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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No.
: 2966 of 2025
Reserved on
: 02.03.2026
Date of Decision : 10.3.2026.
Sachin Sharma
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP
…. Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner
:
Mr
Prashant
Advocate.
Sharma,
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr
Ajit
Sharma,
Advocate General.
Deputy
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in FIR No. 2 of 2025, dated 02.01.2025,
registered at Police Station Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P.,
for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 21 of
the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act.
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? yes
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2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution's
story, the police recovered 13.7 grams of heroin and arrested the
petitioner. The allegations against the petitioner are false. The
petitioner has no role in the commission of the crime, and the
prosecution’s case is based on an imaginary story. The police
have filed the chargesheet before the Court. The petitioner had
earlier filed the bail petition before this Court, which was
registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1251 of 2025 and was dismissed on
25.06.2025. The petitioner was earlier convicted in FIR No.
43/2018 and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for one year and pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-. Another FIR No. 13 of
is pending against the petitioner. The petitioner would
abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose.
Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
petitioner be released on bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police party was on a traffic checking duty on
02.01.2025. A person came from Jahu towards Kuthera at about
04.35 p.m. He had a yellow carry bag with him. He returned after
seeing the police and started walking briskly. The police
apprehended the person who revealed his name as Sachin
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Sharma (the present petitioner) in the presence of Nitin
Mahajan. The police searched the yellow carry bag and found
13.07 grams of heroin in it. The police seized the heroin and
arrested the petitioner. The heroin was sent to SFSL, and as per
the result of analysis, it was found to be a sample of
diacetylmorphine (heroin). The chargesheet has been filed
before the Court, and the statement of a one witness has been
recorded on 09.01.2026. The matter was listed for checking of
copies of the supplementary challan on 17.01.2026. The
petitioner was convicted in FIR No. 43 of 2018, and FIR 13 of 2024
is pending against the petitioner. Hence, the status report.
4.
I have heard Mr Prashant Sharma, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate
General for the respondent/State.
5.
Mr
Prashant
Sharma,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was
falsely implicated. The petitioner was arrested on 02.01.2025,
and more than one year has elapsed since his arrest. The
prosecution has examined only one witness, and the matter was
listed for checking of copies of the supplementary challan. The
( 2026:HHC:6382 )
trial is not likely to conclude soon. The petitioner’s right to a
speedy trial is being violated. Hence, he prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
6.
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner has criminal
antecedents. He was convicted in one FIR No. 43 of 2018, and
another FIR No. 13 of 2024 is pending against him. He would
indulge in the commission of a similar offence if released on bail.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.
8.
It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a
bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 1251 of 2025
and was dismissed on 25.06.2025. It was held in State of
Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC
605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a
subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a
change of circumstances. It was observed:
“Once that application was rejected, there was no question
of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the
earlier decision without there being a change in the fact
situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a
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substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier
decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of
little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was
a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during
these two days, drastic changes had taken place,
necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial
discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the
impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all
earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J.,
only a couple of days before, in the absence of any
substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is
necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that
the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an
impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either
successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure
an order which had hitherto eluded him.
9.
Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an
earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to
consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then
consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed.
It was held:
“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have
been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to
consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by
noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have
been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of
the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court
will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier
rejection the subsequent bail application should be
granted.”
10.
A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,
(2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed:
( 2026:HHC:6382 )
“9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had
denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that
order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate
forum, without there being any major change of
circumstances, another fresh application should not have
been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were
valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course,
the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail
applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications
without there being any change of circumstances would lead
to bad precedents.”
11.
This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit
v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was
observed:“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused
has a right to make successive applications for the grant of
bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications
has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the
earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the
court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which
persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the
earlier applications.”
12.
