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( 2026:HHC:4186 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No.34 of 2026
Reserved on: 09.01.2026.
Decided on: 25.02.2026
Santokh Singh
...…. Petitioner
Versus
Baldeep Singh
…. Respondent
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner:
Mr Suneet Goel, Senior Advocate,
with Mr Vivek Negi, Advocate.
For the Respondent:
None.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The
present
revision
is
directed
against
the
judgment dated 27.11.2025 passed by learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. (learned Appellate
Court) vide which judgment of conviction dated 14.12.2023 and
order of sentence dated 19.12.2023 passed by learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. (learned
Trial Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes.
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned
Trial Court for convenience.)
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the
learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of
an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (in short, 'NI Act'). It was asserted that
the parties had good relations. The accused needed money to
run his transport business. He sought financial help from the
complainant. The complainant advanced ₹2,70,000/- to the
accused.
The
accused
issued
a
post-dated
cheque
for
₹2,70,000/- drawn on Punjab National Bank, Nalagarh, to
discharge his debt. The complainant deposited the cheque at his
bank,
and
it
was
dishonoured
with
an
endorsement
“insufficient funds'. The complainant issued a demand notice
to the accused asking him to pay the amount of ₹2,70,000/within 15 days. Notice was served upon the accused on 3.7.2019,
but he failed to pay the money. Hence, a complaint was filed
before the learned Trial Court against the accused for taking
action as per law.
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
3.
Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of
accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded
not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4.
The complainant examined himself (CW1) to prove
his complaint.
5.
The accused, in his statement recorded under
Section 313 Cr. P.C., did not dispute his signature on the cheque
and the service of notice upon him. He did not produce any
evidence in defence.
6.
Learned Trial Court held that the issuance of the
cheque was not disputed, and a presumption arose that the
cheque
was
issued
for
consideration
to
discharge
the
debt/liability. The accused failed to produce any evidence to
rebut the presumption. It was suggested by the accused to the
complainant that the accused had paid ₹20,000/- to the
complainant
against
liability,
which
corroborated
the
complainant's version that the accused had a subsisting liability
towards the complainant. The cheque was dishonoured with an
endorsement “insufficient funds”, and the notice was duly
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
served upon the accused. All the ingredients of the commission
of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were
duly satisfied. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the
accused of the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 138 of the NI Act, and sentenced him to undergo simple
imprisonment
for
six
months,
pay
a
compensation
of
₹4,00,000/- and, in default of payment of compensation, to
undergo simple imprisonment for one month.
7.
Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed
by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which
was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nalagarh
(learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred
with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the
issuance of the cheque was not disputed, and a presumption
arose that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge
the debt/liability. The accused did not lead any evidence to rebut
the presumption. The cheque was dishonoured with an
endorsement “insufficient funds”. Notice was duly served upon
the accused, and he failed to repay the amount despite receipt of
a valid notice of demand. The learned Trial Court had rightly
convicted the accused. The sentence imposed by the learned
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
Trial Court was adequate, and no inference was required with it.
Hence, the appeal was dismissed.
8.
Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed
by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present
revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in
appreciating the material placed before them. The complainant
failed
to
prove
the
existence
of
a
legally
enforceable
debt/liability. The accused had denied the existence of any debt,
and the burden was upon the complainant to establish the
existence of a debt. The complainant asserted in the complaint
that the cheque was issued as financial help, but stated in his
cross-examination that the cheque was issued to pay the
instalment of the vehicle. He failed to examine his father, in
whose presence the financial help was provided. He did not
produce the Income Tax Return to show his financial capacity to
advance the loan. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the
learned Courts below be set-aside.
9.
Mr. Suneet Goel, learned Senior Advocate, assisted
by Mr Vivek Negi, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused,
submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
the material placed before them. The complainant had not
mentioned the nature of the debt/liability in the complaint or
the date on which the financial help was provided. There were
discrepancies in the evidence and the averments made in the
complaint, and the learned Courts below failed to notice it.
Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the
judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be setaside.
10.
I
have
given
considerable
thought
to
the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records
carefully.
11.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:
(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a
revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify
the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was
observed at page 207“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at
the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent
findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a
detailed appreciation of the material and evidence
brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision
against conviction is not supposed to exercise the
jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of
interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests
jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence
or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of
any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the
provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of
jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error
which is to be determined on the merits of individual
cases. It is also well settled that while considering the
same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon
the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those
findings.
12.
This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court
under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the
power to call for and examine records of an inferior
court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the
legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made
in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a
patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the
perversity which has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v.
Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ)
687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397
has been considered and succinctly explained as under:
(SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself
as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings
or order made in a case. The object of this
provision is to set right a patent defect or an error
of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a wellfounded error, and it may not be appropriate for
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the
face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and
appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks
into the various judgments of this Court, it
emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be
invoked where the decisions under challenge are
grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the
provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on
no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but
are merely indicative. Each case would have to be
determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it
should not be against an interim or interlocutory
order. The Court has to keep in mind that the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not
lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is
dealing with the question as to whether the charge
has been framed properly and in accordance with
law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere
in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless
the case substantially falls within the categories
aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a
much-advanced stage in the proceedings under
CrPC.”
13.
It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8
SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC
OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the
absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of
Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the
revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of
Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri,
(1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering
the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court,
this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55,
para 5)
5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court
can call for and examine the record of any
proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High
Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But
the said revisional power cannot be equated with
the power of an appellate court, nor can it be
treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate
for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and
come to its conclusion on the same when the
evidence has already been appreciated by the
Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal,
unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice
of the High Court which would otherwise amount
to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising
the impugned judgment of the High Court from the
aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in
concluding that the High Court exceeded its
jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of
the respondent by reappreciating the oral
evidence. …”
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and
relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court
in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao
Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] . This
Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order
of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly
unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on
the ground that another view is possible. The following
has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)
“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is
perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly
unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any
relevant material or there is palpable misreading
of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in
setting aside the order, merely because another
view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant
to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of
the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power
in the court to do justice in accordance with the
principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional
power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC
is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless
the finding of the court, whose decision is sought
to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable
in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly
unreasonable or where the decision is based on no
material or where the material facts are wholly
ignored or where the judicial discretion is
exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts
may not interfere with the decision in exercise of
their revisional jurisdiction.”
14.
This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh
Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC
(Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at
page 205:
“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of
perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for
the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the
evidence on record.
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.
Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC
457, it is a well-established principle of law that the
Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order
is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of
a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is,
therefore, in the negative.”
15.
The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
16.
The ingredients of an offence punishable under
Section 138 of the NI Act were explained by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen
Noorul, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2019 as under: 5.1.1. In K.R. Indira v. Dr. G. Adinarayana (2003) 8 SCC
300, this Court enlisted the components, aspects and the
acts, the concatenation of which would make the offence
under Section 138 of the Act complete, to be these (i)
drawing of the cheque by a person on an account
maintained by him with a banker, for payment to another
person from out of that account for discharge in whole/in
part of any debt or liability, (ii) presentation of the
cheque by the payee or the holder in due course to the
bank, (iii) returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee
bank for want of sufficient funds to the credit of the
drawer or any arrangement with the banker to pay the
sum covered by the cheque, (iv) giving notice in writing
to the drawer of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt
of information by the payee from the bank regarding the
return of the cheque as unpaid demanding payment of
the cheque amount, and (v) failure of the drawer to make
payment to the payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque, of the amount covered by the cheque within 15
days of the receipt of the notice.
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
17.
