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Page |1
signed
LAIRENM Digitally
by
AYUM LAIRENMAYUM
INDRAJEET
INDRAJE SINGH
Date: 2023.05.31
ET SINGH 15:36:30 +05'30'
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
(1). MAT.APP.CASE NO.2 OF 2019
Ref : JUDL. MISC. CASE NO.24 OF 2019
Ref : MAT (DECLARATION) SUIT NO.16 OF 2017
Ms. Ruby Soram, aged about 22 years, D/O (Late) Soram Indubala Devi
of Uripok Sorbon Thingel, P.O. & P.S. Imphal, Imphal West District,
Manipur – 795001.
……. Appellant/s
– Versus –
Smt. Lairenmayum Ningol Akoijam Ongbi Roma Devi, aged about 42
years, W/O Akoijam Kiran Singh, of Kwakeithel Konjeng Leikai, P.O.
Imphal & P.S. Singjamei, Imphal West District, Manipur – 795001.
…. Respondent/s
IN JUDL. MISC. CASE NO.24 OF 2019
Ms. Ruby Soram, aged about 22 years, D/O (Late) Soram Indubala Devi
of Uripok Sorbon Thingel, P.O. & P.S. Imphal, Imphal West District,
Manipur – 795001.
……. Applicant/s
– Versus –
Smt. Lairenmayum Ningol Akoijam Ongbi Roma Devi, aged about 42
years, W/O Akoijam Kiran Singh, of Kwakeithel Konjeng Leikai, P.O.
Imphal & P.S. Singjamei, Imphal West District, Manipur – 795001.
…. Respondent/s
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
Page |2
IN MAT (DECLARATION) SUIT NO.16 OF 2017
Smt. Lairenmayum Ningol Akoijam Ongbi Roma Devi, aged about 42
years, W/O Akoijam Kiran Singh, of Kwakeithel Konjeng Leikai, P.O.
Imphal & P.S. Singjamei, Imphal West District, Manipur – 795001.
……. Plaintiff/s
– Versus –
1. Ms. Ruby Soram, aged about 22 years, D/O (Late) Soram Indubala Devi
of Uripok Sorbon Thingel, P.O. & P.S. Imphal, Imphal West District,
Manipur.
2. The State of Manipur represented by the Secretary (Lab & Employment),
Govt. of Manipur.
3. The Secretary/Joint Secretary (Finance/Pension Cell), Govt. of Manipur,
Imphal.
4. The Accountant General (A&E), Manipur.
5. The Addl. Director of Employment, Employment Exchange Complex,
Lamphelpat, Imphal West.
6. The Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance & Banking
Services, New Delhi.
7. The Chief General Manager, State Bank of India, Paona Bazar Branch,
Imphal.
8. The Branch Manager, State Bank of India, Paona Bazar Branch, Imphal.
9. Shri Lairenmayum Surendro Singh @ Achou Singh, aged about 74 years
of Uripok Sorbon Thingel, P.O. Imphal, Imphal West District, Manipur.
…. Respondent/s
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
Page |3
(2). With MC(MAT.APP.)CASE NO.13 OF 2018
Ref : MAT.APP. CASE NO.13 OF 2018
Ms. Ruby Soram, aged about 22 years, D/O (Late) Soram Indubala Devi
of Uripok Sorbon Thingel, P.O. & P.S. Imphal, Imphal West District,
Manipur – 795001.
…. Applicant/s
Smt. Lairenmayum Ningol Akoijam Ongbi Roma Devi, aged about 42
years, W/O Akoijam Kiran Singh, of Kwakeithel Konjeng Leikai, P.O.
Imphal & P.S. Singjamei, Imphal West District, Manipur – 795001.
…. Respondent/s
(3). With MAT.APP.CASE NO.13 OF 2018
Ref : JUDL. MISC. CASE NO.90 OF 2018
MAT (ORIGINAL/DECLARATION) SUIT NO.16 OF 2017
Ms. Ruby Soram, aged about 22 years, D/O (Late) Soram Indubala Devi
of Uripok Sorbon Thingel, P.O. & P.S. Imphal, Imphal West District,
Manipur – 795001.
