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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Shri Sanasam Jacky Singh, aged about 35 years S/o Late
Sanasam Kulla Singh, a resident of Babu Bazar, Kiyam Siphai,
Thoubal District, Manipur-795138.
…... Applicant/s
- Versus Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Imphal SubZonal Office, Sangakpham, Chingmeirong, near Police Outpost
Imphal, Manipur-795001.
........Respondent/s
B E F O R E
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A. GUNESHWAR SHARMA
For the Applicant
::
For the Respondents
Date of Hearing
Date of Order
::
::
::
Mr. Nageswar Rao, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. M. Brojendro, Advocate.
Mr. S. Suresh, Advocate.
03.09.2025
23.12.2025
ORDER (CAV)
[1]
Heard Mr. Nageswara Rao, learned senior counsel assisted by
Mr. M. Brojendro, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S. Suresh,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of Directorate of Enforcement (ED).
[2]
The petitioner who is in custody with respect to ECR No.
IMSZO05/2022 registered by Directorate of Enforcement (ED), Government
of Manipur under Section 483 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita
(BNSS), 2023 seeking regular bail in the above referred case.
[3]
The petitioner is the Chief Managing Director of Lamjingba
Group of Companies. The company is alleged to have been operating an
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 1
authorized and unregulated deposits scheme by collecting huge amount of
deposit
money
to
the
tune
of
Rs.
crores
from
15,000
investors/depositors from the State of Manipur with a promise of exorbitant
rate of returns and hereby alleged to have been cheated the investors by
causing loss to them to the tune of Rs. 600
crores. Money
investors/depositors have opened accounts with Lamjingba Finance by
depositing funds mostly in cash and by misleading the investors that the
investments are safe and guarantee high amounts of interest. Initial interest
was paid, however, the company closed in the 1st quarter of 2020 without
returning promised funds to the investors. It is also alleged that the
Lamjingba Finance is currently operating its business in the name of
investors Association known as AMLIA (All Manipur Lamjingba Investor
Association) where Mr. Mutum Robindro Singh and Inaoton Laiphrakpam
are said to have been the leaders of the said association. Based on the
allegations, the Manipur Police registered 7 (seven) FIRs viz. FIR No.
152(6)2022, FIR No. 153(6)2022, FIR No. 154(6)2022, FIR No. 155(6)2022,
156(6)2022, 157(6)2022 and 158(6)2022 all dated 18.06.2025. It is further
alleged that Lamjingba Finance was operating
a Ponzi Scheme that
promised gullible investors an exorbitant return in a very short period at the
rate of Rs. 3.5% for the 2 year plan, 2% monthly simple interest rate for 6
months’ plan, 1 year plan monthly interest rate of Rs. 2.5%, 3 year plans with
a monthly interest rate of 3% and 4 year plans with a monthly interest rate of
3.5% and thereby collected a huge amount of deposit to the tune of Rs. 600
crores from 15000 investors/depositors with a promise of exorbitant rate of
returns.
[4]
Lamjingba Group of Companies was not registered as a Non-
Banking Financial Companies (NBFC) under Section 45-IA of RBI Act and
engaged in the illegal collection of money from the general public with a
promise of high rate of returns. The group also illegally indulged in giving
loan to public/borrower against the security of property (Loan Against
Property) at a very high rate of interest i.e. 3 to 3.5% per month (i.e. 36% to
42% per annum) and the group is functioning like a Bank or NBFC without
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 2
any valid registration and license. Mr. Sanasam Jacky Singh is alleged to
have criminal conspiracy with other co-accused and signed a fictitious MoU
in New Delhi wherein the petitioner transferred most of the assets of the
Lamjingba Group to AMLIA Group and disguised the proceeds of crime to
mislead the investigation. The petitioner is further alleged to have committed
the offence of Money Laundering under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act (PMLA). It is stated that the investigation in the predicate
offence is not completed and final report after investigation has not been
filed. However, the trial in PMLA case in Special Court PMLA is in progress.
It is submitted that the petitioner is in custody since 21.01.2023.
[5]
Vide common order dated 19.04.2023 in Cril.Misc.(B) Case
Nos. 15 of 2023 (FIR No. 152 (6) 2022 (IPS), 16 of 2023 (FIR No. 153 (6)
2022 (IPS), 27 of 2023 (FIR No. 154 (6) 2022 (IPS), 14 of 2023 (FIR No. 155
(6) 2022 (IPS), 28 of 2023 (FIR No. 156 (6) 2022 (IPS), 29 of 2023 (FIR No.
