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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
Judgment reserved on: 13.01.2026
Judgment pronounced on:18.02.2026
+
ARB. A. (COMM.) 8/2026, I.A. 723/2026 (Ex.), I.A. 724/2026
(Seeking permission to file a long list of dates exceeding 5
pages) & I.A. 725/2026 (Stay)
INDO SPIRITS
Through:
....Appellant
Mr.
Srijan
Sinha,
Mr.
Himanshu
Chaubey,
Mr.
Siddharth Garg, Mr. Srajan
Yadav, Ms. Lihzu Shiney
Konyak, Ms. Trisha Garimala,
Advocates.
versus
PERNOD RICARD INDIA PVT LTD AND ORS
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Suhail Dutt, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Raj Kamal,
Mr. Karan Khanuja, Mr. Aseem
Atwal, Mr. Kunal Khanuja, Mr.
Manish Kumar Sharma, Mr.
Harneet Singh, Advocates for
R-1.
Mr. Nitesh Rana and Ms.
Raksha Tripathy, Advocates for
R-4.
+
ARB. A. (COMM.) 9/2026, I.A. 765/2026 (Ex.), I.A. 766/2026
(Seeking permission to file a long list of dates exceeding 5
pages), I.A. 767/2026 (U/O XXXIX Rule 1 & 2) & I.A.
768/2026 (Delay of 2 days in re-filing the petition)
SAMEER MAHANDRU
Through:
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
Mr.
Srijan
... Appellant
Sinha,
Mr.
Himanshu
Chaubey,
Mr.
Siddharth Garg, Mr. Srajan
Yadav, Ms. Lihzu Shiney
Konyak, Ms. Trisha Garimala,
Advocates.
versus
M/S PERNOD RICARD INDIA PVT LTD AND ORS
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Suhail Dutt, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Raj Kamal,
Mr. Karan Khanuja, Mr. Aseem
Atwal, Mr. Kunal Khanuja, Mr.
Manish Kumar Sharma, Mr.
Harneet Singh, Advocates for
R-1.
+
ARB. A. (COMM.) 10/2026, I.A. 769/2026 (Ex.), I.A.
770/2026 (Seeking permission to file a long list of dates
exceeding 5 pages), I.A. 771/2026 (Stay) & I.A. 772/2026
(Delay of 2 days in re-filing the petition)
SAMEER MAHANDRU
Through:
... Appellant
Mr.
Srijan
Sinha,
Mr.
Himanshu
Chaubey,
Mr.
Siddharth Garg, Mr. Srajan
Yadav, Ms. Lihzu Shiney
Konyak, Ms. Trisha Garimala,
Advocates.
versus
M/S PERNOD RICARD INDIA PVT LTD AND ORS
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Suhail Dutt, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Raj Kamal,
Mr. Karan Khanuja, Mr. Aseem
Atwal, Mr. Kunal Khanuja, Mr.
Manish Kumar Sharma, Mr.
Harneet Singh, Advocates for
R-1.
Mr. Nitesh Rana and Ms.
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
+
Raksha Tripathy, Advocates for
R-4.
ARB. A. (COMM.) 5/2026, I.A. 561/2026 (Stay), I.A. 562/2026
(Ex. From filing certified copies of annexures) & I.A. 563/2026
(Seeking permission to file a lengthy list of dates and events)
INDOSPIRIT DISTRIBUTION LTD
... Appellant
Through: Mr. Darpan Wadhwa, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Dhruv
Gupta, Mr. Yash Raj Mehran,
Ms. Divita Vyas and Mr. Amer
Vaid, Advocates.
versus
PERNOD RICARD INDIA PVT LTD & ORS. ....Respondents
Through: Mr. Suhail Dutt, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Raj Kamal,
Mr. Karan Khanuja, Mr. Aseem
Atwal, Mr. Kunal Khanuja, Mr.
Manish Kumar Sharma, Mr.
Harneet Singh, Advocates for
R-1.
Mr.
Srijan
Sinha,
Mr.
Himanshu
Chaubey,
Mr.
Siddharth Garg, Mr. Srajan
Yadav, Ms. Lihzu Shiney
Konyak, Ms. Trisha Garimala,
Advocates for R-2.
Mr. Nitesh Rana and Ms.
Raksha Tripathy, Advocates for
R-4.
+
ARB. A. (COMM.) 6/2026, I.A. 564/2026 (Stay), I.A. 565/2026
(Ex. From filing certified copies of annexures) & I.A. 566/2026
(Seeking permission to file a lengthy list of dates and events)
INDOSPIRIT DISTRIBUTION LTD
.... Appellant
Through:
Mr. Dhruv Gupta and Mr.
Yash Raj Mehran, Advocates.
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
versus
PERNOD RICARD INDIA PVT LTD & ORS. ....Respondents
Through: Mr. Suhail Dutt, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Raj Kamal,
Mr. Karan Khanuja, Mr. Aseem
Atwal, Mr. Kunal Khanuja, Mr.
Manish Kumar Sharma, Mr.
Harneet Singh, Advocates for
R-1.
Mr.
Srijan
Sinha,
Mr.
Himanshu
Chaubey,
Mr.
Siddharth Garg, Mr. Srajan
Yadav, Ms. Lihzu Shiney
Konyak, Ms. Trisha Garimala,
Advocates for R-2.
+
ARB. A. (COMM.) 7/2026, I.A. 567/2026 (Stay) & I.A.
568/2026 (Ex. From filing certified copies of annexures)
GEETIKA MAHANDRU
Through:
.... Appellant
Mr. Dhruv Gupta and Mr.
Yash Raj Mehran, Advocates.
versus
PERNOD RICARD INDIA PVT LTD & ORS. ....Respondents
Through: Mr. Suhail Dutt, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Raj Kamal,
Mr. Karan Khanuja, Mr. Aseem
Atwal, Mr. Kunal Khanuja, Mr.
Manish Kumar Sharma, Mr.
Harneet Singh, Advocates for
R-1.
Mr.
Srijan
Sinha,
Mr.
Himanshu
Chaubey,
Mr.
Siddharth Garg, Mr. Srajan
Yadav, Ms. Lihzu Shiney
Konyak, Ms. Trisha Garimala,
Advocates for R-2.
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
With the consent of the parties, all the aforesaid Appeals were
taken up together for hearing. Since they arise out of the same
Impugned Order and involve substantially similar grounds and issues,
this Court proceeds to adjudicate them by way of the present
consolidated judgment.
PROLOGUE:
2.
These Appeals under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 19961 have been preferred assailing the Common
Order dated 14.10.20252 passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator in
DIAC Case Nos. 9176/08-24 and 9136/08-243 titled as Pernod
Ricard India Pvt. Ltd. v. Indospirits & Ors. and Pernod Ricard India
Pvt. Ltd. v. Indospirit Distribution Ltd. & Ors., respectively.
3.
