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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 28.11.2025
Pronounced on:28.02.2026
+
W.P.(C) 7695/2017 & CM APPL. 32949/2023
SAIYEED MOHD JAFAR
.....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Ritu Jain & Ms. Sreedhi
Nair, Advs.
versus
M/S KIRAN ENGINEERING AND SUPPLIERS AND ANR
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. A.K. Jain, Mrs. Santosh
Jain & Mr. R.M. Tiwari, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
JUDGMENT
1.
The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India assailing the Award dated 31.08.2013
(hereinafter referred to as “impugned award”) passed by learned
Presiding Officer, Court No. IX, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi
(hereinafter referred to as “Labour Court”) in Industrial Dispute being
ID No. 226/2012, whereby, the reference of the petitioner workman
was dismissed.
2.
The facts necessary for deciding the controversy involved in the
present writ petition is in narrow compass. It is stated that Sh. Saiyeed
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Mohd Jafar (hereinafter referred to as “the petitioner workman”) had
been working with the respondent No. 1 management (hereinafter
referred to as “the respondent management”) at B-68/3, Wazirpur
Industrial Area, Delhi-110052, as an operator since the year 2008. It is
stated that the workman was made to work for both the managements
as both the managements were running in the same building. It is
stated that the respondent management, in the year 2011-12, allegedly
closed their establishment/undertaking from the aforesaid premises
and shifted their address to Sikandrabad, Uttar Pradesh.
3.
It is the case of the petitioner that the services of the petitioner
were terminated w.e.f. 19.09.2011 and he was not given any terminal
benefits such as retrenchment compensation, prior notice or gratuity,
etc. As a result thereof, the petitioner and other co-workmen protested
against the said closure of management and subsequently, preferred an
industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter
referred to as “ID Act”) for adjudication of their claims.
4.
The appropriate government referred the industrial dispute
being ID No. 226/2012 to the learned Labour Court. The learned
Labour Court framed issues surrounding the dispute to the following
effect:
(i) whether there is any employee-employer relationship in
between the workman and the management no.2?
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(ii) whether the workman has absented from the duties of his
own with management no.1 and failed to resume the duties
w.e.f from 19.09.2011? OPM
(iii) in terms of reference? OP parties
(iv) relief.
5.
The learned Labour Court decided issue No. 2 in favour of
workman holding that as the management has shifted, it is not a case
of abandonment. On issue Nos. 1, 3 and 4 the learned Labour Court
answered the same in favour of the management holding therein that it
was merely a case of shifting of the establishment and not its closure.
6.
Being aggrieved thereof, the present writ petition has been filed
seeking setting aside of the said impugned award in respect of issues
no. 1, 3 and 4 and seeking a relief holding that the respondent
management has been closed and further, grant the petitioner
retrenchment compensation in terms of Section 25FFF of the ID Act.
7.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner workman
submitted to the effect that the finding of the learned Labour Court
that the present dispute was not a case of closure of respondent
management and was merely shifting of the establishment, is
erroneous, arbitrary and contrary to the settled position of law and is
thus, liable to be set aside.
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8.
It is submitted that the learned Labour Court erred in dismissing
the reference filed by the workman by holding that since, he was
asked to resume his services at the shifted premises at Sikandrabad,
therefore, it does not amount to termination of his services. It is
submitted that no workman can be forced to join at the shifted
premises and in the present case, the workman was asked to join at the
shifted premises with a view to avoid making payment of terminal
benefits like closure compensation, notice pay as per Section 25FFF
of ID Act which tantamount to illegal termination of his services.
9.
Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the
learned Labour Court failed to appreciate the fact that closing down
the undertaking at one place and shifting the machinery and industry
to a different state/premises amounts to closure of the undertaking and
thus, the respondent management were bound to follow the procedure
under Section 25FFF of the ID Act.
10.
It is further submitted that the learned Labour Court failed to
adhere to the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court passed in
the case of Workmen of the Straw Board Manufacturing Company
Limited v. M/s. Straw Board Manufacturing Company Limited 1974
AIR 1132, wherein it was held that in case the learned Labour Court
arrives at a finding that the establishment has been closed down, then
it is bound to proceed to determine the amount of compensation,
notice pay and benefits under Section 25FFF of the ID Act. It is
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contested that in the present case, the learned Labour Court, having
arrived at the finding that the management had been shifted to a
different place in a different state, failed to apply the law laid down by
the Hon‟ble Court in Workmen of the Straw Board Manufacturing
Company Limited (Supra).
11.