157 (6) 2022 (IPS), 26 of 2023 (FIR No. 158 (6) 2022 (IPS) and 20 of 2023
(FIR No. 249 (9) 2022 (IPS) passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Imphal
West, the petitioner was released on bail under Section 437 Cr.P.C. read
with Section 167 Cr.P.C., as there was no progress in the investigation on a
bond of Rs. 2 lakhs along with one surety. The relevant paras 11 & 12 are
reproduced below:
“11. Be that as it may, considering the given circumstances,
I do not find sufficient ground as to why the accused should not be
released. The submission of the prosecution does not hold enough
weight to justify the further suspension of the accused Freedom and
Liberty by continuing his judicial custody more particularly where the
investigation shows no progress over the last 60 odd days. Thus,
upon the accused being ready to furnish sufficient surety and bonds,
I am of the considered opinion that it would be just and in interest of
justice to release the accused person on bail upon him furnishing a
PR bond of Rs. 2 lakhs along with 1 (one) surety who shall be a
government employee for each bail petition of the like amount and the
accused person is subject to the following conditions that:
(i)
That, the accused shall surrender his passport to
the custody of this Court,
(ii)
That, the accused person shall not tamper with
any evidence(s),
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 3
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
That, the accused shall not contact or intimidate
any witnesses,
That, the accused person shall not commit similar
offences
That, the accused shall not leave the State of
Manipur without permission of this Court,
That, the accused person shall cooperate with
investigation,
That, the accused shall appear to this Court as
and when directed.
Out of the said PR bond of Rs.2 lakhs each, Rs.50,000/- each
in respect of the accused person i.e. Rs.4,00,000/- in total be
furnished in the form of cash to the Nazir of the District & Sessions
Judge, Imphal West.
12. In the backdrop of the aforesaid reasons, all the bail
petitions as mentioned in Para No. 1 stands allowed and disposed of
subject to the terms and conditions mentioned in Para No. 11. The
observation and findings above shall not have any bearing on the
merits of investigation or facts as investigation continues.
Announced in Open Court.
Thus disposed of.”
In other words, the petitioner has been released on default bail
in all the 9 (nine) FIRs registered against him, as the investigation could not
be completed within the stipulated time.
[6]
It is already noted that the ED also registered another case and
trial has initiated as Special Trial (PMLA) Case No. 2 of 2023 with reference
to ECIR No. IMSZO05/2022 U/S 4 & 5 PMLA Act, 2022. Vide order dated
20.10.2023 passed by the Ld. Special Judge (PMLA), Imphal East in
Cril.Misc. (B) Case No. 89 of 2023 [Ref: Special Trial (PMLA) Case No. 2 of
2023] ECIR No. IMSZO05/2022 U/S 4 & 5 PMLA Act, 2022, the bail
application of the petitioner was rejected, as twin conditions imposed under
Section 45 of PMLA could not be satisfied. Vide another order dated
27.12.2023 in Cril.Misc. (B) Case No. 118 of 2023 [Ref: Special Trial (PMLA)
Case No. 2 of 2023] ECIR No. IMSZO05/2022 U/S 4 & 5 PMLA Act, 2022,
the Ld. Special Judge (PMLA), Imphal East also rejected the second appeal
filed by the petitioner, as there was no changed circumstances after
dismissal of the first bail application and the twin conditions of section 45 of
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 4
PMLA were not satisfied. In the circumstances, the petitioner is still in
custody.
[7]
Mr. Nageswara Rao, learned senior counsel for the petitioner,
submits that in all the FIRs registered by the Manipur Police, chargesheets
have not been submitted as the investigation is still ongoing. However, in the
case registered by ED, the petitioner is facing trial and out of 21 (twenty one)
witnesses cited, 5 (five) witnesses have been examined and 16 (sixteen)
more to be examined and it may take one or two more years to complete the
proceeding before the Special Court. The petitioner has been granted bail in
all the FIRs but he is in custody in the ED case. The punishment provided
under Section 3 & 4 of PMLA is minimum 3 years and maximum 7 years of
imprisonment. As on date, the petitioner is in custody more than half of the
minimum sentence and about to reach half of the maximum punishment in
custody as an under trial prisoner (UTP).
[8]
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner refers to the decision
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v.
Union of India reported (2023) 12 SCC 1 and V. Senthil Balaji v. The
Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement: 2024 INSC 739: 2024 SCC
OnlineSC 2626, where it was held that when a person is acquitted or
discharged in the predicate offence, the charge under PMLA Act will no
longer survive. It is submitted that in the present case, chargesheets have
not been filed in the predicate offences and the continuation of the
proceedings under PMLA Act is not proper and the petitioner cannot be
convicted in the PLMA case, unless is has already been convicted under the
scheduled/predicate offences. It is submitted that the ongoing trial under
PMLA Act will be a nullity until and unless the petitioner has been convicted
under the predicate offence under IPC and other related normal penal
offence. The trial under PMLA Act defines upon the outcome of the normal
FIR case registered against the petitioner and as such, half of the petitioner
in PMLA offence is not justifiable.
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 5
[9]
Mr. Nageswara Rao, learned senior counsel for the petitioner,
has also pointed out that the provisions of Section 45 of PMLA Act will not
attracted in the present case where there is long incarceration as held by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Manish Sisodia v. Directorate
of Enforcement reported as (2024) 12 SCC 660 and Senthil Balaji v. The
Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement reported as 2024 SCC
Online SC 2626 where it was held that where there is an inordinate delay in
the trial and there is no likelihood of expeditious completion of trial, the
applicant deserves to be released on bail. In the case of Nikesh Tarachand
Shah reported as (2018) 11 SCC 1, it was held that the onus under Section
45 of the PMLA Act will not fall upon the accused. It is submitted that the
petitioner may be released on bail on such conditions as imposed by this
Court and no fruitful purpose will be served by keeping in custody when
investigation under predicate offence are not completed and he has already
released on default bail in the 8 FIRs registered against him.