The accused did not dispute his signature or the
issuance of the cheque in his statement recorded under Section
313 of Cr.P.C. It was suggested to the complainant in his crossexamination that the accused had paid ₹20,000/-out of his
liability during the pendency of the proceedings. Learned Courts
below had rightly held that this suggestion corroborated the
complainant’s version regarding the existence of liability. It
was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in APS Forex
Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020)
12 SCC 724, that when the issuance of a cheque and signature on
the cheque are not disputed, a presumption would arise that the
cheque was issued in discharge of the legal liability. It was
observed: “9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and
considering the fact that the accused has admitted the
issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque
and that the cheque in question was issued for the second
time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that
even according to the accused some amount was due and
payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the
NI Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or
liability. Of course, such a presumption is rebuttable.
However, to rebut the presumption, the accused was
required to lead evidence that the full amount due and
payable to the complainant had been paid. In the present
case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The
story put forward by the accused that the cheques were
given by way of security is not believable in the absence
of further evidence to rebut the presumption, and more
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
particularly, the cheque in question was issued for the
second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured.
Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in
not properly appreciating and considering the
presumption in favour of the complainant that there
exists a legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section
139 of the NI Act. It appears that both the learned trial
court as well as the High Court have committed an error
in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the
debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption
under Section 139 of the NI Act. As observed above,
Section 139 of the Act is an example of reverse onus
clause and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has
been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has
been admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of
the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt
or liability and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut
such presumption by leading evidence.”
18.
It was laid down in N. Vijay Kumar v. Vishwanath
Rao N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873, wherein it was held as under:
“6. Section 118 (a) assumes that every negotiable
instrument is made or drawn for consideration, while
Section 139 creates a presumption that the holder of a
cheque has received the cheque in discharge of a debt or
liability. Presumptions under both are rebuttable,
meaning they can be rebutted by the accused by raising a
probable defence.”
19.
A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore
S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:
“ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED,
PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE
NI ACT ARISE
15. In the present case, the cheque in question has
admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1Accused. This Court is of the view that once the execution
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
of the cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section
118 of the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn
for consideration and the presumption under Section 139
of the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the
said cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or
liability arises against the accused. It is pertinent to
mention that observations to the contrary by a twoJudge Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G.
Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54, have been set aside by a threeJudge Bench in Rangappa (supra).
16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this
presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques
as a mode of payment in commercial transactions.
17. Needless to mention that the presumption
contemplated under Section 139 of the NI Act is
rebuttable. However, the initial onus of proving that the
cheque is not in discharge of any debt or other liability is
on the accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singh v.
Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197].
20.
Thus, the Court has to start with the presumption
that the cheque was issued in discharge of the liability for
consideration, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut this
presumption.
21.
It was submitted that the complainant had not
mentioned the nature of the liability or the date of advancing
the loan to the accused; therefore, the complaint is bad, and no
action could have been taken on it. This submission cannot be
accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. , (2002)
1 SCC 234: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1364 that there is no
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
requirement of mentioning the subsisting liability in the
complaint because it is a matter of presumption. It was
observed at page 240: 17. There is therefore no requirement that the
complainant must specifically allege in the complaint
that there was a subsisting liability. The burden of
proving that there was no existing debt or liability was on
the respondents. This they have to discharge in the trial.
At this stage, merely on the basis of averments in the
petitions filed by them, the High Court could not have
concluded that there was no existing debt or liability.
22.
This judgment was followed by Kerla High Court in
B. Surendra Das versus State of Kerala, 2019 STPL 12260 Kerala,
wherein it was observed:12. It is contended by the petitioner that there is no
specific averment in the complaint that the cheque was
issued in discharge of the amount allegedly borrowed by
him from the complainant. There is no need to make
such a specific averment in the complaint. There is no
requirement that the complainant must specifically
allege in the complaint that there was a subsisting
liability (See M.M.T.C Limited v. Medchil Chemicals and
Pharma (P) Limited, (2002) AIR SC 182).
23.