…. Appellant/s
Smt. Lairenmayum Ningol Akoijam Ongbi Roma Devi, aged about 42
years, W/O Akoijam Kiran Singh, of Kwakeithel Konjeng Leikai, P.O.
Imphal & P.S. Singjamei, Imphal West District, Manipur – 795001.
…. Respondent/s
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
Page |4
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A. GUNESHWAR SHARMA
For the Petitioner/s
:
Mr. K. Roshan, Advocate
For the Respondent/s
:
Ms. Juliana, Advocate representing
Mr. Kh. Chonjon, Senior Advocate
Date of Hearing
:
31.03.2023
Date of Judgment & Order :
29.05.2023
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(CAV)
A. Guneshwar, J. :
[1]
The appeals and the application are considered jointly as arising out
of the same suit being Mat. (Declaration) Suit No. 16 of 2017. The
appellant/defendant No.1 has filed Mat. Appeal Case No.2 of 2019 challenging
the impugned order dated 04.04.2019 passed by the Ld. Family Court, Manipur
at Lamphelpat in Judl. Misc. Case No.24 of 2019 [Ref: Mat. (Declaration) Suit
No.16 of 2017] whereby the application filed by her questioning maintainability
of the suit was dismissed. In Mat. Appeal No.13 of 2018, the appellant/defendant
No.1 herein also challenged the impugned order dated 04.09.2018 in Judl. Misc.
Case No.90 of 2018 [Ref: Mat. (Declaration) Suit No.16 of 2017] passed by the
Ld. Family Court, Manipur at Lamphelpat thereby rejecting the prayer to file written
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
Page |5
statement after 390 days. The Misc. Case, being MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018,
is the application for condoning delay of 466 days in filing Mat. Appeal No.13 of
2018.
[2]
The brief fact of the case in the nutshell is that the respondent/
plaintiff herein filed a suit for declaration, ie, Mat.(Declaration) Suit No.16 of 2017
before the Ld. Family Court, Manipur inter-alia praying for declaring herself as
the only daughter and legal heir of her mother (late) Soram Indubala Devi and
for declaring that appellant/defendant No.1 was not adopted by and not a legal
heir of the plaintiff’s mother, i.e. Soram Indubala Devi and for cancellation of the
deed of adoption dated 12.09.2012. The prayer in the suit is produced below:
“(i)
A decree declaring that the plaintiff Lairenmayum Ningol Akoijam
Ongbi Roma Devi is the only daughter (natural/biological) and the
legal heir of her mother late Soram Indubala Devi, retired Technical
Assistant of the Office of the Addl. Director of Employment
(Employment Exchange Complex), Lamphelpat, Imphal West;
(ii)
A decree declaring that the defendant No.1 Ruby Soram was not
adopted and not legal heir of plaintiff’s mother late Soram Indubala
Devi;
(iii)
A decree for cancellation of the said deed of adoption dated
12.9.2012 with orders to deliver up the said deed of adoption;
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
Page |6
(iv)
Cost of the present suit;
(v)
Any other relief(s) for refund of the sum of Rs. 6,08,025/- being the
G.P.F. Balance and the interest received by her as the Hon’ble Court
deems fit, just and expedient in law and equity.”
[3]
The appellant/defendant No.1 filed an application, being Judl. Misc.
Case No.24 of 2019 inter-alia raising maintainability of the Mat. (Declaration)
Suit No.16 of 2017 that the Ld. Family Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the
suit under Section 7(1) explanation (c) and (e) of the Family Court Act, 1984 and
the suit was barred by limitation under Article 57 & 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963
as the suit was filed after 3(three) years of the knowledge of the adoption. Vide
the impugned order dated 04.04.2019 in Judl. Misc. Case No. 24 of 2019, the
Ld. Family Court, Manipur held that the Family Court has jurisdiction to try the
suit for declaration of the respondent/plaintiff as the only daughter of (late)
Soram Indubala Devi.
[3.1]
Being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 04.04.2019, the
appellant/defendant No.1 approached this Court by way of Mat. Appeal Case
No.2 of 2019, inter-alia, on the ground that provisions of the Family Court Act to
be applicable when there is a valid marriage or marital relation between the
parties. It is stated that there was no marital relation between the parties and the
suit was also barred by limitation. The respondent/plaintiff filed written argument
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
Page |7
stating that the Family Court has the jurisdiction to try this matter and the
adoption deed was void as the appellant/defendant No.1 was using her
biological parents’ names in the matriculation examination passed after the date
of the alleged adoption and she was more than 15 years old on the date of the
alleged adoption.
