The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
19. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment and order impugned dated December 17, 2021 do not call for interference. WA No.1 of 2022 is dismissed.
20. MC (WA) No.1 of 2022 is disposed of.
21. There will, however, be no order as to costs. (W. Diengdoh) Judge (Sanjib Banerjee) Chief Justice Meghalaya
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Serial No.04
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
MC (WA) No.1/2022
Date of Order: 07.02.2022
Sanjeeb Ch. Marak
Coram:
Vs.
State of Meghalaya & ors
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. KC Gautam, Adv
: Mr. B Bhattacharjee, AAG with
Ms. ZE Nongkynrih, GA
i) Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
The marginal delay of about 12 days in preferring the appeal is
condoned. The appeal is taken on record.
2.
The short grievance of the appellant, who has been dismissed
from the Meghalaya police service by an order dated January 15, 2016, is
that the precondition to dispensing with an inquiry in terms of Article
311(2)(b) of the Constitution was not complied with in the appellant being
summarily dismissed from service without being afforded an opportunity to
deal with the charges levelled against him.
3.
Article 311(2) of the Constitution is a safety-net that is provided
to every person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or of an allIndia service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the
Union or a State. It is constitutionally mandated that such a person shall be
dismissed or removed or reduced in rank only upon an inquiry in which he
has been informed of the charges levelled against him and given a
reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect thereof. The second
proviso to the clause, inter alia, mandates that the clause, that is to say
Article 311(2) of the Constitution, would not apply in certain situations:
“311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons
employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State. –
(1) ....
(2) ....
Provided that ....
Provided further that this clause shall not apply –
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in
rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his
conviction on a criminal charge; or
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some
reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not
reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or
(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may
be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State
it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.
(3) ....”
4. The appellant asserts that the three situations covered by the relevant
proviso are distinct and do not overlap. According to the appellant, a
relevant person may be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in
rank following his conviction on a criminal charge, which implies the
conviction by a criminal court. The second ground under which the clause
would be inapplicable would be when the authority empowered to dismiss
the relevant person is satisfied for some reason that it is not reasonably
practicable to hold the inquiry envisaged in the substantive provision of the
clause. However, there is a caveat to the second condition: in that, the
reason as to why it is not practicable to hold such inquiry should be
recorded by the relevant authority in writing. Thus, according to the
appellant, the mandatory inquiry may not be dispensed with unless the
reasons therefor are recorded as to why it is not reasonably practicable to
hold such inquiry. In the absence of reasons, the appellant maintains, the
relevant order would have no legs to stand on.
5.
For the completeness of the discussion, the third limb of the
second proviso has also to be covered. Such third limb provides for the
satisfaction of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, that in the
interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.
6.
Though the third limb of the relevant proviso does not come into
play in the present case, the appellant has laboured on such aspect to
emphasise that if it is the security of the State that is in question, it is only
for the highest office of the President or the Governor to be satisfied in such
regard; no satisfaction on such count even expressly mentioned by the
disciplinary authority would allow the inquiry to be dispensed with. In other
words, the appellant seeks to compartmentalise the three situations and
suggest that the entirety of the conditions in one situation must be complied
with and it would not do for a disciplinary authority to dispense with the
inquiry on the ground that the interest of the security of the State demands
otherwise.
7.
In the present case, a confidential report, departmentally rendered,
found that the appellant had passed on information pertaining to police
operations and movements to a banned and extremist outfit by the name of
Garo National Liberation Army. At the time that such confidential report
was obtained in or about 2015-16 there was a spurt in the violent and
nefarious activities undertaken by the outfit and it appears that several
police personnel lost their lives in the course of dealing with the outfit.
8.
The order of dismissal of January 15, 2016 referred to the
confidential report of the appellant herein having passed on information to
the banned outfit. The order alluded to the casualties suffered by the police
and opined that in the light of the material available against the appellant, it
was incumbent that he be removed from service immediately without any
formal inquiry. However, the relevant order did not expressly indicate why
it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry and give the appellant
an opportunity to deal with the charges levelled against him before taking
any punitive action. To such extent the appellant is justified in the assertion
that the letter of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution may have not been
followed.
9.
An initial challenge was launched against the order of January 15,
2016 in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, which
culminated in an order passed on August 6, 2019 to the effect that since the
appellant herein had preferred a statutory appeal from the order of
dismissal, the appellant had to await the outcome thereof before
approaching this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction. A direction was
issued for the expeditious disposal of the appeal which resulted in the
appellate order being passed on October 23, 2019.
10.