By the Impugned Order, the learned Arbitrator disposed of the
Applications filed under Section 17 of the A&C Act by Pernod
Ricard India Pvt. Ltd. (the Claimant in both proceedings)4 against
two sets of Respondents in the aforesaid DIAC cases. In both
Applications, extensive interim measures were sought.
4.
The learned Arbitrator, in the Impugned Order, has succinctly
recorded and clarified the nature of the reliefs claimed in the Section
A&C Act
Impugned Order
DIAC Cases
Section 17 Applications
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
17 Applications. For the sake of clarity and to avoid any ambiguity,
the relevant extracts from the Impugned Order are reproduced below:
“1. The claimant, in the applications, besides pleading (i) existence
of a prima-facie case in its favour for recovery of
Rs.37,09,24,712/- and Rs. 1,52,78,64,477/-respectively along with
interest and damages jointly and severally from the respondents;
(ii) balance of convenience being in its favour; and, (iii) that it will
suffer irreparable injury or loss in the event the interim relief
sought is not granted, has also made specific pleadings of (a) risk
of the respondents alienating their assets or their assets being
confiscated of forfeited in other proceedings against them,
rendering them financially incapable of giving effect to the award
eventually made in favour of the claimant; (b) respondents, despite
their fragile working capital extending long term loans and
advances to undisclosed related parties, without there being
legitimate business reasons therefor, (c)respondents deliberately
diverting and or mis-appropriating funds; (d) respondents, despite
receiving timely payments from their customers, not utilizing the
same for on-going business operations or for reduction of their
trade liabilities and instead making loans and advances to
undisclosed related parties and consequently increasing the debt to
their operational creditors; (e) respondents depleting their liquidity
assets by channeling them for their own benefit; (f) respondents
purchasing and selling vehicles to improperly divert funds; (g)
respondents disposing/selling their mutual fund units; (h)
respondents withdrawing profit exceeding their rightful share,
constituting deliberate diversion of funds; (i) net worth of
respondents falling, rendering them unavailable for any debts owed
to their creditors; (j) respondents engaging in conduct which would
lead to frustration of these arbitral proceedings if no security is
created; and, (k) likelihood of alienation of assets by the
respondents preventing the claimant's ability to enforce any
potential award which may be granted in its favour.
2. On the aforesaid pleadings, the claimant has sought the
following interim measures in case no. 2:
“a. Direct the Respondents to furnish a list of assets and
liabilities, including bank statements for the Financial
Years 2020-21, 2021-22, 2022-23, and 2023-24, and
the current Financial Year, and to state on affidavit
details of any encumbrances over the said assets,
including, but not limited to attachment/confiscation /
forfeiture
under
any
law,
pendency
of
insolvency/bankruptcy proceedings, or the creation of
any charge, mortgage, or security interest thereupon;
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
b. Direct that during the pendency of the arbitral
proceedings, the Respondents, either jointly, or
severally, invest, in an interest-bearing fixed-deposit of
a nationalised bank, a sum equivalent to the whole of
the sum claimed i.e., INR 1,52,78,64,477/- (Rupees
One Hundred Fifty-Two Crore Seventy-eight Lakh
Sixty-four Thousand Four-Hundred and Seventy-seven
Only);
c. Alternatively, direct that during the pendency of the
arbitral proceedings, the Respondents, either jointly, or
severally, furnish a bank guarantee of an amount
equivalent to whole of the sum claimed (i.e., INR
1,52,78,64,477/- (Rupees One Hundred Fifty-Two
Crore Seventy-eight Lakh Sixty-four Thousand FourHundred and Seventy-seven Only);
d. Direct that the Respondents make suitable arrangements
for the payment of any sum in excess of that which has
been secured by virtue of prayer clauses (b) to (c)
hereinabove, in the event that the Applicant is
successful in the arbitral proceedings;
e. Declare that if, in pursuance of prayer clauses (b) or (c)
the Respondents are required to place a whole or part of
the sum claimed (including any interest, damages, and
penalties thereupon) in an interest-bearing fixeddeposit, then in the event that the interest and/or
damages awarded by this Hon'ble Tribunal are higher
than the total of the principal and interest amount
available in the interest-bearing fixed-deposit as on the
date of the passing of the award, the Respondents shall,
nevertheless, be liable to pay any sum in excess of the
same in terms of the award to be made by this Hon'ble
Tribunal in the captioned arbitral proceedings;
f. Direct that the Respondents submit an affidavit of their
compliance with the directions of this Hon'ble Tribunal,
no later than 15 days from the receipt of the order of
this Hon'ble Tribunal;
g. Pass such other and further orders that this Hon'ble
Tribunal may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of
the present case.”
The prayer in case no.1 is the same save thair instead of the
amount of Rs. 1,52,78,64,477/-, the amount of Rs.37,09,24,712/- is
mentioned.”
5.
The present batch of Appeals, namely, ARB. A. (COMM.)
8/2026, 10/2026 and 5/2026, arise out of DIAC Case No. 9176/08-24,
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
whereas ARB. A. (COMM.) 9/2026, 6/2026 and 7/2026 arise out of
DIAC Case No. 9136/08-24.
6.
Since the interim measures sought by Pernod Ricard in both
DIAC Cases were substantially similar in nature against the respective
Respondents, the learned Arbitrator adjudicated the Applications by
way of a Common Order.
7.
Upon consideration of the pleadings and material on record, the
learned Arbitrator declined to grant the substantive monetary and
security-related reliefs sought in the Section 17 Applications;
however, certain limited interim measures were granted to the
Claimants therein/ Pernod Ricard in the Impugned Order, in the
following terms:
“27. I therefore decide both the applications, by declining to the
claimant the interim measures sought in prayer paragraphs (b), (c),
(d) and (e) and, by directing each of the respondents to, on or
before 31.10.2025, make a disclosure in terms of prayer paragraph
(a) and by restraining till the arbitration award, each of the
respondents from alienating, encumbering or parting with
possession of their assets/belongings.
28. The applications are disposed of.”
8.
Aggrieved by the limited relief granted under the Impugned
Order in both DIAC cases, certain Respondents, as before the learned
Arbitrator, have preferred the present Appeals.
9.
For the purposes of the present judgment, the main contesting
Respondent, being Respondent No. 1 in these Appeals, who was the
Claimant before the learned Arbitrator in both DIAC cases, shall be
referred to as “Pernod Ricard”, and the parties who have filed the
present Appeals shall be collectively referred to as the “Appellants”,
unless the context otherwise requires.
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
BRIEF FACTS:
10.
The necessary facts relevant for the adjudication of the present
Appeals are set out hereinbelow:
(a) M/s Indo Spirits is a partnership firm having its registered
office in Delhi, constituted pursuant to the Partnership Deed
dated 29.10.2021.
(b) Pernod Ricard India Pvt. Ltd. is a company incorporated under
the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office in India,
and is a subsidiary of the French alcoholic beverage company,
Pernod Ricard SA.