[3.2]
Earlier the appellant/defendant No.1 also filed an application being
Judl. Misc. Case No.90 of 2018 before the Family Court for allowing her to file
written statement after lapse of 390 days and the said application was dismissed
vide order dated 04.09.2018 being devoid of merit. Against the impugned order
dated 04.09.2018, the appellant/defendant No.1 filed Mat. Appeal No. 13 of 2018
along with an application for condoning of delay being MC(Mat. Appeal) No.13
of 2018 for condoning delay of 461 days in filing the Mat. Appeal No.13 of 2018.
[4]
Heard Mr. K. Roshan, learned counsel for the appellant and Ms.
Juliana, learned counsel representing Mr. Kh. Chonjon, learned senior counsel
for the respondent.
[5]
During the course of argument, Mr. K. Roshan, learned counsel for
the appellant/defendant No.1 has raised a new plea that the Mat. (Declaration)
Suit No.16 of 2017 is barred by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 1 Sub-Rule 4 of
CPC. He has pointed out that prior to the present suit, the appellant/defendant
No.1 had filed a Mat. (Declaration) Suit No.92 of 2013 before the Family Court,
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
Page |8
Manipur inter-alia praying to declare her as the adopted daughter of (late) Soram
Indubala Devi. In the earlier suit filed by the appellant/defendant No.1, the
respondent/plaintiff contested the same by filing written statement taking the
plea that the appellant/defendant was never adopted, at any stage, by (late)
Soram Indubala Devi. Along with the written statement, the respondent/plaintiff
also set up a counter claim to declare herself as daughter of (late) Soram
Indubala
Devi
and
for
declaration
of
the
adoption
deed
of
the
appellant/defendant No.1 as void. The prayer of the counter claim filed by the
respondent/plaintiff in Mat. (Declaration) Suit No.92 of 2013 is reproduced as
below:
“i)
To declare that the respondent is the only natural daughter of
late, Soram Indubala Devi;
ii) To declare that the respondent has got eery properties
(movbables and immovables) which was left by her deceased
mother Soram Indubala Devi;
iii) To declare that the registered Deed of Adoption, dated 14.9.2012
is null and void;
iv) Any other relief(s) as the Hon’ble Court may deem fit, just and
expedient in law and equity.”
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
Page |9
[5.1]
Mr. K. Roshan, learned counsel for the appellant further points out
that the appellant/defendant No.1 herein had not pressed the Mat. (Declaration)
Suit No.92 of 2013 and the respondent/plaintiff herein also did not press counter
claim. Accordingly, vide order dated 02.11.2015, the Ld. Family Court, Manipur
disposed of both the suit of the appellant/defendant No.1 and the counter claim
of the respondent/plaintiff as not pressed and without any liberty to file fresh one.
Relevant portion of the order dated 02.11.2015 in Mat. (Declaration) Suit No.92
of 2013 is reproduced as below:
“Both the parties are present by counsel.
The counsel of the plaintiff not pressed the suit.
On the other hand Ld. Counsel of the defendant is also not pressed
the counter claim of the defendant.
In the result the suit of the plaintiff and the counter claim of the
defendant are disposed off.
Announced.”
[5.2]
Mr. K. Roshan, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the
provisions of the Order 23 Rule 1 Sub-Rule 4 CPC stipulate that upon withdrawal
from suit/counter claim without permission to file fresh one, the parties shall be
precluded from filing a fresh suit in respect of any matter or part of the
suit/counter claim already abandoned or withdrawn. He points out that since the
counter claim filed by the respondent/plaintiff in the earlier suit filed by the
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
P a g e | 10
appellant/defendant No.1 was withdrawn without any liberty to file fresh one, the
subsequent suit, i.e., Mat. (Declaration) Suit No.16 of 2017 having the same
prayer is barred in view of the statutory mandate of the provisions of Order 23
Rule 1 Sub-Rule 4 (b) CPC.