[10]
Mr. S. Suresh, learned counsel for the ED, submits that the
petitioner is main accused and the Chief of Lamjingba Group of Companies
which is not registered as Non-Banking Financial Companies but doing the
business of lending loan and deposit from the general public at the high rate
of interest from 3% to 3.3% per month (i.e. 36% to 42% per annum) in the
process after collected approximately Rs. 586 crores from 15,000 depositors
and investors with a promise of giving exceptional higher returns in his
voluntary statement made on 28.01.2023 and recorded under Section 50 of
PMLA Act, the petitioner admitted that unaccounted huge transactions were
related to funds which he collected from the general public under his deposit
scheme and the Lamjingba Group transferred all the assets of one of selfstyle group under the name of AMLIA vide MoU dated 21.04.2022 to the
tune of more than Rs. 252 crore which is nothing but direct proceeds of
crimes in terms of Section 2(1)(u) of PMLA Act, 2002 and the petitioner was
taken into custody on 21.03.2023. Two movable and seven immovable
properties with a value of almost Rs. 2 crores were already attached as
proceeds of crime in terms of Section 2(1)(u) of PMLA Act and the Court
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 6
took cognizance on 20.03.2023 and framed charge on 30.03.2024 and there
is good progress in the trial. Mr. S. Suresh, learned counsel for the ED,
submits that the petitioner is involved in inducing large number of gullible
and innocent investors to deposit under the Lamjingba Finance of
Companies which was Ponzi scheme with a promise of high rate of return
and defrauded the investors and misappropriate amount to the tune of Rs.
298 crores by transferring to AMLIA and the petitioner has definite and major
role in the commission of offence of money laundering
[11]
Mr. S. Suresh, learned counsel for ED, draws the attention of
this Court to Section 45 of PMLA Act for which the twin conditions have to
be satisfied before releasing the accused in bail. He refers to the case of
Tarun Kumar v. Assistant Director Directorate of Enforcement reported
in (2023) 14 SCR 813. Learned counsel refers to the decision of Saumya
Chaurasia v. Directorate of Enforcement reported in (2024) 6 SCC 401
with respect to twin conditions of grant of bail under section 45 of PMLA Act.
Reference is also made to the Union of India through the Assistant
Director v. Kanhaiya Prasad reported in (2025) 2 SCR 544 where it is was
held that offence of money laundering is not an ordinary offence and Court
should not grant bail by passing cryptic orders without considering the
seriousness of the crime and rigorous of Section 45 of the Act.
[12]
Learned counsel for the ED has further pointed out that under
Section 24 of PMLA Act, the burden of proof lies on the accused until
contrary is proved. He further refers to the decision of Gautam Kundu v.
Directorate of Enforcement (Prevention of Money Laundering Act)
reported as (2015) 16 SCC 1 to the effect that the provisions of Section 45
of PMLA are pointing on the High Court while considering the bail application
under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. On merit, it is stated that the petitioner is
involved in collection of huge amount of money to the tune of Rs. 600 crores
from the innocent investors on the promise of high returns and after initial
payment of interest, they stopped the payment of interest and transfer the
proceed to another company i.e. AMLIA. The whole collection, deposit and
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 7
lending of money is done without any license from RBI or from any
competent authority and it is a clear case of money laundering by the
petitioner from innocent investors.
[13]
Mr. S. Suresh, learned counsel for the ED, has negated the
submission of Mr. Nageswara Rao, learned senior counsel for the petitioner
that continuing custody of the petitioner under ED offence is not maintainable
by stating that the bar is in the conviction and there is no bar of continuation
of the trial under the PMLA Act by ED, notwithstanding non-completion of
the investigation in the scheduled offence/predicate offence, i.e., pending
FIR lodged against the petitioner. It is submitted that the bail application may
be rejected.
[14]
This Court has minutely examined the materials on record, the
submissions at bar and the relevant case law in this regard.
[15]
The short question involved in the present bail application are:
I. When the investigation under the scheduled offences is not
completed and the accused having been released on default bail in
the cases registered under scheduled offences, is the accused
entitled to bail in the offences under the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002 for which the trial is in progress and the
accused is in custody for almost half the period of the maximum
sentence prescribed under PMLA offences?
II. Whether in case of long incarceration and non-completion of
investigation in the scheduled offences, the rigor of twin test under
Section 45 of PMLA is toned downed or not?
[16]
In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the petitioner has
been released on default bail under Section 167 CrPC in the scheduled
offences registered under IPC due to non-completion of the investigation in
the eight FIRs being 152(6)2022 Imphal PS; 153(6)2022 Imphal PS;
154(6)2022 Imphal PS; 155(6)2022 Imphal PS; 156(6)2022 Imphal PS;
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 8
157(6)2022 Imphal PS; 158(6)2022 Imphal PS & 249(6)2022 Imphal PS.
