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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 2807 of 2025
Reserved on: 16.01.2026
Date of Decision:23.01.2026
Sanjay Kumar
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the Petitioner
:
Mr
Karan
Advocate.
Kapoor,
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr Ajit Sharma,
Advocate General.
Deputy
Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
regular bail in F.I.R. No. 18 of 2022, dated 16.01.2022, registered
at Police Station Baddi, District Solan, H.P., for the commission
of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code(IPC).
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
petitioner was the neighbour of the deceased. The petitioner
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
and the deceased consumed liquor on 15.01.2022 at about 5:00
PM. The deceased did not return to his room. The informant
went to the petitioner’s room and found that the deceased was
lying under the cot. The informant checked him and found him
to be dead. The matter was reported to the police, who registered
the FIR and investigated the matter. The charge-sheet was filed
on 30.03.2022. The prosecution has cited 21 witnesses in the
main challan and four witnesses in the supplementary chargesheet. The petitioner has been behind bars for more than 3 years
and 10 months. The trial is not likely to conclude soon, and the
petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated.
The
petitioner had approached this Court for bail earlier, and his bail
petition was dismissed on the ground that the learned trial Court
had summoned the remaining witnesses and the trial was likely
to conclude soon; however, the statements of only two witnesses
were recorded after the passing of the order. The matter is listed
on 19.03.2026, when two witnesses have been summoned. The
trial is not likely to conclude soon at this pace; therefore, it was
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be
released on bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police received information that one person
was lying dead in a room. The police visited the spot. The
informant made a statement to the police that she was married
to Rahul Kumar Yadav (since deceased). Rahul was residing with
his family. Sanjay Kumar (the present petitioner) was residing in
the adjacent room. The petitioner, Sanjay, called Rahul to his
room. They consumed liquor. The informant called the
petitioner, who told her that Rahul would come after some time.
When Rahul did not return till 10.00 PM, the informant went to
the petitioner’s room. She asked about Rahul, and the petitioner
replied that he had left the room; however, she found that her
husband was lying under the cot in the room, and he was
covered with a bed sheet. She checked her husband and found
him dead. The police registered the FIR and investigated the
matter. The cause of death was asphyxia secondary to
compression of the neck, consistent with antemortem throttling
as per the autopsy report. As per the report of analysis, 270.55%
proof alcohol was found in the blood of the deceased. The
prosecution has cited 21 witnesses, out of whom five witnesses
have been examined, and the statements of 16 witnesses are yet
to be recorded. The matter is listed for recording the statement
of two witnesses on 23.03.2026. Hence, the status report.
4.
I have heard Mr Karan Kapoor, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Dy. Advocate General
for the respondent/State.
5.
Mr Karan Kapoor, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely
implicated. The prosecution has failed to complete the evidence,
and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. The
trial is not likely to conclude soon, because only two witnesses
have been summoned by the learned trial Court; therefore, he
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be
released on bail.
6.
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Dy. Advocate General for the
respondent/State submitted that the petitioner had earlier filed
the bail petitions, which were dismissed by the Court.
Subsequent bail application only lies when there is a change in
the circumstances. The petitioner has failed to establish any
change in the circumstances; therefore, he prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed
two bail petitions, which were registered as Cr.MP(M) No.2990
of 2024 and 1787 of 2025, and they were dismissed on
29.05.2025 and 22.08.2025, respectively. It was held in the State
of Maharashtra v Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2
SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a
subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a
change of circumstances. It was observed:
“Once that application was rejected, there was no
question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually
overruling the earlier decision without there being a
change in the fact situation. And when we speak of
change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct
impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic
changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between
the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is
nobody's case that during these two days, drastic
changes had taken place, necessitating the release of the
respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and
comity demanded that the impugned order should not
have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including
the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days
before, in the absence of any substantial change in the
fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with
restraint and circumspection so that the process of the
Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does
not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully
avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order
which had hitherto eluded him.”
9.
Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an
earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to
consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then
consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed.
It was held:
“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have
been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to
consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by
noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications
have been rejected and after such consideration, if the
court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then
the said court will have to give specific reasons why in
spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail
application should be granted.”
10.
A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,
(2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:
“9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had
denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that
order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate
forum, without there being any major change of
circumstances, another fresh application should not have
been dealt with within a short span of time unless there
were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of
course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to
bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail
applications without there being any change of
circumstances would lead to bad precedents.”
11.
This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant
Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was
observed:
“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an
accused has a right to make successive applications for
the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent
bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and
grounds on which the earlier bail applications were
rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record
the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view
different from the one taken in the earlier applications.”
12.
It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of
Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail
application can be filed if there is a material change in the
circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It
was observed:
“7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive
bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the
existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine
qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a
material change in circumstances. A material change in
circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact
situation or law that requires the earlier view to be
interfered with or where the earlier finding has become
obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no
bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that
successive bail application needs to be decided by the
same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of
sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a
judge to consider the application and a person's right
based on a material change in circumstances. A material
change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an
offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the
power to decide such a subsequent application operates in
a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts
of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and
judicially recognized principle that if successive bail
applications on the same subject are permitted to be
disposed of by different Judges, there would be
conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering
every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in
the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other
side being put in issue and there would be wastage of
Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such
matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is
available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change
in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same
Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore,
the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a
change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant,
which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.”
13.
Therefore, the present bail petition can only be
considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and
it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.
14.
It was submitted that the prosecution has failed to
complete the evidence, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy
trial is being violated.
The petitioner has relied upon the
photocopies of the order sheets of the learned trial Court in
support of his submission.
The order sheets show that the
charges were framed on 09.01.2024, and the witnesses were
summoned repeatedly, but the prosecution failed to produce the
witnesses. The status report also mentions that the statements
of five witnesses have been recorded out of 21 witnesses cited by
the prosecution. The status report further mentions that the
learned trial Court has summoned only two witnesses on
23.03.2026, which shows that the trial is not likely to conclude
soon and the grievance of the petitioner is justified that his right
to a speedy trial is being violated.
15.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that when the State or any prosecuting
agency including the Court concerned has no wherewithal to
provide the right to speedy trial of the accused, the bail should
not be opposed on the ground that crime committed is serious. It
was observed at page 820:
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the
court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect
the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial
as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the
State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose
the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed
is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies
irrespective of the nature of the crime.
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an
accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of
criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be
innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside
lightly, however stringent the penal law may be.
19. We are convinced that the manner in which the
prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded,
the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be
said to have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of
the Constitution.
16.
It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127
that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the
accused. It was observed at page 298:
“13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948, assures that:
“12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.”
14. More recently, the European Convention on Human
Rights in Article 6(1) promises that:
“6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time….”
And in its second sub-article, that:
“6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence
shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law.”
15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down
the use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and
omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal
prosecution in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386
US 213 (1967)].
16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569:
1994 SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court
unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a
fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract
these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp.
638-39, paras 86-87)
“86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article
21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to
life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with
the actual restraint imposed by arrest and
consequent incarceration and continues at all
stages, namely, the stage of the investigation,
inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any
possible prejudice that may result from the
impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of
the commission of the offence till it consummates
into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it
may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of a
speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while dealing
with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has observed
thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
“reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of
Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a
speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean
reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life and
liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which
would, however, arise is as to what would be the
consequence if a person accused of an offence is
denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of
his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a longdelayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released
unconditionally, freed from the charge levelled
against him on the ground that trying him after an
unduly long period of time and convicting him after
such a trial would constitute a violation of his
fundamental right under Article 21?”
17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence
being present at every stage of a criminal trial and a
fortiori in departmental enquiries has been emphasised
by this Court on numerous occasions. The Constitution
Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC
225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] underscored that this right to
speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution
and is also reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973; that it encompasses all stages viz.