(c) The disputes between the parties arose in the backdrop of the
Delhi Excise Policy 2021-22, which was promulgated on
05.07.2021 and came into effect on 17.11.2021.
(d) Under the said Policy, manufacturers were barred from holding
L-1 (wholesale) and L-7Z (retail) licences. The Policy further
mandated that a manufacturer, such as Pernod Ricard, was
required to appoint an exclusive distributor for the distribution
of its products in the National Capital Territory of Delhi5.
(e) In compliance with the requirements of the said Policy, Pernod
Ricard entered into contractual arrangements for the
appointment of an exclusive distributor in the NCT of Delhi.
Joint Venture Agreement and Partnership Deed were executed,
pursuant to which Indo Spirits was appointed as the exclusive
distributor for Pernod Ricard‟s products in Delhi. For this
purpose, various ancillary agreements and documents were
also executed between the parties.
NCT of Delhi
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
(f) Pursuant thereto, on 08.11.2021, Indo Spirits obtained an L-1
Licence under the Excise Policy for the wholesale supply of
Indian and Foreign Liquor within the NCT of Delhi.
Thereafter, Pernod Ricard commenced the supply of its
products to Indo Spirits on a credit basis.
(g) In the course of the commercial transactions between Pernod
Ricard and Indo Spirits, disputes arose between the parties in
relation to their respective rights and obligations under the
contractual documents.
(h) On 20.10.2023, Pernod Ricard issued two separate notices
under Section 21 of the A&C Act, thereby invoking arbitration
in respect of disputes arising under letters dated 16.05.2022
and 21.12.2021, as well as surety bonds dated 17.05.2022 and
05.01.2022.
(i) On 22.11.2023, the Appellants responded to the said notices.
(j) Thereafter, Pernod Ricard filed two petitions under Section 11
of the A&C Act, being ARB. P. Nos. 411/2024 and 399/2024,
before this Court, seeking appointment of a Sole Arbitrator to
adjudicate the disputes between the parties.
(k) By Order dated 09.08.2024, this Court referred the disputes to
arbitration and appointed Hon‟ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sahai
Endlaw (Retd.) as the Sole Arbitrator in both matters.
(l) On 03.10.2024, Pernod Ricard filed its Statements of Claim in
both DIAC cases before the learned Arbitrator. Indo Spirits
thereafter filed its Statement of Defence.
(m) Prior to the filing of the Statement of Defence, Applications
under Section 16 of the A&C Act were preferred and came to
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
be adjudicated by the learned Arbitrator.
(n) Subsequently, Pernod Ricard filed Applications under Section
17 of the A&C Act seeking various interim measures in both
DIAC cases.
(o) Upon completion of pleadings in the said Applications, the
learned Arbitrator, by the Common Order dated 14.10.2025
impugned herein, partly allowed the Applications by directing
each of the Respondents before the learned Arbitrator
(Appellants herein) to, on or before 31.10.2025, make
disclosures of their assets and liabilities, including bank
statements for the relevant financial years, and further
restrained them, till the passing of the Arbitral Award, from
alienating, encumbering, or parting with possession of their
assets and belongings.
11.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid Impugned Order, the Appellants
have preferred the present Appeals.
SUBMISSION OF THE PARTIES:
12.
On behalf of the Appellants, the following submissions would
be advanced:
(a) The learned Arbitrator exceeded the scope of the pleadings and
the specific reliefs sought in the Section 17 Applications by
directing against restraint on alienation and dealing with
assets, despite no such express relief having been sought,
pleaded, or argued by Pernod Ricard in the said Applications.
(b) The Impugned Order, to the extent it imposes a restraint on
alienation of assets, amounts to a patent excess of jurisdiction
and a departure from the scope of adjudication.
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
(c) The learned Arbitrator has travelled beyond the reliefs claimed,
thereby rendering that portion of the Order ex facie
unsustainable. In support of this submission, reliance would be
placed on the judgment rendered by the Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court in Noida Toll Bridge Company Limited v. Nidhi
Sharma & Anr.6.
(d) The direction restraining alienation of assets was imposed
without prior notice and without affording the Appellants a
meaningful opportunity of hearing on that specific aspect.
(e) The scope of consideration, as recorded in the Impugned Order,
was confined to the maintainability of prayer clause (a)
seeking disclosure of assets. The imposition of a restraint, in
the absence of pleadings or submissions on that issue, is stated
to be in violation of the Principles of Natural Justice.
(f) The Section 17 Applications were filed nearly two years after
the invocation of arbitration. Such delay negates any plea of
urgency or irreparable harm and disentitles Pernod Ricard
from seeking discretionary interim relief.
(g) The Impugned Order does not record any reasoned satisfaction
of the well-settled parameters governing the grant of interim
measures, namely, the existence of a prima facie case, balance
of convenience, and irreparable injury.
(h) The Impugned Order proceeds without any discernible analysis
of the aforesaid requirements in light of the material on record,
and the absence of cogent reasoning vitiates the exercise of
discretion.
2023 SCC OnLine Del 7666
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
(i) The interim reliefs sought by Pernod Ricard were, in substance,
in the nature of attachment before judgment, and therefore,
attracted the statutory threshold embodied in Order XXXVIII
Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19087.
(j) The Section 17 Applications neither pleaded nor demonstrated,
by reference to any contemporaneous or credible material, any
conduct on their part indicative of an intention to obstruct or
delay the execution of a prospective Arbitral Award, or of any
imminent removal or disposition of assets with a view to
defeating such execution. For this purpose, reliance would be
placed, inter alia, on the judgment rendered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in decision in Indian Railway
Construction Co. Ltd. v. Quadricon (P) Ltd.8 to contend that
the mandatory preconditions under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of
the CPC were neither pleaded nor satisfied.
(k) Lastly, once the learned Arbitrator declined the substantive
reliefs sought under prayer clauses (b) to (e), which were in
the nature of attachment or security, the subsequent grant of
relief under prayer clause (a), coupled with a restraint on
alienation, is impermissible in law and contrary to the scheme
of the Applications themselves.
13.
Per contra, on behalf of Pernod Ricard, the following
submissions would be advanced:
(a) The Impugned Order is an interlocutory direction passed by the
learned Arbitrator in exercise of discretionary powers under
CPC
1994 SCC OnLine Del 531
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
Section 17 of the A&C Act.
(b) An appeal under Section 37 of the A&C Act lies within a
narrow and circumscribed ambit, and the appellate court ought
not to substitute its own discretion for that of the Arbitral
Tribunal. In support of this, reliance would be placed on
Augmont Gold Pvt. Ltd. v. One97 Communication Ltd.9,
Karanja Terminal & Logistics (P) Ltd. v. Sahara Dredging
Ltd.10, Raymond Ltd. v. Akshaypat Singhania11, Shabnam
Dhillon v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd.12, and Godrej
Properties Ltd. v. Frontier Home Developers (P) Ltd.13 to
submit that interference is warranted only where the Impugned
Order is shown to be arbitrary, perverse, or suffering from
patent illegality.