However, his two earlier bail applications in the case registered by ED under
Sections 3/4 of PMLA, 2002 have already been rejected by learned Special
Court on the ground of inability of the petitioner to overcome the strict twin
test under Section 45 of the Act. The ‘twin test’ is: (i) the public prosecutor
must be given an opportunity to oppose bail in case registered under PMLA,
and (ii) the court should satisfy that there is reasonable ground of the
accused not guilty of the offence and he is unlikely to repeat the offence
during on bail. Sometimes, the second condition is bifurcated into two part
and it is also called as ‘triple test’. The prosecution under PMLA cannot
proceed or survive, if the accused is discharged or acquitted in trial under
the scheduled offences. In the present case, the proceeding under PMLA is
in active progress, while the eight FIRs under the scheduled offences are
still in investigation and the accused is on default bail. He is in custody in the
ED case registered under PMLA. Even if the trial under PMLA concludes
within a reasonable time, there can be no conviction unless the petitioner is
convicted in any of the eight FIRs registered against him. The petitioner is
still in custody since 21.01.2023 only in the ED case. In this factual matrix,
this Court has to consider the present bail application.
[17]
Before proceeding further, it will fruitful to refer some of the
decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court with regard to twin test and long
incarceration. In the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2023) 12 SCC 1, Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the beneficial
legislation in terms of insertion of Section 436-A CrPC (by the Act 25 of 2005)
enabling the courts to release under trial prisoners on bail, if they have
undergone up to half of the maximum punishment prescribed for the offence.
It has been held that the provisions of Section 436-A CrPC is in the nature
of default bail provisions under Section 167 CrPC and this benefits will
extend to special penal law such as offence under Section 4 of PMLA as a
statutory bail. Relevant para are reproduced below for ready reference:
317. There is, however, an exception carved out to the strict
compliance of the twin conditions in the form of Section 436-A of the
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 9
1973 Code, which has come into being on 23-6-2006 vide Act 25 of
2005. This, being the subsequent law enacted by Parliament, must
prevail. Section 436-A of the 1973 Code reads as under:
“[436-A. Maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can
be detained.—Where a person has, during the period of
investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under
any law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death
has been specified as one of the punishments under that law)
undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of
the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence
under that law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal
bond with or without sureties:
Provided that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor
and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order the continued
detention of such person for a period longer than one-half of the
said period or release him on bail instead of the personal bond
with or without sureties:
Provided further that no such person shall in any case be detained
during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial for more than the
maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence
under that law.
Explanation.—In computing the period of detention under this
section for granting bail, the period of detention passed due to
delay in proceeding caused by the accused shall be excluded.]”
318. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it was stated thus:
“There had been instances, where undertrial prisoners were
detained in jail for periods beyond the maximum period of
imprisonment provided for the alleged offence. As remedial
measure Section 436-A has been inserted to provide that where
an undertrial prisoner other than the one accused of an offence
for which death has been prescribed as one of the punishments,
has been under detention for a period extending to one-half of the
maximum period of imprisonment provided for the alleged offence,
he should be released on his personal bond, with or without
sureties. It has also been provided that in no case will an undertrial
prisoner be detained beyond the maximum period of
imprisonment for which he can be convicted for the alleged
offence.”
319. In Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar421, this Court stated
that the right to speedy trial is one of the facets of Article 21 and
recognised the right to speedy trial as a fundamental right. This
dictum has been consistently followed by this Court in several cases.
Parliament in its wisdom inserted Section 436-A under the 1973
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 10
Code recognising the deteriorating state of undertrial prisoners so as
to provide them with a remedy in case of unjustified detention.
320. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing
Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India422, the Court, relying on
Hussainara Khatoon421, directed the release of prisoners charged
under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act after
completion of one-half of the maximum term prescribed under the
Act. The Court issued such direction after taking into account the non
obstante provision of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which imposed
the rigours of twin conditions for release on bail. It was observed :
(Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial
Prisoners case422, SCC pp. 747-48, para 15)
“15. … We are conscious of the statutory provision finding place
in Section 37 of the Act prescribing the conditions which have to
be satisfied before a person accused of an offence under the Act
can be released. Indeed we have adverted to this section in the
earlier part of the judgment. We have also kept in mind the
interpretation placed on a similar provision in
Section 20 of
the TADA Act by the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State
of Punjab123. Despite this provision, we have directed as above
mainly at the call of Article 21 as the right to speedy trial may even
require in some cases quashing of a criminal proceeding
altogether, as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak423, release on bail, which can be
taken to be embedded in the right of speedy trial, may, in some
cases be the demand of Article 21. As we have not felt inclined to
accept the extreme submission of quashing the proceedings and
setting free the accused whose trials have been delayed beyond
reasonable time for reasons already alluded to, we have felt that
deprivation of the personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial
would also not be in consonance with the right guaranteed by
Article 21. Of course, some amount of deprivation of personal
liberty cannot be avoided in such cases; but if the period of
deprivation pending trial becomes unduly long, the fairness
assured by Article 21 would receive a jolt. It is because of this that
we have felt that after the accused persons have suffered
imprisonment which is half of the maximum punishment provided
for the offence, any further deprivation of personal liberty would
be violative of the fundamental right visualised by Article 21, which
has to be telescoped with the right guaranteed by Article 14 which
also promises justness, fairness and reasonableness in
procedural matters.”
