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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 25th August, 2026
Uploaded on: 25th August, 2026
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CRL.A. 1635/2025 and CRL.M.A. 35500/2025
SADDAM @ ATAUR REHMAN IN JUDICIAL
CUSTODY
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Chatanya Siddharth and Mr.
Kartikey Chaudhary, Advocates.
versus
STATE NCT OF DELHI
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Ritesh Kumar Bahri, APP with
Ms. Divya Yadav & Mr. Lalit Luthra,
Advs.
SI Shiv Dayal Kumar.
CRL.A. 255/2026 and CRL.M.(BAIL) 533/2026
MOHD UBESH ALIAS SHAHRUKH
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Chatanya Siddharth and Mr.
Kartikey Chaudhary, Advocates.
versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Ritesh Kumar Bahri, APP with
Ms. Divya Yadav & Mr. Lalit Luthra,
Advs.
SI Shiv Dayal Kumar.
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
VIKAS MAHAJAN, J.
1.
This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.
2.
These two appeals have been preferred by the Appellants - Saddam @
Ataur Rehman and Mohd. Ubesh alias Shahrukh under Section 415(2) of
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
BNSS, 2023 assailing the impugned judgment dated 19.07.2025 whereby the
Appellants were convicted for offences under Section 302/34 IPC. Vide order
on sentence dated 06.08.2025, both the appellants were sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 IPC and to
pay fine of Rs.10,000/-.
3.
The case of the prosecution in brief is that on 28.02.2019 at around
00:42 AM, at House No.180, Gali No.3, Munga Nagar, Delhi within the
jurisdiction of P.S. Dayalpur, the Appellant - Saddam alias Ataur Rehman
caught hold of deceased Smt. Hamidan and the Appellant - Mohd. Ubesh alias
Shahrukh, gave beatings to the deceased with a wooden danda having pointed
edge on one side whereas the mother of the Appellant - Mohd. Ubesh alias
Shahrukh namely, Salma gave slaps to deceased Hamidan with an intention
to kill, as a result of which she sustained injuries.
4.
The injured was taken to GTB Hospital on the same day where she
remained under treatment for about seven (07) days and died on 07.03.2019.
After investigation, chargesheet was filed and the charges were framed on
29.07.2019 against the Appellants under Section 302/34 of IPC.
5.
The co-accused Salma could not be arrested as she had absconded. The
Appellants pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution led evidence
and examined 16 witnesses, whereafter the statements of the Appellants were
recorded under Section 313 CrPC. They did not, however, lead any defence
evidence.
6.
The ld. Trial Court, on the basis of the evidence on record, convicted
the Appellants under Sections 302/34 IPC based on the testimony of PW1
Shahzad who deposed that the injuries were inflicted on the deceased by the
two Appellants and one Salma, and such injuries were opined by doctor to be
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
antemortem in nature and sufficient to cause of death in ordinary course of
nature. The relevant extract from the Trial Court judgment reads as under:
“75.
It is, further contended that PW1 stated in his
examination in chief that his grand mother was beaten
with sharp object, while in cross examination, it is
mentioned that his grand mother was killed by sharp
edged pointed danda. Whereas it is mentioned in his
Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement that a nukili cheez was
used.
76.
However, there is no material inconsistency
in his statement. PW 1 stated in examination in chief
that sharp object was used and it is clarified in cross
examination that it was a sharp edged danda. A danda
can be sharp edged from a side, hence there is no
inconsistency in his statement.
77.
It is contended that PW 1 in his cross
examination claimed to have made the the PCR call
from his mobile no. 9871XX8706, but DD entry No. 4A
shows the call was made by someone else from mobile
number 9650XX7858. However, it is an immaterial
inconsistency. A PCR call was made which is duly
proved and thereafter police reached at the spot which
is established by way of testimony of public and police
witnesses.
78.
It is contended and is also mentioned in written
submissions also that accused was arrested in a
kalandra initially under Section 107/151 of Cr.P.C. but
this kalandra is suppressed in the present charge sheet.
However, if a kalandra was made, it is separate
proceeding and has nothing to do with the present case.
79.
As per the post mortem report, the cause of
death is Septicemic shock consequent upon
antemortem injury to head as a result of blunt force
impact and as per subsequent opinion, it was opined by
doctor that injuries are antemortem in nature and
sufficient to cause of death in ordinary course of
nature.