It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of
Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail
application can be filed if there is a material change in the
circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It
was observed:
“7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail
applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of
a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for
filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in
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circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled
by law is a change in the fact situation or law that requires
the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier
finding has become obsolete. However, a change in
circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of
judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be
decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the
place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power
of a judge to consider the application and a person's right
based on a material change in circumstances. A material
change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an
offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the
power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a
completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a
case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially
recognized principle that if successive bail applications on
the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different
Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant
would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his
liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the
confidence of the other side being put in issue and there
would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline
requires that such matter must be placed before the same
Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of
material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by
the same Judge who had earlier decided the application.
Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there
is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant,
which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.”
13.
Therefore, the present bail petition can only be
considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and
it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court.
14.
The status report mentions that the petitioner was
found in possession of 13.7 grams of heroin, which is an
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intermediate quantity. Hence, the rigours of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act do not apply to the present case.
15.
The status report also mentions that the statement of
only one witness has been recorded, and the matter was listed for
checking of copies of the supplementary challan on 17.01.2026.
The learned Trial Court has not even listed the matter for
recording the statements of the witnesses, which justifies the
grievance of the petitioner that the trial is not likely to be
concluded soon.
16.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that when the State or any prosecuting
agency including the Court concerned has no wherewithal to
provide the right to speedy trial of the accused, the bail should
not be opposed on the ground that crime committed is serious. It
was observed at page 820:
“17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the
court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect
the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the State
or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea
for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious.
Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the
nature of the crime.”
( 2026:HHC:6382 )
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an
accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of criminal
jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent
until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, however
stringent the penal law may be.
19. We are convinced that the manner in which the
prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded, the
right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said to
have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the
Constitution.”
17.
It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127
that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the
accused. It was observed at page 298:
“13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
1948, assures that:
“12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone
has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”
14. More recently, the European Convention on Human
Rights in Article 6(1) promises that:
“6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within
a reasonable time….”
And in its second sub-article, that:
“6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the
use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and
( 2026:HHC:6382 )
omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal prosecution
in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386 US 213 (1967)].
16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994
SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court
unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a
fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract
these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp.
638-39, paras 86-87)
“86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21
as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and
liberty guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the
actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent
incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the
stage of the investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and
revision so that any possible prejudice that may result
from the impermissible and avoidable delay from the
time of the commission of the offence till it
consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this
context, it may be noted that the constitutional
guarantee of a speedy trial is properly reflected in
Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while dealing
with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has observed
thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably
quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just”
and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can,
therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by
speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is
an integral and essential part of the fundamental right
to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question
which would, however, arise is as to what would be the
consequence if a person accused of an offence is
denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of
his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a longdelayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released
( 2026:HHC:6382 )
unconditionally, freed from the charge levelled against
him on the ground that trying him after an unduly
long period of time and convicting him after such a
trial would constitute a violation of his fundamental
right under Article 21?”
17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being
present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in
departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court
on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri)
93] underscored that this right to speedy trial is implicit in
Article 21 of the Constitution and is also reflected in Section
309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; that it
encompasses all stages viz. investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal, revision and retrial; that the burden lies on the
prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that the Court
must engage in a balancing test to determine whether this
right had been denied in the particular case before it.”
18.
It was held in Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of
India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot be
kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial being
concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:
“8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to grant
some relief to those persons who have been deprived of their
personal liberty for a considerable length of time without
any prospect of the trial being concluded in the near future.
Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and the nation
needs to be safeguarded, looking to the nature of the
offences these undertrials have been charged with. But the
ultimate justification for such deprivation of liberty pending
trial can only be their being found guilty of the offences for
which they have been charged. If such a finding is not likely
to be arrived at within a reasonable time, some relief
becomes necessary.”
( 2026:HHC:6382 )
19.
Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3
SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be
subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at
page 335:
“40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has
been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that
cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed
as an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is
not necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which,
regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or the
gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised the
legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it
differently, no accused can be subjected to unending
detention pending trial, especially when the law presumes
him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even where
statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail, such
as in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967, this Court has expressly ruled that after a reasonably
long period of incarceration, or for any other valid reason,
such stringent provisions will melt down, and cannot be
measured over and above the right of liberty guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution (see Union of
India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3
SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] ).”
