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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 15.01.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 13.02.2026
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O.M.P. (COMM) 76/2017
RPG CABLES LIMITED
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Jayant Bhushan, Senior
Advocate along with Ms.
Shreya Jain, Mr. Gaurav
Tanwar, Mr. Amartya Bhushan
and
Mr.
Yujit
Mehra,
Advocates.
versus
BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD.
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Dinesh Agnani, Senior
Advocate along with Ms. Leena
Tuteja and Ms. Ishita Kadyan,
Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Petition has been filed under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 1 , assailing the Arbitral
Award dated 05.11.20082 passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator, to
the limited extent that the said Award directs the Petitioner to pay a
sum of Rs. 12.63 crores to the Respondent. In addition to challenging
the aforesaid direction, the Petitioner also seeks, by way of the present
A&C Act
Impugned Award
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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Petition, appropriate orders granting the reliefs which were originally
claimed by the Petitioner before the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
2.
By the impugned Award, the learned Arbitrator substantially
rejected the claims raised by the Petitioner and also disallowed a
significant portion of the counter-claims preferred by the Respondent.
However, while partly allowing the Respondent’s counter-claims, the
learned Arbitrator held that the Petitioner is liable to pay a sum of Rs.
12.63 crores to the Respondent towards the cost of unusable Optical
Fibre Cables 3 supplied under the contract. The learned Arbitrator
further directed that, upon receipt of the said amount, the Respondent
shall release all pending payments due to the Petitioner and its sister
concern and shall also release the Performance Bank Guarantees
furnished by the Petitioner in relation to the contract.
3.
The learned Arbitrator additionally directed the Respondent to
reimburse the Petitioner an amount of Rs. 1,37,500/- towards
arbitration fees, upon receipt of the aforesaid sum towards the cost of
unusable cables. It was further directed that each party shall bear its
own respective costs of the arbitration proceedings and that no interest
shall be payable by either party.
BRIEF FACTS:
4.
The Respondent, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited4, formerly
functioning as the Department of Telecommunications5, has been
entrusted with the responsibility of establishing, operating, and
maintaining telecommunication services across the country. In
furtherance of this mandate, and prior to the incorporation of BSNL in
OFCs
BSNL
DOT
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BHATIA
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October 2000, the DoT routinely invited tenders for the procurement
of OFCs from approved vendors. For administrative convenience,
BSNL discharges its functions through various Telecom Circles and
Regional Telecom Project and Maintenance Circles for the execution
of specialised projects and maintenance activities.
5.
In pursuance of the aforesaid procurement policy, the DoT
issued tenders dated 15.04.1998, 11.02.1999, and 13.04.1999. Based
on these tenders, five Purchase Orders were placed upon the Petitioner
between 09.10.1998 and 13.08.1999 for the supply of 12 Fibre and 24
Fibre OFCs. The total quantity ordered comprised 4,100 kilometers of
12 Fibre cables and 1,261 kilometers of 24 Fibre cables, out of which
1,824 kilometers of 12 Fibre cables and 815 kilometers of 24 Fibre
cables were supplied to the Southern Telecom Project Circle6 of the
Respondent.
6.
The OFCs were supplied to various circles of the Respondent,
including the STPC, during the period from March 1999 to May 2000,
and were thereafter commissioned for the purpose of carrying
telecommunication traffic.
7.
Approximately one and a half years after commissioning, the
Respondent observed that, in certain stretches, the OFCs supplied by
the Petitioner were exhibiting abnormally high attenuation levels,
thereby
adversely
telecommunication
affecting
traffic.
the
smooth
Consequently,
transmission
commencing
of
from
25.06.2001, the Respondent lodged complaints with the Petitioner.
Upon receipt of the said complaints, the Petitioner deputed its
technical personnel to inspect the sites and undertook detailed field
STPC
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BHATIA
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studies to ascertain the cause of the alleged defects.
8.
Based on its technical assessment, the Petitioner concluded that
the observed degradation in performance was not attributable to any
manufacturing defect in the OFCs, but was primarily the result of substandard cable laying, handling, and maintenance practices adopted by
the Respondent. It is further stated that the Petitioner specifically
identified several deficiencies, including the use of non-water-tight
joint closures, repeated damage caused by excavation activities in
close proximity to the cable routes, choking of ducts with sand and
mud, and excessive tensile stress arising from improper pulling
techniques during installation.
9.
Simultaneously,
committee
comprising
the
Respondent
officers
from
constituted
an
its
Assurance
Quality
expert
Department, under the chairmanship of a Deputy General Manager, to
independently examine the issue. The committee, inter alia, observed
that large quantities of cables from the same manufacturing batches
had not exhibited any deterioration and that unused cables stored on
spare drums continued to retain satisfactory optical and mechanical
characteristics, with attenuation values remaining within prescribed
limits. The committee further noted that the deterioration was
confined exclusively to coloured fibres, whereas the natural colour
fibres did not exhibit similar degradation, despite being laid under
identical underground conditions.
10.