(c) So long as the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal is a plausible
one, informed by due application of mind to the pleadings and
material on record, the appellate court must exercise restraint.
(d) Placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
in ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel (India) Ltd. v. Essar Bulk
Terminal Ltd.14, it would be submitted that interim measures
under Section 17 of the A&C Act are intended to preserve the
efficacy of the arbitral process and to ensure that the eventual
award is not rendered illusory.
(e) Where the Arbitral Tribunal, upon consideration of the material
placed before it, issues protective directions so as to balance
(2021) 4 HCC (Del) 642
2023 SCC OnLine Bom 594
2019 SCC OnLine Bom 227
2019 SCC OnLine Del 8905
2025 SCC OnLine Del 2148
(2022) 1 SCC 712
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
the competing interests of the parties and safeguard the subject
matter of the dispute, such exercise of discretion ought to be
allowed to prevail unless it demonstrably transgresses the
settled principles governing the grant of interim relief.
ANALYSIS:
14.
This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at
considerable length and, with their assistance, carefully perused the
record of the present appeals, including the pleadings and the
Impugned Order passed by the learned Arbitrator.
15.
Having regard to the grounds urged, the controversy in the
present Appeals essentially narrows down to two aspects, namely,
first, whether the direction restraining the Appellants from alienating,
encumbering, or otherwise dealing with their assets pending the
arbitral award is legally sustainable, and, second, whether the
direction issued by the learned Arbitrator requiring disclosure of the
Appellants‟ assets and liabilities is in accordance with law.
16.
At the outset, this Court notes that it is fully conscious of the
limited scope of appellate jurisdiction under Section 37(2)(b) of the
A&C Act. The legislative intent underlying Section 5 of the A&C Act
mandates minimal judicial interference in arbitral proceedings.
17.
A Coordinate Bench of this Court in NHAI v. HK Toll Road
(P) Ltd.15 has reiterated that an appellate court does not ordinarily
interfere with discretionary orders passed by an Arbitral Tribunal.
Interference is justified only where such discretion has been exercised
arbitrarily, perversely, or in disregard of settled principles governing
the grant or refusal of interim relief. The appellate court is not
2025 SCC OnLine Del 2376
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
expected to substitute its own view merely because another view is
possible; rather, it must confine itself to examining whether the
Arbitral Tribunal adhered to settled legal principles. The relevant
portion of the said judgment reads as follows:
“56. A perusal of the aforesaid judgments show that the appellate
court while exercising powers/jurisdiction under Section 37 of the
1996 Act and more particularly under Section 37(2)(b) of the 1996
Act has to keep in mind the limited scope of judicial interference
as prescribed under Section 5 of the 1996 Act. Section 5 of the
1996 Act clearly reflects the legislative intent to minmize judicial
interference in the arbitration process. Unlike the appeals under
other statutes, the appeals under the 1996 Act against the orders
passed by the Arbitral Tribunal are subject to strict and narrow
grounds. The 1996 Act aims at minimal court involvement, thereby
to uphold the autonomy and efficiency of the arbitration process.
(Reference: paras 64, 66, 68-70 of Dinesh Gupta case13).
57. The appellate court is not required to substitute its views with
the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal which is a reasonable or a
plausible view except where the discretion is exercised arbitrarily
or where the AT has ignored the settled principles of law. In fact,
the whole purpose to bring the 1996 Act is to give supremacy to
the discretion exercised by the AT. The appellate court is not
required to interfere in the arbitral orders especially a decision
taken is at an interlocutory stage. The appellate court is only
required to see the whether the AT has adhered to the settled
principles of law rather than reassessing the merits of the AT's
reasoning.
58. A coordinate Bench of this Court in Tahal Consulting
Engineers India (P) Ltd. [2023 SCC OnLine Del 2069] case has
observed as under: (SCC OnLine Del paras 36 and 38)
“36. L & T Finance lays emphasis on the need of the
appellate court to bear in mind the basic and foundational
principles of the Act and that being of judicial intervention
being kept at the minimal. It also correctly finds that the
power conferred by Section 37(2)(b) is not to be
understood as being at par with the appellate jurisdiction
which may otherwise be exercised by courts in exercise of
their ordinary civil jurisdiction. This clearly flows from
the foundational construct of the Act which proscribes
intervention by courts in the arbitral process being kept at
bay except in situations clearly contemplated under the
Act or where the orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal
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may be found to suffer from an evident perversity or
patent illegality.
∗∗∗
38. It would thus appear to be well settled that the powers
under Section 37(2)(b) is to be exercised and wielded with
due circumspection and restraint. An appellate court
would clearly be transgressing its jurisdiction if it were to
interfere with a discretionary order made by the Arbitral
Tribunal merely on the ground of another possible view
being tenable or upon a wholesome review of the facts the
appellate court substituting its own independent opinion in
place of the one expressed by the Arbitral Tribunal. The
order of the Arbitral Tribunal would thus be liable to be
tested on the limited grounds of perversity, arbitrariness
and a manifest illegality only.”
59. To sum up, it is clear that in view of the limited judicial
interference, the appellate court has to exercise its power only if
the arbitral order suffers from perversity, arbitrariness and a
manifest illegality.”
18.
A similar exposition of law is found in World Window
Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Central Warehousing Corpn16, wherein it
has been held that the scope of interference under Section 37 of the
A&C Act against orders passed under Section 17 is extremely limited.
The Co-ordinate Bench emphasized that Interlocutory Orders of an
Arbitral Tribunal are inherently tentative and protective in nature,
subject to modification at the stage of final award. Judicial restraint
operates with even greater vigour at the interlocutory stage, as
unwarranted interference may impede the arbitral process itself. The
relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:
“66. The scope of interference, in appeal, against orders passed by
arbitrators on applications under Section 17 of the 1996 Act is
limited. This Court has already opined in Dinesh Gupta v. Anand
Gupta, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2099, Augmont Gold (P)
Ltd. v. One97 Communication Ltd., (2021) 4 HCC (Del) 642] and
Sanjay Arora v. Rajan Chadha, (2021) 3 HCC (Del) 654, that the
(2021) 3 HCC (Del) 731
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restraints which apply on the court while examining a challenge to
a final award under Section 34 equally apply to a challenge to an
interlocutory order under Section 37(ii)(b). In either case, the court
has to be alive to the fact that, by its very nature, the 1996 Act
frowns upon interference, by courts, with the arbitral process or
decisions taken by the arbitrator. This restraint, if anything,
operates more strictly at an interlocutory stage than at the final
stage, as interference with interlocutory orders could interference
with the arbitral process while it is ongoing, which may frustrate,
or impede, the arbitral proceedings.
