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2025:MLHC:1078
Serial No. 02
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
MC(WPC) No. 261 of 2025 in
WP(C) No. 383 of 2025
Date of Decision :11.11.2025
Satnam Global Infraprojects Ltd.,
….. Applicant(s)
Versus
Meghalaya Power Distribution Corporation Ltd.,
…. Respondent(s)
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.S.Thangkhiew, Judge.
Appearance:
For the Applicant(s)
: Mr. M. Goswami, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. S.K. Raut, Adv.
Mr. A. Verma Adv.
Mr. R. Verma, Adv.
Mr. S. Purkhayastha, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. A. Kumar, AG with
Mr. A.H. Kharwanlang, Add. Sr. GA
Mr. A.S. Pandey, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc:
Yes/No
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
2025:MLHC:1078
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
This Misc. application under Article 226 (3) has been filed
seeking vacation/recall/modification of the interim order dated 04.09.2025
passed by this Court.
2.
The brief background facts are that the NCLT, Guwahati
Bench on an application by the applicant (respondent in writ petition), had
passed an order dated 04.09.2025, and initiated Corporate Insolvency
Resolution Process (CIRP) against the writ petitioner company. The said
proceedings before the NCLT, were put to challenge by way of WP(C) No.
383 of 2025, and this Court by the order dated 04.09.2025, which is sought
to be vacated/modified by this instant application, ordered for suspension of
all proceedings before the learned NCLT Guwahati Bench in
CP(IB)/9/GB/2024, IA(IBC)/188, IA (IBC)/41/GB/2025/188 and IA
(IBC)/41/GB/2025, including appointment of an Interim Resolution
Professional.
3.
It is submitted by Mr. M. Goswami, learned Senior counsel
assisted by Mr. S.K. Rout, learned counsel for the applicant that the writ
petition itself is not maintainable and is to be dismissed at the threshold
itself, inasmuch as, there has been suppression of material facts by the
petitioner who has not disclosed that it is a government company registered
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under the Companies Act, 2013. Further, it is submitted that the petitioner
had made a misleading averment by stating that it was a corporate entity.
The learned Senior counsel contends that it is not a case where the NCLT
lack inherent jurisdiction but on the contrary the NCLT did have a
jurisdiction to adjudicate as the respondent corporation is a ‘corporate
debtor’, which will be evident from a bare perusal of Section 3(7), (8),
Section 6, 8 & 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC 2016)
read with Section 2(20) and 2(45) of the Companies Act, 2013. The
petitioner he submits, is a government company engaged in the business of
distribution of electricity in the State of Meghalaya and it is neither a
sovereign entity, nor does it perform any sovereign function as per the tests
laid down by the Supreme Court in this regard. The learned Senior counsel
on this aspect has placed the following decisions: i)
Balmer Lawrie & Company Limited & Ors. Vs. Partha Sarathi
Sen Roy & Ors. (2013) 9 SCC 345
4.
ii)
Agriculture Produce Market (2000) 8 SCC 61
iii)
Chief Conservator of Forest (1996) 2 SCC 293
The learned Senior counsel then submits that a perusal of
paragraphs 8.6 to 8.9 of the judgment of the NCLT dated 04.09.2025, will
clearly reveal that the issue pertaining to jurisdiction has been elaborately
dealt with and that the judgment relied upon by the petitioner i.e. Hindustan
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Construction Company (2020) 17 SCC 324, would have no application as
the petitioner corporation is not a creature of a statute but is merely a
government company. He then contends that this being a position it would
certainly come within the meaning of Section 3(7) & (8) IBC Code, read
with Section 2(20) and 2(45) of the Companies Act, 2013.
5.
It is then argued by the learned Senior counsel that when an
alternative efficacious remedy is available under Section 61 of the IBC, this
Court may not entertain the instant petition and relegate the petitioner to seek
redressal of its grievances before a statutory forum that is available in
accordance with law. Learned Senior counsel has relied upon the following
2(two) decisions in this regard: i)
Embassy Property Developments Private Limited vs. State of
Karnataka & Ors. (2020) 13 SCC 308
ii)
6.
Whirlpool Corporation (1998) 8 SCC
He then prayed that the ex parte interim order dated 04.09.2025
on the grounds as set out, be vacated and the writ petition dismissed.