In view of the continued degradation in the performance of the
OFCs, and acting upon the recommendations of the STPC, the
Respondent suspended the Petitioner’s Type Approval Certificate7
TAC
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BHATIA
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vide letter dated 14.02.2003. The suspension of the TAC effectively
debarred the Petitioner from supplying any further OFCs to the
Respondent.
The
Respondent
also
demanded
a
large-scale
replacement of the cables alleged to be defective.
11.
Thereafter, joint meetings were held between the parties, during
which the Petitioner offered to replace approximately 5,200 fibrekilometres equivalent cables in respect of those instances where the
colouring work had been outsourced to an external agency. This
proposal, however, was not accepted by the Respondent on the
grounds that the offer was limited in scope and did not extend to the
entire length of the cables alleged to be affected.
12.
Subsequently, the Respondent, vide letter dated 12.12.2003,
demanded replacement of the allegedly faulty cables. By a further
letter dated 17.12.2003, the Respondent reiterated its demand and, in
the event of non-compliance within the stipulated time, also
threatened the Petitioner with blacklisting. These communications
gave rise to the disputes between the parties.
13.
In terms of the arbitration clause contained in the contract, Mr.
J. M. Misra, former Member of the Telecom Commission, was
appointed as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the
parties.
14.
The Petitioner filed its Statement of Claims on 28.01.2005,
inter alia, seeking declarations absolving it from any liability to
replace the cables, release of the bank guarantees furnished under the
contract, injunctive relief restraining the Respondent from withholding
payments, and consequential damages.
15.
The Respondent filed its reply to the Statement of Claims on
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BHATIA
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27.07.2005 and was granted liberty to raise counter-claims. Pursuant
thereto, the Respondent filed its counter-claims, primarily seeking an
award for a sum of Rs. 60,15,67,935/- against the Petitioner, along
with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of the alleged
excess payment until realisation.
16.
The said counter-claims were duly contested by the Petitioner.
The parties thereafter exchanged rejoinders and filed further
pleadings.
17.
The learned Arbitrator framed issues encompassing, inter alia,
questions of arbitrability, compliance with contractual and technical
specifications, the causes of deterioration of the OFCs, entitlement to
damages and refunds, and the claim for interest.
18.
The parties subsequently led evidence by way of affidavits as
well as oral testimony.
19.
Upon a comprehensive consideration of the pleadings, evidence
on record, expert opinions, and the submissions advanced by both
parties, the learned Arbitrator rendered the Impugned Award dated
05.11.2008.
20.
Aggrieved by the Impugned Award, the Petitioner has preferred
the present objection petition before this Court.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER:
21.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would submit that all
complaints relating to the alleged deterioration of the OFCs were
raised only after expiry of the contractual twelve-month warranty
period stipulated under the contractual terms. It would further be
submitted that the first complaint in every case post-dated the
warranty expiry, and therefore, the Respondent had no subsisting
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BHATIA
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contractual right to seek replacement or damages, though the
Petitioner nevertheless undertook investigations purely as a matter of
goodwill and commercial prudence.
22.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would further submit
that upon receipt of the complaints, the Petitioner promptly deputed its
technical experts who conducted inspections and tests in the presence
of the Respondent’s officials, and these investigations conclusively
established that the deterioration was solely attributable to external
and installation-related factors, such as repeated third-party digging,
broken and choked ducts, entangled roots, non-water-tight joints, and
excessive tensile stress during laying, and not to any defect in
material, workmanship, or design on the part of the Petitioner.
23.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would further submit
that the recovered cable samples, when tested in the Respondent’s
own Quality Assurance laboratory, were found to be compliant with
specifications, that heating treatment restored original attenuation
values, and that unused intact drums from the same manufacturing lot
were fully compliant, while only selective laid stretches showed
deterioration, thus negating any inference of inherent manufacturing
defect.
24.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would contend that
even the Respondent’s own expert committee supported this
conclusion, having recorded that joint closures were not water-proof
due to installation deficiencies leading to water ingress, that unused
and spare cables showed no deterioration in optical or mechanical
properties, that large quantities from the same batch remained
unaffected, and that degraded cables substantially recovered upon
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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heating, with moisture playing a definite role in deterioration.
25.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the
Respondent’s allegation attributing deterioration to fibre colouring is
wholly baseless and founded on conjectures, since unused cables of
the same colour did not deteriorate and even recovered and re-laid
treated cable stretches continued to perform satisfactorily.
26.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would further submit
that similar complaints had earlier arisen in respect of cables supplied
by
other
manufacturers
such
as
Sterlite
Ltd.
and
Optel
Communications Ltd., where the Respondent’s own Telecom
Engineering Centre attributed degradation to water penetration caused
by improper splice closures during installation and issued specific
recommendations for water-tight jointing, yet these reports, though
placed before the learned Arbitrator, were completely ignored.