67. Views expressed by arbitrators while deciding applications
under Section 17 are interlocutory views. They are not final
expressions of opinion on the merits of the case between the
parties. They are always subject to modification or review at the
stage of final award. They do not, therefore, in most cases,
irreparably prejudice either party to the arbitration. Section 17 like
Section 9 is intended to be a protective measure, to preserve the
sanctity of the arbitral process. The pre-eminent consideration,
which should weigh with the arbitrator while examining a Section
17 application, is the necessity to preserve the arbitral process and
ensure that the parties before it are placed on an equitable scale.
The interlocutory nature of the order passed under Section 17,
therefore, must necessarily inform the court seized with an appeal
against such a decision, under Section 37. Additionally, the
considerations which apply to Section 34 would also apply to
Section 37(ii)(b).”
19.
Before proceeding further, this Court considers it apposite to
extract the relevant portion of the Impugned Order passed by the
learned Arbitrator. The said extract is reproduced hereinbelow:
“11. I have considered the rival contentions, the records and the
judgments cited.
12. The claim in both the cases is for the balance price of liquor
products sold on credit basis by the claimant to the respondent no.1
in each of the two cases. The claim against the respondents 2 and 3
in case no. 1 is as guarantors of the respondent no.1. The claim
against the respondents 2 to 5 in case no. 2 is as guarantors
/partners of respondent no.1.
13. The respondent no.1 in each of the two cases, in its SOD has
not denied the receipt of the goods balance price whereof is
claimed. Rather the defence on merits of the respondent no.1 in
each of the two cases is, (i) that the claimant has suppressed the
actual course of dealings between the parties; (ii) the claimant
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exercised full operational control over procurement, pricing,
retailer mapping, payment collection and marketing, with the
respondent no.1 acting purely as a channel partner to facilitate
logistical and statutory compliances; (iii) the claimant cannot now
seek to off-load its own liabilities on to the respondent no.1; (iv)
unlike the earlier policies which placed no such restrictions, the
Delhi Excise Policy for 2021-22 explicitly barred manufacturers of
alcoholic products from holding the wholesale or retail license and
mandated that manufacturer must appoint an exclusive distributor
for its products; (v) the claimant approached the respondent no.1 in
furtherance of the aforesaid policy requirements and appointed the
respondent no.1 as the exclusive distributor for the claimant; (vi)
the documents relied by the claimant were prepared in accordance
with the said policy and the transaction between the parties was not
in accordance therewith; (vii) the claimant, in practice exercised
complete control and directed movement of stocks and engaged
with retail vendors, thereby bypassing the respondent no.1 which
was rendered a mere logistical conduit; (viii) the orders for
purchase placed by the respondent no.1 on the claimant were a
result of the claimant's direct interventions and not respondent no.1
's independent sale efforts; (ix) the credit notes and the trade
schemes were unilaterally controlled by the claimant; (x) the
respondent no.1 merely served as the implementing arm of the
claimant for credit notes based on the claimant's pre-decided
schemes; (xi) the claimant also completely usurped the respondent
no.1 's role in collection of payments; (xii) the relationship between
the claimant and the respondent no.1 , instead of on principal to
principal basis, was akin to a principal to agent relationship; (xiii)
the claimant cannot thus make the respondent no.1 liable for the
price if any remaining to be recovered of its products; (xiv) the
claim even otherwise is not only grossly inflated but is fictitious
and concocted; and, (xv) rather it is the claimant who owes monies
to the respondent no.1 and for which a counter claim is being
made. The respondent no.1 in its SOD has also taken several
technical and legal pleas including as to the very maintainability of
this arbitration.
14. The other respondents in each of the two cases also have
defended the claim, besides on technical/legal pleas, on the same
pleas as the respondent no.1 and/or otherwise denying their
liability for the claim made.
15. On completion of pleadings, it was enquired from the counsels,
whether desired decision on the admitted documents on record or
wanted to examine witnesses. The counsels for the claimant as well
as the respondents have opted to examine witnesses and trial
therefor has been scheduled.
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16. It is in the aforesaid context that the applications for interim
measures have to be decided.
17. During the hearing itself, I had indicated that (i) once according
to the claimant also, the acts of the respondents pleaded in the
application to show that the respondents, with the intent to obstruct
or delay the execution of any award that may be passed against
them, were about to dispose of the whole or any part of their
property were of a date prior to invocation of arbitration; and, (ii)
considering the delay even after invoking arbitration on the part of
the claimant in seeking the interim measures now sought, no case
for grant of interim measures sought in prayer paragraphs (b), (c)
and (d) of the application was made out. It was for this reason only
that the senior counsel for the claimant made the alternate
argument for grant at least of relief in terms of prayer paragraph (a)
of the application.
18. The law and the procedure in accordance with principles of
natural justice for implementation thereof provide for attachment
of property and/or a direction for furnishing security only after the
court/tribunal has reached a finding of the person whose property
is being attached and/or who is being asked to furnish security
owes money to another and not prior thereto. The reason therefor is
obvious. An order I direction for attachment of property and/or to
furnish security has serious consequences, sometimes irreversible.
Thus, merely because a money claim is made, is no reason for the
order of attachment or for furnishing of security to be made. The
law has however made an exception in this regard. Where the
court/tribunal is satisfied that the person against whom money
claim has been made, with intent to obstruct or delay the execution
of the decree/award likely to be passed, is about to dispose of his
property or to make it unavailable for satisfaction of the
decree/award likely to be made, the court/tribunal has been
empowered to issue such an order/direction even prior to returning
the judgment/award for recovery of money against such person.
Such principles though not strictly applicable to arbitration, would
guide the undersigned and if not follow, in the case of the claimant
ultimately failing to prove its claim have the tendency of playing
havoc on the respondents.
19. Though undoubtedly, the sales, supply and delivery of liquor
products of the value claimed by the claimant does not appear to be
in dispute but eyes cannot be shut to the other defences of the
respondents and which according to the counsel for the claimant
also cannot be adjudicated on the basis of documents alone and
require trial. In such a state of affair, orders/directions sought by
the claimant in prayer paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of its
application cannot be issued/made. The claims of the claimant are
yet to be adjudicated and asking the respondents to deposit the
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claim amount in the court or to furnish bank guarantee for payment
thereof or to make any other arrangement for payment thereof
would tantamount to this tribunal at this interim stage itself when
the proof of what is pleaded is still to unfold, finding in favour of
the claimant and which cannot
be the case.
20. Had there been any urgency emanating from the acts of the
respondents pleaded, the claimant would not have waited for two
years to seek such interim measures. Nothing of the recent past to
show any such intent of the respondents has been pleaded. The
claimant, though as far back as on 20.10.2023, i.e. nearly two years
back, was aware of its claims against the respondents but did not
deem it necessary to obtain interim measures as now sought in
prayer paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e). Though the claimant in the
year 2024 approached the court for appointment of arbitral tribunal
but still did not feel the need to still seek any such interim
measures against the respondents. The undersigned entered upon
reference on 12.09.2024 i.e. more than one year back and till the
filing on 18.08.2025 of the applications, did not feel the need for
any such interim Measures.
