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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment pronounced on: 11.08.2026
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W.P.(C) 15518/2025, CM. APPLs. 63474/2025, 68718/2025
SAI CONSULTING ENGINEERS PVT LTD.
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Shashank Garg, Sr. Adv., Mr.
Aseem Chaturvedi, Mr. Arit Kumar
Singh, Mr. Anuj Shrotriya, Ms.
Nishtha Jain and Ms. Lizthachet,
Advs.
versus
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS
AUTHORITY OF INDIA & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Santosh Kumar, SC and
Mr. Devansh Malhotra, Adv. for R-1.
Mr. Jagdish Chandra and Ms. Maanya
Saxena, Advs., UOI.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA
JUDGMENT
1.
The present petition has been filed by the petitioner assailing a
debarment
notice/order
dated
30.09.2025
issued
by
respondent
no.1/National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), whereby, the petitioner
on account of breach of its contractual obligation/s has been debarred from
participating in any future bids with the NHAI, Ministry of Road Transport
and Highways, Government of India (MoRTH)/respondent no.2 and their
executing agencies for a period of two years from the date of issuance of the
impugned notice.
2.
The petitioner is a multi-disciplinary organisation providing
engineering services including feasibility, planning, detailed design,
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construction supervision, IE, AE and construction management in the areas
such as Building and Industry, Water and Environment, Urban Planning and
SEZ. As a consultant, the petitioner is stated to have completed several
projects in India as well as abroad including providing consultancy services
for the construction, maintenance, design etc., of National and State
Highways for the respondents.
3.
The petitioner and respondent no.1 executed a consultancy agreement
dated 26.03.2018, in terms whereof, the petitioner was appointed as a
consultant for preparing Detailed Project Reports (DPR) for bypass/ring
road around Gorakhpur, Bareilly, Moradabad, Kanpur and Ayodhya in the
State of Uttar Pradesh under the NHDP Phase-VII.
4.
As per the Terms of Reference (ToR), particularly stipulated in
clauses 3.3.1 and 5.1 of the Appendix A to the Special Conditions of
Contract (SCC), as a consultant the petitioner was required to support NHAI
in land acquisition process inter-alia by conducting all required
surveys/valuation, liaison with relevant state departments throughout the
said process, assist NHAI and CALA in publishing of notifications in
Official Gazette as required under Section 3A and 3D of the National
Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred as “the NH Act, 1956”) and
declaration of award under Section 3G of the NH Act, 1956.
5.
The disputes between the parties in the present petition have arisen as
regards the discrepancies noticed in a report dated 08.08.2024 submitted by
a committee constituted by the respondent no.1 to conduct an inquiry into
the manner in which the land acquisition process was undertaken by the
concerned stakeholders for GATA No.156, Sarniya Village, District
Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh falling within a stretch from Km. 0.000 to Km.
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19.200 of Bareilly Bypass in District Bareilly in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
6.
The background of the matter is that in the year 2024, a complaint
was received by respondent no.1 regarding discrepancies in land acquisition
process in the stretch of Western Spur of Bareilly from Km. 0+00 to 20+200
on HAM basis in the State of Uttar Pradesh. In particular it was alleged
therein that the landowner of GATA No. 156, Sarniya Village, District
Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh in connivance with the certain officials has illegally
converted the said land into non-agricultural land and is constructing a
structure thereon in order to secure higher compensation from the
Government. Consequently, upon receipt of the said complaint, the
Competent Authority of respondent no.1 vide an office order dated
30.07.2024 constituted a committee to investigate into the concerned
allegations.
7.
The said Committee vide its report dated 08.08.2024 highlighted
certain irregularities in the concerned land acquisition process including
discrepancies in valuation of the structure constructed on GATA No. 156,
Sarniya Village, District Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh.
8.
In view of the findings rendered by the concerned committee in its
report dated 08.08.2024, alleging role of the petitioner viz. the irregularities
highlighted thereto, a show cause notice dated 04.12.2024 came to be issued
against the petitioner by the respondent no.1 seeking a detailed explanation
as regards submission of faulty/overvalued structure valuation reports
pertaining to GATA No. 156, Sarniya Village, Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh by it
and as to why no adverse action in regard to the same including debarment
be initiated against the petitioner.
9.
The allegations levied in the said show cause notice were vehemently
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opposed by the petitioners vide a reply dated 11.12.2024 and also during
personal
hearing
scheduled
on
13.01.2025
before
the
Member
(Administration), NHAI. Furthermore, pursuant to the personal hearing it is
stated that an additional detailed written submission dated 17.01.2025 along
with documentary support was also submitted by the petitioner.
10.
Thereafter, after a lapse of almost four months, in furtherance of the
show-cause notice dated 04.12.2024, another show-cause notice dated
29.04.2025 came to be issued by the respondent no.1 against the petitioner
seeking to explain as to why an appropriate action of debarment for “upto 2
years” should not be taken against it in terms of Clause 7.4.2 of the General
Contract Condition (GCC) of the Consultancy Agreement read with NHAI
circulars no. 97/ 12 dated 17.04.2012 & no. 186/2015 dated 27.11.2015. A
detailed response dated 13.05.2025 to the said show-cause notice is stated to
have been submitted by the petitioner (annexed as Annexure P-24 to the
present petition).
11.