27.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the
Respondent adopted coercive and arbitrary measures by suspending
the Petitioner’s TAC on 14.02.2003 despite the absence of any fault,
illegally demanding large-scale replacement long after expiry of
warranty, insisting on renewal of expired Performance Bank
Guarantees, threatening blacklisting, and withholding payments even
under unrelated contracts, including those of the Petitioner’s sister
concern.
28.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the
Petitioner’s offer to replace approximately 5200 fibre-kilometres of
cables was merely a commercial gesture made to preserve customer
relations and did not constitute any admission of defect or liability, yet
the
Respondent
misconstrued
this
goodwill
gesture
as
an
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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acknowledgment of fault and proceeded to demand replacement of
quantities far in excess thereof.
29.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the
Impugned Award is contrary to the contract and the evidence on
record, inasmuch as the learned Arbitrator ignored the warranty clause
limiting liability to twelve months and erroneously imposed liability
extending to the entire alleged working life of about twenty years,
despite the Respondent’s own admission that no prescribed test exists
to verify a twenty-year life and that only statistical mechanical life
calculations were possible, with no assurance as to optical life.
30.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would further submit
that the learned Arbitrator overlooked the tender and Purchase Order
terms which nowhere contemplated a warranty co-extensive with the
product’s life span, ignored the fact that the Petitioner’s bid costing
was based strictly on the limited warranty requirement, and failed to
appreciate that warranty liability could arise only upon proof of
defects in material, design, or workmanship, none of which were
established.
31.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the
learned Arbitrator ignored crucial expert evidence and admissions,
including the Respondent’s own witness admitting water seepage into
joint closures. It would further be submitted that the Award suffers
from inherent contradictions, as the learned Arbitrator acknowledged
the absence of any definite technical cause while nevertheless
attributing deterioration to colouring material and hydrogen
generation without scientific or evidentiary basis.
32.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would further submit
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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that the award of damages is arbitrary and unsustainable, having been
granted without proof of actual loss, affected quantities, or causation,
suffering from inconsistencies in quantum, and further ignoring the
Petitioner’s claim for substantial business losses arising from
wrongful suspension of the TAC, which severely affected its financial
standing.
33.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would advance an
alternative contention and submit that even if the deficiencies in the
OFCs are assumed to have occurred due to the fault of the Petitioner,
the Respondent cannot be completely exonerated from liability. It
would further be contended that since various processes were carried
out from inception till completion under the supervision of the
Respondent, the present case would amount to one of contributory
negligence, and therefore, the Petitioner alone cannot be held liable. In
support of this contention, reliance would be placed upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Municipal Corpn.,
Greater Bombay v. Laxman Iyer8.
34.
Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner would lastly submit
that on a cumulative consideration of the above, the Impugned Award
suffers from patent illegality, perversity, non-application of mind, and
violation of the express terms of the contract and settled principles of
law, and is, therefore, liable to be set aside.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT-BSNL:
35.
Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would submit that
this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the A&C
Act, does not sit as a court of appeal and would not be empowered to
(2003) 8 SCC 731
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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reappreciate evidence or interfere with findings of fact recorded by the
learned Arbitrator, and therefore, since the Impugned Award is a wellreasoned, detailed, and speaking award passed after due consideration
of the pleadings, evidence, and submissions of the parties, the present
petition would be liable to be dismissed.
36.
The learned senior counsel for the Respondent would further
submit that, inasmuch as the Petitioner has failed to establish the
existence of any illegality, perversity, patent error, or violation of the
public policy of India in the Impugned Award, no ground whatsoever
is made out for interference by this Court in exercise of its limited
jurisdiction under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
37.
Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would submit that it
is an admitted position on record that the Petitioner represented the
life of the OFCs as 32.8 years while the tender prescribed a minimum
service life of 20 years, and accordingly, the learned Arbitrator has
rightly relied upon this representation in determining liability,
particularly when the cables failed much before the assured life
period, and further, the Petitioner’s own witness has admitted during
cross-examination the willingness to replace the faulty cables, which
admission clearly supports the findings recorded in the Impugned
Award.
38.
Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would submit that
the Petitioner admittedly engaged a third-party agency for colouring
of fibres and that deterioration was confined only to coloured fibres,
and moreover, joint investigations conducted after recovery of a twokilometre stretch has revealed that the coloured fibres were faulty and
that the cables supplied by the Petitioner alone underwent mechanical
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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reaction with moisture, whereas cables of other manufacturers
installed under identical conditions did not degrade, and these findings
have been duly noted, analyzed, and appreciated by the learned
Arbitrator.
39.
Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would submit that
the Petitioner never denied attenuation in the supplied cables and, on
the contrary, admitted that only coloured fibres were affected, and
further it is also be an admitted fact that the Petitioner offered to
replace approximately 5200 fibre-kilometres of cable where colouring
was carried out through an external agency, which conduct on the part
of the Petitioner further supports and corroborates the findings
recorded in the Impugned Award.
40.
Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would submit that
the Production Qualification Test and the Bulk Production Certificate
are issued only for Type Approved products and that, during such
testing, the Quality Assurance authorities verify the use of approved
raw materials, including FRP rods, PBT for loose tubes, tube-filling
compound ITC-0-210, and sheath material HD-800.