It is further submitted that the present issue is a clear case of
closure of the management from one place and therefore, the
respondent management failed to comply with the provision of
Section 25FFF in giving retrenchment compensation and other
benefits to the petitioner.
12.
It is also submitted that the respondent management failed to
lead any evidence or take a plea before the learned Labour Court to
show that other workmen joined the premises of respondent
management at Sikandrabad. It is stated that the respondent‟s
opportunity to lead evidence was thus, closed on 16.08.2013.
13.
It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that
there were no provisions under the conditions of service of the
workmen to transfer the petitioner and his co-workmen at a shifted
place. It is stated that the respondent failed to produce any letter of
appointment or any other document on record which empowered them
to transfer the services of the petitioner from one place to another.
14.
Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, contended that the
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respondent management deliberately took shelter under the defence of
transfer of the undertaking with a view to avoid the payment of
statutory benefits of retrenchment compensation, notice pay and
gratuity to the petitioner and other co-workers.
15.
It is also argued that the learned Labour Court erred in its
finding on the aspect that there was no employer-employee
relationship between the petitioner workman and respondent No.2
management. It is submitted that the learned Labour Court failed to
consider the fact that both the firms were being run by the same family
and were doing the same business from the same location, hence, both
the firms ought to have been jointly and severally liable to pay the
dues of the petitioner workman.
16.
In view of the foregoing submissions, the learned counsel for
the petitioner thus, seeks intervention of this Court in setting aside the
impugned award dated 31.08.2013 qua its finding that that the present
case is of simple shifting of unit from one place to another and as
such, the workmen were not illegally terminated.
17.
Per Contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
management submitted that the learned Labour Court rightly held to
the effect that the management shifted its unit from Delhi to
Sikandrabad and it is the petitioner who failed to join his duty at the
Sikandrabad premises. He therefore submits that the services of the
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petitioner were never terminated and thus, no question of compliance
under Section 25FFF of the ID Act arises in favour of the petitioner
workman.
18.
It is submitted that even on merits, the award passed by the
learned Labour Court is in accordance with the settled position of law
and it is indeed the petitioner workman who has failed to establish that
his services were illegally terminated by the respondent management.
He submitted that transfer letters dated 21.09.2011 and 07.10.2011
were duly issued by the management to all its workmen, despite
which, the petitioner herein, failed to join his duty at the Sikandrabad
premises. It is stated that all other 80 workmen had joined at the
transferred place except 6 workmen, who had raised industrial dispute
which are pending before this Court.
19.
It is further submitted that the petitioner also filed a suit for
permanent injunction before the learned District Court, Rohini, Delhi,
seeking a direction to stop the shifting process of the respondent
management, however, even there, the petitioner was unable to obtain
a relief of stay on the operation.
20.
It is stated that management has a right to transfer a workman.
If the entire unit of management had shifted to Sikandarabad, all the
workmen should have joined the place of shifting after being asked to
do so but this workman, instead of joining, had filed cases for
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settlement of his Provident Funds, Gratuity etc., showing his intention
not to continue at the transferred place. It is stated that the crossexamination of the workman clearly indicates this fact.
21.
It is submitted that the petitioner even had an option to give his
resignation and settle his accounts with the respondent management if
he was unable to join at the shifted premises, however, the petitioner
has, with a malafide intent, raised a false claim of illegal termination
of his services along with allegations of closure of a unit.
22.
In view of the aforementioned, the learned counsel appearing
for the respondent management No.1 submitted that the present
petition is liable to be dismissed being devoid of any merits.
23.
Heard the learned counsel for petitioner and the learned counsel
for the respondent No. 1 and perused the material placed on record.
24.
The case of the petitioner pertains to his employment with the
respondent management where he was working since the year 1989 as
a machine operator. The first and foremost objection raised by the
petitioner against the impugned Award is that when the respondent
management closed their establishment from Wazirabad, Delhi
premises and shifted to Sikandrabad address, the respondent
intentionally terminated the services of the petitioner w.e.f.
19.09.2011 as he was not allowed to enter the premises of the
management at Delhi. The petitioner further alleges that he was not
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given any retrenchment compensation, nor was he issued any prior
notice and as such, his termination is in violation of Section 25FFF of
the ID Act. It is his claim that no workman can be forced to transfer
from one establishment to another and the present case is a clear case
of closure of a branch, which fact, has been rejected by the learned
Labour Court.
25.