However, vide the impugned communication dated 29.09.2025 on
account of flagrant breaches of the Consultancy agreement by the petitioner,
the respondent no.1 debarred the petitioner for a period of two years from
participating in any future bids with NHAI, MoRTH and their executing
agencies. Aggrieved by the impugned decision, the petitioner has preferred
the present petition.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
12.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the show-
cause notices and impugned debarment order attributes irregularities solely
to revenue officials and landowners; and the entire foundation of the
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impugned action against the petitioner rests only on alleged deficiencies in
its performance, without a single charge of fraud, fabrication, moral
turpitude, collusion, or mala fide intent being recorded against it. Therefore,
contractual or procedural lapses, even if assumed, as a settled position of
law does not warrant extreme civil consequence such as that of debarring the
petitioner for a period of two-years. The same is violative of the doctrine of
proportionality, more so when no quantified loss as mandated under Clauses
7.3 of the GCC is attributed to the petitioner. In this regard, reliance has
been placed on law laid down by the Supreme Court in Blue Dreamz
Advertising (P) Ltd. v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 1896 and this Court in Hariom Project (P) Ltd. v. Military Engineer
Services, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 3464; and Coastal Marine Construction &
Engineering Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del
6542.
13.
It is contended that nearly one year and ten months after the petitioner
had completed its work and submitted the Final Valuation Report on
17.02.2023,
respondent
no.1,
without
any
prior
intimation
or
communication, by relying upon an undisclosed Inspection Committee
Report dated 08.08.2024, issued a Show Cause Notice dated 04.12.2024.
The petitioner was kept completely uninformed about the constitution of the
concerned committee, its composition, the material considered, or any
deliberations held. Such non-disclosure, suppression of material documents,
and exclusion of the petitioner from the process render the entire
proceedings arbitrary, opaque, and legally unsustainable.
14.
It is also contended that the subsequent Show Cause Notice dated
29.09.2025 in verbatim, merely repeats the initial Show-cause notice dated
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04.12.2024 issued, ignoring the petitioner’s detailed replies dated
11.12.2024 and 17.01.2025 and is therefore an arbitrary, unauthorised
reopening of settled issues without any new material or legal basis.
15.
It is further submitted that the impugned debarment notice is also
nothing but a verbatim reproduction of the subsequent Show Cause Notice
dated 29.04.2025, devoid of any independent reasoning, consideration of
facts, or evaluation of the petitioner’s submissions specially detailed
response dated 17.01.2025 (to show cause notice dated 04.12.2024)and
13.05.2025 (to the show-cause notice dated 29.04.2025) to show cause
notices issued by the respondent no.1.Moreover, despite submitting response
thereto, paragraph 5 of the impugned debarment notice erroneously records
that no reply was submitted by the petitioner in response to the show-cause
notice dated 29.04.2025. The said conduct of the respondent no.1 evidences
towards a mechanical and predetermined mindset of the respondent no.1
while issuing the impugned decision.
16.
It also contended that even if there were any alleged breach, the
Contract itself provides for other remedies, including monetary penalties or
settlement of disputes through arbitration, and therefore, proceeding directly
to the extreme and most severe punitive measure of debarment/blacklisting,
without alleging any serious fraud, fault, or mala fide intention, is wholly
unjustifiable.
17.
It is further submitted that the assertion in the impugned debarment
notice that the Inspection Committee Report dated 08.08.2024 had been
shared with the petitioner is wholly false. The said report, which allegedly
formed the very foundation of the debarment proceedings, was neither
supplied with the first Show Cause Notice dated 04.12.2024 nor with the
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subsequent Show Cause Notice dated 29.05.2025 and was only provided to
the petitioner for the very first time with the Counter Affidavit filed in the
present petition. Further, even on merits, the aforementioned report of the
committee contains no adverse finding/s against the petitioner and does not
even attribute any role to the petitioner. Thus, evidently, withholding of such
material along with non-consideration of the petitioner’s replies violates
natural justice and renders the entire proceeding void, ultra vires, and
constitutionally unsustainable.
18.
Further, it is contended that the allegation that the petitioner failed to
correctly value the concerned land is contrary to its contractual mandate
inasmuch as: a) in terms of clause 5.1 and 5.1.8 of the agreement petitioner’s role was
limited strictly to valuation of structures, tress and crops; and did not
include
land
valuation,
land-use
verification,
road-width
determination, or application of circle rates, all of which exclusively
fell within the statutory functions of CALA. The contemporaneous
CALA Award dated 06.07.2023 further establishes that the petitioner
had only submitted the valuation for the structure on the said land at
INR 2,95,61,800/-, whereas valuation of the land was done only by
the CALA, not the petitioner/DPR Consultant;
b) all draft and final submissions made by the petitioner as prescribed
under Section 3G of the NH Act 1956 were duly scrutinised and
finally approved without any contemporaneous objection whatsoever.
The concerned irregularities arose for the first time only in the
undisclosed Inspection Committee proceedings of August 2024,
almost 20 months later, demonstrating that the allegation levied
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against the petitioner is an afterthought and is barred by acquiescence,
waiver, and estoppel. Such post-facto objections, relating to
deliverables outside contractual scope, cannot constitute grounds for
punitive civil consequences such as blacklisting
c) The
allegations
regarding
incorrect
land
valuation,
wrong
consideration of 9 metres road width, or omission of Sarniya are
factually untenable since Sarniya was included by the petitioner in the
initial Schedule 3(a) draft submission and the omission in the Gazette
thereafter was solely respondent no.1’s admitted error, and road-width
determination is a government function and not attributable to the
petitioner. The petitioner has always acted diligently and the same is
evident from the fact that after becoming aware of land conversion
upon publication of the certified Khatauni on 20.11.2021, it
immediately brought about the
said
change in
subsequent
submissions.
d) Respondent no.1’s allegation regarding use of incorrect rates for
valuation is misconceived. In the absence of communication with
respect to any applicable rates for the purposes of valuation of the
structure from PIU Bareilly, the petitioner applied the DM circle rates,
which is the consistent and accepted practice across land acquisition
projects and had been followed throughout by the petitioner in the
earlier projects as well without any objection or protest. Further, since
DM rates are notified by the District Magistrate, a statutory authority,
the petitioner has no control over their determination, and their
application is fully compliant with the Manual of Guidelines on Land
Acquisition under the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter
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referred as “Manual of Guidelines”), which mandates reliance on
government-notified rates.
