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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 07.08.2026
#
CNR No. DLHC010804312024
+
RC.REV. 330/2024 & CM APPL. 66707/2024 (Stay)
SANTOSH SAINI AND ORS
.....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Debendra Kumar Sabat,
Ms. Sharmila Sabat and Mr.
Amit Kumar Tripathi,
Advocates.
versus
SMT SARITA AND ORS
Through:
.....Respondents
Mr. Niraj Chaudhary,
Advocate.
#
CNR No. DLHC010804322024
+
RC.REV. 331/2024 & CM APPL. 66808/2024 (Stay)
SANTOSH SAINI AND ORS
.....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Debendra Kumar Sabat,
Ms. Sharmila Sabat and Mr.
Amit Kumar Tripathi,
Advocates.
versus
RAJ KUMAR AND ANR
Through:
.....Respondents
Mr. Niraj Chaudhary,
Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
1.
JUDGEMENT (Oral)
The present Petitions, filed under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:04:15
RC.REV. 330/2024 & RC.REV. 331/2024
Rent Control Act, 19581 read with Sections 115 and 151 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India,
1950, challenge two separate Orders, both dated 20.07.20242, passed
by the learned ACJ-cum-CCJ-ARC, South District, Saket Courts,
New Delhi3, in two separate Eviction Petitions4 bearing Nos. RCARC/04/2024, titled “Mrs. Santosh Saini & Ors. v. Smt. Sarita &
Anr.” and RC-ARC/03/2024, titled “Mrs. Santosh Saini & Ors. v. Sh.
Raj Kumar & Anr.”, whereby the applications seeking leave to defend
filed by the Respondents herein were allowed.
2.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners submits
that the averments made in the Eviction Petitions are sufficient and
that there is no requirement for the matter to proceed to trial. He
submits that, in the event the matter proceeds to trial, the Petitioners
herein would be inconvenienced, since they are senior citizens and
have to take care of their respective families. He further submits that,
since the Petitioners are senior citizens and also have children who are
either married or yet to be married, it would be difficult for them to
undergo the rigours of a trial.
3.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents would wholeheartedly support the Impugned Orders and
submit that the learned ARC has formed a considered opinion upon an
evaluation of the pleadings as well as the relevant documents and has
arrived at the conclusion after perusing the material placed on record.
ANALYSIS:
4.
This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
DRC Act
Impugned Orders
Learned ARC
Eviction Petitions
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:04:15
RC.REV. 330/2024 & RC.REV. 331/2024
the parties and with their able assistance had the occasion to go
through the Impugned Orders herein.
5.
Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioners, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
6.
The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd.5, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
Singh6, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua7, has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
7.
The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.8, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
Grover9.
8.
In Abid-Ul-Islam(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25B of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
(1998) 8 SCC 119
(2014) 9 SCC 78
(2022) 6 SCC 30
2024:DHC:9322
2025:DHC:11285
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:04:15
RC.REV. 330/2024 & RC.REV. 331/2024
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
9.
In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
10.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:04:15
RC.REV. 330/2024 & RC.REV. 331/2024
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Orders
suffer from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
11.
It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged on behalf of the Petitioners against the
Impugned Orders are required to be examined.
12.
The relevant portion of the Impugned Order passed in RC.REV.
330/2024, whereby the learned ARC has allowed the Respondents’
applications seeking leave to defend, is reproduced herein below. The
corresponding findings in the Impugned Order passed in RC.REV.
331/2024 are, mutatis mutandis, the same:
“19. Petitioner has set up the case for bona fide requirement of
tenanted premises to construct a residential premises since the
petitioners’ family has grown. However, petitioner has not given
what portion is to be reconstructed and which portion would be
required for bonafide requirement of which petitioner(s). The
petitioners in their own reply have stated that they are in possession
of various other properties outside and within the locality of the
tenanted premises and thus there is sufficient prima facie evidence
that alternate accommodation is available. The area of those
properties have also stated and same is not anyway less than the
area of the property of which tenanted premises is a part. The
alternate accommodation thus are not only available but reasonable
and suitable. This Court accepts the leave of the respondents on
both grounds of alternate accommodation as well as bonafide
requirement of petitioners. The same has even been admitted by the
petitioners in their reply stating that it is a triable issue about the
availability of alternate accommodation.