21. I therefore, as indicated during the hearing also, do not find the
claimant entitled to the interim measures sought in prayer
paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e).
22. It was therefore straightaway enquired from the counsels for
the respondents, why directions in terms of prayer paragraph (a)
should not be issued against the respondents.
23. As would be obvious from the narration hereinabove, no
cogent reply could be given by either of the counsels for the
respondents to my aforesaid query. I had during the hearing also
drawn attention of the counsels to the principles enshrined in the
Commercial Court Act, 2015 and/or in the provisions of CPC
specifically designed therefor and which encourage disclosure of
all relevant facts. Such disclosure in my view would also include
disclosure in terms sought in prayer paragraph (a) of the
application. Even otherwise the recent trend of judgments shows
the courts to be encouraging disclosure particularly of assets, in
cases of monitory claims which may be liable to be enforced
against the assets.
24. Merit is indeed found in the contention that this tribunal ought
not to permit creation of a situation where the claimant even after
succeeding in the arbitration is left without any modes of
recovering the amounts from the respondents.
25. The argument of the counsels for the respondents that the
claimant has not sought any interim measure of so restraining the
respondents is misconceived. Such a direction is implicit in the
other interim measures sought in the applications as well as under
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the residual prayer paragraph. For grant thereof, the claimant is
found to satisfy the triple test of prima-facie case, balance of
convenience and irreparable injury.
26. Merit is not found in the contention of the counsels for the
respondents that granting any such restraint against the respondents
would amount to interference in the business being carried on by
the respondents. The right of the respondents to carry on their
business has to be balanced against the right of the claimant to be
able to recover the amounts if any ultimately found due from the
respondents. The said rights can be balanced by, while restraining
the respondents, giving them liberty to approach this tribunal for
modification if any need therefor arises. If at that stage this tribunal
is of the view that the affairs of the respondents are indeed being
prejudiced owing to the restraint order, this tribunal can consider
the alternatives at that stage.
27. I therefore decide both the applications, by declining to the
claimant the interim measures sought in prayer paragraphs (b), (c),
(d) and (e) and, by directing each of the respondents to, on or
before 31.10.2025, make a disclosure in terms of prayer paragraph
(a) and by restraining till the arbitration award, each of the
respondents from alienating, encumbering or parting with
possession of their assets/belongings.
28. The applications are disposed of.”
20.
In order to appreciate whether the learned Arbitrator acted
within the permissible contours of discretion on the issues raised
before this Court, it is necessary to briefly advert to the reasoning
recorded in the Impugned Order. A perusal thereof reveals, inter alia,
the following findings:
(a) The disputes in both arbitrations arise from alleged nonpayment of the balance consideration for liquor supplied on
credit. The liability of other Respondents therein is founded
upon guarantees and/or partnership obligations.
(b) Since parties have elected to lead oral evidence, and the issues
cannot be adjudicated merely on admitted documents, the
claims require a full trial and remain to be finally determined.
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(c) The alleged acts indicating intention to defeat execution were of
a period prior to the invocation of arbitration. Further, there
was a delay of nearly two years in seeking interim measures,
which undermined any plea of urgency.
(d) No recent or cogent material was placed to demonstrate
imminent dissipation or removal of assets so as to justify
drastic measures akin to attachment before the Arbitral Award.
(e) Directing the deposit of the claim amount, furnishing of bank
guarantees, or other security at this stage would effectively
amount to granting substantive relief prior to adjudication,
which is impermissible.
(f) Attachment or security before adjudication is an exceptional
remedy and requires satisfaction that the Respondents therein
intend to obstruct or delay execution of a prospective award.
Such a threshold was not met in the present cases.
(g) The Respondents therein were unable to furnish cogent reasons
opposing the disclosure of assets and liabilities. Contemporary
commercial
jurisprudence
encourages
transparency,
particularly in monetary claims where enforcement against
assets may eventually arise.
(h) The learned Arbitrator felt justified in ensuring that a situation
does not arise where, upon success in arbitration, Pernod
Ricard is left without any effective means of recovery.
(i) A limited restraint on alienation, coupled with disclosure, was
considered protective and proportionate, attempting to balance
Pernod Ricard‟s right to secure effective recovery to carry on
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business by the Respondents therein. Liberty was preserved to
seek modification in case of genuine prejudice.
(j) Consequently, the substantive interim measures seeking deposit
or security (prayers b-e) were declined; however, disclosure of
assets was directed and a limited restraint against alienation or
encumbrance of assets was imposed pending the arbitral
award.
21.
Turning now to the specific contentions raised by the
Appellants before this Court, it finds considerable merit in the
Appellants‟ submission that the learned Arbitrator has travelled
beyond the pleadings and granted a relief which was neither
specifically sought nor founded upon any prayer in the application
under Section 17 of the A&C Act. A careful perusal of the prayer
clauses in the Section 17 Applications demonstrates that, while
Pernod Ricard had sought extensive disclosure of assets and various
interim measures under prayers (a) to (e), there was no prayer
whatsoever seeking a restraint on alienation, encumbrance, or parting
with possession of the Appellants‟ assets.
22.
Notwithstanding the absence of any such specific relief in the
pleadings, the Impugned Order proceeds to impose precisely such a
restraint. The effect of this direction is to confer a substantive interim
protection not anchored in the pleadings, thereby granting a relief de
hors the prayers made before the learned Arbitrator.
23.
The legal position in this regard is well settled. An adjudicatory
authority, including an Arbitral Tribunal exercising powers under
Section 17 of the A&C Act, is bound by the pleadings and the reliefs
sought by the parties. While the tribunal may mould relief within the
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framework of the case presented, it cannot, under the guise of doing
complete justice, grant a direction that introduces a new dimension to
the dispute or imposes a burden which the opposite party was never
called upon to meet.
24.
In this context, the reliance placed by the Appellants upon the
judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench in Noida Toll Bridge (supra) is
apposite. In the said decision, this Court categorically held that an
Arbitral Tribunal cannot recast pleadings or award a relief that was
neither prayed for nor argued, as such an exercise would amount to
jurisdictional overreach and would offend the fundamental principles
of fair adjudication and natural justice. The relevant portion of the said
judgment is extracted hereinbelow:
“21. The Learned Arbitrator, instead of granting the specific
reliefs, ordered the Appellant to deposit a Fixed Deposit Receipt
[“FDR”] for Rs. 5 crores, pending final resolution of the dispute.
This interim direction clearly strays from the reliefs sought in the
Section 17 application. Thus, the Court opines that if the Learned
Arbitrator intended to grant reliefs beyond the application's
prayers, it was essential for the Appellant to be given adequate
notice to respond appropriately.”
25.