7.
Mr. A. Kumar, learned AG assisted by Mr. A.H. Kharwanlang,
learned Add. Sr. GA for the opposite party (writ petitioner) has submitted
that firstly, the present case involves pure questions of law to which the
petitioner corporation has not yet filed reply to. However, it is submitted the
grant or refusal of an interim order is governed by the triple test of prima
2025:MLHC:1078
facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable damage and that in the
instant case all the three parameters are satisfied. Learned AG has submitted
that the instant case has huge ramifications, inasmuch as, had no interim
protection been given, it would not only have made the writ petition
infructuous, but would have also led to a cascading effect on the distribution
of power across the State of Meghalaya. As such, he submits the writ petition
is an exceptional case which would therefore be maintainable under the writ
jurisdiction of this Court.
8.
It is submitted that the jurisdiction of the NCLT is not made out
as the Schemes executed by the MePDCL, are in the nature of discharge of
sovereign function and therefore, there is no debt and due payable under the
IBC 2016 in terms of Section 3 (11) and thus, there is no default under
Section 3 (12). The MePDCL it is submitted has no functional autonomy to
disburse the funds, inasmuch as, the sanction of payments, both the advance
and consequent payments are entirely met by the Central or State
Government. The MePDCL it is contended is not under any financial distress
as is the case of other companies against whom insolvency proceedings are
invoked and IRP appointed. The payments in the instant case he submits,
was stopped by virtue of the directions passed by the State Government
which was executing the Schemes through the MePDCL.
2025:MLHC:1078
9.
It is further submitted that the applicant has incorrectly placed
reliance upon Para-17 of the NCLT order dated 04.09.2025 to argue that the
appointment of IRP would not affect the functioning of MePDCL. The said
averment, the learned AG submits is incorrect as the said provision has been
included only to maintain the essential supplies to the corporate debtor, but
does not provide any protection of discharge of essential functions by the
corporate debtor after the insolvency is invoked and IRP appointed.
MePDCL, it is contended is an extended limb of the State of Meghalaya
implementing Schemes of the Central Government on behalf of the State
Government. In this context, the learned AG has submitted that it is an
admitted position that subject contract agreements were executed under the
Government of India Saubhagya Schemes, which the applicant was also
bound by other governing terms under the said Scheme, and that it had
completed both Package-A and Package-B within the stipulated time as per
the General conditions of the contract and other terms under the said
Scheme. The Letter of Intent issued to the applicant itself he submits, had
clarified that the LOI was subject to approval Ministry of Power and
approval of State Government for funds and additional sanction.
10.
The Guidelines of the Saubhagya Scheme dated 20.10.2017, it
is submitted provides that Projects under the Scheme will be implemented
through a State Government Agency and the assets to be created under the
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Scheme will be owned by the State Government/State owned company and
that the grants would be subject to determination by the Monitoring
Committee of the Central Government. Further, it is submitted that for the
implementation of the Project a tripartite agreement dated 30.11.2016, was
also entered into by the Rural Electrification Corporation Limited (RECL)
with the State of Meghalaya and MePDCL. The State Government he
submits, had sent a Letter of Intent dated 13.04.2018 for participation by the
State in the Saubhagya Schemes to REC Ltd. and the Department of Power,
State of Meghalaya undertook to comply and abide by the prescribed
Guidelines of the Scheme. As such, he submits it is not a case that the writ
petitioner had any functional autonomy in the disbursal of payments and as
such there is no debt and due payable by it. The finding therefore, by the
NCLT he submits that the MePDCL was liable for the debt is incorrect,
moreover as it was merely a custodian of the funds and the sanction of the
funds was by the Central Government which was disbursed subject to
fulfillment of conditions. Learned AG has also referred to certain materials
which have been annexed to an application for amendment to substantiate
this point, which however are not illustrated or discussed herein.
11.
The learned AG further argues that in order to exercise
jurisdiction under the IBC 2016, the requirement of law as set out in Section
3(12) is that there has to be default in payment of debt, due and payable, but
2025:MLHC:1078
as there was an embargo by the Government on any payments to the
contractor/supplier and with the MePDCL not possessing any autonomy in
the disbursal of funds, the alleged debt was not due and payable by the
MePDCL. Payments made in the past he submits were always on account of
payments advanced by the Central/State Government and both these entities
do not come within the ambit of the IBC 2016, hence the NCLT had no
inherent to jurisdiction in relation to the petitioner as far as alleged nonpayment of debt arising out of the above contract.