e) the allegation regarding non-deduction of salvage value is contrary to
Clause 3.5.5(iii)(d) of the aforesaid Manual of Guidelines which
permits either (i) valuation by the competent authority or approved
agency, or (ii) reconstruction cost net of salvage. As the project did
not involve shifting or reconstruction, the petitioner correctly adopted
valuation by the competent authority or approved agency, under
which no salvage deduction is warranted. In any event, once
compensation is determined by the CALA, the structures vest in
respondent no.1, making salvage deduction impermissible. The
petitioner thus acted strictly in line with statutory guidelines and
established practice, and no deviation can be attributed to it.
f) the Inspection Committee’s reliance on Google Earth imagery to
allege that certain structures appeared between February 2021 and
March 2022 is speculative, non-statutory, and directly contrary to the
authenticated revenue records that were verified by respondent no.1,
the CALA, and the revenue officials at every stage of the acquisition
process. The petitioner’s Draft dated 27.10.2021 prepared in terms of
Section 3A of the NH Act 1956 and Draft dated 05.05.2022 prepared
in terms of Section 3D of the said Act correctly reflected the land
status strictly in accordance with and as recorded in official revenue
documents at the contemporaneous time. These entries were to be
independently verified and confirmed by the appropriate authorities
including but not limited to CALA and other revenue officials, before
publication of the 3A Gazette Notification on 28.01.2022 and the 3D
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Gazette notification on 13.09.2022. Therefore, the sequence of
submissions and the corresponding statutory publications clearly
demonstrates that any default, if at all, lies with the respondents and
their associated authorities, and not with the petitioner.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.1
19.
Learned counsel on behalf of the respondent no.1 submitted that the
contention of the petitioner that the impugned order is passed in violation of
the principles of natural justice is unfounded. A bare perusal of the record
demonstrates
that
the
impugned
order
was
passed
following
a
comprehensive, multi stage and procedurally fair process wherein every
material relied upon was disclosed as well as multiple opportunities of
hearing were provided to the petitioner. The same is evident from the fact
that pursuant to issuance of show cause notice dated 04.12.2024, the
petitioner was given a personal hearing on 13.01.2025 and his response
thereto dated 11.12.2024 was duly considered by the concerned authority.
Thereafter, even after issuance of a subsequent show-cause notice dated
29.04.2025, the petitioner was given an opportunity of personal hearing on
06.05.2025.
20.
It is submitted that the averment of the petitioner that the Inspection
Committee report dated 08.08.2024 was never supplied is nothing but an
afterthought. During the course of personal hearing on 13.01.2025, the
inspection committee’s report dated 08.08.2024 was supplied to the
petitioner. Further, the petitioner never raised any issue regarding nonsupply of said report in any of its reply during either personal hearing, or
through any email. Anyhow, discrepancies disclosed in the said inspection
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report were already put to the knowledge of the petitioner in the show cause
notices and the said report contained no new factual material that wasn’t
already known to the petitioner.
21.
It is further submitted that the omission on part of the petitioner has
resulted in a valuation escalation from INR 1.72 crores to INR 12.48 crores,
causing a sevenfold inflation at the cost of public funds. The said position is
not denied by the petitioners. Thus, the period of debarment imposed upon
the petitioner is proportionate to the gravity of lapse committed by it and is
in public interest.
22.
It is submitted that in terms of clauses 3.1.1 and 7.1.1 of the
agreement, the petitioner’s obligation extended beyond the mere valuation
of structures and also included joint measurements surveys; valuation of
land related assets; monitoring land-use changes; accurate verification of
entries for notifications published in terms of Section 3G of the NH Act
1956, which contained compensation amount for land and structures; and
timely reporting of discrepancies. Thus, the plea of the petitioner that it
bears no responsibility and had no role to play in the said valuation since a
separate agency was appointed by it to carry out the same is of no merit
23.
It is also contended that the petitioner in its reply to the show-cause
notice neither denied the factum of overevaluation nor the varsities of
discrepancies alleged therein. The petitioner merely denies its responsibility
in this regard under the contract. However, since the avoidable escalation
caused significant losses and compromised sanctity of Land Acquisition
Process, requisite actions have been undertaken against the petitioner,
CALA and officials of NHAI.
24.
It is submitted that the overvaluation of the structure situated at
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GATA No.156, Sarniya Village, Bareilly, U.P was carried out on the basis
of plinth area, despite the said structure having no plinth. The same ought to
have been valued in accordance with item rates prescribed by the concerned
Public Works Department’s Schedule of Rates (PWD SOR).
25.
It is also contended that the petitioner in its written submission dated
16.12.2025 has sought to set out an entirely new case particularly as regards
the issue of valuation of plinth. Besides the said written submission, the
petitioner neither in its reply to show cause notice dated 04.12.2024 and/or
debarment proceedings before the NHAI nor in the present petition stated
that the structure in question had a plinth.
26.
It is further submitted that not only was the land use surreptitiously
changed
from
agriculture
to
non-agriculture
for
securing
higher
compensation rate but also non-agricultural land rates were applied to the
entire acquired area of 0.6053 Ha of Gata No. 156, Sarniya Village, Bareilly
despite admittedly a portion of the land being agricultural, as reflected in the
Notification drafted by the petitioner itself in terms of Section 3D of the NH
Act 1956.
27.