[5.3]
Mr. K. Roshan, learned counsel for the appellant has emphasized
that the prayer in the counter claim in Mat. (Declaration) Suit No.92 of 2013 and
the prayer in Mat.(Declaration) Suit No.16 of 2017 of the respondent/plaintiff are
similar and are in the same subject matter, i.e., for declaring the respondent as
the sole daughter of late Soram Indubala Devi and for declaring the adoption
deed of the appellant/defendant No.1 herein by (late) Soram Indubala Devi as
void. He also relies on the judgment dated 12 November, 1986 in Sarguja
Transport Service vs State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P., Gwalior &
Others reported as (1987) 1 SCC 5 and order dated 12.09.2022 passed by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.8247 of 2009 titled Yashoda
Vs. Sukhwinder Singh & Others: MANU/SC/1160/2022: AIR 2022 SC 4623
which held that subsequent suit or petition is barred if earlier suit in the same
subject was withdrawn without any liberty to file fresh one.
[6]
Ms. Juliana, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submits that
the new plea of bar of the subsequent suit was not raised before the Ld. Family
Court in the application challenging the maintainability i.e., Judl. Misc. Case
No.24 of 2019 filed by the appellant/defendant No.1. The application was
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
P a g e | 11
confined to jurisdiction of the Family Court under Section 7 of the Family Court
Act and the question of limitation. She submits that the new plea cannot be
raised before this Court in the appeal during the course of hearing and she prays
that the appeal be dismissed with heavy cost.
[7]
Heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the materials
on record and cited laws.
[8]
It is true that the question of bar of subsequent suit by provisions of
the Order 23 Rule 1 CPC was not raised in the application being Judl. Misc.
Case No.24 of 2019 filed by the appellant/defendant No.1 before the Ld. Family
Court, Manipur. The objection to the maintainability was confined to the
jurisdiction of the Family Court under Section 7 of the Family Court Act and the
question of limitation. It may be noted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in
the case of State of Punjab v. Dr. R N Bhatnagar :1999 (2) SCC 330 that new
plea involving pure question of law, in absence of any disputed question of fact,
can be raised for the first time in Supreme Court. In the case of Vimal Chandra
Grover Vs. Bank of India reported as 2000 (5) SCC 122, it was held that new
plea can be put if it involves of pure question of law going to the root of the case.
[9]
In a recent case of The State of Karnataka and Ors. vs. B.R.
Muralidhar and Ors. (28.07.2022- SC): MANU/SC/0931/2022, Hon’ble
Supreme Court allowed a new plea regarding validity of a provision of statue
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
P a g e | 12
taken up for the first time during the argument where there was no such pleading.
Considering the new plea, the matter was remanded for fresh consideration
including the new plea. Relevant para are reproduced below:
“19. As aforesaid, in addition to the challenge to Section 20 of the 1973
Act being unconstitutional, during the course of argument for the first time
and then restated in the written submission, question regarding the
applicability of Section 17 of the 1973 Act to the fact situation of the
present case has been raised. There is no pleading in the writ petitions in
that regard.
20. Be that as it may, the High Court had held that in absence of an
express provision regarding lapsing of acquisition in the 1973 Act unlike
the 1894 or 2013 Act, it is not open to grant relief of setting aside
impugned notification dated 23.6.2005 on account of efflux of time. In that,
show cause notice (preliminary notification) is ordinarily issued when the
competent authority is satisfied that for the purpose of executing any work
of improvement in relation to any "slum area" or any building in such area
or for the purpose of re-developing any "slum clearance area", or for the
purpose of rehabilitating slum dwellers, it is necessary to acquire any land
and it has been so decided in pursuance of the said provision. The need
to develop the slum area and to rehabilitate the slum dwellers is a
continuing obligation of the State until it is fully discharged. The fact that
there is some time gap between the preliminary notice to show cause why
the land in question should not be acquired and in issuance of the final
notification Under Section 17, by itself, cannot be a ground to declare the
process initiated vide valid show cause notice as having lapsed by efflux
of time.