12.
The Insolvency proceedings it is contended is also in
contravention of Section 131 of the Electricity Act, inasmuch as, any
property, rights and liabilities of the State Electricity Board stand vested in
the State Government and therefore, there cannot be transfer of such
property, rights and liabilities in any manner other than as provided under
Section 131. It is also submitted that the MePDCL being constituted in terms
of the Meghalaya Power Sector Reforms Transfer Scheme, 2010 under
Sections 131 and 133 of the Electricity Act, 2003 is a Government entity and
that the regulation and development of all matters concerning electricity is
under the control of the Union and the State and the regulation of electricity
is an executive function of the State through the Corporation.
13.
The learned AG has then referred to the judgment of Hindustan
Construction Company Ltd., (supra) and submits that the learned NCLT had
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erred in not correctly appreciating the ratio of the judgment, inasmuch as, at
Para-76 thereof, the Supreme Court has held in essence that a statutory body
which functions as an extended limb of the Central Government and
performs governmental functions cannot be taken over by a resolution
professional under IBC or any other corporate body and that further in the
case referred, the claims against government companies arose out of an
arbitration award unlike in the present case, wherein the claims are for
projects of the Central/State Government. As such, he submits the instant
paragraph is squarely applicable to the present case.
14.
On the point of availability of alternative statutory remedy, it is
contended by the learned AG that the same does not operate as an absolute
bar and one of the exceptions carved out which is applicable in the instant
case, is where the order or the proceedings impugned are wholly without
jurisdiction. It is the case of the writ petitioner he submits, that the learned
NCLT lacks the very competence to exercise and initiate the insolvency
proceedings and that the determination of such a pure question of law can
only be decided by this Court in exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction.
The learned AG has referred to the following case in support of his
arguments: i)
Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. vs. Excise and Taxation Authority 2023
SCC OnLine SC 95
2025:MLHC:1078
ii)
Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021)
6 SCC 771.
15.
Learned AG has also placed reliance in the case of Embassy
Property Developments Private Ltd,. vs. State of Karnataka (2020) 13 SCC
308, wherein he submits, it has been held that a decision taken by a
Government or statutory authority in relation to a matter which is in the
realm of public law cannot by any stretch of imagination be brought in the
fold of the phrase ‘arising out or in relation to the insolvency resolution’
appearing in Section 60 (5) (c). It is also submitted that electricity is a
fundamental right and a responsibility of the State and in Meghalaya there
are no private entities providing this service, and the MePDCL being owned
100% by the State Government discharges a sovereign function. Reference
has been made to the following judgments in support of this argument: i)
Flaming B. Marak vs. State of Meghalaya in PIL 3 of 2023 dated
05.05.2023 and 14.06.2024.
ii)
Chameli Singh & Ors. Vs. State of UP & Anr. (1996) 2 SCC 549
iii)
TM Prakash vs. District Collector, Tiruvannamalai (2013) 6
CTC 849
16.
The learned AG has then proceeded to distinguish the decisions
relied upon by the applicant and submits that the writ petitioner has an
excellent prima facie case and irreparable injury would be caused if
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insolvency proceedings are allowed to be proceeded with, as the same will
result in the operation of distribution of electricity in the entire State coming
to a standstill, as no resolution professional or private individual can take
over the management of MePDCL. It is also submitted that the order of the
learned NCLT, also suffers from the violation of the principles of natural
justice and that the writ petition will become infructuous if the interim order
is vacated. He lastly submits that the respondent has also approached the
Prime Minister Office making baseless allegations in order to prejudice the
adjudication of this matter and the said communication, however while
making such allegations has also acknowledged the fact that funds have been
released by REC Ltd./Central Government. This representation in fact to the
Hon’ble PMO itself, he submits is a concession that the Schemes concerns
the Central Government and the payments become due and payable only
with the sanction of the Government. He therefore, prays that the instant
application for modification be rejected and the main writ petition be taken
up for consideration.
17.
In his rejoinder reply, the learned Senior counsel Mr. M.