It is further contended that the petitioner’s attempt to attribute the
land-use change to an inadvertent omission of Sarniya village from the 3(a)
notification is wholly misconceived and had the petitioner discharged its
obligation and flagged the material development at the appropriate stage, the
subsequent misuse of land and the resultant overevaluation could have been
prevented since:a. admittedly the petitioner as on 20.11.2021 was aware of the certified
khatuni reflecting conversion from agriculture to non-agricultural
land, however conveyed no disclosure in this regard to the respondent
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no.1. Further, despite the aforesaid knowledge, based upon a
misclassification traceable to the inputs provided by the petitioner, the
3A Gazette dated 28.01.2022 came to be published, continuing to
classify the concerned land as agriculture.
b. Even though the petitioner finally on 05.05.2022 referred to the
concerned land as non-agricultural, it failed to disclose that the
conversion occurred during the land acquisition process, a fact critical
to preventing construction that was underway on the concerned land
during the said period of time.
c. Notably, contemporaneous Google Earth imagery demonstrates that
construction on the subject land took place after February 2021 and
was visible by March 2022, evidently to facilitate such land-use
change and secure higher compensation.
THE AMBIT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
28. The law is well settled that an order of debarment/blacklisting passed
by the State or its instrumentality, though arising in a contractual setting, is
amenable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
both as regards the decision-making process and the decision itself, on the
touchstone of fairness, natural justice, non-arbitrariness and proportionality.
In Kulja Industries Limited v. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom
Project, BSNL & Ors., (2014) 14 SCC 731, the Supreme Court while
recognising that the power to blacklist inheres in every entity allotting a
contract, observed as under:“17. That apart the power to blacklist a contractor whether the
contract be for supply of material or equipment or for the execution
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of any other work whatsoever is in our opinion inherent in the party
allotting the contract. There is no need for any such power being
specifically conferred by statute or reserved by contractor… But
any such decision is subject to judicial review when the same is
taken by the State or any of its instrumentalities. This implies that
any such decision will be open to scrutiny not only on the
touchstone of the principles of natural justice but also on the
doctrine of proportionality. A fair hearing to the party being
blacklisted thus becomes an essential pre-condition for a proper
exercise of the power and a valid order of blacklisting made
pursuant thereto. The order itself being reasonable, fair and
proportionate to the gravity of the offence is similarly examinable
by a writ Court…”
29. In the same decision, the Supreme Court reiterated the well-established
principal set out in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West
Bengal & Anr., (1975) 1 SCC 70 as under: “18. The legal position on the subject is settled by a long line of
decisions rendered by this Court starting with Erusian Equipment
& Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B. [(1975) 1 SCC 70] where this
Court declared that blacklisting has the effect of preventing a
person from entering into lawful relationship with the Government
for purposes of gains and that the authority passing any such order
was required to give a fair hearing before passing an order
blacklisting a certain entity. This Court observed: (SCC p. 75, para
20)
“20. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the
privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with
the Government for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability
is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant
authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of
fair play require that the person concerned should be given an
opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the
blacklist.”…………..
30. It was further emphasised in Kulja Industries (supra) that even where
the underlying right of a writ petitioner is contractual in character, “the
manner, the method and the motive behind the decision of the authority
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whether or not to enter into a contract is subject to judicial review on the
touchstone of fairness, relevance, natural justice, non-discrimination,
equality and proportionality”. It is within these confines (and not as an
appellate authority re-appreciating the merits of the underlying contractual
controversy) that this Court proceeds to examine the impugned action.
DEBARMENT: AN EXCEPTIONAL REMEDY
31. Debarment is stigmatic in character, and its consequences travel far
beyond the dealings of the debarred entity with the authority which passes
the order. As held by the Supreme Court in UMC Technologies Private
Limited v. Food Corporation of India & Anr., (2021) 2 SCC 551 [at
paragraph 15], “this domino effect, which can effectively lead to the civil
death of a person, shows that the consequences of blacklisting travel far
beyond the dealings of the blacklisted person with one particular
government corporation and in view thereof, this Court has consistently
prescribed strict adherence to principles of natural justice whenever an entity
is sought to be blacklisted.”
32. The circumstances in which recourse to this drastic measure is
permissible have been authoritatively delineated by the Supreme Court in
The Blue Dreamz Advertising Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Kolkata Municipal
Corporation & Ors., (2024) 15 SCC 264 by observing that debarment is a
remedy calibrated to the protection of public interest against contractors
whose conduct betrays a want of business integrity; it is not an instrument
for the resolution, or the punishment of ordinary contractual disagreements.
The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under -
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“25. In other words, where the case is of an ordinary breach of
contract and the explanation offered by the person concerned
raises a bona fide dispute, blacklisting/debarment as a penalty
ought not to be resorted to. Debarring a person albeit for a certain
number of years tantamounts to civil death inasmuch as the said
person is commercially ostracized resulting in serious
consequences for the person and those who are employed by him.
26. Too readily invoking the debarment for ordinary cases of
breach of contract where there is a bona fide dispute, is not
permissible. Each case, no doubt, would turn on the facts and
circumstances thereto.”
33. Two further propositions from Blue Dreamz (supra) bear directly on
the present controversy. First, the mere presence of recitals styled as reasons
is not decisive; the true enquiry is whether the reasons justify the invocation
of a penalty of this magnitude. The relevant paragraph thereof reads as
under:“34. The Division Bench has, in our opinion, not appreciated the
case in its proper perspective. Merely saying that the blacklisting
order carried reasons is not good enough. Do the reasons justify
the invocation of the penalty of blacklisting and is the penalty
proportionate, was the real question.”
34. Second, the authority must undertake an enquiry into whether the
conduct in question is of a qualitatively different order than the ordinary
vicissitudes of commerce. The relevant portion thereof is as under:“37. There has been no enquiry by the Division Bench as to
whether the conduct of the appellant was part of the normal
vicissitudes in business and common place hazards in commerce or
whether the appellant had crossed the rubicon warranting a
banishment order, albeit for a temporary period in larger public
interest.”