In rival submissions, the case of the management is that the
services of the petitioner workman were never terminated as the
management merely decided to shift its branch from Wazirabad, Delhi
to Sikandrabad address and it was rather the petitioner workman who
failed to resume his duties at the transferred place despite being given
written directions vide letters dated 21.09.2011 and 07.10.2011. It is
therefore, the plea of the respondent management that the provisions
of Section 25FFF of the ID Act does not apply in the instant case as
the management merely shifted its unit from Delhi to Sikandrabad and
as such, the learned Labour Court has rightly arrived at its findings.
26.
Before deliberating upon the objections raised by the petitioner,
it is relevant to note the relevant law on this point. The petitioner has
claimed that the shifting of the premises of the management amounts
to closure of their business resulting in illegal termination of the
workman in violation of provisions of Section 25FFF of the ID Act.
Section 25FFF provides that in case of close down of an undertaking,
for any reason whatsoever, every workman who has been in
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continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking
immediately before such closure, is entitled to notice and
compensation in accordance with Section 25-F of the ID Act.
27.
The petitioner is aggrieved by the findings of learned Labour
Court which held that the case of the management does not amount to
closure of an undertaking but amounts to only shifting and as such
25FFF of the ID Act is not applicable.
28.
What amounts to closure has been dealt with in the case of
Biddle Sawyer Ltd., Mumbai v. Chemical Employees Union, 2007
SCC OnLine Bom 339 passed by the High Court of Bombay wherein,
after going through the entire law relating to closure, it was held that
closure
means
permanent
closing
down
of
the
business/undertaking/industry and not merely a “place of business”.
The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:
“40. Having considered extensively all the
judgments placed before us by the learned
Senior Counsel, the law relating to “closure”
seems to be a well settled one. Closure is the
closing down permanently of the source of
employment of the workmen, i.e. the place
where the employment is actively generated.
It thus follows that closing down of a “place”
of business would not amount to closure as
that would be over simplification which
would lead to various negative ramifications
as they have been extensively dealt with in the
earlier part of the judgment in various
quotations from various judgments. It must be
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recalled that the object of labour legislation is
a social welfare legislation. It is an umbrella
of protection provided to workmen to shield
them from the employer exploiting their
vulnerable position. But it cannot be said that
merely because a place of manufacture has
been closed down and restarted at another
place or transferred to another employer that
the undertaking has been closed down. The
business itself is still alive, the source of
employment is still present and there is no
valid closure in law.
41. A conspectus of all the above judgments
makes it clear that “closure” would really
mean permanent closure of the “place of
employment” or a part thereof and the same
could never mean only “place” of
employment. One has to read the above
definition of section 2(cc) of Industrial
Disputes Act in a comprehensive manner and
not in a disjointed manner. A “place of
employment” means a place which generates
employment or where business is carried on,
and the same should not be construed in a
superficial manner to indicate only a building
or factory. The above interpretation has been
consistently adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court and our High Court, as can be seen
from the following:
(a) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Tatanagar Foundary Co.
Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1970 (I) LLJ
348, in paragraph No. 3 has observed
as under:—
“……. It was pointed out in that case
that in the case of a closure, the
employer does not merely close down
the place of business but he closes the
business itself finally and irrevocably. A
lockout on the other hand indicates the
closure of the place of business and not
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closure of the business itself. In the
present case the totality of facts and
circumstances would lead to the
conclusion that the undertaking at
Jamshedpur
was
closed
down
completely and was a final and
irrevocable termination of the business
itself.”
(b) Our High Court in the case
of Innovations Garment Limited v. S.K.
Singe, (2002) II CLR 902 has observed
in paragraph No. 8 as follows:—
“The petitioners were directed to
discontinue or stop the manufacturing
activities under the law by the
competent authority. It is, therefore, not
possible for me to accept the contention
of Ms. Gopal that the decision of the
petitioners to stop or to discontinue the
manufacturing activities suffer from lack
of bona fides or an act of victimisation
or it was a mala fide decision to resort
to closure in the guise of shifting. The
bona fides of the petitioner can further
be tested in the light of their restarting
the factory at Mumbai after making
alternative arrangement from 1st
September, 1998. The petitioners had
sufficient land and infrastructure at
Massourie and their decision to shift
their activities to Massourie cannot be
questioned as unjustified or mala fide. I
do not find any fault with the decision of
the petitioners to shift to Massourie
their manufacturing unit from Mumbai.
It is, therefore, not possible for me to
accept the findings of the industrial
Court that stopping of manufacturing
activity at Mumbai and shifting to
Massourie amounted to closure as
defined under the provisions of the
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Industrial Disputes Act. Since there was
no closure of the manufacturing
activities at Mumbai and it was decided
to relocate or shift the factory at
Massourie, it cannot be said that it was
a closure of the factory or company at
Mumbai. In my opinion, therefore,
section 25-O of the Industrial Act is not
attracted….””