The prejudice occasioned to the Appellants is not merely
technical but substantive. Since no restraint on alienation was ever
sought in the Section 17 Applications, the Appellants were denied any
opportunity to file pleadings, place material, or address arguments
specifically directed to such a relief. The Impugned Order, therefore,
fastens a serious restriction on the Appellants‟ proprietary and
commercial rights without affording them the procedural safeguards
and an effective opportunity of hearing.
26.
Such a course of action strikes at the very root of the principles
of audi alteram partem and renders the direction passed by the learned
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Arbitrator vulnerable on the ground of breach of Natural Justice. In
the considered view of this Court, once the learned Arbitrator had
confined the scope of adjudication to the maintainability of prayer (a),
it was impermissible to travel further and superimpose an unpleaded
and unargued restraint on alienation of assets.
27.
With respect to the invocation of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the
CPC, this Court is of the considered opinion that the jurisdiction to
grant relief thereunder is extraordinary and drastic in nature. Such
power is not to be exercised lightly or as a matter of course. It can be
invoked only upon the applicant establishing, on the basis of cogent,
credible, and proximate material, a real and imminent apprehension
that the respondents are acting with a deliberate intent to obstruct or
defeat the satisfaction of a prospective decree or award, by alienating,
dissipating, secreting, or otherwise removing their assets beyond the
reach of the judicial process.
28.
In Skypower Solar India (P) Ltd. v. Sterling and Wilson
International FZE17, Division Bench of this Court has held interim
protection akin to Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the CPC can be granted
only upon a prima facie finding of a real and imminent risk of asset
alienation or conduct intended to frustrate enforcement of a
prospective award, and not merely on the existence of a prima facie
case or balance of convenience, which is extracted as follows:
“47. There is no finding (prima facie or otherwise) by the learned
Single Judge that, if S&W prevails in the arbitral proceedings, it
would be unable to enforce the arbitral award in its favour if the
amounts as claimed are not secured. There is no allegation that
Appellants 2 to 6 are alienating their assets and are acting in a
manner that would frustrate the enforcement of an arbitral award
(2023) 6 HCC (Del) 702
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that may be delivered in favour of S&W.
****
49. We have carefully examined the impugned judgment. Whilst,
the learned Single Judge has found that S&W has established a
prima facie case and that the balance of convenience is also in its
favour, there is no finding to the effect that Appellants 2 to 6 are
alienating their assets or would do so and frustrate S&W's recourse
to enforce the arbitral award if it prevails in the arbitral
proceedings. There is no finding that absent an order for securing
the amounts in dispute, S&W would be unable to enforce the
arbitral award that may be made in its favour. The learned Single
Judge had accepted that any change in the shareholding pattern of
original Respondents 2 to 8 would have a bearing on the arbitration
proceedings as well as the execution of the arbitral award. The
observations to the said effect are contained in para 74 of the
impugned judgment, which reads as under: (Sterling & Wilson
International FZE v. Sunshakti Solar Power Projects (P)
Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2414, SCC OnLine Del 74)
“74. It is clear that under Section 9, the court has the
power to issue interim directions to non-parties to
arbitration agreement. Keeping in view the judgments
referred to above, in my opinion, petitioner is right in its
contention that if the shareholding pattern of respondents
changes by transferring shares, there is likelihood of
changes in the management, overall control and the
decision-making power. This would have a significant
bearing on the arbitration proceedings as well as the
ultimate execution of the award. Thus, interim directions
are required to be issued against Respondents 2 to 8. The
judgments relied upon by respondents are distinguishable
on the facts of this case and thus of no avail to them.”
****
63. The principle for granting orders under Order 38 Rule 5CPC
are now well-settled. In Raman Tech. & Process Engg.
Co. v. Solanki Traders, (2008) 2 SCC 302, the Supreme Court had
observed that the power under Order 38 Rule 5 are drastic and
extraordinary powers and are required to be used sparingly and in
accordance with the rule. The Supreme Court also observed that
the purpose of Order 38 Rule 5 was not to convert an unsecured
debt as a secured one. The object of Order 38 Rule 5 was to
prevent any defendant from defeating the realisation of a decree
that may ultimately be passed in favour of the plaintiff. The
relevant extract of the said decision is set out below: (SCC p. 304,
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paras 4 and 5)
“4. The object of supplemental proceedings (applications
for arrest or attachment before judgment, grant of
temporary injunctions and appointment of receivers) is to
prevent the ends of justice being defeated. The object of
Order 38 Rule 5 CPC in particular, is to prevent any
defendant from defeating the realisation of the decree that
may ultimately be passed in favour of the plaintiff, either
by attempting to dispose of, or remove from the
jurisdiction of the court, his movables. The Scheme of
Order 38 and the use of the words „to obstruct or delay the
execution of any decree that may be passed against him‟
in Rule 5 make it clear that before exercising the power
under the said Rule, the court should be satisfied that there
is a reasonable chance of a decree being passed in the suit
against the defendant. This would mean that the court
should be satisfied that the plaintiff has a prima facie case.
If the averments in the plaint and the documents produced
in support of it, do not satisfy the court about the existence
of a prima facie case, the court will not go to the next
stage of examining whether the interest of the plaintiff
should be protected by exercising power under Order 38
Rule 5CPC. It is well-settled that merely having a just or
valid claim or a prima facie case, will not entitle the
plaintiff to an order of attachment before judgment, unless
he also establishes that the defendant is attempting to
remove or dispose of his assets with the intention of
defeating the decree that may be passed. Equally wellsettled is the position that even where the defendant is
removing or disposing his assets, an attachment before
judgment will not be issued, if the plaintiff is not able to
satisfy that he has a prima facie case.
5. The power under Order 38 Rule 5CPC is a drastic and
extraordinary power. Such power should not be exercised
mechanically or merely for the asking. It should be used
sparingly and strictly in accordance with the rule. The
purpose of Order 38 Rule 5 is not to convert an unsecured
debt into a secured debt. Any attempt by a plaintiff to
utilise the provisions of Order 38 Rule 5 as a leverage for
coercing the defendant to settle the suit claim should be
discouraged. Instances are not wanting where bloated and
doubtful claims are realised by unscrupulous plaintiffs, by
obtaining orders of attachment before judgment and
forcing the defendants for out of court settlements, under
threat of attachment.”
****
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70. The principles underlying the object of Order 38 Rule 5CPC
are, as noticed earlier, well-settled. Such orders are required to be
issued in case where the court is satisfied that the party has
established a strong prima facie case and that the respondents are
acting in a manner that would defeat the realisation of the decree.
These principles must be equally satisfied for securing protective
orders under Section 9 of the A&C Act, which are in the nature of
orders under Order 38 Rule 5CPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
29.
On this basis, a bare perusal of the Impugned Order reveals that,
beyond a narration of the rival submissions, there is no independent or
reasoned evaluation of the factual material placed on record in support
of Pernod Ricard‟s apprehension of siphoning, diversion, or
dissipation of assets.
30.