35. Further, the Supreme Court in Blue Dreamz (supra) drew a pointed
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contrast (at paragraph 40 thereof) between the circumstances that fell for
consideration in Patel Engineering Ltd. v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC
257, and Kulja Industries (supra) inasmuch as the latter cases involved
fraudulent and collusive conduct and were not cases of ordinary contractual
breach. Where the conduct falls short of that threshold, the authority, in the
words of the Supreme Court, has “lifted a sledgehammer to crack a nut”
[paragraph 30 of Blue Dreamz (supra)].
36. The said position has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in M/s
Techno Prints v. Chhattisgarh Textbook Corporation & Anr., 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 343 as under:“33. As observed by this Court in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals
Ltd. Vs. State of W.B. reported in (1975) 1 SCC 70, an order of
blacklisting casts a slur on the party being blacklisted and is
stigmatic. Given the nature of such an order and the import thereof,
it would be unreasonable and arbitrary to visit every contractor
who is in breach of his contractual obligations with such
consequences. There have to be strong, independent and
overwhelming materials to resort to this power given the drastic
consequences that an order of blacklisting has on a contractor. The
power to blacklist cannot be resorted to when the grounds for the
same are only breach or violation of a term or condition of a
particular contract and when legal redress is available to both
parties…
34. Plainly, if a contractor is to be visited with the punitive measure
of blacklisting on account of an allegation that he has committed a
breach of a contract, the nature of his conduct must be so deviant
or aberrant so as to warrant such a punitive measure. A mere
allegation of breach of contractual obligations without anything
more, per se, does not invite any such punitive action.
35. ……Therefore, while the debarment itself may not be permanent
and may only remain effective for a limited, pre-determined period,
its negative effect continues to plague the business of the debarred
entity for a long period of time. As a result, it is viewed as a
punishment so grave, that it must follow in the wake of an action
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that is equally grave.”
37. In light of the foregoing discussion, the following broad principles
emerge: (i) an order of debarment, and the decision-making process
culminating therein, are open to judicial review on the anvil of natural
justice, non-arbitrariness and proportionality; (ii) debarment tantamounts to
‘civil death’ and consequently
the power to debar must be exercised
sparingly, and only upon strong, independent and overwhelming material;
(iii) a breach of contractual obligations, without the conduct of the entity
being shown to be deviant, aberrant or subversive of public interest, does not
furnish a cause for debarment, particularly where the explanation offered
raises a bona fide dispute and legal redress is otherwise available; (iv) the
order must contain reasons which do not merely record a conclusion of
breach, but demonstrate why the conduct justifies a penalty of this
magnitude, and why the period imposed is proportionate; and (v) the reasons
must reflect due and demonstrable consideration of the defences set up by
the affected entity.
THE CONTRACTUAL
IMPUGNED ACTION
/
POLICY
FRAMEWORK
OF
38. The impugned order invokes clauses 3.1.1 and 7.1.1 of the General
Conditions of Contract (‘GCC’) of the Consultancy Agreement. Clause 3.1.1
(‘Standard of Performance’) is a general obligation to perform the Services
“with all due diligence, efficiency and economy, in accordance with
generally accepted professional techniques and practices” and to act “as
faithful advisers to the Client”. Clause 7.1.1 provides that “The Consultant
shall be responsible for accuracy of the data collected, by him directly or
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procured from other agencies/authorities, the designs, drawings, estimates
and all other details prepared by him as part of these services”, and obliges
the Consultant to indemnify the Authority against any inaccuracy in the
work.
39. The operative provision under which the penalty has been imposed is
Clause 7.4.2 of the GCC, read with NHAI Policy Circulars No. 97/12 dated
17.04.2012 and No. 186/2015 dated 27.11.2015, all of which stand extracted
in the impugned order itself. Clause 7.4.2 of GCC reads:“7.4.2 Warning/ Debarring — In addition to the penalty as
mentioned in para 7.3, warning may be issued to the erring
consultants for minor deficiencies. In the case of major deficiencies
in the Detailed Project Report involving time and cost overrun and
adverse effect on reputation of NHAI, other penal action including
debarring for certain period may also be initiated as per policy of
NHAI.”
40. Paragraph 2.2 of NHAI Policy Circular No. 97/2012 dated 17.04.2012,
in turn, prescribes a graded scheme of deterrent penalty action. The same
reads as under:“2.2…….In case of minor deficiencies on consultant’s part a
warning may be issued. In the case of significant deficiencies in
services causing adverse effects on the Project or on reputation of
the Authority, other penal actions including debarring for a
specified period shall be initiated as per this policy. The deterrent
penalty action can be taken in any of the following ways:
(i) Issue warning to the consultants as decided by Employer/client.
(ii) Suspend their short-listing with NHAI and debar them from
award of future works in NHAI for a period of less than 12 months
in case of minor deficiency in services.
(iii) Debarring the consultants for a period of 1 to 5 years for
major negligence/deficiency in services.”
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41. It is evident that the scheme contemplates debarring an entity
depending upon the nature of the lapse; the scheme itself inherently makes a
distinction between a mere shortfall in performance and “major
negligence/deficiency in services”. A finding locating the deficiency within
the graver category, supported by reasons, is the jurisdictional premise for a
debarment of the kind imposed.
42. As regards the scope of the petitioner’s engagement, Clause 3.3.1 of
the ToR is titled “Support in land Acquisition process till the receipt of land
possession certificate from CALA”; sub-clause (iv) thereof requires the
consultant to “Conduct all required surveys/valuation including joint
measurement survey and valuation of land assets”. Clause 5.1.1 of the ToR
(‘Conduct all required surveys/valuation’) enumerates: “1. Identify all land
parcels that need to be acquired as part of project road 2. Conduct Joint
measurement survey in conjunction with CALA, NHAI and Land revenue
department to verify land records. 3. Conduct valuation of land related
assets (Structures, trees, crops etc.) and liaison with respective State
authority for authentication of the valuation”.