20A. It is, however, urged by the writ Petitioners that the stated power to
effectuate a purpose has to be exercised in a reasonable time frame. The
exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its
exercise within a reasonable time. What would be the length of reasonable
time must be then determined by the facts of the case in the context of
scheme of the Act and the nature of the power which is to be exercised to
prevent miscarriage of justice, misuse or abuse of power. Even this plea
will have to be examined by the High Court in the first place.
21. After cogitating over the matter and in the fact situation of the present
case, we are of the considered opinion that it would be appropriate to
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
P a g e | 13
relegate the parties before the High Court for reconsideration of the writ
petitions afresh including in relation to the question of constitutional
validity of Section 20 of the 1973 Act. In the remanded proceedings, it
would then be open to the writ Petitioners to amend the writ petition to
raise a new plea regarding inapplicability of Section 17 to the land in
question -- which had not been declared as slum area or slum clearance
area. That question, if answered in favour of the writ Petitioners, would go
to the root of the matter and it may then not be necessary to even examine
the question regarding the constitutional validity of Section 20 of the 1973
Act.
22. As a result, to do substantial justice to both the parties, we deem it
appropriate to relegate the parties before the learned Single Judge of the
High Court for reconsideration of the writ petitions afresh on its own merits
and in accordance with law with liberty to both parties to amend the writ
petition or file further better affidavit to defend the provisions in question
and the action of acquisition, as the case may be. The parties may do so
within six weeks from today. The matter after remand to proceed before
the learned Single Judge of the High Court in the first week of September
2022 for hearing.
[10]
Accordingly, we are of the view that the question of maintainability
of the Mat. (Declaration) Suit No.16 of 2017, as per the mandatory provisions of
Order 23 Rule 1 CPC, can be considered at this stage also even though it was
not raised before the Ld. Family Court, Manipur. The new plea goes to the very
root of the matter, i.e., maintainability of the subsequent suit.
[11]
In the case of Sarguja Transport Service v. S.T.A.T., (1987) 1 SCC
5 @ Para 9, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that withdrawal or abandonment of a
petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution without liberty to file fresh one
would bar such a fresh petition on the same subject matter. The principle
embodied in Order 23 Rule 1 CPC will be applicable on ground of public policy.
Relevant para is reproduced as below. Para 9 is reproduced below:
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
P a g e | 14
“9. The point for consideration is whether a petitioner after withdrawing a
writ petition filed by him in the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India without the permission to institute a fresh petition can
file a fresh writ petition in the High Court under that article. On this point
the decision in Daryao case1 is of no assistance. But we are of the view
that the principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code should be
extended in the interests of administration of justice to cases of withdrawal
of writ petition also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of
public policy as explained above. It would also discourage the litigant from
indulging in bench-hunting tactics. In any event there is no justifiable
reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution once
again. While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in a High Court without
permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a
suit or a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India since such
withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the remedy under Article 226
of the Constitution of India should be deemed to have been abandoned
by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ
petition when he withdraws it without such permission. In the instant case
the High Court was right in holding that a fresh writ petition was not
maintainable before it in respect of the same subject-matter since the
earlier writ petition had been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh
petition. We, however, make it clear that whatever we have stated in this
order may not be considered as being applicable to a writ petition involving
the personal liberty of an individual in which the petitioner prays for the
issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus or seeks to enforce the
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution since
such a case stands on a different footing altogether. We, however leave
this question open.”
1.
[12]
AIR 1961 SC 1457 : (1962) 1 SCR 574
In the case of KS Bhoopathy Vs. Kokila reported 2000 (5) SCC
458, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that withdrawal of a suit without permission to
file a fresh one from the Court will preclude the person from suing on the same
cause of action.
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
P a g e | 15
[13]
In the case of Upadhyay & Co. v. State of U.P. : 1999 (1) SCC 81,
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is not permissible practice to challenge the
same order over action after withdrawing the Special Leave Petition without
obtaining permission of the Court for withdrawing it with liberty to move Special
Leave Petition subsequently, relying on the principles embodied in the provisions
of Order 23 Rule 1 CPC.
[14]
From the above cited judgments, the law is clear that once a suit or
counter claim has been withdrawn without any liberty to file fresh one,
subsequent suit in the same subject matter is barred by the principles embodied
in Order 23 Rule(1) Sub-Rules (3)&(4) of the CPC. However, in the present case,
both the suit and counter claim were withdrawn without any liberty to file a fresh
suit on the same cause.