Goswami has reiterated his earlier submissions, and has also placed on
record two further judgments that a company/government company would
come within the meaning of Section 3(7) & (8) of the IBC, 2016. The
judgments are 2021 (4) GLT 693 (Hindustan Paper Corporation) and WP
2025:MLHC:1078
No. 19785/2021 (Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation
Ltd.,). Learned Senior counsel has also contended that it is a fallacy to state
that the writ petitioner is a statutory authority under the Electricity Act,
inasmuch as, it cannot at the same time be a company incorporated under the
Companies Act, 2013, and a perusal of Section 131 (1) & (2) read with
Section 2 (13) & (31) will make it clear that the writ petitioner is not a
statutory authority but merely a company. It is also submitted that language
used in the statute being plain and unambiguous, there is no possibility to
interpret or to read into Sections 3(7) (8) and (23) of the IBC, 2016 that
companies/government company’s function as an extended limb of the State
and are thus exempted from the purview of IBC, 2016. Reliance has been
placed on the case of State of UP vs. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj 1962 SCC
OnLine SC 12 Pr 8 (CB). It is submitted that if legislature had intended not
to include companies/government companies functioning as an extended
limb of the State from the purview of the aforementioned Sections, the same
would have been specifically done do by a legislature as done in the case of
a Financial Service Provider.
18.
The learned Senior counsel further submits that though an
argument has been advanced that overnight the State will be in darkness if
the IRP is to be appointed, the same is misplaced, inasmuch as, in the final
directions of the order of the NCLT, Para-17 thereof, adequately protects
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and addresses this issue and the larger public interest has been duly taken
care of. Reverting to the Hindustan Construction Company, it is submitted
that NHPC and NTPC are two monopoly government companies involved
in creating infrastructure etc. and also essentially involved in implementing
various Schemes of the Union Government and operate as its extended arms,
and if such companies are amenable to the IBC 2016, the petitioner cannot
claim to be exempted on the purported doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, and
the mere fact that there is no other private power distribution company in the
State of Meghalaya makes no difference.
19.
The learned Senior counsel submits that the issue before this
Court, is only in the premise that the NCLT lacks inherent jurisdiction to
adjudicate and as such therefore, this Court may not entertain or adjudicate
any issue touching upon the merits of the case, such as debt not pertaining
to the petitioner and not payable by the petitioner and interpretation of the
various contracts/agreements of the Soubhagya Schemes and that these
issues lie within the exclusive domain of the NCLAT in its appellate
jurisdiction. This apart he submits, the applicant is not a party or signatory
to the tripartite agreement dated 30.11.2016, and therefore no reliance can
be placed on the same. He concludes his reply by submitting that the writ
petition deserves to be dismissed.
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20.
On hearing the parties, before proceeding to determine the issue
i.e. jurisdiction, it would be useful to refer to the following provisions under
the IBC 2016, placed against the facts of the present case. Section 3(7)
defines “corporate persons” and reads as follows:
“corporate person” means a company as defined in clause
(20) of section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013), a
limited liability partnership, as defined in clause (n) of subsection (1) of section 2 of the Limited Liability Partnership
Act, 2008 (6 of 2009), or any other person incorporated with
limited liability under any law for the time being in force but
shall not include any financial service provider;”
Section 3 (8) defines “corporate debtor”, 3(11) defines “debt”,
3(12) “default” in non-payment of debts as follows: “3. Definitions. —In this Code, unless the context otherwise
requires,
(8) “corporate debtor” means a corporate person who owes a
debt to any person;
(11) “debt” means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim
which is due from any person and includes a financial debt
and operational debt;
(12) “default” means non-payment of debt when whole or any
part or instalment of the amount of debt has become due and
payable and is not paid by the debtor or the corporate debtor,
as the case may be;”
21.