(Emphasis Supplied)
29.
This Court also deems it appropriate to refer to the judgment of
the Calcutta High Court passed in the case of Birla Corporation Ltd.
(Unit Soorah Jute Mill) Sramik Union v. Birla Corporation Ltd.,
2008 SCC OnLine Cal 649, whereby, a stark difference between
„closure‟ and „shifting‟ has been laid down as follows:
“41. Another argument has also been
advanced on behalf of the appellants that the
shifting of the concerned jute mill amounts to
closure and hence, forms an industrial dispute.
The aforesaid argument, in our opinion, is
without substance since closure is associated
with loss of employment whereas shifting
results in no loss of employment. It is not
closing down of the place of employment but
shifting of the place of employment. The word
“closure” has conceptually a definite
connotation in industrial law and is
necessarily associated with the concept of loss
of employment. Furthermore, the impugned
order of reference does not mention that
shifting in the instant case means closure of
the jute mill.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
30.
In deliberating the aforementioned issue, the learned Labour
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Court has taken into consideration the admissions of the petitioner
workman in his cross-examination and rightly came to the finding that
there was no malafide intention on the part of the management to
terminate the services of the workman and that the issue relates to
merely shifting of a unit from one place to another and not a case of
closure. The relevant portion of the cross examination of the workman
is also reproduced hereinbelow:
“…..It is correct that the managements have
shifted their units at H-4, UPSIDC, Industrial
Area, Sikandarabad, District Bulandshahar,
U.P. It is correct that we have filed a suit for
permanent injunction in the court of Vacation
Judge, North West District, Rohini, Delhi from
shifting the machines from Delhi to
Sikandarabad, U.P. It is correct that no stay
was granted to us in that suit. It is correct that
I alongwith other workers sat on Dharna
outside the factory gate of the management at
Wazirpur, Delhi. It is correct that a suit for
permanent injunction was filed by the
management against the workmen and union
for stay before Ld. Civil Judge, Rohini, Delhi.
It is correct that an interim order was passed
by Ld. Civil Judge, Rohini, Delhi against us. It
is correct that thereafter the Dharna/protest
had come to an end. It is correct that we were
protesting that until and unless the
managements settles our accounts for the
services rendered at Delhi, we shall not join at
the transferred place. It is correct that the
managements had told that they are ready to
allow us to join duties at Sikandarabad on the
same terms and conditions as were applicable
at Delhi at the time of our transfer. It is
correct that the managements time and again
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had asked us to join our duties at
Sikandarabad vide written directions vide
letters dt. 21.09.11 and 7.10.11. It is correct
that I had not joined duties alongwith other
co-workers till date at Sikandarabad despite
repeated directions of the managements. It is
correct that despite offer of duties to us in this
Court we have not accepted to join the duties
at the shifted place of the managements.”
31.
The above cross-examination of the petitioner workman
indicates that it is an admitted case of the petitioner that the
management had shifted its unit to Sikandrabad, Uttar Pradesh, and
time and again, asked the workman to join his duties there vide letters
dated 21.09.2011 and 07.10.2011 and that despite receiving the said
letters, the workman had not joined at Sikandrabad location, giving
one flimsy ground of not joining there. He has also admitted that the
respondent management was always willing to take him back on duty
and had not given any letter terminating his services.
32.
In view of the evidence that had come on record, the learned
Labour Court has rightly recorded its findings that it was not a case a
closure of management but rather a case of shifting of its business
from one place to another and that there is no pleading of the
workman that the workers were shifted to Sikandrabad unit when the
same was not operational and some malafide was put against the
workman or the management had shifted its unit due to some malafide
to teach a lesson to the workman.
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33.
As already admitted by the petitioner workman, it is an
undisputed fact that the respondent management offered its employees
to join their duties at the transferred location at Sikandrabad unit on
the same terms and conditions as were applicable to them in the
Wazirabad, Delhi premises. Applying the aforesaid principle of law
held in Birla Corporation Ltd. (Unit Soorah Jute Mill) Sramik
Union (Supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that since the
workmen were extended the employment conditions at the transferred
location by the respondent management, there was no loss of
employment to them nor any service condition had been changed, and
as such, the establishment was only shifted to a different place. In
view of the same, the compliance of Section 25FFF of the ID Act is
not attracted in the present scenario.
34.