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
80.
In view of the above discussion, it is proved
that both the accused persons in furtherance of their
common intention deliberately gave beatings to
deceased Hamidan who was their neighbour, with
sharp object danda with the intention of causing such
bodily injury as the accused knew likely to cause death
of Hamidan due to her old age and hence caused her
death. And both are found guilty for the offence of
committing murder of deceased Hamidan.
Conclusion:81.
In view of above discussion, observations and
findings, accused persons Mohd. Ubesh @ Sharukh and
Saddam @ Ataur Rehman are hereby convicted for
offence u/s 302/34 of IPC.”
(emphasis supplied)
7.
Mr. Chatanya Siddharth, ld. counsel for the Appellants submits that in
the present case, the offence under Section 302 IPC is not made out. At best
or worst, the case would fall under Section 304 Part II IPC.
8.
Elaborating on his submissions, he submits that from the MLC, it is
evident that when the deceased was taken to the hospital, she herself gave
description of the incident which shows that she was very much conscious.
9.
He submits that the alleged weapon of offence used in the present case,
as per the prosecution’s version, is a one and a half feet wooden danda, which
is not a dangerous weapon, therefore, there was no intention to kill.
10.
He further submits that as per the post-mortem report, the cause of
death is ‘Septicemic Shock consequent upon ante-mortem injury to head as a
result of blunt force impact’. There were total seven injuries found on the
deceased person, out of which six were either a contusion or abrasion and only
injury no.2 was a sutured wound with one suture present on right forehead.
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
11.
He submits that PW-12 Dr. Shilpa Singh, who conducted post-mortem,
also stated that injury no.2 cannot be the cause of death.
12.
He contends that the Appellant - Saddam @ Ataur Rehman, who was
aged about 25 years at the time of the incident, is presently aged about 32
years, and as per the nominal roll, he has served a sentence of approximately
3 years, 4 Months and 22 days as on 09.01.2026. Whereas, the AppellantMohd. Ubesh alias Shahrukh was aged about 26 years at the time of the
incident and is presently aged about 33 years, and as per the nominal roll, he
has served a sentence of approximately 3 years, 8 Months and 1 day as on
27.03.2026.
13.
Per contra, Mr. Ritesh Kumar Bahri, ld. APP for the State submits that
the deceased was aged about 65 years at the time of incident and injury was
inflicted on her head with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the
accused knew likely to cause death of Hamidan due to her old age, which
constitutes an offence of ‘murder’.
14.
He further submits that the Appellants calculatedly chose to attack the
deceased during the midnight and the same goes on to show their criminal
intent to inflict fatal injuries.
15.
We have heard ld. counsel for the Appellants, as well as, ld. APP for
the State and have perused the record.
16.
The prosecution has examined two eye-witnesses PW-1 Shahzad and
PW-4 Shahid. In so for as PW-4 is concerned the Trial Court found that as
per testimony of PW-1, PW-4 had reached at the spot after accused persons
had gone. It was also held that PW-4 had made improvement over his earlier
statement under section 161 CrPC, and is not an eye witness. Accordingly,
his statement was held to be not credible.
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
17.
PW-1 Shahzad, who is the grandson of the deceased, is thus, the sole
eye-witness. The relevant part of his testimony is reproduced herein below
for the ease of reference:
“On the intervening night of 27/28 February, 2019,
when I was sleeping in the room at first floor of my
house, at about 12:00 night I heard noise of shouting
coming from towards the roof of our house. I got up and
saw that my grandmother Hamidan was not in the room
and then I went on the roof of my house and saw that
my grandmother was present on the roof and our
neighbour Shahrukh@Uvesh was beating my
grandmother with some sharp object and mother of
Shahrukh was given slap blows to my grandmother
and Saddam, who is son of Mausi (Khala) of Sharukh,
had caught hold my grandmother at that time. On
seeing the same, when I tried to intervene to save my
grandmother and the aforesaid three persons,
attempted to assault me, I immediately raised alarm, at
which all the aforesaid three persons ran away from
there. While running they were saying “aaj toh chhor
diya hai agli baar jaan se maar denge”. After that my
other family members had also come on the roof and
thereafter we made 100 number call to police. After
sometime one ambulance had come at our house and
took my grandmother to hospital, at that time I had not
accompanied my grandmother to the hospital. In the
hospital my grandmother was remained under
treatment[….]
xxxxxx by Abdul Rauf, Ld. Counsel for both the accused
persons
[….] My grand mother was killed by a sharp edged
pointed danda from one side and that side was made of
wood itself. The danda was in the hand of accused
Ubesh @ Shahrukh. The length of the danda was
approximately 1½ feet. [….]