The complainant admitted in his cross-examination
that the handwriting of the cheque and the signature were
different. This will not make any difference. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar
(2019) 4 SCC 197, that a person is liable for the commission of
an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
Instruments Act even if the cheque is filled by some other
person. It was observed:
“37. A meaningful reading of the provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular,
Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a
person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee
remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the
presumption that the cheque had been issued for
payment of a debt or in the discharge of a liability. It is
immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by
any person other than the drawer if the cheque is duly
signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the
penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted.
38. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a
payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill in the
amount and other particulars. This in itself would not
invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the
accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of
a debt or liability by adducing evidence.
39. It is not the case that the respondent accused that he
either signed the cheque or parted with it under any
threat or coercion. Nor is it the case that the respondent
accused that the unfilled signed cheque had been stolen.
The existence of a fiduciary relationship between the
payee of a cheque and its drawer would not disentitle the
payee to the benefit of the presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of
evidence of the exercise of undue influence or coercion.
The second question is also answered in the negative.
40. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and
handed over by the accused, which is towards some
payment, would attract presumption under Section 139
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any
cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued
in discharge of a debt.
41. The fact that the appellant-complainant might have
been an Income Tax practitioner conversant with
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
knowledge of the law does not make any difference to the
law relating to the dishonour of a cheque. The fact that
the loan may not have been advanced by a cheque or
demand draft, or a receipt might not have been obtained,
would make no difference. In this context, it would,
perhaps, not be out of context to note that the fact that
the respondent-accused should have given or signed a
blank cheque to the appellant complainant, as claimed by
the respondent-accused, shows that initially there was
mutual trust and faith between them.
42. In the absence of any finding that the cheque in
question was not signed by the respondent-accused or
not voluntarily made over to the payee and in the absence
of any evidence with regard to the circumstances in
which a blank signed cheque had been given to the
appellant-complainant, it may reasonably be presumed
that the cheque was filled in by the appellantcomplainant being the payee in the presence of the
respondent-accused being the drawer, at his request
and/or with his acquiescence. The subsequent filling in of
an unfilled signed cheque is not an alteration. There was
no change in the amount of the cheque, its date or the
name of the payee. The High Court ought not to have
acquitted the respondent-accused of the charge under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.”
24.
This position was reiterated in Oriental Bank of
Commerce vs. Prabodh Kumar Tewari 2022 0 Supreme (SC) 837,
wherein it was observed:
“12. The submission, which has been urged on behalf of
the appellant, is that even assuming, as the first
respondent submits, that the details in the cheque were
not filled in by the drawer, this would not make any
difference to the liability of the drawer.
xxxxxx
15. A drawer who signs a cheque and hands it over to the
payee is presumed to be liable unless the drawer adduces
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque has
been issued towards payment of a debt or in the
discharge of a liability. The presumption arises under
Section 139.”
25.
Therefore, the cheque is not bad even if it is not
filled in by the drawer.
26.
The accused did not step into the witness box to
establish this version. It was held in Sumeti Vij v. Paramount
Tech Fab Industries, (2022) 15 SCC 689: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 201
that the accused has to lead defence evidence to rebut the
presumption and mere denial in his statement under section 313
is not sufficient to rebut the presumption. It was observed at
page 700:
“20. That apart, when the complainant exhibited all
these documents in support of his complaints and
recorded the statement of three witnesses in support
thereof, the appellant recorded her statement under
Section 313 of the Code but failed to record evidence to
disprove or rebut the presumption in support of her
defence available under Section 139 of the Act. The
statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of
the Code is not substantive evidence of defence, but only
an opportunity for the accused to explain the
incriminating
circumstances
appearing
in
the
prosecution's case against the accused. Therefore, there
is no evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques
were issued for consideration." (Emphasis supplied)”
27.
The complainant stated in his cross-examination
that his bus was attached to the Indian Cord Clothing company.