43. Clause 5.1.7 obliges the consultant to “Assist CALA and NHAI (PIU)
in the publishing of 3D notification”, and Clause 5.1.8 to “Assist the CALA
in the declaration of award (3G)”, including (item 6) “valuation of land
related assets (Structures, trees, crops etc.)” and (item 8) assistance to
CALA “in 3G award preparation and in drafting 3G award documents”.
44. The allocation of functions is reflected in the respondent no.1’s own
Manual of Guidelines which has been placed on record. Paragraph 3.5.5(i)
thereof records that “Once MoRTH has notified any land for acquisition for
a road project or associated facilities, the CALA is duty-bound under law to
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determine the compensation for the subject land and the structures, trees or
any other assets attached to such lands or standing thereon as on the date of
issue of notification under Section 3A of the NH Act, 1956”. The Manual
further records that “the CALA is required to get the valuation of such assets
carried out from the respective competent authorities e.g. from the PWD or
approved valuers in respect of structures”, and that “the CALAs are
expected to undertake due diligence in assessing the values of assets
attached to the land being acquired”. The Manual of Guidelines
contemplates that the creation of any asset, or a change in the nature of any
asset, including value addition therein, on or after the issuance of the Section
3A Gazette Notification, is not to be taken into account for payment of any
compensation.
REASONING AND CONCLUSION
45. I have considered the rival submissions advanced by the parties,
including the written submissions filed on behalf of the petitioner and the
respondent no.1, and have examined the material placed on record, including
the impugned order, the show cause notices, the Consultancy Agreement
and its Terms of Reference, and the Manual of Guidelines. Testing the
impugned action on the anvil of the principles enunciated hereinabove, I am
of the considered opinion that the impugned debarment order cannot be
sustained. The reasons are set out hereunder.
Controversy between the parties essentially pertains to alleged breach
of contract
46. The foundational enquiry in every debarment matter is whether the
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conduct of the entity concerned is of such a deviant or aberrant character as
to place it outside the ordinary vicissitudes of contractual performance. In
the present case, that enquiry stands answered by the impugned order itself.
The operative wrongdoing found in paragraph 4 of the impugned order is
attributed, in terms, to third parties. Paragraph 4(ii)of the impugned order
concludes as under:“…From this fact it is clear that the concerned landowner in
connivance with the revenue officials have deliberately converted
their land in order to secure higher compensation from the
Government.”
47. Equally, the determinations which produced the impugned escalation
in compensation are recorded in the impugned order as determinations of the
CALA. Paragraphs 4(iv) and 4(v) thereof reads as under:“(iv) Upon perusal of the 3(G) award declared by CALA for GATA
No. 156 it was found that CALA has adopted non agriculture rates
for the land abutting road having width of more than 9Mtrs
however at site it is only 3.5 Mtrs wide.
(v) Also CALA has given the Non-agriculture rate for whole
Gazetted area of GATA No. 156 i.e 0.6053 Ha however the area
covered by the structure is only 0.3660 Ha.”
48. What is attributed to the petitioner has been set out in the ‘Authority’s
reply’ column of the tabulation contained in paragraph 5 of the impugned
order. The relevant portion therein reads as follows:
“The consultant’s lack of proactive engagement contributed to the
discrepancies”; and
“The Authority asserts that the consultant had a duty to ensure
accuracy and detect fraud. Merely relying on an external agency
does not absolve them of responsibility. Their failure to report
irregularities is a serious lapse.”
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Thus, the gravamen of the charge against the petitioner is not that it
committed, participated in, or was complicit in the alleged manipulation
found; it is that the petitioner failed to detect, flag and follow up upon the
acts of others. The case set up against the petitioner is essentially one of
deficient performance simpliciter, in the course of a complex, multi-agency
statutory land acquisition process.
49. This position stands placed beyond controversy by the statement made
on behalf of the respondent no.1 before this Court during the course of
hearing on 20.04.2026. In response to a specific query, learned counsel for
the respondent no.1 categorically stated that no allegation of collusion has
been levelled against the petitioner. The order dated 20.04.2026 passed in
the present proceedings records as under:“2. In response to a specific query, Mr. Santosh Kumar, learned
standing counsel for the respondents, submits that although no
allegation of collusion has been levelled against the petitioner, but
the conduct of the petitioner, and the nature of the lapse/s, warrants
the debarment action.”
50. Neither the show cause notices nor the impugned order contain any
charge of fraud, fabrication, misrepresentation, moral turpitude or mala fides
against the petitioner. The present case is thus the very antithesis of Patel
Engineering (supra) and Kulja Industries (supra), viz. the category of cases
involving deliberate dereliction or collusive fraud which, as explained in
Blue Dreamz (supra), alone justifies the invocation of this extreme power.
The enquiry mandated by paragraph 37 of Blue Dreamz (supra) viz. whether
the petitioner’s conduct “crossed the rubicon” or was part of the normal
hazards of a multi-agency exercise of this nature, was apparently never
undertaken, and no finding to that effect is discernible from the impugned
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order. As held in paragraph 34 of Techno Prints (supra), a mere allegation
of breach of contractual obligations, without anything more, does not per se
invite punitive action of this nature.
51. The characterisation, in paragraph 6 of the impugned order, of the
petitioner’s conduct as “gross and willful negligence” is not based on any
cogent analysis. As discussed hereinabove, the jurisdictional foundation for
a debarment action mandatorily requires that conduct of an egregious and
aberrant character is manifest. Evidently, this essential pre-requisite for a
debarment action has not been satisfied in the present case and therefore on
this ground alone the impugned action is rendered unsustainable.