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
18.
A perusal of the MLC–Ex.PW6/A shows that the patient herself
narrated the history of physical assault at around 1:35 AM on 28th February,
2019, which establishes that she was fully conscious. Further, upon clinical
examination of the patient, following injuries were observed:
1. Lacerated wound on right eyebrow of size 2x0.5 cm.
2. Lacerated wound on upper lip of size 1x0.5 cm.
3. Abrasion on forehead.
4. Puncture wound at nose.
5. Sweeling on occipital region.
19.
After the death of the deceased, PW-12 Dr. Shilpa Singh conducted the
post-mortem of the deceased and the post-mortem report is Ex.PW12/A. On
examination, the following external injuries were noted, which were antemortem in nature:
“1. Contusion, Yellowish in colour of size 8 cm x 5 cm
present on right side of neck, touching lower lobe of
right ear and is 3 cm away from midline.
2. Sutured wound with 1 suture in situ present on the
right forehead, touching right eye brow, outer aspect
and is 3.5 cm away from midline.
3. Dark brown scabbed abrasion present on the right
upper lip of size 2 cm x 1 cm and is 0.5 cm away from
midline on remaining scars, pink coloured base seen.
4. Contusion, yellowish in colour of size 12 cm x 7 cm
present on left side of face on forehead and is 1 cm away
from midline.
5. Contusion, yellowish in colour of size 5 cm x 4 cm
present on left side of chin 0.5 cm away from midline
and touching the left side of mandible.
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
6. Dark brown scabbed abrasion present on the right
side of forehead, of size 1 cm x 0.5 cm, is 3cm above
right eyebrow and 4 cm away from midline.
7. Contusion, yellowish in colour of size 2 cm x 2 cm
present at the base of frenulum in mouth, at right lower
lip, inner aspect. Frenulum – Intact”
(emphasis supplied)
20.
Besides that, the post-mortem report also records the cause of death as
– ‘septicemic shock consequent upon ante-mortem injury to head as result of
blunt force impact’.
21.
For the purposes of the present case, the cross-examination of PW-12
Dr. Shilpa Singh also assumes relevance, inasmuch as she testified that there
was no punctured wound found on the dead body of the deceased which could
have been caused by a pointed weapon. As regards, injury no.2, the sutured
wound, she stated that the same cannot be the cause of death. The relevant
part of her testimony reads thus:
“[….]
I received inquest papers at 2:00PM. I had not
discussed with the IO regarding the case. It is possible
to receive the same injuries due to fall from stairs. It is
correct that in the present case, there is no punctured
wound which had been caused by a pointed weapon.
Vol. Injury No.2 mentioned in external injuries is a
suture wound and its nature of injury cannot be
commented upon. Injury no.2 cannot be cause of
death.”
(emphasis supplied)
22.
The only contention which has been put forth by the learned counsel
for the Appellants, on the basis of the evidence on record is that the present is
not a case of ‘murder’, rather it would be a case of culpable homicide not
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
amounting to murder which would fall under the gamut of Sections 299 and
304 Part II of IPC. To appreciate the said submission, it would be apposite to
refer to the relevant part of Section 299 as well as Section 300 which are
reproduced as under:
“299. Culpable homicide.—
Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention
of causing death, or with the intention of causing such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the
knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death,
commits the offence of culpable homicide.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Explanation 1.— A person who causes bodily injury to
another who is labouring under a disorder, disease or
bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of
that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death.
Explanation 2.— Where death is caused by bodily
injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall
be deemed to have caused the death, although by
resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the
death might have been prevented.
Explanation 3.— The causing of the death of child in the
mother’s womb is not homicide. But it may amount to
culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if
any part of that child has been brought forth, though the
child may not have breathed or been completely born.”