He used to earn ₹1,10,000/- per month and ₹13,00,000/- per
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
year. This part of the statement has remained unshaken, and
there is nothing to show that he was making a false statement.
Thus, the financial capacity of the complainant to advance the
money was proved.
28.
The complainant stated in his cross-examination
that the money was paid in the presence of his father. It was
submitted that the complainant's father was not examined, and
there is no corroboration of the complainant's testimony
regarding the advancement of a loan to the accused.
This
submission will not help the accused. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uttam Ram v. Devinder Singh Hudan,
(2019) 10 SCC 287: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1361, that a presumption
under Section 139 of the NI Act would obviate the requirement
to prove the existence of consideration. It was observed:
“20. Th
̨ e trial court and the High Court proceeded as if
the appellant was to prove a debt before the civil court,
wherein the plaintiff is required to prove his claim on the
basis of evidence to be laid in support of his claim for the
recovery of the amount due. An dishonour of a cheque
carries a statutory presumption of consideration. The
holder of the cheque in due course is required to prove
that the cheque was issued by the accused and that when
the same was presented, it was not honoured. Since there
is a statutory presumption of consideration, the burden
is on the accused to rebut the presumption that the
cheque was issued not for any debt or other liability.”
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
29.
This position was reiterated in Ashok Singh v. State
of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 706, wherein it was observed:
“22. The High Court while allowing the criminal revision
has primarily proceeded on the presumption that it was
obligatory on the part of the complainant to establish his
case on the basis of evidence by giving the details of the
bank account as well as the date and time of the
withdrawal of the said amount which was given to the
accused and also the date and time of the payment made
to the accused, including the date and time of receiving
of the cheque, which has not been done in the present
case. Pausing here, such presumption on the
complainant, by the High Court, appears to be
erroneous. The onus is not on the complainant at the
threshold to prove his capacity/financial wherewithal to
make the payment in discharge of which the cheque is
alleged to have been issued in his favour. Only if an
objection is raised that the complainant was not in a
financial position to pay the amount so claimed by him
to have been given as a loan to the accused, only then
would the complainant would have to bring before the
Court cogent material to indicate that he had the
financial capacity and had actually advanced the amount
in question by way of loan. In the case at hand, the
appellant had categorically stated in his deposition and
reiterated in the cross-examination that he had
withdrawn the amount from the bank in Faizabad
(Typed Copy of his deposition in the paperbook wrongly
mentions this as ‘Firozabad’). The Court ought not to
have summarily rejected such a stand, more so when
respondent no. 2 did not make any serious attempt to
dispel/negate such a stand/statement of the appellant.
Thus, on the one hand, the statement made before the
Court, both in examination-in-chief and crossexamination, by the appellant with regard to
withdrawing the money from the bank for giving it to
the accused has been disbelieved, whereas the argument
on behalf of the accused that he had not received any
payment of any loan amount has been accepted. In our
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
decision in S. S. Production v. Tr. Pavithran Prasanth,
2024 INSC 1059, we opined:
‘8. From the order impugned, it is clear that
though the contention of the petitioners was that
the said amounts were given for producing a film
and were not by way of return of any loan taken,
which may have been a probable defence for the
petitioners in the case, but rightly, the High Court
has taken the view that evidence had to be adduced
on this point which has not been done by the
petitioners. Pausing here, the Court would only
comment that the reasoning of the High Court, as
well as the First Appellate Court and Trial Court,
on this issue is sound. Just by taking a counterstand to raise a probable defence would not shift
the onus on the complainant in such a case, for the
plea of defence has to be buttressed by evidence,
either oral or documentary, which in the present
case has not been done. Moreover, even if it is
presumed that the complainant had not proved the
source of the money given to the petitioners by
way of loan by producing statement of accounts
and/or Income Tax Returns, the same ipso facto,
would not negate such claim for the reason that
the cheques having being issued and signed by the
petitioners has not been denied, and no evidence
has been led to show that the respondent lacked
capacity to provide the amount(s) in question. In
this regard, we may make profitable reference to
the decision in Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass
Mahant, (2022) 6 SCC 735:
‘10. The trial court and the first appellate court
have noted that in the case under Section 138 of
the NI Act, the complainant need not show in
the first instance that he had the capacity. The
proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act are
not a civil suit. At the time, when the
complainant gives his evidence, unless a case is
set up in the reply notice to the statutory notice
sent, that the complainant did not have the
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
wherewithal, it cannot be expected of the
complainant to initially lead evidence to show
that he had the financial capacity. To that
extent, the courts in our view were right in
holding on those lines. However, the accused
has the right to demonstrate that the
complainant in a particular case did not have
the capacity and therefore, the case of the
accused is acceptable, which he can do by
producing independent materials, namely, by
examining his witnesses and producing
documents. It is also open to him to establish
the very same aspect by pointing to the
materials produced by the complainant himself.