20.
It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to
a speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right of
bail is curtailed on the premise that the trial would be concluded
expeditiously. It was observed at page 174:-
( 2026:HHC:6382 )
13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused
to secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial
discretion (like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present
case), this Court has upheld them for conflating two
competing values i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy
freedom, based on the presumption of innocence, and
societal interest — as observed in Vaman Narain
Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan [Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of
Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 745: (2008)
17 SCR 369] (“the concept of bail emerges from the conflict
between the police power to restrict liberty of a man who is
alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption of
innocence in favour of the alleged criminal….”). They are, at
the same time, upheld on the condition that the trial is
concluded expeditiously. The Constitution Bench in Kartar
Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab,
(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899: (1994) 2 SCR 375]
made observations to this effect. In the Shaheen Welfare
Association. v. Union
of
India [Shaheen
Welfare
Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366:
(1996) 2 SCR 1123] again, this Court expressed the same
sentiment, namely, that when stringent provisions are
enacted, curtailing the provisions of bail, and restricting
judicial discretion, it is on the basis that investigation and
trials would be concluded swiftly. The Court said that
parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen Welfare
case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC
616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123], SCC p. 624, para
17)
“17. … a conscious decision has been taken by the
legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal
liberty of an undertrial accused for the sake of
protecting the community and the nation against
terrorist and disruptive activities or other activities
harmful to society, it is all the more necessary that
investigation of such crimes is done efficiently and an
adequate number of Designated Courts are set up to
bring to book persons accused of such serious crimes.
This is the only way in which society can be protected
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against harmful activities. This would also ensure that
persons
ultimately
found
innocent
are
not
unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.”
21.
The
Court
highlighted
the
effects
of
pre-trial
detention and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page
178:“23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that
laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of
bail may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials
are not concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the
individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and
their living conditions, more often than not, are appalling.
According to the Union Home Ministry's response to
Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had
recorded that as on 31-12-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners
were lodged in jails against a total capacity of 4,25,069
prisoners in the country [ National Crime Records Bureau,
Prison
Statistics
in
India
<https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI2021/Executive_ncrb_Summary-2021.pdf>]. Of these,
1,22,852 were convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were
undertrials.
24. The danger of unjust imprisonment is that inmates are
at risk of “prisonisation”, a term described by the Kerala
High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict
Prisoner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242]
as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner: (SCC
OnLine Ker para 13)
“13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He
loses personal possessions. He has no personal
relationships. Psychological problems result from loss
of freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy
of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out
to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by
ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.”
( 2026:HHC:6382 )
25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to
crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more
professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” [
Working Papers - Group on Prisons & Borstals - 1966
U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer's “The Prison Community”
published in 1940 [ Donald Clemmer, The Prison
Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is
referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald Clemmer's
Concept
of
Prisonisation”,
available
at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/
Sobecki_sklad.pdf> (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ).
Incarceration has further deleterious effects, where the
accused belongs to the weakest economic strata:
immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases,
scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and
alienation from society. The courts, therefore, have to be
sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an
acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and
ensure that trials—especially in cases where special laws
enact stringent provisions- are taken up and concluded
speedily.”
22.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) that the right to speedy trial of
the offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial entitles the accused to the grant of bail. It
was observed at page 817: “10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC
81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the
right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is
“implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as
interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid
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procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a
procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just”, it was held
that: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
“5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for
depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable,
fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy
trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No
procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick
trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it
would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no
doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean
reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life and
liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which
would, however, arise is as to what would be the
consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied
a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty
by imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial in
violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.”