The omission of Sarniya village: the genesis of the controversy
52. Another fundamental aspect merits particular attention. It is borne out
from the record that (i) the documentation for the notification under Section
3(a), submitted by the petitioner to PIU Bareilly on 23.04.2021, included
Sarniya village; (ii) that the 3(a) Gazette notification published on
11.06.2021 nevertheless omitted Sarniya; (iii) that upon the omission
coming to light, the petitioner submitted a draft amendment on 31.08.2021,
once again including Sarniya village, pursuant whereto the amended Gazette
notification came to be published on 24.09.2021.
53. Significantly, the tabulation in the impugned order itself records the
petitioner’s assertion to the aforesaid effect. The ‘Authority’s reply’ joins
issue not by disputing the inclusion of Sarniya in the petitioner’s draft, nor
by claiming that the act of Gazette publication was the petitioner’s function,
but only by asserting that the petitioner “should have followed up” and
ensured that the Revenue Department was officially notified. In other words,
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even at its highest, the respondent no.1’s case against the petitioner qua this
omission is one of insufficient follow-up. The omission itself occurred in the
publication process at the respondent no.1’s own end.
54. The significance of this omission is crucial. As noticed hereinabove,
under the scheme reflected in the respondent no.1’s own Manual of
Guidelines, the Section 3A Gazette Notification operates as the statutory
cut-off. The creation of any asset, or a change in the nature of any asset,
after its issue, has a bearing on the payment of compensation. Admittedly,
the landowner’s application for conversion of land use was made on
25.07.2021, after the publication of 3 (a) Gazette Notification dated
11.06.2021 from which Sarniya stood omitted. The conversion was effected
by the revenue officials in October 2021, which was “between 3(a) and 3(A)
gazette notification”, as paragraph 4(ii) of the impugned order itself records.
Indeed, the respondent no.1’s own case before the arbitrator, as recorded in
paragraph 4(ix) of the impugned order, is that no compensation is admissible
for the structure constructed on the concerned land precisely because it was
constructed after the publication of 3A Gazette Notification. This stand itself
demonstrates that the initial omission on the part of the respondent no.1,
contributed in large measure to the alleged mischief that took place.
55. Arguably, had Sarniya village been carried into the Gazette
notification of 11.06.2021, the window within which the conversion and the
construction occurred would not have opened as it did. The root of the
controversy thus lies in an omission squarely attributable to the respondent
no.1 and not in any act of the petitioner. In these circumstances, it is quite
incongruous for the authority to impose the extreme penalty of debarment
upon the petitioner, for a controversy which has its genesis in the
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respondent’s own initial lapse.
Functions of the CALA fastened upon the petitioner; subsistence of a
bona fide dispute as regards rival interpretations
56. The charges levelled against the petitioner reveal a further fundamental
difficulty. The change of land use was effected by the revenue authorities.
The impugned order in paragraph 4 (ii) itself records that the conversion was
done by the concerned revenue officials in October 2021, and attributes the
decision behind it to the landowner “in connivance with the revenue
officials”. The adoption of non-agricultural rates, the application of rates
referable to a road width exceeding 9 metres, and the extension of nonagricultural rates to the entire gazetted area, are all recorded in paragraphs
4(iv) and 4(v) of the impugned order as acts of the CALA in the declaration
of the 3(G) Award. The respondent no.1’s own Manual of Guidelines, as
noticed above, declares the CALA “duty-bound under law” to determine
compensation. The same also requires CALA to obtain structure valuations
from the PWD or approved valuers, and expects CALA “to undertake due
diligence in assessing the values of assets attached to the land being
acquired”.
57. Despite the above, the respondent no.1 invokes Clause 3.3.1(iv) of the
ToR (“valuation of land assets”), the responsibility recital in Clause 5.1
(“responsible in land Acquisition process till the receipt of land possession
certificate from CALA”), and Clauses 3.1.1 and 7.1.1 of the GCC, to
contend that the petitioner’s obligations extended to monitoring land-use
changes, verifying entries in the statutory notifications, obtaining and
verifying rates, and timely reporting of discrepancies. The petitioner, per
contra, relies upon the description of its valuation function in Clauses 5.1.1.3
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and 5.1.8.6 of the ToR [ “valuation of land related assets (Structures, trees,
crops etc.)] to contend that its mandate in the valuation exercise was
confined to structures, trees and crops, and never extended to land valuation,
land classification, road-width determination or the application of circle
rates. It is also pointed out that the CALA award dated 06.07.2023 itself
reflects that the petitioner submitted valuation only in respect of the
structure, the valuation of the land having been made by the CALA.
58. It is not necessary for this Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to conclusively construe these
provisions, and this Court refrains from doing so, particularly because the
respondent no.1’s remedies in damages and arbitration (noticed hereinafter)
are expressly preserved. What is relevant for the purpose of the impugned
debarment action, is that the rival constructions represent a genuine and
substantial dispute concerning contractual provisions. It is also noticed that
the functions entrusted to the petitioner are assistive in nature and do not
detract from statutory functions entrusted to the CALA and the revenue
authorities under the NH Act, 1956 as reflected in the respondent no.1’s own
Manual of Guidelines. The same is particularly true as regards the valuation
methodology, particularly as to whether the structure was required to be
valued on DM circle rates (which, according to the petitioner, was adopted
in the absence of communication of any applicable rates by PIU Bareilly and
consistently with prevailing practice) or on item rates under the PWD
Schedule of Rates (as the respondent no.1 contends, on the footing that the
structure had no plinth). The impugned order itself contains no comparative
analysis of the rival methodologies.
59. Where the explanation offered by the entity concerned raises a bona
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fide dispute of this nature, the law declared in paragraphs 25 and 26 of Blue
Dreamz (supra) squarely proscribes recourse to debarment. The proscription
operates with added force here, because the respondent no.1 is in fact
pursuing alternative remedies. Paragraph 4(ix) of the impugned order
records the same as under:“(ix) NHAI has filed the case before the arbitrator under section
3(G)(5) of NH Act 1956 wherein it is prayed that Agriculture rates
shall be given for GATA No. 156 since the landowner in
connivance with the revenue officials have converted the nature of
land between 3(a) and 3(A) in order to secure higher compensation
from the Government and no compensation against structure
existing on GATA no. 156 is admissible as the same was
constructed after 3(A) notification.”