300. Murder.—
Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable
homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is
caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—
Secondly.— If it is done with the intention of causing
such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to
cause the death of the person to whom the harm is
caused, or—
Thirdly.— If it is done with the intention of causing
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, or—
Fourthly.— If the person committing the act knows that
it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely
to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse
for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as
aforesaid.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Exception 1
….
Exception5 [….]”
23.
Section 299 defines ‘culpable homicide’ while section 300 defines
‘murder’. All ‘murder’ is ‘culpable homicide’ but vice versa is not true. In
Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana and Ors. (2026) SCC Online SC 293,
the Supreme Court has observed that the question whether the evidence
disclosed by the proved facts is “murder” or “culpable homicide not
amounting to murder” should be approached in a structured manner
comprising in the following three stages:
47. At the first stage, the Court must determine whether
the accused has committed an act which has caused the
death of another, that is to say, whether the case
involves a homicide. If such causal connection between
the act of the accused and the death is established, the
enquiry then proceeds to the second stage, that is to say,
whether the act so committed amounts to “culpable
homicide” within the meaning of Section 299 IPC.
48. If the answer to this question is prima facie in the
affirmative, the Court must then enter upon the third
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
stage of enquiry, viz., whether the facts proved by the
prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the
four clauses of Section 300 IPC, which define murder. If
the case does not fall within any of the four clauses of
Section 300, the offence would be culpable homicide not
amounting to murder, punishable under either Part I or
Part II of Section 304 IPC, depending upon whether the
case attracts the second or the third clause of
Section 299 IPC.
49. Even if the case falls within the four clauses of
Section 300 IPC, the Court must further examine
whether any of the Exceptions to Section 300 IPC are
attracted. If the case is covered by any such Exception,
the offence would fall back to Section 299, that is,
culpable homicide not amounting to murder.”
24.
Clearly, the Exceptions can be applied only after it has been found that
the accused is guilty of murder within the meaning of any of the four clauses
of Section 300 IPC.
25.
Therefore, the first exercise to be undertaken is to ascertain as to
whether the prosecution has been able to prove that the case comes within the
ambit of any of the four clauses of Section 300 IPC.
26.
Indubitably, it is not the case of prosecution that the Appellants
committed the act knowingly that it is so imminently dangerous that it must
in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
therefore, Clause (4) of Section 300 is not attracted. Such an act has been
illustrated by illustration (d) to Section 300 viz., where a person without
excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them.
27.
The Trial Court has, however, tried to bring the case within Clause (2)
of Section 300 IPC by recording a finding that the accused persons gave
beating with sharp object danda with the intention of causing such bodily
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
injury as the accused knew likely to cause death of Hamidan due to her old
age and hence caused her death. To understand the scope and import of
Clause (2) it is imperative to refer to relevant part of illustration (b) to Section
300 which alludes to the said Clause, and reads thus: A, knowing that Z is
labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes
him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the
blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound
state of health.
27.1 As also explained by the Supreme Court in Dayanand v. State of
Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 717, the instances of cases falling under Clause (2)
of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow
intentionally given, knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged
liver or enlarged spleen or a diseased heart and such a blow is likely to cause
death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver or spleen
or the failure of heart as the case may be.
27.2 Considering the above illustration and the exposition, we are of the
view that Clause (2) is not attracted to the case in hand, inasmuch as it is not
the case of the prosecution that the deceased was suffering from any disease
or was not in a sound state of health, and that such a fact was within the
knowledge of the Appellants. Merely because, the deceased was aged about
65 years, in our opinion, would not be sufficient to bring the case within the
ambit of the said Clause.
28.
Therefore, what needs to be seen next is that whether there was an
intention to cause death in terms of Clause (1) or there was an intention of
causing bodily injury to the deceased and the said bodily injury was sufficient
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death to bring the case within the
purview of Clause (3) of Section 300 IPC.
29.
In Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of AP, (2006) 11 SCC 444, the
Supreme Court elucidated the guiding factors to be borne in mind for
gathering whether there was an intention to cause death. The relevant extract
is reproduced hereinbelow:
“29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the
pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as
that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302
or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant
matters — plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel
of children, utterance of a rude word or even an
objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and
group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like
revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally
absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There
may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be
criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may
be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid
the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case
that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the
courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable
under Section 302, are not converted into offences
punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated
as murder punishable under Section 302. The intention
to cause death can be gathered generally from a
combination of a few or several of the following,
among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon
used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the
accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether
the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the
amount of force employed in causing injury; (v)
whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or
sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
incident occurs by chance or whether there was any
premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior
enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii)
whether there was any grave and sudden provocation,
and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether
it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person
inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has
acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the
accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above
list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and
there may be several other special circumstances with
reference to individual cases which may throw light on
the question of intention. Be that as it may.”