11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and
again,
in
several
judgments,
such
as Kadra
Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar,
(1981) 3 SCC 671: 1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,
(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court
re-emphasised the right to a speedy trial and further held
that an accused, facing a prolonged trial, has no option:
(Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269,
para 84)
“84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is,
thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as
the case may be, to proceed with the case with
reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country,
where the large majority of accused come from poorer
and weaker sections of society, not versed in the ways
of law, where they do not often get competent legal
advice, the application of the said rule is wholly
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inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused
demands a speedy trial and yet he is not given one, it
may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot
disentitle
an
accused
from
complaining
of
infringement of his right to a speedy trial on the
ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy
trial.”
23.
This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v.
State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was
observed:“7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a
hurried trial is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient
time to prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an
accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in
“The Ballad of Reading Gaol”, wrote the following
poignant lines while being incarcerated:
“I know not whether Laws be right,
Or whether Laws be wrong;
All that we know who be in jail
Is that the wall is strong;
And that each day is like a year,
A year whose days are long.”
24.
It was held in Athar Parwez v. Union of India, (2024) 20
SCC 57: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762 that long incarceration and the
delay in the conclusion of the trial will entitle the accused to bail.
It was observed at page 63:
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“19. Long incarceration and the unlikely likelihood of the
trial being completed in the near future have also been
taken as a ground for exercising its constitutional role by
the constitutional courts to grant bail on violation of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees
trial be concluded within a reasonable time. Gross delay in
conclusion of the trial would justify such invocation,
leading to a conclusion of violation of Part III of the
Constitution of India, which may be taken as a ground to
release an undertrial on bail.
*****
21. At the initial stage, the legislative policy needs to be
appreciated and followed by the courts. Keeping the
statutory provisions in mind, but with the passage of time,
the effect of that statutory provision would, in fact, have
to be diluted, giving way to the mandate of Part III of the
Constitution, where the accused, as of now, is not a
convict and is facing the charges. Constitutional right of
speedy trial in such circumstances will have precedence
over the bar/strict provisions of the statute and cannot be
made the sole reason for denial of bail. Therefore, the
period of incarceration of an accused could also be a
relevant factor to be considered by the constitutional
courts, not to be merely governed by the statutory
provisions.”
25.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322
that the accused has a right to an expeditious trial. It was
observed-:
“10. However, many times we have made ourselves very
clear that howsoever serious a crime may be, the accused has
a fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined in
Article 21 of the Constitution.”
( 2026:HHC:6382 )
26.
Hence, the petitioner is entitled to bail because of the
violation of his right to a speedy trial.
27.
It was submitted that the petitioner has criminal
antecedents and he is not entitled to bail on this consideration.
This submission will not help the State. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3763: 2024:INSC:994 that the criminal antecedents
may not be a reason to deny bail to the accused in case of long
incarceration. It was observed:
“10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only
one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer for
bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused makes out a
strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact situation
and period of incarceration, the presence of antecedents may
not be a ground to deny bail. There may be a case where a
Court can grant bail only on the grounds of long
incarceration. The presence of antecedents may not be
relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court may grant
default bail. Again, the antecedents of the accused are
irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending upon the peculiar
facts, the Court can grant bail notwithstanding the existence
of the antecedents.”
28.
In view of the above, the present petition is allowed,
and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his
furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety
in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.
( 2026:HHC:6382 )
While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following
conditions:-
29.
(I)
The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor
will he influence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever.
(II)
The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every
hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments.
(III)
The petitioner will not leave the present address for a
continuous period of seven days without furnishing
the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned,
the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court.
(IV)
The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to
the Court; and
(V)
The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and
social media contact to the Police and the Court and
will abide by the summons/notices received from the
Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media
Account. In case of any change in the mobile number
or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to
the Police/Court within five days from the date of the
change.
It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file
a petition for cancellation of the bail.
30.
The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Open Air Jail,
Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by
FASTER.
( 2026:HHC:6382 )
31.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on
the case's merits.
10th March, 2026
(Sushma)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
CHANDER CHANDER
SHEKHAR
SHEKHAR Date: 2026.03.10
13:15:18 +0530
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