A bare perusal of the above noted provisions read with Section
2(45) of the Companies Act, 2013, wherein a government company is
defined, no doubt will bring the writ petitioner company within the ambit
and jurisdiction under the NCLT. However, over and above the stated
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definitions and the nature of the company, what has been urged in this case
is that the actions which had brought about the institution of the instant
proceedings are beyond the control of the writ petitioner company, inasmuch
as, it does not have functional autonomy in the disbursal of payments and
therefore there is no debt due and payable. In this context, it has been argued
and demonstrated, that the MePDCL is merely a custodian of the funds and
as such, has no authority to independently disburse the payments, and that
the sanction of the funds by the Central Government and the disbursal
thereof, were also subject to fulfillment of certain conditions. Another valid
consideration that this Court has to keep in mind is that whether there can be
a transfer of property, rights and liabilities in any other manner than that
provided under Section 131 of the Electricity Act.
22.
Another pertinent issue, is the question of sovereign function.
In the case Hindustan Construction Company (supra), the Supreme Court
had clarified and held that in the application of the Code to government
owned companies as defined under Section 2(45) of the Companies Act,
2013, and thus included within the definition of Section 3(7) of the IBC, of
corporate person, such entities were amenable to the provisions of the IBC,
but when the company performs non-delegable sovereign functions, it
cannot be put to resolution nor be wound up under the IBC as allowing
insolvency proceedings against such entities, would disrupt essential
2025:MLHC:1078
services or governmental functions. In the instant case, it has been strongly
canvassed that the writ petitioner is functioning as an extended limb of the
Government and performs governmental functions, which cannot be taken
over by a resolution professional under the IBC, or any other corporate body.
Strong emphasis has also been made that electricity is a fundamental right,
which is the responsibility of the State and that the writ petitioner is the only
entity owned 100% by the State Government which provides electricity and
discharges a sovereign function. On this point it would be useful to refer to
the judgment in the case of Balmer Lawrie & Company Limited & Ors. Vs.
Partha Sarathi Sen Roy & Ors. reported in (2013) 9 SCC 345, wherein at
Para-18 & 20 thereof, which is reproduced hereinbelow, it has been held as
follows: “18. Often, there is confusion when the concept of sovereign
functions is extended to include all welfare activities.
However, the court must be very conscious whilst taking a
decision as regards the said issue, and must take into
consideration the nature of the body’s powers and the manner
in which they are exercised. What functions have been
approved to be sovereign are the defense of the country, the
raising the arms forces, making peace or waging war, foreign
affairs, the power to acquire and retain territory, etc. and the
same are not amenable to the jurisdiction of ordinary civil
courts. (Vide N. Nagendra Rao & Co. v. State of A.P. (1994)
6 SCC 205: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1609: AIR 1994 SC 2663 and
Chief Conservator of Forest v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare
(1996) 2 SCC 293: 1996 SCC (L&S) 500: AIR 1996 SC 2898)
20. Every governmental function need not be sovereign. State
activities are multifarious. Therefore, a scheme or project,
sponsoring trading activities may well be among the State’s
2025:MLHC:1078
essential functions, which contribute towards its welfare
activities aimed at the benefit of its subjects, and such
activities can also be undertaken by private persons,
corporates and companies. Thus, considering the wide
ramifications, sovereign functions should be restricted to
those functions, which are primarily inalienable, and which
can be performed by the State alone. Such functions may
include legislative functions, the administration of law,
eminent domain, maintenance of law and order, internal and
external security, grant of pardon, etc. Therefore, mere
dealing in a subject by the State, or the monopoly of the State
in a particular field, would not render an enterprise sovereign
in nature. (Vide Agricultural Produce Market Committee v.
Ashok Harikuni (2000) 8 SCC 61: AIR 2000 SC 3116, State
of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh (2005) 5 SCC 1: 2005 SCC (L&S) 642,
Assam Small Scale Industries Development Corpn. Ltd., v.
J.D. Pharmaceuticals (2005) 13 SCC 19: AIR 2006 SC 131
and Haryana State Industrial Development Corpn. V. Hari
Om Enterprises (2009) 16 SCC 208: AIR 2009 SC 218)
23.
A perusal of the above extract would show that sovereign
functions are those functions which are primarily inalienable and which can
be performed by the State alone, and as such mere dealing in a subject by
the State in a particular field would not render an enterprise sovereign in
nature. However, it is noted in this judgment, the question was whether the
appellant company which was a government company, would come within
the meaning of ‘State’ as per Article 12 of the Constitution, and the degree
of Governmental control such as its objectives, functions, management and
control, financial aid received by it, functional and administrative were
examined, to determine as to whether it would be amenable to writ
jurisdiction. The finding in this case at Para-34 thereof, was that there was
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nothing on record to show that the Central Government provided any
financial or budgetary support to the company, which met its own working
capital requirements which is unlike the present situation where admittedly
the Scheme was wholly financed by the Government. As such therefore, in
the considered view of this Court, in the realm of sovereign function though
every governmental function need not be sovereign, the same has to be
examined on the circumstances pertaining to a particular case or situation.