(emphasis supplied)
30.
Now turning to the facts of the present case, we find that it has come in
the testimony of PW-1 Shahzad that only the Appellant Mohd. Ubesh alias
Shahrukh gave injuries to the deceased with wooden Danda whereas
Appellants - Saddam @ Ataur Rehman had caught hold of the deceased while
other accused Salma gave slaps blows. All the three assailants were carrying
only one weapon, i.e., a Danda which was about 11/2 ft. long, and which by
no stretch of imagination can be characterised as a deadly weapon. Further
six out of seven injuries are in the form of contusion or abrasion which appear
to be simple in nature.
31.
The remaining seventh injury i.e, injury no. 2 was a sutured wound with
one suture present on the right forehead. Dr. Shilpa Singh (PW-12) when
cross-examined failed to comment on the nature of the said injury nor the
same has been described as grievous either in the MLC or in the post-mortem
report. The said injury does not otherwise, fall in any of the categories as
enumerated in Section 320 IPC to qualify as grievous hurt.
32.
Having regard to the nature of weapon used, a single wound which is
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
not a grievous one, and the fact that other two assailants were empty handed,
goes to show that the Appellants did not possess the intention to cause death,
therefore, the applicability of Clause (1) of Section 300 IPC also stands ruled
out.
33.
Lastly, it needs to be determined whether the case falls in Clause (3) of
Section 300 IPC. The Supreme Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, 1958
SCC OnLine SC 37, explained the meaning and scope of Clause (3) in the
following terms:
“14. To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the
following facts before it can bring a case under Section
300 “thirdly”.
15. First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a
bodily injury is present.
16. Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved;
These are purely objective investigations.
17. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an
intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is
to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that
some other kind of injury was intended.
18. Once these three elements are proved to be present,
the enquiry proceeds further and.
19. Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the
type just described made up of the three elements set
out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely
objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the
intention of the offender.
20. Once these four elements are established by the
prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the
prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under
Section 300 “thirdly”. It does not matter that there was
no intention to cause death. It does not matter that
there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
CRL.A. 1635/2025 & CRL.A. 255/2026
that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course
of nature (not that there is any real distinction between
the two). It does not even matter that there is no
knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause
death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury
actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the
enquiry is purely objective and the only question is
whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the
injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. No one has a licence to run around
inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not
guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they
must face the consequences; and they can only escape if
it can be shown, or reasonably deduced, that the injury
was accidental or otherwise unintentional.”
(emphasis supplied)
34.
From the testimony of PW-1 Shahzad it is clear that the injuries present
on the body of the deceased were inflicted by the Appellants. However, there
is no opinion of the Doctor in the post-mortem report or otherwise, that any
one injury or all the injuries taken together on the person of the deceased were
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. As noted above, out
of seven injuries present on the person of the deceased, six were either a
contusion or abrasion and only injury no.2 was a sutured wound with one
suture present on right forehead.
35.
Neither in the MLC nor in the post-mortem report, it was opined that
the injuries found on the body of the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, rather PW-12 Dr. Shilpa Singh, has stated that
injury no.2, i.e., the suture wound with one suture present on the right
forehead cannot be the cause of death. Therefore, in our opinion the finding
recorded by the Trial Court that the injuries are sufficient to cause death in
Digitally Signed
By:DEEPAK SINGH
12:46:49
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ordinary course of nature, is perverse.
36.
More importantly, in the post mortem report, the cause of death has
been recorded as “septicemic shock consequent upon ante-mortem injury to
head as result of blunt force impact”.
37.
The deceased was admitted in the hospital on 28th February, 2019 at
about 1.30 AM and died 7 days later on 07.03.2019, evidently not on account
of the injuries inflicted by the Appellants, rather due to the septicemic shock,
which could possibly be on account of the infection contracted by the
deceased during her stay at the hospital. In the absence of the opinion of the
Doctor that the injuries inflicted to the deceased were sufficient to cause death
in the ordinary course of nature, the offence under Clause (3) of Section 300
IPC is not made out.