He can further, more importantly, further
achieve this result through the crossexamination of the witnesses of the
complainant. Ultimately, it becomes the duty of
the courts to consider carefully and appreciate
the totality of the evidence and then come to a
conclusion whether, in the given case, the
accused has shown that the case of the
complainant is in peril for the reason that the
accused
has
established
a
probable
defence.’(emphasis supplied)’ (underlining in
original; emphasis supplied by us in bold).
30.
A similar view was taken in Sanjay Sanjabij Tari v.
Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069 , wherein it was
observed:
“21. This Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that
some District Courts and some High Courts are not giving
effect to the presumptions incorporated in Sections 118
and 139 of the NI Act and are treating the proceedings
under the NI Act as another civil recovery proceedings
and are directing the complainant to prove the
antecedent debt or liability. This Court is of the view that
such an approach is not only prolonging the trial but is
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
also contrary to the mandate of Parliament, namely, that
the drawer and the bank must honour the cheque;
otherwise, trust in cheques would be irreparably
damaged.”
31.
Therefore,
the
complainant's
case
cannot
be
doubted because of the non-examination of his father.
32.
The complainant admitted in his cross-examination
that he used to file an Income Tax Return. He had filed the
Income Tax Return of ₹5,00,000/- at the relevant time. It was
submitted that the complainant had not produced his Income
Tax Return to show that he had mentioned the amount
advanced to the accused in the return. This submission will not
help the accused. Even if it is presumed, for the sake of
argument that the amount was not reflected in the Income Tax
Return, it would not make any difference to the complainant's
case. It was laid down by this Court in Surinder Singh vs. State
of H.P. 2018(1) D.C.R. 45 that the failure to mention the loan in
the income tax return will not entitle the accused to acquittal. It
was observed: 10. It would further be noticed that the learned trial
Magistrate has acquitted the accused on the ground that
the loan has not been shown in the Income Tax Return
furnished by the complainant, and while recording such
finding has placed reliance upon the judgment of the
Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Vipul Kumar Gupta vs. Vipin
Gupta 2012 (V) AD (CRI) 189. However, after having
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
perused the said judgment, it would be noticed that the
amount in the said case was ₹ 9 lacs, and it is in that
background that the Court observed as under: "9. I find myself in agreement with the reasoning
given by the learned ACMM that before a person is
convicted for having committed an offence
under Section 138 of the Act, it must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the cheque in
question, which has been made as a basis for
prosecuting the respondent/accused, must have
been issued by him in the discharge of his liability
or a legally recoverable debt. In the facts and
circumstances of this case, there is every reason to
doubt the version given by the appellant that the
cheque was issued in the discharge of a liability or
a legally recoverable debt. The reasons for this are
a number of factors which have been enumerated
by the learned ACMM also. Some of them are that
non-mentioning by the appellant in his Income
Tax Return or the Books of Accounts, the factum of
the loan having been given by him because by no
measure, an amount of ₹ 9,00,000/- can be said to
be a small amount which a person would not
reflect in his Books of Accounts or the Income Tax
Return, in case the same has been lent to a person.