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial;
that the burden lies on the prosecution to justify and
explain the delay; that the Court must engage in a
balancing test to determine whether this right had been
denied in the particular case before it.”
17.
It was held in the Shaheen Welfare Association. v.
Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person
cannot be kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial
being concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:
“8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to
grant some relief to those persons who have been
deprived of their personal liberty for a considerable
length of time without any prospect of the trial being
concluded in the near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of
the community and the nation needs to be safeguarded,
looking to the nature of the offences these undertrials
have been charged with. But the ultimate justification for
such deprivation of liberty pending trial can only be their
being found guilty of the offences for which they have
been charged. If such a finding is not likely to be arrived
at within a reasonable time, some relief becomes
necessary.”
18.
Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3
SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be
subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at
page 335:
“40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has
been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that
cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed
as an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is
not necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which,
regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or
the gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised
the legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To
put it differently, no accused can be subjected to
unending detention pending trial, especially when the law
presumes him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even
where statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail,
such as in cases under the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967, this Court has expressly ruled that
after a reasonably long period of incarceration, or for any
other valid reason, such stringent provisions will melt
down, and cannot be measured over and above the right
of liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
(see Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A.
Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] ).”
19.
It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right
to a speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right
of bail is curtailed on the premise that the trial would be
concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: 13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused
to secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial
discretion (like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present
case), this Court has upheld them for conflating two
competing values i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy
freedom, based on the presumption of innocence, and
societal interest — as observed in Vaman Narain
Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan [Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of
Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 745: (2008)
17 SCR 369] (“the concept of bail emerges from the conflict
between the police power to restrict liberty of a man who is
alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption of
innocence in favour of the alleged criminal….”). They are, at
the same time, upheld on the condition that the trial is
concluded expeditiously. The Constitution Bench
in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of
Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899: (1994) 2 SCR
375] made observations to this effect. In the Shaheen
Welfare Association. v. Union of India [Shaheen Welfare
Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366:
(1996) 2 SCR 1123] again, this Court expressed the same
sentiment, namely, that when stringent provisions are
enacted, curtailing the provisions of bail, and restricting
judicial discretion, it is on the basis that investigation and
trials would be concluded swiftly. The Court said that
parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen Welfare
case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC
616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123], SCC p. 624,
para 17)
“17. … a conscious decision has been taken by the
legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal
liberty of an undertrial accused for the sake of
protecting the community and the nation against
terrorist and disruptive activities or other activities
harmful to society, it is all the more necessary that
investigation of such crimes is done efficiently and an
adequate number of Designated Courts are set up to
bring to book persons accused of such serious crimes.
This is the only way in which society can be protected
against harmful activities. This would also ensure that
persons
ultimately found innocent
are not
unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.”
20.
The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial
detention and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page
178:
“23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect
that laws which impose stringent conditions for the
grant of bail may be necessary in the public interest;
yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice
wreaked on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are
overcrowded, and their living conditions, more often
than not, are appalling. According to the Union Home
Ministry's response to Parliament, the National Crime
Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31-12-2021,
over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against a
total capacity of 4,25,069 prisoners in the country [
National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in
India
<https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI2021/Executive_ncrb_Summary-2021.pdf>]. Of these,
1,22,852 were convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were
undertrials.
24. The danger of unjust imprisonment is that inmates
are at risk of “prisonisation”, a term described by the
Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A
Convict Prisoner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993
Cri LJ 3242] as “a radical transformation” whereby the
prisoner: (SCC OnLine Ker para 13)
“13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number.
He loses personal possessions. He has no personal
relationships. Psychological problems result from
loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity and
autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of
prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner
becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Selfperception changes.”
25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to
crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more
professional the crime, more honour is paid to the
criminal” [ Working Papers - Group on Prisons &
Borstals - 1966 U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer's “The
Prison Community” published in 1940 [ Donald
Clemmer, The Prison Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart
& Winston, which is referred to in Tomasz Sobecki,
“Donald Clemmer's Concept of Prisonisation”,
available
at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/
12/Sobecki_sklad.pdf> (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ).