20. As regards the first issue of landlord-tenant relationship. The
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:04:15
RC.REV. 330/2024 & RC.REV. 331/2024
petitioners have alleged that respondents have no tenancy
agreement and are not lawful occupant of the property. The
petitioners have contested the claim of respondents that they are
tenants. The petitioners alleged that after Sh. Sher Singh expired,
the respondents being his legal heirs have never approached the
petitioners for tenancy agreement. The respondents on the other
hand allege that after Sh. Hari Singh and Smt. Dhallo Devi expired,
the petitioners have not approached the respondents for attornment
and never served any valid notice for payment of rent or for
enhancement. Be that as it may, both sides admit that the opposite
sides are legal heirs of the original landlord and original tenant,
respectively. Original landlord being Sh. Hari Singh and original
tenant being Sh. Sher Singh. The petitioners admit respondents are
legal heirs of Sh. Sher Singh and respondents admit that petitioners
are legal heirs of Sh. Sher Singh. The property has thus devolved
upon the petitioners through succession and on respondents
through devolution. It is immaterial if the respondents were paying
rent or not, they remain to the respondents. It is true that petitioners
failed to serve any notice for payment of rent and at the same time
the respondent have not filed any petition for deposit of rent before
any rent controller. The petitioners are thus joint landlords and
respondents are tenants. As per section 2(l) DRC Act, the
respondent no.2 being widow of original tenant Sh. Hari Singh
would be the only tenant, however the other respondents allege to
be residing in the premises and were dependent on the original
tenant. The exact status however is contested and this is also
known from the previous two litigation between the same parties
pending before this Court on even date. The petitioners are also
contesting eviction on ground of Section 14(1) (f), (g) and (j),
whereas the respondents have been contesting their petition under
Section 44 DRC Act since before.
21. As regards the present case of eviction under Section14(1)(e)
DRC Act, it goes without saying that a landlord may require
tenanted premises for expansion of his residence. He is master of
his decisions and choices, and the tenant or the Court cannot
dictate terms to him. However, need of the landlord is to be
determined by examining, evaluating and adjudicating the
projected requirements to reach a conclusion that the requirement
of the landlord is a genuine need and not merely a desire to evict
the tenant so as to deprive the tenant of the statutory protection.
The petitioners in their reply to leave to defend admit that there are
triable issues as to availability of other properties and requirement
of petitioners and their family members.
22. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, respondent
has been able to raise triable issues as to what is the actual
measurement of premises under possession and ownership of
petitioner, what is the extent of land available with him for
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:04:15
RC.REV. 330/2024 & RC.REV. 331/2024
carrying out construction of his house and whether the properties
already available is sufficient for meeting his requirements. These
issues are required to be answered during trial to test the bona fide
need of the petitioner in respect of the tenanted premises, which if
decided in favour of the respondent, will lead to dismissal of the
petition. Thus, respondent is entitled to the leave of the Court to
contest present petition.
23. Accordingly, application is allowed and respondent is granted
the leave of the Court to contest the present petition on two
grounds of availability of suitable alternate accommodation and
requirement of the petitioners being bonafide for their residence.
The leave to defend qua landlord tenant relationship is not allowed,
since the tenancy is admitted by the respondents.”
13.
A perusal of the aforesaid findings of the learned ARC shows
that leave to defend has not been granted merely on the basis of bald
or unsubstantiated assertions. The learned ARC has identified specific
issues arising from the pleadings and material placed on record,
particularly with regard to the availability and suitability of alternative
accommodation and the extent of the premises available to the
Petitioners for carrying out the proposed construction.
14.
The principal issue which, therefore, arises for consideration is
whether the learned ARC, in arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, has
committed any error apparent on the face of the record, material
irregularity or perversity warranting interference by this Court in
exercise of its limited revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to
Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
15.
At the outset, it is required to be borne in mind that at the stage
of consideration of an application seeking leave to defend, the Court is
not required to conduct a “mini trial” as if adjudicating the eviction
petition finally. The question is whether the facts disclosed by the
tenant, if ultimately established, would disentitle the landlord from
obtaining an order of eviction. Where such facts disclose a triable
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:04:15
RC.REV. 330/2024 & RC.REV. 331/2024
issue, leave to defend ought not to be declined.
16.
At the same time, the mere assertion of a defence, unsupported
by material particulars or evidence, would not by itself be sufficient to
compel the landlord to undergo a full-fledged trial. The defence must
disclose facts which, if proved, would have a bearing upon the
landlord’s entitlement to seek eviction. The legislative scheme under
Section 25B of the DRC Act is intended to prevent a tenant from
prolonging proceedings by raising vague or frivolous defences, while
preserving the right to trial where a genuine triable issue is disclosed.
17.
In the present case, the learned ARC has found that the
Petitioners themselves have disclosed the existence of other properties
and have further referred to the extent of such properties. The learned
ARC has also recorded a finding that the question whether such
properties constitute reasonably suitable alternative accommodation,
having regard to the actual requirements of the Petitioners, requires
consideration.
18.
The aforesaid finding cannot, at this stage, be characterised as
perverse or wholly unsupported by the material on record. The
availability of another property, by itself, may not invariably defeat a
claim of bona fide requirement. What is relevant is whether such
accommodation is reasonably suitable for the requirement pleaded by
the landlord.
19.
In the present case, however, the learned ARC has not finally
concluded that the alternative properties are, in fact, suitable
accommodation disentitling the Petitioners from seeking eviction.