321. The Union of India also recognised the right to speedy trial and
access to justice as fundamental right in their written submissions
and, thus, submitted that in a limited situation right of bail can be
granted in case of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. Further,
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 11
it is to be noted that Section 436-A of the 1973 Code was inserted
after the enactment of the 2002 Act. Thus, it would not be appropriate
to deny the relief of Section 436-A of the 1973 Code which is a
wholesome provision beneficial to a person accused under the 2002
Act. However, Section 436-A of the 1973 Code, does not provide for
an absolute right of bail as in the case of default bail under Section
167 of the 1973 Code. For, in the fact situation of a case, the court
may still deny the relief owing to ground, such as where the trial was
delayed at the instance of the accused himself.
322. Be that as it may, in our opinion, this provision is comparable
with the statutory bail provision or, so to say, the default bail, to be
granted in terms of Section 167 of the 1973 Code consequent to
failure of the investigating agency to file the charge-sheet within the
statutory period and, in the context of the 2002 Act, complaint within
the specified period after arrest of the person concerned. In the case
of Section 167 of the 1973 Code, an indefeasible right is triggered in
favour of the accused the moment the investigating agency commits
default in filing the charge-sheet/complaint within the statutory
period. The provision in the form of Section 436-A of the 1973 Code,
as has now come into being is in recognition of the constitutional
right of the accused regarding speedy trial under Article 21 of the
Constitution. For, it is a sanguine hope of every accused, who is in
custody in particular, that he/she should be tried expeditiously — so
as to uphold the tenets of speedy justice. If the trial cannot proceed
even after the accused has undergone one-half of the maximum
period of imprisonment provided by law, there is no reason to deny
him this lesser relief of considering his prayer for release on bail or
bond, as the case may be, with appropriate conditions, including to
secure his/her presence during the trial.
323. The learned Solicitor General was at pains to persuade us that
this view would impact the objectives of the 2002 Act and is in the
nature of superimposition of Section 436-A of the 1973 Code over
Section 45 of the 2002 Act. He has also expressed concern that the
same logic may be invoked in respect of other serious offences,
including terrorist offences which would be counterproductive. So be
it. We are not impressed by this submission. For, it is the
constitutional obligation of the State to ensure that trials are
concluded expeditiously and at least within a reasonable time where
strict bail provisions apply. If a person is detained for a period
extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment
specified by law and is still facing trial, it is nothing short of failure of
the State in upholding the constitutional rights of the citizens,
including person accused of an offence.
324. Section 436-A of the 1973 Code, is a wholesome beneficial
provision, which is for effectuating the right of speedy trial
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution and which merely
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 12
specifies the outer limits within which the trial is expected to be
concluded, failing which, the accused ought not to be detained
further. Indeed, Section 436-A of the 1973 Code also contemplates
that the relief under this provision cannot be granted mechanically. It
is still within the discretion of the court, unlike the default bail under
Section 167 of the 1973 Code. Under Section 436-A of the 1973
Code, however, the court is required to consider the relief on caseto-case basis. As the proviso therein itself recognises that, in a given
case, the detention can be continued by the court even longer than
one-half of the period, for which, reasons are to be recorded by it in
writing and also by imposing such terms and conditions so as to
ensure that after release, the accused makes himself/herself
available for expeditious completion of the trial.
325. However, that does not mean that the principle enunciated by
this Court in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing
Undertrial Prisoners422, to ameliorate the agony and pain of persons
kept in jail for unreasonably long time, even without trial, can be
whittled down on such specious plea of the State. If
Parliament/legislature provides for stringent provision of no bail,
unless the stringent conditions are fulfilled, it is the bounden duty of
the State to ensure that such trials get precedence and are
concluded within a reasonable time, at least before the accused
undergoes detention for a period extending up to one-half of the
maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence
concerned by law. [Be it noted, this provision (Section 436-A of the
1973 Code) is not available to the accused who is facing trial for the
offences punishable with death sentence.]
326. In our opinion, therefore, Section 436-A needs to be construed
as a statutory bail provision and akin to Section 167 of the 1973
Code. Notably, the learned Solicitor General has fairly accepted
during the arguments and also restated in the written notes that the
mandate of Section 167 of the 1973 Code would apply with full force
even to cases falling under Section 3 of the 2002 Act, regarding
money laundering offences. On the same logic, we must hold that
Section 436-A of the 1973 Code could be invoked by the accused
arrested for the offence punishable under the 2002 Act, being a
statutory bail.
[18]
In the case of V. Senthil Balaji v. The Deputy Directorate of
Enforcement: 2024 INSC 739: 2024 SCC Online SC 2626, Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that the existence of scheduled offence is sine quo non
for the existence of the proceeds of crime. The trial under PMLA cannot be
decided unless the trial in the scheduled offences concludes. In case of delay
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 13
in trial, the accused is entitled to bail, notwithstanding the strict rigor of the
provision of Section 45 of PMLA. The relevant para are reproduced below:
21. Hence, the existence of a scheduled offence is sine qua non for
alleging the existence of proceeds of crime. A property derived or
obtained, directly or indirectly, by a person as a result of the criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence constitutes proceeds of crime.
