed of.
29. The Trial Court Record (TCR), if any, shall be sent down to the Trial Court, at
once.
30. Case diary, if any, be returned forthwith.
31. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the
parties, as expeditiously as possible, upon compliance with the necessary
formalities in this regard.
(Uday Kumar, J.)
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