The appellant, neither in the complaint nor in his
evidence, has mentioned the date, time or year
when the loan was sought or given. The appellant
has presented a cheque, which obviously is written
with two different inks, as the signature appears in
one ink, while the remaining portion, which has
been filled in the cheque, is in a different ink. All
these factors prove the defence of the respondent
to be plausible to the effect that he had issued
these cheques by way of security to the appellant
for getting a loan from the Prime Minister Rojgar
Yojana. The respondent/accused has only to create
doubt in the version of the appellant, while the
appellant has to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt, in which, in my
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
opinion, he has failed miserably. There is no
cogent reason which has been shown by the
appellant which will persuade this Court to grant
leave to appeal against the impugned order, as
there is no infirmity in the impugned order."
33.
Thus, no advantage can be derived from the fact that
the Income Tax Return was not filed before the learned Trial
Court.
34.
There is no other evidence to rebut the presumption
attached to the cheque, and the learned Courts below had
rightly held that the accused had failed to rebut the
presumption attached to the cheque.
35.
The complainant stated that the cheque had
dishonoured with the endorsement “insufficient funds”. This
was duly proved by memo (Ex.C3/CW1) wherein the reason of
dishonour was mentioned as “insufficient funds.” It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mandvi Cooperative
Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore, (2010) 3 SCC 83: (2010) 1 SCC
(Civ) 625: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 155 that the
memo issued by the Bank is presumed to be correct and the
burden is upon the accused to rebut the presumption. It was
observed at page 95:
24. Section 146, making a major departure from the
principles of the Evidence Act, provides that the bank's
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
slip or memo with the official mark showing that the
cheque was dishonoured would, by itself, give rise to the
presumption of dishonour of the cheque, unless and until
that fact was disproved. Section 147 makes the offences
punishable under the Act compoundable.
36.
In the present case, no evidence was produced to
rebut the presumption, and the learned Courts below had
rightly held that the cheque was dishonoured with an
endorsement ‘insufficient funds.’
37.
The accused admitted in his statement recorded
under Section 313 of Cr.P.C that he had received the notice; thus,
the receipt of notice was not disputed.
38.
Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly held that
all the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable
under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied, and there is
no infirmity in the judgment convicting the accused of the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the
NI Act.
39.
Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to
undergo simple imprisonment for six months and pay
compensation of ₹4,00,000/- to the complainant. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh
Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
(Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 138 that the penal provisions of
Section 138 of the NI Act is deterrent in nature. It was observed
at page 203:
“6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable
instruments, including cheques, and to encourage and
promote the use of negotiable instruments, including
cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision of
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended
to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable
instruments such as cheques without serious intention to
honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.”
40.
Keeping in view the deterrent nature of the
punishment, the sentence of six months cannot be said to be
excessive.
41.
The learned Trial Court awarded the compensation
of ₹4,00,000/-. Thus, the learned Trial Court had only awarded
the compensation of ₹1,30,000/- of the cheque amount of
₹2,70,000/-. The cheque was issued for ₹2,70,000/- on
31.05.2019.
The sentence was imposed on 19.12.2023 after a
lapse of more than 4 ½ years. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5
SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 75 that the Courts should uniformly levy a fine up to
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
twice the cheque amount along with simple interest at the rate
of 9% per annum. It was observed at page 291: 19. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf
of the respondent, we are conscious of the settled
principles that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not
only punitive but also compensatory and restitutive. The
provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal
liability for the dishonour of a cheque as well as civil
liability for the realisation of the cheque amount. It is
also well settled that there needs to be a consistent
approach towards awarding compensation, and unless
there exist special circumstances, the courts should
uniformly levy fines up to twice the cheque amount along
with simple interest @ 9% p.a. [R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012)
1 SCC 260, para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC
(Cri) 520]”
42.