Furthermore, since it has been held in a catena of judgments
that an employer has an inherent right to choose his place of
employment, the respondent management made a managerial decision
to shift its establishment from Wazirabad, Delhi to Sikandrabad after
duly issuing transfer letters dated 21.09.2011 and 07.10.2011 to its
workmen, and the same does not constitutes as closure. This Court
deems it relevant to rely on the judgment passed by Calcutta High
Court in Shalimar Paints Ltd. v. Third Industrial Tribunal of West
Bengal, 1970 SCC OnLine Cal 17, in which case, the management
had shifted its business from 6, Lyons Range, Calcutta to Goabaria,
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Howrah and sales division to 13, Gamac Street, Calcutta, whereafter
the workmen started claiming compensation for the amount spent in
travelling to the transferred place. The same was denied by the
management on the ground that there had been no alteration in the
conditions of the service of any employee, to which the workmen
raised an industrial dispute, which was allowed by the Industrial
Tribunal. Against the said order, the management had moved to the
Calcutta High Cout, whereby it was inter-alia held as follows:
“17. It, therefore, follows that just as an
employee cannot make a claim for an extra
allowance when he shifts his residence to a
more distant place from his office there can be
no claim for compensation when the employer
shifts his business or undertaking from one
place to another. The employer, in my view,
has an inherent right to choose his place of
business. The fact that some of the employees
may have to incur additional expenses by way
of travelling as a result of such shifting of
employer's business or undertaking, does not
entitle the employee to make a claim for extra
benefit or compensation. In any event such a
claim cannot be made on the ground that there
has been a transfer of employees. The
expression „transfer‟, in my opinion, connotes
that an employer has more than one place of
business and the employee is called upon to
work in a different place of business from the
one in which he worked previously….”
35.
The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on
Workmen of the Straw Board Manufacturing Company Limited,
(Supra) is also of no aid to the petitioner as the issue in the aforesaid
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judgment clearly pertains to the closure of one of the units of an
establishment and not the complete closure which is not the case
herein. Considering the difference between the terms „closure‟ and
„shifting‟, as already illustrated by the Calcutta High Court in Birla
Corporation Ltd. (Unit Soorah Jute Mill) Sramik Union (Supra) and
by the High Court of Bombay in Biddle Sawyer Ltd., Mumbai (Supra)
this Court finds that since the petitioner workman was at liberty to
resume his duties at the transferred location at Sikandrabad, there was
no loss of employment to the petitioner. Further, keeping in view the
fact that there was no illegal termination of his services and in view of
all the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion
that asking the workman to join duty at the transferred location cannot
be held as closure of an establishment, rather, the present issue
pertains to shifting of a unit from one place to another.
36.
Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the
petitioner is that the learned Labour Court erroneously held that the
petitioner workman had failed to prove an employer-employee
relationship with the respondent No.2 management. As per the stand
of respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 before the learned Labour
Court and even before this Court, there is no employer-employee
relationship between the workman and the respondent No. 2. It is
stated that both the managements are different entities as one is a
partnership firm and the other is a private limited company. They
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cannot be co-related even if the partners or directors are of the same
family. It is stated that the petitioner workman is an employee of the
respondent No. 1 management.
37.
The onus to prove the relationship is squarely upon the
petitioner. As indicated from the record, there is no specific pleading
as to under which management the workman was working and from
whom he was claiming his legal facilities. As per his evidence, he
joined the management of M/s Kiran Engineering and Suppliers, i.e.,
the respondent No. 1 management. He has also deposed that his name
was entered in the attendance register of the respondent management
No. 1 and the said management was making payment of earned wages
after getting his signatures on the vouchers, and that he was covered
under the provisions of the Employees‟ State Insurance Act of 1948 as
well as under the Employees‟ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act, 1952 by the respondent No. 1. He further admits to
have filed the documents pertaining to respondent No. 1 only.
38.
In view of his own deposition, it is clear that he was an
employee of respondent No. 1 and not of respondent No. 2. The
allegations in his claim are ostensibly vague. As respondent No. 1
management has admitted the workman to be its employee and in the
absence of any specific pleading and evidence qua respondent No. 2,
the learned Labour Court has rightly proceeded on the premise that the
petitioner workman was an employee of respondent No. 1. This Court
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finds no infirmity in the findings of the learned Labour Court in this
regard also.
39.
No other arguments are advanced before this Court.
40.
In view of the aforesaid discussion on facts and law, this Court
finds no merit in the present writ petition. There is no perversity or
illegality in the Order passed by the learned Labour Court warranting
any interference.
41.
Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed being devoid
of any merit. All pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
RENU BHATNAGAR, J
FEBRUARY 28,2026
p/sm
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