41.
It would further be submitted that in compliance with Clause
1.3.2 of the Generic Requirements No. G/QFC-01/02.APR94
issued by the DOT, Telecommunication Engineering Centre9, the
Petitioner submitted life calculations and expressly assured a service
life of 32.8 years at the time of issuance of the Bulk Production
Certificate, which assurance consequently became a binding
contractual commitment.
42.
Learned senior counsel for the Respondent would also submit
DOT’s Generic Requirements
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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that the learned Arbitrator has passed a reasoned and speaking Award
after considering all technical aspects, the tender conditions, the
Purchase Orders, the documentary and oral evidence, and the
admissions of the Petitioner, and that the said Award therefore calls
for no interference by this Court.
ANALYSIS:
43.
This Court has heard the learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the parties at length and, with their able assistance, has
carefully perused the paperbook and other material documents placed
on record, including the record of the Arbitral Tribunal, as well as the
written submissions filed by the respective parties.
44.
At the outset, it is apposite to note that this Court is conscious
of the limited scope of its jurisdiction while examining an objection
petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act. The contours of judicial
intervention in such proceedings have been authoritatively delineated
and settled by a consistent and evolving line of precedents of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
45.
In this regard, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, after an exhaustive consideration of a catena of earlier
decisions, in OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power
Cooling Solutions (India) (P) Ltd.10, while dealing with the grounds
of conflict with the public policy of India and perversity, grounds
which have also been urged in the present case, made certain pertinent
observations, which are reproduced hereunder:
“Relevant legal principles governing a challenge to an arbitral
award
(2025) 2 SCC 417
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BHATIA
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30. Before we delve into the issue/sub-issues culled out above, it
would be useful to have a look at the relevant legal principles
governing a challenge to an arbitral award. Recourse to a court
against an arbitral award may be made through an application for
setting aside such award in accordance with sub-sections (2), (2-A)
and (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section
34 has two clauses, (a) and (b). Clause (a) has five sub-clauses
which are not relevant to the issues raised before us. Insofar as
clause (b) is concerned, it has two sub-clauses, namely, (i) and (ii).
Sub-clause (i) of clause (b) is not relevant to the controversy in
hand. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) provides that if the Court finds
that the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India,
it may set aside the award.
Public policy
31. “Public policy” is a concept not statutorily defined, though it
has been used in statutes, rules, notification, etc. since long, and is
also a part of common law. Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872
uses the expression by stating that the consideration or object of an
agreement is lawful, unless, inter alia, opposed to public policy.
That is, a contract which is opposed to public policy is void.
*****
35. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994
Supp (1) SCC 644, a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed
that the doctrine of public policy is somewhat open—textured and
flexible. By citing earlier decisions, it was observed that there are
two conflicting positions which are referred to as the “narrow
view” and the “broad view”. According to the narrow view, courts
cannot create new heads of public policy whereas the broad view
countenances judicial law making in these areas. In the field of
private international law, it was pointed out, courts refuse to apply
a rule of foreign law or recognise a foreign judgment or a foreign
arbitral award if it is found that the same is contrary to the public
policy of the country in which it is sought to be invoked or
enforced. However, it was clarified, a distinction is to be drawn
while applying the rule of public policy between a matter governed
by domestic law and a matter involving conflict of laws. It was
observed that the application of the doctrine of public policy in the
field of conflict of laws is more limited than that in the domestic
law and the courts are slower to invoke public policy in cases
involving a foreign element than when a purely municipal legal
issue is involved. It was held that contravention of law alone will
not attract the bar of public policy, and something more than
contravention of law is required.
*****
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
16:46:30
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37. What is clear from above is that for an award to be against
public policy of India a mere infraction of the municipal laws of
India is not enough. There must be, inter alia, infraction of
fundamental policy of Indian law including a law meant to serve
public interest or public good.
*****
40. In ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9
SCC 263, paras 35, 38 & 39, which also related to the period prior
to the 2015 Amendment of Section 34(2)(b)(ii), a three-Judge
Bench of this Court, after considering the decision in ONGC
Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, without exhaustively
enumerating the purport of the expression “fundamental policy of
Indian law”, observed that it would include all such fundamental
principles as providing a basis for administration of justice and
enforcement of law in this country. The Court thereafter
illustratively referred to three fundamental juristic principles,
namely:
(a) that in every determination that affects the rights of a citizen or
leads to any civil consequences, the court or authority or quasijudicial body must adopt a judicial approach, that is, it must act
bona fide and deal with the subject in a fair, reasonable and
objective manner and not actuated by any extraneous
consideration;
(b) that while determining the rights and obligations of parties the
court or Tribunal or authority must act in accordance with the
principles of natural justice and must apply its mind to the
attendant facts and circumstances while taking a view one way
or the other; and
(c) that its decision must not be perverse or so irrational that no
reasonable person would have arrived at the same.
41. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, a two-Judge
Bench of this Court, held that audi alteram partem principle is
undoubtedly a fundamental juristic principle in Indian law and is
enshrined in Sections 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of the 1996 Act. In
addition to the earlier recognised principles forming fundamental
policy of Indian law, it was held that disregarding:
(a) orders of superior courts in India; and
(b) the binding effect of the judgment of a superior court would
also be regarded as being contrary to the fundamental policy of
Indian law.
Further, elaborating upon the third juristic principle (i.e. qua
perversity), as laid down in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco
International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263, it was observed that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to
the decision which it arrives at; or
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such decision
would necessarily be perverse[Associate Builders case, (2015)
3 SCC 49, para 31].
To this a caveat was added by observing that when a court applies
the “public policy test” to an arbitration award, it does not act as a
court of appeal and, consequently, errors of fact cannot be
corrected; and a possible view by the arbitrator on facts has
necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of
the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he
delivers his arbitral award. It was also observed that an award
based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up
in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on
that score. Thus, once it is found that the arbitrator's approach is
not arbitrary or capricious, it is to be taken as the last word on
facts.
The 2015 Amendment in Sections 34 and 48
42. The aforementioned judicial pronouncements were all prior to
the 2015 Amendment. Notably, prior to the 2015 Amendment the
expression “in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law” was not used by the legislature in either Section 34(2)(b)(ii)
or Section 48(2)(b). The pre-amended Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and its
Explanation read:
*****
44. By the 2015 Amendment, in place of the old Explanation to
Section 34(2)(b)(ii), Explanations 1 and 2 were added to remove
any doubt as to when an arbitral award is in conflict with the public
policy of India.
45. At this stage, it would be pertinent to note that we are dealing
with a case where the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act
was filed after the 2015 Amendment, therefore the newly
substituted/added Explanations would apply [Ssangyong Engg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
46. The 2015 Amendment adds two Explanations to each of the
two sections, namely, Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Section 48(2)(b), in
place of the earlier Explanation. The significance of the newly
inserted Explanation 1 in both the sections is two-fold. First, it
does away with the use of words : (a) “without prejudice to the
generality of sub-clause (ii)” in the opening part of the preamended Explanation to Section 34(2)(b)(ii); and (b) “without
prejudice to the generality of clause (b) of this section” in the
opening part of the pre-amended Explanation to Section 48(2)(b);
secondly, it limits the expanse of public policy of India to the three
specified categories by using the words “only if”.
Whereas, Explanation 2 lays down the standard for adjudging
whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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Indian law by providing that a review on merits of the dispute shall
not be done. This limits the scope of the enquiry on an application
under either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996
Act.
47. The 2015 Amendment by inserting sub-section (2-A) in Section
34, carves out an additional ground for annulment of an arbitral
award arising out of arbitrations other than international
commercial arbitrations. Sub-section (2-A) provides that the Court
may also set aside an award if that is vitiated by patent illegality
appearing on the face of the award. This power of the Court is,
however, circumscribed by the proviso, which states that an award
shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous
application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.
48.Explanation 1 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii), specifies that an arbitral
award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if:
(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or
corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law;
or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or
justice.
49. In the instant case, there is no allegation that the making of the
award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or was in
violation of Section 75 or Section 81. Therefore, we shall confine
our exercise in assessing as to whether the arbitral award is in
contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law, and/or
whether it conflicts with the most basic notions of morality or
justice. Additionally, in the light of the provisions of sub-section
(2-A) of Section 34, we shall examine whether there is any patent
illegality on the face of the award.
50. Before undertaking the aforesaid exercise, it would be apposite
to consider as to how the expressions:
(a) “in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law”;
(b) “in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice”;
and
(c) “patent illegality” have been construed.
In contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law
51. As discussed above, till the 2015 Amendment the expression
“in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law” was
not found in the 1996 Act. Yet, in Renusagar Power Co.
Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644, in the
context of enforcement of a foreign award, while construing the
phrase “contrary to the public policy”, this Court held that for a
foreign award to be contrary to public policy mere contravention of
law would not be enough rather it should be contrary to:
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(a) the fundamental policy of Indian law; and/or
(b) the interest of India; and/or
(c) justice or morality.
*****
55. The legal position which emerges from the aforesaid discussion
is that after “the 2015 Amendments” in Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and
Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996 Act, the phrase “in conflict with the
public policy of India” must be accorded a restricted meaning in
terms of Explanation 1. The expression “in contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law” by use of the word
“fundamental” before the phrase “policy of Indian law” makes the
expression narrower in its application than the phrase “in
contravention with the policy of Indian law”, which means mere
contravention of law is not enough to make an award vulnerable.
To bring the contravention within the fold of fundamental policy of
Indian law, the award must contravene all or any of such
fundamental principles that provide a basis for administration of
justice and enforcement of law in this country.
56. Without intending to exhaustively enumerate instances of such
contravention, by way of illustration, it could be said that:
(a) violation of the principles of natural justice;
(b) disregarding orders of superior courts in India or the binding
effect of the judgment of a superior court; and
(c) violating law of India linked to public good or public interest,
are considered contravention of the fundamental policy of
Indian law.