Hence, the amount of ₹1,30,000 awarded on the
cheque amount of ₹2,70,000/-cannot be said to be excessive.
43.
It was submitted that the learned Trial Court could
not have awarded the sentence of imprisonment in case of
default in the payment of compensation. This submission is not
acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
K.A. Abbas v. Sabu Joseph, (2010) 6 SCC 230: 2010 SCC OnLine
SC 612, the Courts can impose a sentence of imprisonment in
default of payment of compensation. It was observed at page
237:
“26. From the above line of cases, it becomes very clear
that a sentence of imprisonment can be granted for
default in payment of compensation awarded under
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
Section 357(3) CrPC. The whole purpose of the provision
is to accommodate the interests of the victims in the
criminal justice system. Sometimes the situation
becomes such that there is no purpose served by keeping
a person behind bars. Instead, directing the accused to
pay an amount of compensation to the victim or affected
party can ensure the delivery of total justice. Therefore,
this grant of compensation is sometimes in lieu of
sending a person to bars or in addition to a very light
sentence of imprisonment. Hence, in default of payment
of this compensation, there must be a just recourse. Not
imposing a sentence of imprisonment would mean
allowing the accused to get away without paying the
compensation, and imposing another fine would be
impractical, as it would mean imposing a fine upon
another fine and therefore would not ensure proper
enforcement of the order of compensation. While passing
an order under Section 357(3), it is imperative for the
courts to look at the ability and the capacity of the
accused to pay the same amount as has been laid down by
the cases above; otherwise, the very purpose of granting
an order of compensation would stand defeated.”
This position was reiterated in R. Mohan v. A.K.
Vijaya Kumar, (2012) 8 SCC 721: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 486,
wherein it was observed at page 729:
“29. The idea behind directing the accused to pay
compensation to the complainant is to give him
immediate relief so as to alleviate his grievance. In terms
of Section 357(3), compensation is awarded for the loss
or injury suffered by the person due to the act of the
accused for which he is sentenced. If merely an order
directing compensation is passed, it would be totally
ineffective. It could be an order without any deterrence or
apprehension of immediate adverse consequences in case
of its non-observance. The whole purpose of giving relief
to the complainant under Section 357(3) of the Code
would be frustrated if he is driven to take recourse to
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
Section 421 of the Code. An order under Section 357(3)
must have the potential to secure its observance.
Deterrence can only be infused into the order by
providing for a default sentence. If Section 421 of the
Code puts compensation ordered to be paid by the court
on a par with the fine so far as the mode of recovery is
concerned, then there is no reason why the court cannot
impose a sentence in default of payment of
compensation, as it can be done in case of default in
payment of a fine under Section 64 IPC. It is obvious that
in view of this, in Vijayan [(2009) 6 SCC 652: (2009) 3
SCC (Cri) 296], this Court stated that the
abovementioned provisions enabled the court to impose
a sentence in default of payment of compensation and
rejected the submission that the recourse can only be had
to Section 421 of the Code for enforcing the order of
compensation. Pertinently, it was made clear that
observations made by this Court in Hari Singh [(1988) 4
SCC 551: 1988 SCC (Cri) 984] are as important today as
they were when they were made. The conclusion,
therefore, is that the order to pay compensation may be
enforced by awarding a sentence in default.
30. In view of the above, we find no illegality in the order
passed by the learned Magistrate and confirmed by the
Sessions Court in awarding a sentence in default of
payment of compensation. The High Court was in error in
setting aside the sentence imposed in default of payment
of compensation.
45.
Thus, there is no infirmity in imposing a sentence of
imprisonment
in
case
of
default
compensation.
46.
No other point was urged.
in
the
payment
of
( 2026:HHC:4186 )
47.
In view of the above, the present revision petition
fails, and is dismissed and so are the pending applications, if
any.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
25 February, 2026.
(Yogesh)
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