The existence of proceeds of crime at the time of the trial of the
offence under Section 3 of PMLA can be proved only if the scheduled
offence is established in the prosecution of the scheduled offence.
Therefore, even if the trial of the case under the PMLA proceeds, it
cannot be finally decided unless the trial of scheduled offences
concludes. In the facts of the case, there is no possibility of the trial
of the scheduled offences commencing in the near future. Therefore,
we see no possibility of both trials concluding within a few years.
24. There are a few penal statutes that make a departure from the
provisions of Sections 437, 438, and 439 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973. A higher threshold is provided in these statutes for the
grant of bail. By way of illustration, we may refer to Section 45(1)(ii)
of PMLA, proviso to Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, ‘NDPS Act’). The
provisions regarding bail in some of such statutes start with a
nonobstante
clause
for
overriding
the
provisions
of
Sections 437 to 439 of the CrPC. The legislature has done so to
secure the object of making the penal provisions in such enactments.
For example, the PMLA provides for Section 45(1)(ii) as money
laundering poses a serious threat not only to the country's financial
system but also to its integrity and sovereignty.
25. Considering the gravity of the offences in such statutes,
expeditious disposal of trials for the crimes under these statutes is
contemplated. Moreover, such statutes contain provisions laying
down higher threshold for the grant of bail. The expeditious disposal
of the trial is also warranted considering the higher threshold set for
the grant of bail. Hence, the requirement of expeditious disposal of
cases must be read into these statutes. Inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial and the higher threshold for the grant of bail
cannot go together. It is a well-settled principle of our criminal
jurisprudence that “bail is the rule, and jail is the exception.” These
stringent provisions regarding the grant of bail, such as Section
45(1)(iii) of the PMLA, cannot become a tool which can be used to
incarcerate the accused without trial for an unreasonably long time.
26. There are a series of decisions of this Court starting from the
decision in the case of K.A. Najeeb2, which hold that such stringent
provisions for the grant of bail do not take away the power of
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 14
Constitutional Courts to grant bail on the grounds of violation of Part
III of the Constitution of India. We have already referred to paragraph
17 of the said decision, which lays down that the rigours of such
provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being
completed in a reasonable time and the period of incarceration
already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed
sentence. One of the reasons is that if, because of such provisions,
incarceration of an undertrial accused is continued for an
unreasonably long time, the provisions may be exposed to the vice
of being violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
27. Under the Statutes like PMLA, the minimum sentence is three
years, and the maximum is seven years. The minimum sentence is
higher when the scheduled offence is under the NDPS Act. When
the trial of the complaint under PMLA is likely to prolong beyond
reasonable limits, the Constitutional Courts will have to consider
exercising their powers to grant bail. The reason is that Section
45(1)(ii) does not confer power on the State to detain an accused for
an unreasonably long time, especially when there is no possibility of
trial concluding within a reasonable time. What a reasonable time is
will depend on the provisions under which the accused is being tried
and other factors. One of the most relevant factor is the duration of
the minimum and maximum sentence for the offence. Another
important consideration is the higher threshold or stringent
conditions which a statute provides for the grant of bail. Even an
outer limit provided by the relevant law for the completion of the trial,
if any, is also a factor to be considered. The extraordinary powers,
as held in the case of K.A. Najeeb2, can only be exercised by the
Constitutional Courts. The Judges of the Constitutional Courts have
vast experience. Based on the facts on record, if the Judges
conclude that there is no possibility of a trial concluding in a
reasonable time, the power of granting bail can always be exercised
by the Constitutional Courts on the grounds of violation of Part III of
the Constitution of India notwithstanding the statutory provisions.
The Constitutional Courts can always exercise its jurisdiction under
Article 32 or Article 226, as the case may be. The Constitutional
Courts have to bear in mind while dealing with the cases under the
PMLA that, except in a few exceptional cases, the maximum
sentence can be of seven years. The Constitutional Courts cannot
allow provisions like Section 45(1)(ii) to become instruments in the
hands of the ED to continue incarceration for a long time when there
is no possibility of a trial of the scheduled offence and the PMLA
offence concluding within a reasonable time. If the Constitutional
Courts do not exercise their jurisdiction in such cases, the rights of
the undertrials under Article 21 of the Constitution of India will be
defeated. In a given case, if an undue delay in the disposal of the
trial of scheduled offences or disposal of trial under the PMLA can
be substantially attributed to the accused, the Constitutional Courts
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 15
can always decline to exercise jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs.
An exception will also be in a case where, considering the
antecedents of the accused, there is every possibility of the accused
becoming a real threat to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction
to issue prerogative writs is always discretionary.
28. Some day, the courts, especially the Constitutional Courts, will
have to take a call on a peculiar situation that arises in our justice
delivery system. There are cases where clean acquittal is granted by
the criminal courts to the accused after very long incarceration as an
undertrial. When we say clean acquittal, we are excluding the cases
where the witnesses have turned hostile or there is a bona fide
defective investigation. In such cases of clean acquittal, crucial years
in the life of the accused are lost. In a given case, it may amount to
violation of rights of the accused under Article 21 of
the Constitution which may give rise to a claim for compensation.