However, while assessing whether there has been a contravention
of the fundamental policy of Indian law, the extent of judicial
scrutiny must not exceed the limit as set out in Explanation 2 to
Section 34(2)(b)(ii).
*****
Patent illegality
65. Sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, which was
inserted by the 2015 Amendment, provides that an arbitral award
not arising out of international commercial arbitrations, may also
be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is visited
by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. The proviso
to sub-section (2-A) states that an award shall not be set aside
merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by
reappreciation of evidence.
66. In ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, while
dealing with the phrase “public policy of India” as used in Section
34, this Court took the view that the concept of public policy
connotes some matter which concerns public good and public
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interest. If the award, on the face of it, patently violates statutory
provisions, it cannot be said to be in public interest. Thus, an award
could also be set aside if it is patently illegal. It was, however,
clarified that illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the
illegality is of trivial nature, it cannot be held that award is against
public policy.
67. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, this Court
held that an award would be patently illegal, if it is contrary to:
(a) substantive provisions of law of India;
(b) provisions of the 1996 Act; and
(c) terms of the contract [See also three-Judge Bench decision of
this Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. SAL Udyog (P) Ltd.,
(2022) 2 SCC 275].
The Court clarified that if an award is contrary to the substantive
provisions of law of India, in effect, it is in contravention of
Section 28(1)(a) of the 1996 Act. Similarly, violating terms of the
contract, in effect, is in contravention of Section 28(3) of the 1996
Act.
68. In Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131 this Court specifically dealt with the 2015
Amendment which inserted sub-section (2-A) in Section 34 of the
1996 Act. It was held that “patent illegality appearing on the face
of the award” refers to such illegality as goes to the root of matter,
but which does not amount to mere erroneous application of law. It
was also clarified that what is not subsumed within “the
fundamental policy of Indian law”, namely, the contravention of a
statute not linked to “public policy” or “public interest”, cannot be
brought in by the backdoor when it comes to setting aside an award
on the ground of patent illegality [ See Ssangyong Engg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131]. Further, it
was observed, reappreciation of evidence is not permissible under
this category of challenge to an arbitral award [See Ssangyong
Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
Perversity as a ground of challenge
69. Perversity as a ground for setting aside an arbitral award was
recognised in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd.,
(2014) 9 SCC 263. Therein it was observed that an arbitral
decision must not be perverse or so irrational that no reasonable
person would have arrived at the same. It was observed that if an
award is perverse, it would be against the public policy of India.
70. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 certain tests
were laid down to determine whether a decision of an Arbitral
Tribunal could be considered perverse. In this context, it was
observed that where:
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(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to
the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such decision
would necessarily be perverse.
However, by way of a note of caution, it was observed that when a
court applies these tests it does not act as a court of appeal and,
consequently, errors of fact cannot be corrected. Though, a
possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass
muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and
quality of evidence to be relied upon. It was also observed that an
award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not
measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to
be invalid on that score.
71. In Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131, which dealt with the legal position post the 2015
Amendment in Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it was observed that a
decision which is perverse, while no longer being a ground for
challenge under “public policy of India”, would certainly amount
to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. It was
pointed out that an award based on no evidence, or which ignores
vital evidence, would be perverse and thus patently illegal. It was
also observed that a finding based on documents taken behind the
back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a
decision based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not
based on evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also
have to be characterised as perverse [ See Ssangyong Engg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
72. The tests laid down in Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3
SCC 49 to determine perversity were followed in Ssangyong
Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131 and
later approved by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Patel Engg.
Ltd. v. North Eastern Electric Power Corpn. Ltd., (2020) 7 SCC
167.
73. In a recent three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in DMRC
Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd., (2024) 6 SCC 357,
the ground of patent illegality/perversity was delineated in the
following terms: (SCC p. 376, para 39)
“39. In essence, the ground of patent illegality is available
for setting aside a domestic award, if the decision of the
arbitrator is found to be perverse, or so irrational that no
reasonable person would have arrived at it; or the
construction of the contract is such that no fair or
reasonable person would take; or, that the view of the
arbitrator is not even a possible view. A finding based on
no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital
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evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and
liable to be set aside under the head of “patent illegality”.
An award without reasons would suffer from patent
illegality. The arbitrator commits a patent illegality by
deciding a matter not within its jurisdiction or violating a
fundamental principle of natural justice.”