Incarceration has further deleterious effects, where
the accused belongs to the weakest economic strata:
immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases,
scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds
and alienation from society. The courts, therefore,
have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the
event of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is
irreparable), and ensure that trials—especially in
cases where special laws enact stringent provisionsare taken up and concluded speedily.”
21.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) that the right to speedy trial of
the offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and inordinate delay in
the conclusion of the trial entitles the accused to the grant of
bail. It was observed at page 817: “10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1
SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that
the right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal
charges is “implicit in the broad sweep and content of
Article 21 as interpreted by this Court”. Remarking
that a valid procedure under Article 21 is one which
contains a procedure that is “reasonable, fair and
just”, it was held that: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
“5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law
for depriving a person of liberty cannot be
“reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure
ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt
of such person. No procedure which does not
ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
“reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of
Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a
speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean
reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life and
liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which
would, however, arise is as to what would be the
consequence if a person accused of an offence is
denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of
his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a longdelayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21.”
11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time
and again, in several judgments, such as Kadra
Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of
Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671: 1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul
Rehman
Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [Abdul
Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri)
93]. In the latter, the court re-emphasised the right to
a speedy trial and further held that an accused, facing
a prolonged trial, has no option: (Abdul Rehman
Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,
(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269, para
84)
“84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It
is, thus, the obligation of the State or the
complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with
the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly,
in this country, where the large majority of accused
come from poorer and weaker sections of society,
not versed in the ways of law, where they do not
often get competent legal advice, the application of
the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a
given case, if an accused demands a speedy trial and
yet he is not given one, it may be a relevant factor in
his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused
from complaining of infringement of his right to a
speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or
insist upon a speedy trial.”
22.
This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v.
State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was
observed:
7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a
hurried trial is frowned upon as it may not give
sufficient time to prepare for the defence, an
inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial would
infringe the right of an accused guaranteed under
Article 21 of the Constitution.
8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in
“The Ballad of Reading Gaol”, wrote the following
poignant lines while being incarcerated:
“I know not whether Laws be right,
Or whether Laws be wrong;
All that we know who be in jail
Is that the wall is strong;
And that each day is like a year,
A year whose days are long.”
23.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to produce
the witnesses on the dates fixed by the learned trial Court, and
the learned trial Court also chose to summon the witnesses in
piecemeal manner, which defeated the petitioner’s right to a
speedy trial. Hence, the petitioner is entitled to bail on this
ground.
24.
In view of the above, the present petition is allowed,
and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail in the sum of
₹1,00,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the
satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the
petitioner will abide by the following terms and conditions: (I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses,
nor will he influence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever;
(II)
The petitioner shall attend the trial on each
and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary
adjournments;
(III)
The petitioner will not leave the present
address for a continuous period of seven days without
furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO
concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial
Court;
(IV)
The petitioner will surrender her passport, if
any, to the Court; and
(V)
The petitioner will furnish her mobile
number and social media contact to the Police and the
Court and will abide by the summons/notices received
from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social
Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile
number or social media accounts, the same will be
intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the
date of the change.
25.
It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to
file a petition for cancellation of the bail.
26.
The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy
of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Jail Nalagarh,
District Solan, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.
27.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding
the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever
on the case's merits.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Vacation Judge
23rd January, 2026
(Gaurav Rawat)
GAURAV
SINGH
DN: C=IN, O=HIGH COURT OF
HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA,
Phone=b615aae6b839bd7695619d205a
0649faa3f10ee78fd5fc7d356ef93266e0e
ad9, PostalCode=171001, S=Himachal
Pradesh,
SERIALNUMBER=97f5851e94d1ce4a9d
9b2419311e660ac9051e6298a507d8e42
c11fe77a95002, CN=GAURAV SINGH
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
Date: 2026-01-23 15:56:10
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