The appellate authority recorded that the papers had been
examined and it was evident that the case was that the appellant had links
with the banned outfit and had passed on information about police
movements and operations to the outlawed organisation. The appellate
authority found that “the act was very grave in nature considering the fact
that he was a member of the police force.” The appellate authority recorded
that the conduct of the appellant had exposed police personnel to great risk
and rendered several operations futile and such conduct was unbecoming of
a member of a police force. The appellate authority expressed satisfaction
that senior police officials had dealt with the matter in an appropriate
manner and the obvious lack of loyalty on the part of the appellant called
for his summary dismissal. Again, the letter of the Article 311(2)(b) of the
Constitution may not have been complied with in the appellate authority
finding any express reason for it not being reasonably practicable for an
inquiry to be held against the appellant before punishing him.
11.
In the judgment and order impugned dated December 17, 2021,
the Court of the first instance recorded the submission of the parties and
noticed the several authorities relied upon by the appellant herein in support
of the contention that the reason had to be indicated before any inquiry
could be dispensed with. The writ court also recorded that the records
pertaining to the proceedings had been placed before the Court and the writ
court took the trouble of going through the records.
12.
Indeed, the writ court found that the appellant herein had admitted
to having links with the banned organisation. In the light of such discovery
from the records, the writ court held that it would have been futile to
conduct any inquiry since the material in the confidential report regarding
the appellant’s links with the banned outfit stood corroborated by the
appellant’s admission which was evident from the records. The writ court
also held that since the matter pertained to the security of the State, the
decision to summarily remove the appellant from service did not warrant
any interference.
13.
Reasons are indispensable in any form of adjudication or
assessment, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. Reasons are the links that
indicate what impelled the adjudicating mind to arrive at the conclusion
after the journey through the facts that were presented before the
adjudicating authority. As to the quality of reasons, it has often been said
that several volumes may be wasted without indicating any iota of reason;
while a terse sentence covering two or three lines may provide adequate
reasons. It is also possible to infer reasons from a relevant order when no
express reasons may be found therein.
14.
Here is a case where a confidential report was obtained indicating
the links of the appellant herein with a banned outfit that the appellant’s
employer was engaged with to quell the disruptive activities initiated by
such outfit. Senior police personnel went through the confidential report
and found sufficient merit therein. Even if, for the present discussion, the
admission of the appellant is not taken into consideration since that has not
been expressly referred to in either the original order of January 15, 2016 or
the appellate order of October 23, 2019, what is evident is that both the
disciplinary authority and the appellate authority found the material against
the writ petitioner to be unimpeachable, given that the nature of charge
against the writ petitioner was that of betraying his employer and providing
information to the banned outfit that the appellant’s employer was engaged
in fighting. It may be reasonably inferred from the departmental orders
impugned that it was not reasonably practicable to hold any inquiry. There
is no doubt that the spirit of the Article 311(2)(b) has been complied with
and the same is evident both from the order of punishment and the appellate
order dealing with the same.
15.
While it is true that as to whether the security of the State is at
stake is a matter that the President or the Governor, as the case may be,
must be satisfied with, the three limbs of the second proviso to Article
311(2) of the Constitution cannot be made into watertight compartments.
This is particularly so since the appellant herein was a member of a police
force and not in any other civil service. When a member of the police force
was found betraying his own force and supplying information to an
extremist outfit that the police organisation was trying to deal with, it was
justifiable on the part of the disciplinary authority to consider it to be not
reasonably practicable to afford the writ petitioner an opportunity of dealing
with the charge against him in the course of any inquiry. Some latitude has
to be given to the police authorities especially in a scenario where no case
of malice in fact is made out.
16.
Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that the police obtain
confidential information from undisclosed sources and it may neither be
prudent nor practicable to expose the identity of the sources or risk such
sources to be cross-examined or their identities revealed. In such a scenario,
particularly with senior police officials having no axe to grind against the
appellant having found that the material against the appellant was clinching,
the reason for dispensing with the inquiry is self-evident and writ large in
the departmental orders impugned without being expressly recorded.
17.
Before parting with the matter, a word of caution may be inserted.
It is elementary that when the law requires a certain thing to be done in a
particular manner, it has to be done in such manner or not at all. The rule
applies with more vigour in respect of any mandate as found in any
provision of the suprema lex which is the Constitution. At the same time,
no adjudication is made without reference to the context and the
surrounding circumstances, be they geographical or situational or even
time-specific or the like. It is also possible that the reason for dispensing
with the inquiry is self-evident in the order impugned despite it not being
expressly spelt out.
18.
Though this is not to suggest that when reasons are required to be
expressed, they may only be inferred; in certain situations, particularly in
the context of the present case, when the reasons are obvious and apparent,
the mandate of the provision may be seen to have been complied with.
19.
For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment and order impugned dated
December 17, 2021 do not call for interference. WA No.1 of 2022 is
dismissed.
20.
MC (WA) No.1 of 2022 is disposed of.
21.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
07.02.2022
“Lam DR-PS”
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