Scope of interference with an arbitral award
74. The aforesaid judicial precedents make it clear that while
exercising power under Section 34 of the 1996 Act the Court does
not sit in appeal over the arbitral award. Interference with an
arbitral award is only on limited grounds as set out in Section 34 of
the 1996 Act. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts is to be
respected as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and
quality of evidence to be relied upon. It is only when an arbitral
award could be categorised as perverse, that on an error of fact an
arbitral award may be set aside. Further, a mere erroneous
application of the law or wrong appreciation of evidence by itself
is not a ground to set aside an award as is clear from the provisions
of sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
75. In Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd.,
(2019) 20 SCC 1, paras 27-43, a three-Judge Bench of this Court
held that courts need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards
are not to be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless
the court concludes that the perversity of the award goes to the root
of the matter and there is no possibility of an alternative
interpretation that may sustain the arbitral award. It was observed
that jurisdiction under Section 34 cannot be equated with the
normal appellate jurisdiction. Rather, the approach ought to be to
respect the finality of the arbitral award as well as party's
autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum
as provided under the law.
*****
Scope of interference with the interpretation/construction of a
contract accorded in an arbitral award
84. An Arbitral Tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms
of the contract. In a case where an Arbitral Tribunal passes an
award against the terms of the contract, the award would be
patently illegal. However, an Arbitral Tribunal has jurisdiction to
interpret a contract having regard to terms and conditions of the
contract, conduct of the parties including correspondences
exchanged, circumstances of the case and pleadings of the parties.
If the conclusion of the arbitrator is based on a possible view of the
matter, the Court should not intefere [See: SAIL v. Gupta Brother
Steel Tubes Ltd., (2009) 10 SCC 63; Pure Helium India (P)
Ltd. v. ONGC, (2003) 8 SCC 593; McDermott International
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Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181; MMTC
Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163]. But where, on a full
reading of the contract, the view of the Arbitral Tribunal on the
terms of a contract is not a possible view, the award would be
considered perverse and as such amenable to interference [South
East Asia Marine Engg. & Constructions Ltd. v. Oil India Ltd.,
(2020) 5 SCC 164].
Whether unexpressed term can be read into a contract as an
implied condition
85. Ordinarily, terms of the contract are to be understood in the
way the parties wanted and intended them to be. In agreements of
arbitration, where party autonomy is the grund norm, how the
parties worked out the agreement, is one of the indicators to
decipher the intention, apart from the plain or grammatical
meaning of the expressions used [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2016) 4 SCC 126].
86. However, reading an unexpressed term in an agreement would
be justified on the basis that such a term was always and obviously
intended by the parties thereto. An unexpressed term can be
implied if, and only if, the court finds that the parties must have
intended that term to form part of their contract. It is not enough
for the court to find that such a term would have been adopted by
the parties as reasonable men if it had been suggested to them.
Rather, it must have been a term that went without saying, a term
necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, a term which,
although tacit, forms part of the contract [Adani Power (Mundra)
Ltd. v. Gujarat ERC, (2019) 19 SCC 9].
87. But before an implied condition, not expressly found in the
contract, is read into a contract, by invoking the business efficacy
doctrine, it must satisfy the following five conditions:
(a) it must be reasonable and equitable;
(b) it must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract,
that is, a term will not be implied if the contract is effective
without it;
(c) it must be obvious that “it goes without saying”;
(d) it must be capable of clear expression;
(e) it must not contradict any terms of the contract [Nabha Power
Ltd. v. Punjab SPCL, (2018) 11 SCC 508, followed in Adani
Power case, (2019) 19 SCC 9].
(emphasis supplied)
46.
A careful perusal of the Impugned Award demonstrates that the
learned Arbitrator has duly considered all relevant material, facts, and
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circumstances while adjudicating upon the claims and counter-claims
raised by the parties. Upon such examination, the learned Arbitrator
arrived at, inter alia, the following conclusions, which, though not
exhaustive, reflect the core findings underpinning the Award:
(a) The OFCs supplied by the Petitioner were manufactured under
the continuous supervision of the Respondent-BSNL’s Quality
Assurance personnel.
(b) All cables conformed to the mandatory TEC-GR specifications
and
successfully
passed
the
prescribed
quality
and
performance tests prior to dispatch.
(c) At the time of supply, the attenuation levels of the cables were
well within the prescribed limits.
(d) Complaints relating to increased attenuation arose only after
the cables had been installed and commissioned for field use.
(e) Reports of deterioration were predominantly received from the
STPC, whereas unused cables lying on drums did not exhibit
any defects.
(f)
While the Petitioner attributed the deterioration to improper
laying practices and moisture ingress, the learned Arbitrator
rejected this explanation on the ground that cables supplied by
other manufacturers, laid along the same routes and under
identical conditions, did not suffer similar deterioration, and
further because complaints were reported from multiple
regions across the country, thereby negating the theory of
defective installation or external environmental factors as the
cause of selective failure.
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(g) It was found that only coloured fibres exhibited deterioration,
whereas natural-coloured fibres remained unaffected, which
strongly suggested that the root cause lay in the colouring
material used during manufacture.
(h) The evidence further revealed that the Petitioner had
outsourced the colouring process for certain consignments and
had, at an earlier stage, even offered to replace a portion of the
affected cables, thereby reflecting apprehensions regarding the
quality of the colouring agents employed.
(i)
It was also noted that there were no specific technical
specifications governing the composition or performance of
the colouring compounds.