29. As stated earlier, the appellant has been incarcerated for 15
months or more for the offence punishable under the PMLA. In the
facts of the case, the trial of the scheduled offences and,
consequently, the PMLA offence is not likely to be completed in three
to four years or even more. If the appellant's detention is continued,
it will amount to an infringement of his fundamental right under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India of speedy trial.
[19]
In the case of Manish Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate:
(2024) 12 SCC 660, Hon’ble Supreme Court held the rigors of Section 45 of
PMLA will not be applicable in case of long incarceration in the custody.
Right to bail, in case delay in investigation and trial coupled with
incarceration for a long period, should be read into Section 439 CrPC and
Section 45 of PMLA. With respect to the plea of tampering with the evidence,
it has been observed that there would not be such situation as the
documentary evidences are in the custody of the prosecution and influencing
of witnesses can be addressed by imposing stringent conditions. Relevant
para are reproduced below:
34. Insofar as the contention of the learned ASG that since the
conditions as provided under Section 45 of the PMLA are not
satisfied, the appellant is not entitled to grant of bail is concerned, it
will be apposite to refer to the first order4 of this Court. No doubt that
this Court in its first order4 in para 28, after recapitulating in para 27
as to what was stated in the charge-sheet filed by CBI against the
appellant, observed that, in view of the aforesaid discussion, the
Court was not inclined to accept the prayer for grant of bail at that
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 16
stage. However, certain paragraphs of the said order cannot be read
in isolation from the other paragraphs. The order will have to be read
in its entirety. In para 36 of the said order, this Court observed that
the right to bail in cases of delay, coupled with incarceration for a
long period, depending on the nature of the allegations, should be
read into Section 439 CrPC and Section 45 of the PMLA. The Court
held that the constitutional mandate is the higher law, and it is the
basic right of the person charged of an offence and not convicted
that he be ensured and given a speedy trial. It further observed that
when the trial is not proceeding for reasons not attributable to the
accused, the court, unless there are good reasons, would be guided
to exercise the power to grant bail. The Court specifically observed
that this would be true where the trial would take years. It could thus
clearly be seen that this Court, in the first round of litigation between
the parties, has specifically observed that in case of delay coupled
with incarceration for a long period and depending on the nature of
the allegations, the right to bail will have to be read into Section 45
of PMLA.
42. The learned Special Judge and the learned Single Judge of the
High Court have considered the applications on merits as well as on
the grounds of delay and denial of right to speedy trial. We see no
error in the judgments and orders of the learned Special Judge as
well as the High Court in considering the merits of the matter. In view
of the observations made by this Court in the first order4, they were
entitled to consider the same. However, the question that arises is
as to whether the trial court and the High Court have correctly
considered the observations made by this Court with regard to right
to speedy trial and prolonged period of incarceration. The courts
below have rejected the claim of the appellant applying the triple test
as contemplated under Section 45 of the PMLA. In our view, this is
in ignorance of the observations made by this Court in para 34 of the
first order4 wherein this Court specifically observed that right to bail
in cases of delay coupled with incarceration for a long period should
be read into Section 439 CrPC and Section 45 of the PMLA.
43. The trial court, in its order, has held that the appellant individually
and along with different accused persons have been filing one or the
other applications/making oral submissions frequently. It further
observed that some of them were frivolous. It was observed that this
was apparently done as a concerted effort for accomplishing the
shared purpose of causing delay in the matter. The trial court
therefore rejected the contention of the appellant that he had not
contributed to delay in proceedings or that the case has been
proceeding at a snail’s pace. However, in the very subsequent
paragraph i.e. para 80, the court observed that, in order to avoid any
delay and considering the time being taken by the counsel for the
accused in inspecting the “un-relied upon documents”, it had vide
order dated 18-4-2024 put a query to the prosecution if the entire
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 17
“un-relied upon documents” can be provided to the accused persons
in a digitised form. It further recorded that ED accepted the
suggestion that it would expedite the proceedings. However, some
time was sought to consider the same. A perusal of the compliance
report filed by the Assistant Director of ED dated 7-5-2024 which
could be found at p. 757 of the paper book would reveal that the
Cyber Lab has informed that it would take 70-80 days to prepare one
copy (cloning) of the data contained in the said un-relied digital
devices.
47. We find that, on account of a long period of incarceration running
for around 17 months and the trial even not having been
commenced, the appellant has been deprived of his right to speedy
trial.
52. The Court in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh case24 further observed
that, over a period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have
forgotten a very well-settled principle of law that bail is not to be
withheld as a punishment. From our experience, we can say that it
appears that the trial courts and the High Courts attempt to play safe
in matters of grant of bail. The principle that bail is a rule and refusal
is an exception is, at times, followed in breach. On account of nongrant of bail even in straightforward open-and-shut cases, this Court
is flooded with huge number of bail petitions thereby adding to the
huge pendency. It is high time that the trial courts and the High
Courts should recognise the principle that “bail is rule and jail is
exception”.