The learned Arbitrator, in paragraph 7 of the Impugned Order,
records that none of the acts relied upon by the claimant were of a date
subsequent to the invocation of arbitration and that the only
subsequent circumstance pressed into service was the alleged nondisclosure of affairs by the Appellants. Further, the learned Arbitrator
expressly notes the absence of urgency as there being a delay of nearly
two years in seeking interim measures, and resultantly, declines the
prayers (b) to (e).
31.
Moreover, the record shows that the Section 17 Applications
are founded primarily on a report of Chartered Accountants dated
25.08.2025, which is pleaded as disclosing, inter alia, large-scale
alienation of assets and diversion of funds. The Impugned Order,
however, in paragraph 10, records the contention of learned counsel
for Pernod Ricard, via his rejoinder, that he disclaimed reliance upon
the said report during the course of arguments, the same having been
assailed by the Appellants as manufactured and fabricated. Once
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learned counsel for Pernod Ricard, before the learned Arbitrator,
elected not to press the very document forming the factual substratum
of the allegations of siphoning and dissipation, the application, to that
extent, was left without any concrete or proximate material
demonstrating a real and immediate risk to the satisfaction of a
prospective award.
32.
In the absence of material establishing the jurisdictional
precondition for the exercise of powers analogous to Order XXXVIII
Rule 5 of the CPC, namely, a demonstrable intent on the part of the
Appellants to obstruct or defeat the enforcement of a prospective
award, the grant of such extraordinary interim protection is rendered
legally unsustainable.
33.
With respect to the application of the well-settled „triple test‟
governing the grant of interim injunctions, it is trite that the exercise
of such jurisdiction is conditioned upon the satisfaction of three
foundational requirements namely, (i) the existence of a prima facie
case; (ii) the balance of convenience tilting in favour of the applicant;
and (iii) the likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of interim
protection. These jurisdictional preconditions cannot be presumed or
invoked as a matter of course. They must be the subject of a conscious
and reasoned judicial determination, founded upon an objective
evaluation of the material placed on record.
34.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Bloomberg Television
Production Services India Pvt. Ltd. v. Zee Entertainment
Enterprises Ltd.18 has underscored that the grant of interim relief must
rest upon a careful and reasoned application of the aforesaid threefold
(2025) 1 SCC 741
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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test and not upon a mechanical or conclusory invocation thereof. The
Court cautioned that a mere reproduction of submissions or precedents
is insufficient; the adjudicatory authority must expressly analyse how
each limb of the test stands satisfied on the facts of the case and
furnish cogent reasons in support of its conclusion. Relevant
paragraph of the said judgment has been extracted as under:
“4. The threefold test of establishing: (i) a prima facie case, (ii)
balance of convenience, and (iii) irreparable loss or harm, for the
grant of interim relief, is well-established in the jurisprudence of
this Court. This test is equally applicable to the grant of interim
injunctions in defamation suits. However, this threefold test must
not be applied mechanically [DDA v. Skipper Construction Co.
(P) Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 622, para 38], to the detriment of the other
party and in the case of injunctions against journalistic pieces,
often to the detriment of the public. While granting interim relief,
the court must provide detailed reasons and analyse how the
threefold test is satisfied. A cursory reproduction of the
submissions and precedents before the court is not sufficient. The
court must explain how the test is satisfied and how the precedents
cited apply to the facts of the case.”
35.
To augment, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in ArcelorMittal
(supra) has reiterated that these foundational principles are equally
applicable in proceedings under Sections 9 of the A&C Act. By
necessary extension, the same discipline in reasoning must inform the
exercise of power under Section 17 of the A&C Act by an Arbitral
Tribunal.
36.
Tested on the aforesaid anvil, the Impugned Order does not
meet the threshold mandated in law. Beyond a bare recital of
satisfaction,
there
is
no
discernible
or
structured
analysis
demonstrating how a prima facie case was established, how the
balance of convenience lay in favour of Pernod Ricard, or how any
irreparable or imminent prejudice was likely to ensue in the absence
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
of the restraint. The invocation of the „triple test‟ in the present case
appears conclusory rather than reasoned, thereby rendering the
exercise of discretion legally vulnerable. In these circumstances, it
cannot be said that the essential ingredients of the „triple test‟ were
duly satisfied.
37.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view
that the restraint imposed upon the Appellants from alienating,
encumbering, or otherwise dealing with their assets during the
pendency of the arbitral proceedings cannot be sustained in law and
warrants interference in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction under
Section 37 of the A&C Act.
38.
This Court now proceeds to examine the validity of the
directions issued with regard to the disclosure of assets and liabilities.
In this context, it is pertinent to note that certain Appellants
themselves, in their respective grounds of appeal, have expressed their
willingness to furnish particulars of their assets and liabilities in a
sealed cover. The relevant portion of one of the Appeals, being
ARB.A.(COMM.) 8/2026, reads as follows:
“Availability of Less Intrusive AlternativesThat, without prejudice, even if the Learned Sole Arbitrator
intended to verify the financial status or asset position of the
Appellant, the objective could have been met through less intrusive
and confidentiality-preserving mechanisms, such as:
(a) submission of a net-worth certificate or summary of assets and
liabilities duly certified by a statutory auditor, or
(b) submission of redacted or anonymized statements to the learned
Arbitrator in a sealed cover, for limited inspection.”
39.
In view of the aforesaid stand taken by some of the Appellants,
this Court finds that the issue of disclosure need not be adjudicated
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
here strictly on adversarial merits.
40.
Rather,
the
suggestion
emanates
from the
Appellants
themselves and reflects their acknowledgment that a calibrated
disclosure mechanism may be adopted without prejudice to their
rights and contentions. This Court, therefore, considers it appropriate
and equitable to extend such a confidentiality-preserving mechanism
uniformly across all connected appeals.
41.
Consequently, the direction requiring disclosure shall apply
uniformly to all Respondents appearing before the learned Arbitrator.
However, such disclosure shall be made in a sealed cover, in the
manner as put forth by the Appellants.
CONCLUSION:
42.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is satisfied that
the Impugned Order, insofar as it restrains the Appellants from
alienating, encumbering, or otherwise dealing with their assets and
belongings during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings, cannot be
sustained in law and warrants interference under Section 37(2)(b) of
the A&C Act. To that extent, the Impugned Order is set aside.
43.
However, the direction requiring the Appellants (many of them
are Respondents before the learned Arbitrator) to furnish a list of
their assets and liabilities, as issued in the Impugned Order, is upheld.
The said disclosure by the Respondents, as before the learned
Arbitrator, shall, however, be made in a sealed cover before the
learned Arbitrator, in terms of the mechanism suggested by the
Appellants, as noted hereinabove.
44.
Accordingly, the present Appeals, along with pending
application(s), if any, stand disposed of in the above terms.
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
45.
No order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 18, 2026/sm/her
ARB. A. (COMM.)8/2026 & connected matters
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:54:19
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