38.
Evidently, not only it is a case of an absence of the intention to cause
death, but also an absence of intention to cause such bodily injury that was
sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death. Therefore, under the given
circumstances, the Appellants cannot be held guilty of ‘murder’, rather they
could be convicted only under Section 304 IPC.
39.
The classification of offence into either part of Section 304 IPC is
essentially a matter of fact. This would again have to be decided with
reference to the nature of the offence, intention of the offender, weapon used,
the place and nature of injuries, existence of premeditated mind, the persons
participating in the commission of crime and to some extent the motive for
commission of the crime. The first clause of Section 304 includes only those
cases in which death is intentionally caused. The offence is really “murder”,
but mitigated by the presence of circumstances recognised in the Exceptions
to Section 300 IPC. The second clause deals only with cases in which the
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death is caused unintentionally but knowingly.1
40.
As already noted above, it is not a case where intention to kill could be
attributed to the Appellants, therefore, the case would fall under Second
Clause of Section 304 IPC.
41.
Under similar circumstances, the Supreme Court in Ganga Dass v.
State of Haryana, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 534, where the accused had given iron
pipe single blow on the head of the deceased, who died after 18 days from the
date of occurrence on account of sceptecimia and other complications, had
altered the conviction of the Appellant therein from Section 302 IPC to
Section 304 Part II IPC. The relevant portion from the said judgment reads as
under:
“6. We find considerable force in this submission. As
stated above the occurrence took place on November
18, 1988 and the deceased died 18 days later on
December 5, 1988 due to septicaemia and other
complications. The Doctor found only one injury on
the head and that was due to single blow inflicted with
an iron pipe not with any sharp-edged weapon. Having
regard to the circumstances of the case, it is difficult to
hold that the appellant intended to cause death nor it
can be said that he intended to cause that particular
injury. In any event the medical evidence shows that the
injured deceased was operated but unfortunately some
complications set in and ultimately he died because of
cardiac failure etc. Under these circumstances, we set
aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302
IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded
thereunder. Instead we convict him under Section 304
Part II IPC and sentence him to undergo six years' RI.
The sentence of fine of Rs 2000 along with default clause
is confirmed. Accordingly the appeal is partly allowed.”
Rampal Singh v. State of U.P., (2012) 8 SCC 289
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42.
In view of the above discussion, we are inclined to bring down the
offence from ‘murder’ to ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’,
punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC. Accordingly, the conviction of the
Appellants under Section 302 IPC and the sentence for imprisonment for life
awarded to them is set aside and they are convicted under Section 304 Part II
IPC.
43.
The next question which we are now confronted with is the sentence to
be awarded to the Appellants. The maximum sentence that can be awarded
for the offence under Section 304 Part II is 10 years, but there is no minimum
sentence prescribed therefor.
44.
It is noted that as on date, the Appellant Mohd. Ubesh alias Shahrukh
has already undergone a sentence of 4 years and 1 month (approximately),
whereas Appellant Saddam @ Ataur Rehman has served 4 years
(approximately).
45.
We are conscious that the punishment awarded to a criminal serves as
a deterrent to those who are dispositioned to take the law into their own hands,
but at the same time it should not be disproportionate to the crime. Each case
comes with its own peculiarities and the sentence has to be awarded by
holistically evaluating the facts of the case. An equitable balance has to be
maintained between the rights of the victim or their family and the rights of
the accused.
46.
Insofar as the present case is concerned, having regard to the kind of
weapon used i.e. 1½ wooden danda; the nature of injuries, which were not
opined to be grievous; the cause of death i.e. septicemic shock; the clean
antecedents; and satisfactory jail conduct of the Appellants, we are of the view
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that the sentence already undergone by the Appellants will serve the ends of
justice. Ordered accordingly.
47.
It is thus, directed that the Appellants may be released forthwith, if not
required in any other case.
48.
Appeals are disposed of in the above terms.
49.
Copy of this order to be communicated to the concerned Jail
Superintendent for necessary information and compliance.
50.
Order to be uploaded on the website of this Court forthwith.
VIKAS MAHAJAN
JUDGE
PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUDGE
AUGUST 25, 2026/aj
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