60. The respondent no.1 has thus itself invoked the statutory remedy
against the very award which embodies the escalation. Paragraph 9 of the
impugned order separately preserves the right to claim damages; and
Clauses 7.3 of the GCC provide the contractual machinery for quantification
and recovery of any loss. In this backdrop, the impugned debarment of the
petitioner is in the teeth of the law declared in paragraph 33 of Techno
Prints (supra). The same reads as under :
“33. As observed by this Court in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals
Ltd. v. State of W.B., (1975) 1 SCC 70, an order of blacklisting casts a
slur on the party being blacklisted and is stigmatic. Given the nature of
such an order and the import thereof, it would be unreasonable and
arbitrary to visit every contractor who is in breach of his contractual
obligations with such consequences. There have to be strong,
independent and overwhelming materials to resort to this power given
the drastic consequences that an order of blacklisting has on a
contractor. The power to blacklist cannot be resorted to when the
grounds for the same are only breach or violation of a term or condition
of a particular contract and when legal redress is available to both
parties. Else, for every breach or violation, though there are legal modes
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of redress and which compensate the party like the Corporation before
us, it would resort to blacklisting and at times by abandoning or scuttling
the pending legal proceedings.”
Impugned order is unreasoned and has internal inconsistencies;
absence of any reasons as regards the period of debarment
61. As noticed hereinabove, the scheme invoked by the respondent no.1 is
expressly graded. The same contemplates warning for minor deficiencies;
debarment for less than twelve months for minor deficiency in services; and
debarment of one to five years reserved for “major negligence/deficiency in
services”. The impugned order does not, at any place, undertake the exercise
which this gradation necessarily demands. It does not specifically identify
the act or omission of the petitioner which in the respondent no.1’s
assessment constitutes ‘major’ negligence or deficiency. It does not explain
why the case is not one of ‘minor deficiency’ answerable by a warning or a
shorter period of debarment; and it assigns no reason whatsoever for
selecting a period of two years, the maximum which the show cause notice
dated 29.04.2025 had proposed (“upto 2 years”). The impugned order travels
directly from a recital of discrepancies to the conclusion, in paragraph 6, as
under:“6. The above factual matrix proves that the Consultant has
exhibited gross and willful negligence towards its obligations and
has committed flagrant breaches of the Consultancy Agreement…”
62. The infirmity is aggravated by the fact (as also noticed hereinabove)
that the impugned order appears to be incongruous/inconsistent on the
central issue of attribution. As noticed, while paragraphs 4(iv) and 4(v)
record that it is the CALA which “has adopted” and “has given” the nonagricultural rates, the ‘Authority’s reply’ in the tabulation asserts that “The
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non-agriculture rates i.e. 5000/square meter were adopted by DPR
consultant on agriculture land in the area of 6053 square meter.”
63. It is trite that reasons are distinct from conclusions. The considerations
which legitimately inform the quantum of a debarment were adverted to by
the Supreme Court in Kulja Industries (supra) at paragraphs 21 and 22
thereof, including the actual or potential harm resulting from the
wrongdoing, its frequency and duration, the existence of any pattern or prior
history, the extent of the contractor’s complicity, and any remedial measures
undertaken. None of these considerations finds any reflection in the
impugned order. In Blue Dreamz (supra), it was observed as under :
“34. The Division Bench has, in our opinion, not appreciated the case
in its proper perspective. Merely saying that the blacklisting order
carried reasons is not good enough. Do the reasons justify the
invocation of the penalty of blacklisting and is the penalty
proportionate, was the real question.”
The above circumstances seriously impinge on the legality of the impugned
order.
Non-consideration of the petitioner’s reply to the show cause notice
dated 29.04.2025
64. There is an additional infirmity, which has a bearing on whether
principles of natural justice can be said to have been complied with.
Paragraph 5 of the impugned order records that no reply or representation
was submitted by the petitioner to the show cause notice dated 29.04.2025,
and that at the personal hearings the petitioner merely reiterated the
contentions in its reply dated 11.12.2024. The submission dated 17.01.2025,
furnished pursuant to the personal hearing of 13.01.2025, finds no mention
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whatsoever in the impugned order. Moreover, the reply dated 13.05.2025 to
the show-cause notice dated 29.04.2025, has been placed on record. The
respondent no.1 has sought to contend that the reply dated 13.05.2025 was
not received but that the same submissions were made at the personal
hearing on 06.05.2025 before the authority and considered thereof. The
difficulty remains that such consideration does not appear from the
impugned order itself. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Transys
Consulting Pvt. Ltd. v. National Highway Authority of India, 2024 SCC
OnLine Del 5713, observed that the reasons for a decision taken by an
authority “must be clearly articulated within the impugned order itself” and
the authority must engage directly with the explanations offered in response
to the show cause notice.
65. The record, as discussed hereinabove, clearly demonstrates that the
impugned order falls foul of the aforesaid dicta and therefore is legally
untenable.
CONCLUSION
66. In view of the foregoing discussion, the debarment order dated
30.09.2025 passed by the respondent no.1 is unsustainable and is,
accordingly, set-aside.
67. The petition stands allowed in the above terms. All pending
applications stand disposed of.
68. Needless to say, the same shall be without prejudice to the right of the
respondent no.1 to claim damages and/or realise any dues, losses and
damages from the petitioner that may have accrued on account of the alleged
breach of the contractual obligations as mandated under the Consultancy
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Agreement, in accordance with law.
SACHIN DATTA, J
AUGUST 11, 2026/at
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