53. In the present case, in ED matter as well as CBI matter, 493
witnesses have been named. The case involves thousands of pages
of documents and over a lakh pages of digitised documents. It is thus
clear that there is not even the remotest possibility of the trial being
concluded in the near future. In our view, keeping the appellant
behind bars for an unlimited period of time in the hope of speedy
completion of trial would deprive his fundamental right to liberty
under Article 21 of the Constitution. As observed time and again, the
prolonged incarceration before being pronounced guilty of an
offence should not be permitted to become punishment without trial.
54. As observed by this Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu25, the
objective to keep a person in judicial custody pending trial or disposal
of an appeal is to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial.
55. In the present case, the appellant is having deep roots in the
society. There is no possibility of him fleeing away from the country
and not being available for facing the trial. In any case, conditions
can be imposed to address the concern of the State.
56. Insofar as the apprehension given by the learned ASG regarding
the possibility of tampering the evidence is concerned, it is to be
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 18
noted that the case largely depends on documentary evidence which
is already seized by the prosecution. As such, there is no possibility
of tampering with the evidence. Insofar as the concern with regard
to influencing the witnesses is concerned, the said concern can be
addressed by imposing stringent conditions upon the appellant.
[20]
From the above cited case law, it is the settled principle of law
that the prosecution under PMLA for proceeds of crime and money
laundering shall be maintainable, only if the accused is convicted in a trial
under the scheduled offences. If the accused is discharged or acquitted from
the scheduled offences, the prosecution under PMLA will become a dead
proceeding. Section 45 of the Act imposes stringent conditions for granting
bail and generally bail may be granted, if the accused is unlikely not guilty of
the offences and will not repeat the offence while on bail. The prosecution
should be given an opportunity of opposing the bail application. However, in
case of delay in trial and long incarceration, the strict rigors of Section 45 of
PMLA will be diluted. It is also the settled law that the provisions of Section
436-A of CrPC will be applicable in a trial under PMLA also and this provision
does not mean that an accused has to be in custody for a particular period
before availing this benefit. It will be pertinent to re-emphasize the basic
principle in criminal jurisprudence that ‘……the prolonged incarceration
before being pronounced guilty of an offence should not be permitted to
become punishment without trial (kindly see: Manish Sisodia, supra)’.
[21]
In the present case, the petitioner is on default in all eight FIRs
under the scheduled offences of Sections 120-B/403/406/420/34 IPC. The
investigations are not completed. The maximum sentence under these
offences is 7 years imprisonment. He is also facing trial in a proceeding
under Sections 3/4 of PMLA and the trial is in active progress, having
examined 5 of the 21 witnesses cited by ED. The punishment for the offence
under PMLA is 3 to 7 years of imprisonment. The petitioner is in custody
under PMLA trial as his two bail applications have been rejected by learned
Special Court on the ground of unable to surpass the twin test of Section 45.
Even if the trial under PMLA is completed within a reasonable time, there
cannot be a conclusion or conviction, unless he is convicted in the trial under
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 19
scheduled offences. If bail application is rejected in PMLA trial and the
investigations in the scheduled offences/FIRs are not completed within a
short period, the petitioner is likely to be in custody till completion of
maximum 7 years imprisonment under Section 4 of the PMLA. He is
completing 3 years in custody on 20.01.2026. In the circumstances and as
held in the above cited cases of V. Senthil Balaji (supra) and Manish Sisodia
(supra), the strict rigors of Section 45 of PMLA will be diluted and the
petitioner will be entitled to release on bail on such strict conditions to prevent
in influencing the trial and investigation.
[22]
In view of the settled law of bail in trial under PMLA and
considering the long incarceration and delay in the investigation and trial of
the scheduled offences, this Court is inclined to release the petitioner on bail
in the ED case registered under PMLA on furnishing a personal bail bond of
Rs.25,00,000/- (rupees twenty-five lakh) with two sureties (both gazetted
officers) of like amount each, to the satisfaction of learned Special Judge
(PMLA), Imphal East with the following conditions:
(i)
The petitioner shall appear before the Special Court on each
date fixed for the trial and on such day as directed.
(ii)
The petitioner, in addition, shall appear before the Investigating
Officer of ED on 1st and 15th of every month, till discharged by the I.O.
(iii)
The petitioner shall not try to influence any person acquainted
with the facts of the present case and shall not tamper with the material
documents.
(iv)
The petitioner shall not leave the State of Manipur without leave
of the Special Court.
(v)
The petitioner shall surrender his passport to the custody of the
Special Court, if not done earlier.
(vi)
If any of the above conditions is violated, the ED will be at liberty
to approach this Court for cancellation of the bail.
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 20
[23]
In terms of the above directions, the bail application is allowed
and disposed of. Interim order, if any, merges with final order. Send a copy
of this order to the court of Learned Special Judge (PMLA), Imphal East for
information.
OINAM
THOIBA MEITEI
2025.12.23 12:54:51
THOIBA MEITEI Date:
+05'30'
JUDGE
FR/NFR
Kh. Joshua Maring
Bail Appln. No. 10 of 2025
Page 21
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