Rather, the learned ARC has found that the extent and suitability of
the properties disclosed by the Petitioners, as well as the actual area
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:04:15
RC.REV. 330/2024 & RC.REV. 331/2024
available for the proposed construction, give rise to questions which
require adjudication. Such an approach, particularly at the stage of
considering leave to defend, cannot be said to amount to an erroneous
exercise of jurisdiction.
20.
Equally significant is the finding of the learned ARC that the
Petitioners themselves, in their reply to the applications seeking leave
to defend, had acknowledged the existence of triable issues
concerning the availability of other properties and their requirement. If
the Petitioners have themselves placed material before the learned
ARC which gives rise to a factual controversy regarding the
availability and suitability of alternative accommodation, they cannot,
merely in revisional proceedings, seek a re-appreciation of that
material with a view to invite this Court to arrive at a different
conclusion.
21.
The second aspect which weighed with the learned ARC
concerns the bona fide requirement pleaded by the Petitioners. The
learned ARC has noted that the Petitioners seek eviction for the
purpose of expanding their residential accommodation and carrying
out construction, but have not specified with sufficient clarity the
portion proposed to be reconstructed, the extent of construction
contemplated, or the manner in which the proposed construction
would cater to the respective requirements of the Petitioners and their
family members.
22.
The aforesaid aspects are not matters which can be conclusively
determined merely by accepting the assertion of the landlord that the
premises are required for residential purposes. The bona fide
requirement pleaded by a landlord is undoubtedly entitled to due
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:04:15
RC.REV. 330/2024 & RC.REV. 331/2024
weight, and the tenant cannot dictate the manner in which the landlord
should arrange his affairs. Nevertheless, the statutory requirement of
bona fide need necessarily entails an examination of whether the
requirement pleaded is genuine and whether the statutory conditions
for eviction are satisfied.
23.
The learned ARC has, therefore, not substituted its own
assessment of the Petitioners’ residential requirements for that of the
landlord. It has merely found that the material placed before it raises
questions concerning the extent of the proposed construction, the
availability of other properties and the suitability of such properties
for the requirement pleaded. These are matters which, if ultimately
established in favour of the Respondents, may have a bearing upon the
Petitioners’ entitlement to an order of eviction.
24.
This Court is conscious that the revisional jurisdiction under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act does not permit the
Revisional Court to reassess the evidence or substitute its own
conclusion merely because another view may be possible.
25.
Tested on the aforesaid parameters, this Court finds no such
infirmity in the Impugned Orders. The learned ARC has considered
the pleadings of the parties, noticed the material concerning the
alternative properties and the proposed residential requirement, and
thereafter concluded that the Respondents had disclosed triable issues
warranting grant of leave to defend.
26.
The submission advanced on behalf of the Petitioners that they
are senior citizens and that requiring them to undergo a trial would
cause inconvenience, cannot by itself furnish a ground for declining
leave to defend where the statutory threshold for grant of such leave is
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:04:15
RC.REV. 330/2024 & RC.REV. 331/2024
otherwise satisfied. The age of the landlord cannot dispense with the
requirement of examining whether the tenant has disclosed a genuine
triable issue under Section 25-B(5) of the DRC Act.
27.
It is equally not for this Court, in exercise of its limited
revisional jurisdiction, to determine at this stage whether the defence
ultimately set up by the Respondents would succeed at trial. The only
question is whether the defence raises an issue which requires
adjudication upon evidence. Once such an issue is found to exist, the
consequence contemplated by the statutory scheme follows.
28.
It is also relevant that the leave to defend has not been granted
on every ground raised by the Respondents. The learned ARC has
specifically confined the grant of leave to defend to the issues
concerning the availability of suitable alternative accommodation and
the bona fide requirement of the Petitioners. This itself demonstrates
that the learned ARC has examined the respective grounds rather than
granting leave as a matter of course.
29.
The approach adopted by the learned ARC is, therefore,
consistent with the limited inquiry contemplated at the stage of an
application for leave to defend. The learned ARC has neither finally
adjudicated the entitlement of the Petitioners to eviction nor returned a
finding that the Respondents’ defence must ultimately succeed. It has
merely found that the issues identified in the Impugned Orders
warrant adjudication after the parties are afforded an opportunity to
lead evidence.
30.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the
Impugned Orders do not suffer from any jurisdictional error, material
irregularity, perversity or error apparent on the face of the record
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:04:15
RC.REV. 330/2024 & RC.REV. 331/2024
warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this
Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
31.
The present Petitions, being devoid of merit, are dismissed.
32.
It is made clear that the findings recorded herein are confined to
the question of whether the Respondents were rightly granted leave to
defend and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the
ultimate merits of the rival claims.
33.
The
present
Petitions,
along
with
respective
pending
Application(s), if any, stand disposed of in aforementioned terms.
34.
A photocopy of this Order be placed in the connected matter.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
AUGUST 07, 2026/tk/DJ
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:04:15
RC.REV. 330/2024 & RC.REV. 331/2024
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