In the instant case, as noted earlier, it has been categorically advanced that
the alleged debt is not due or payable in terms of the IBC, and that further,
the writ petitioner does not exercise functional autonomy or did it possess
financial autonomy for disbursal of the funds. This Court notes also a
question that remains unanswered, is whether in these circumstances, it can
be held that the writ petitioner company was unable to pay the debts due to
financial distress, or that the same was not due and payable by the writ
petitioner company. Another question that has arisen, is whether the NCLT
has jurisdiction on payments which were subject to funds being released by
the Central or State Government, which in turn subject to fulfillment of
certain terms and conditions. It is noted that a ground has also been taken
that the State Government has put an embargo on the payment of dues, which
is a question which also has to be gone into as to its veracity.
2025:MLHC:1078
24.
On the question of the availability of alternate remedy, the
decision in the case of Embassy Property Developments Private Limited vs.
State of Karnataka & Ors. reported in (2020) 13 SCC 308, at Para-10 & 11
thereof, which are relevant has held as follows: “10. In the backdrop of the facts narrated and in the light of
the rival contentions extracted above, the first question that
arises for consideration is as to whether the High Court ought
to interfere, under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, with
an order (Vasudevan v. State of Karnataka, 2019 SCC
OnLine NCLT 681) passed by NCLT in a proceeding under
the IBC, 2016 despite the availability of a statutory alternative
remedy of appeal to NCLAT.
11. It is beyond of any pale of doubt that the IBC, 2016 is a
complete code in itself. As observed by this Court in
Innoventive Industries Ltd., v. ICICI Bank (2018) 1 SCC 407:
(2018) 1 SCC (Civ) 356: AIR 2017 SC 4084) it is an
exhaustive code on the subject-matter of insolvency in
relation to corporate entities and others. It is also true that the
IBC, 2016 is a single Unified Umbrella Code, covering the
entire gamut of the law relating to insolvency resolution of
corporate persons and others in a time-bound manner. The
Code provides a three-tier mechanism, namely, (i) the NCLT,
which is the adjudicating authority, (ii) the NCLAT, which is
the appellate authority, and (iii) this Court as the final
authority, for dealing with all issues that may arise in relation
to the reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate
persons. Insofar as insolvency resolution of corporate debtors
and personal guarantors are concerned, any order passed by
the NCLT is appealable to NCLAT under Section 61 of the
IBC, 2016 and the orders of the NCLAT are amenable to the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Section 62. It is in
this context that the action of the State of Karnataka in
bypassing the remedy of appeal to NCLAT and the act of the
High Court in entertaining the writ petition against the order
(Vasudevan v. State of Karnataka, 2019 SCC OnLine NCLT
681) of the NCLT are being questioned.”
2025:MLHC:1078
25.
The above quoted judgment leaves no room for doubt as to the
IBC being a complete Code in itself, with an in-built mechanism to deal with
all issues that may arise in insolvency resolution of corporate debtors. In the
instant case however, many questions as observed earlier remain open, and
the matter has been primarily deliberated only on the vacation, or recall of
the order dated 04.09.2025 passed by this Court. Further, the entire facts
including a formal challenge to the impugned order of the NCLT dated
04.09.2025, has yet to be brought on record by an amendment application
which though filed, is yet to be allowed. This Court therefore, deems it fit
that for a proper and complete adjudication on the question of
maintainability, which unquestionably is inextricably linked to, and will
decide the main writ petition, to reject the prayer for vacation of the interim
order at this stage, leaving the matter to be finally decided on all facts and
materials being placed by the parties on the pleadings being completed.
26.
Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, this Misc.
application is not entertained, and is accordingly disposed of.
JUDGE
Meghalaya
11.11.2025
“V. Lyndem- PS”
VALENTINO LYNDEM
Date: 2025.11.11 16:53:11 IST
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