[15]
For clarity provisions of the Order 23 Rule 1 CPC are reproduced
below:
“Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim
ORDER XXIII
WITHDRAWAL AND ADJUSTMENT OF SUITS
1. Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim.— (1) At any
time after the institution of a suit, the plaintiff may as against all or any of
the defendants abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim:
Provided that where the plaintiff is a minor or other person to whom the
provisions contained in Rules 1 to 14 of Order XXXII extend, neither the
suit nor any part of the claim shall be abandoned without the leave of the
Court.
(2) An Application for leave under the proviso to sub-rule (1) shall be
accompanied by an affidavit of the next friend and also, if the minor or
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
P a g e | 16
such other person is represented by a pleader, by a certificate of the
pleader to the effect that the abandonment proposed is, in his opinion, for
the benefit of the minor or such other, person.
(3) Where the Court is satisfied,—
(a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or
(b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a
fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim,
it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to
withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a
fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the
claim.
(4) Where the plaintiff—
(a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1), or
(b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the permission
referred to in sub-rule (3),
he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be
precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subjectmatter or such part of the claim.
(5) Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to authorise the Court to permit
one of several plaintiffs to abandon a suit or part of a claim under sub-rule
(1), or to withdraw, under sub-rule (3), any suit or part of a claim, without
the consent of the other plaintiffs.”
[16]
From bare perusal of the above quoted Rules, it is seen that Rule 1
Sub-Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC provides that the Court may permit the party to
withdraw the suit with a liberty to file a similar suit afresh on the same cause.
However, Sub-Rule 4 stipulates that if the plaintiff abandons the suit or a part of
the claim or withdrawing the suit without any liberty to file fresh one under SubRule 3, he is precluded from instituting a fresh suit in respect of the same subject
matter. The same principle is applicable in case of counter claim as mandated
by provision of Rule 6-A Sub-Rule 2 CPC.
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
P a g e | 17
[17]
On perusal of the prayers made by the respondent/plaintiff in counter
claim in Mat. (Declaration) Suit. No.92 of 2013 and in the subsequent suit, ie,
Mat. (Declaration) Suit No.16 of 2017, it is crystal clear that they are similar and
with regard to declaring her has the sole daughter of (late) Soram Indubala Devi
and for declaring deed of adoption of the appellant/defendant No.1 as void. Both
the suit and the counter claim in Mat. (Declaration) Suit No.92 of 2013 were
dismissed as withdrawn as not pressed without any liberty to file fresh one.
[18]
In view of the clear provisions of law and the case laws as cited
above, we are of the view that the respondent/plaintiff is precluded from filing the
subsequent suit being Mat. (Declaration) Suit No.16 of 2017 after withdrawal of
the counter claim filed by her in Mat. (Declaration) Suit No.92 of 2013 without
any liberty to file fresh one. It may be noted that the pleas of the
respondent/plaintiff in the counter claim in Mat. (Declaration) Suit No.92 of 2013
and the subsequent suit, ie, Mat. (Declaration) Suit No.16 of 2017 are similar.
[19]
Accordingly, the present Appeal, ie, Mat. Appeal No. 2 of 2019 is
allowed in view of the clear mandate of the principles embodied in Order 23 Rule
1 Sub-Rules (3) & (4) CPC. The impugned order dated 04.04.2019 passed by
the Ld. Family Court, Manipur in Judl. Misc. Case No.24 of 2019 [Ref: Mat.
(Declaration) Suit No.16 of 2017] is set aside as the subsequent suit is barred
by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 1 Sub-Rules (3) & (4) of the CPC. Hence, the
whole proceeding of Mat. (Declaration) Suit No.16 of 2017 is closed. No cost.
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
P a g e | 18
[20]
In view of the above observations and findings, Mat. Appeal No.13
of 2018 and MC (Mat. App.) No.13 of 2018 have become infructuous and are
disposed of accordingly.
[21]
Return the case record along with copy of this order.
JUDGE
-Larson
FR/NFR
Mat.App. No.2 of 2019
With MC(Mat.App.) No.13 of 2018
With Mat.App. No.13 of 2018
JUDGE
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