(j)
On the basis of expert evidence and technical material, the
learned Arbitrator concluded that the deterioration occurred
due to defective colouring material, which underwent chemical
degradation over time, resulting in increased attenuation
levels.
(k) Consequently, the fault was held to be attributable to
deficiencies in the Petitioner’s manufacturing process rather
than to any lapse in handling or maintenance by the
Respondent.
(l)
Although the Petitioner contended that its liability stood
extinguished upon expiry of the 12-month warranty period, the
learned Arbitrator held that the tender conditions mandated a
minimum service life of 20 years for the OFCs and that such
assurance constituted a substantive contractual obligation.
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(m) It was accordingly held that the expiry of the warranty period
did not absolve the Petitioner of its responsibility for the
defective cables.
(n) While the Respondent had sought refund in respect of cables
supplied across India, the learned Arbitrator restricted the
Respondent’s entitlement only to those cables that were
proven to have deteriorated within the STPC.
(o) Replacement or refund was thus allowed by the learned
Arbitrator strictly in respect of the proven defective quantity
and not for the entire supply.
(p) The Respondent’s claims towards trenching, pipe laying,
pulling charges, and other consequential expenses were
rejected on the ground that such costs were not contemplated
under the contract and no contractual provision entitled the
Respondent to recover the same from the supplier.
(q) The Petitioner’s claim for damages on account of alleged loss
of business arising from suspension of the TAC was also
rejected, with the learned Arbitrator holding that both parties
had suffered business losses and that no compensation was
payable to either side on this account.
(r)
The Respondent’s claims for interest and consequential loss of
revenue were similarly disallowed; it being held that recovery
was limited strictly to the value of the defective cables and that
no
additional
damages
were
contractually or
legally
sustainable.
(s) The Petitioner was held liable only to refund the value of the
unusable cables, and the Respondent was accordingly directed
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to release all pending payments and the Performance Bank
Guarantees upon receipt of the said amount.
(t)
Finally, each party was directed to bear its own costs of the
arbitral proceedings, and no interest was awarded to either
party.
47.
This Court now proceeds to examine the aforesaid findings
returned by the learned Arbitrator on the anvil of the limited and
circumscribed jurisdiction available under Section 34 of the A&C Act,
and in the light of the principles authoritatively laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in OPG Power Generation (supra).
48.
Upon a careful consideration of the findings recorded in the
Impugned Award, as well as the rival submissions advanced by the
learned counsel appearing for the parties, this Court is of the
considered view that no infirmity can be discerned in the approach
adopted by the learned Arbitrator. Having due regard to the narrow
scope of judicial interference permissible under Section 34 of the
A&C Act, this Court finds no reason to depart from, or interfere with,
the conclusions arrived at by the learned Arbitrator and accordingly
concurs with the same.
49.
A perusal of the present petition and arguments made by the
learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner makes it
abundantly clear that the Petitioner is, in effect, seeking a reappreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence led by the parties
before the learned Arbitrator and is further inviting this Court to
substitute its own interpretation of the contractual terms governing the
parties. Such an exercise is wholly impermissible in proceedings
under Section 34 of the A&C Act, which does not confer appellate
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jurisdiction upon this Court.
50.
One of the principal contentions advanced on behalf of the
Petitioner is that no liability could have been fastened upon it beyond
the warranty period stipulated under Clause 10.1 of the General
(Commercial) Conditions of the Contract11, which provided for a
warranty period of twelve months.
51.
However, it is an undisputed and admitted position that the
DOT’s Generic Requirements specifically mandated, under Clause
1.3.2, that the minimum life of the cable shall be at least twenty years.
The relevant clause reads as follows:
“1.3.2 Life of cable shall be at least 20 years. Necessary statistical
calculations may be submitted by the manufacturer.”
52.
It is also a matter of record that, pursuant to the aforesaid
clause, the Petitioner itself furnished an assurance, by way of a
certificate submitted to the Respondent authorities, stating that the life
of the OFCs supplied by it was 32.8 years.
53.
The learned Arbitrator, in paragraphs 11.6 and 14 of the
Impugned Award, has undertaken a detailed and careful examination
of the relevant contractual stipulations, the applicable tender
conditions, and the specific representations made by the Petitioner. In
addition thereto, the learned Arbitrator has also placed limited and
cautious reliance on the oral testimony of Mr. P.D. Kulkarni, the Unit
Head of the Petitioner, to the extent that such testimony corroborated
the documentary and contractual material already on record.
54.
Upon a holistic and comprehensive appreciation of the aforesaid
documentary and oral evidence, the learned Arbitrator arrived at the
GCCC
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conclusion that, notwithstanding the Petitioner’s contention that its
liability stood extinguished upon the expiry of the twelve-month
warranty period, the DOT’s Generic Requirements, which is inherent
part of the tender conditions, clearly and unequivocally mandated a
minimum service life of twenty years for the OFCs. The learned
Arbitrator further held that the assurance furnished by the Petitioner in
this regard was not merely incidental but constituted a substantive,
enforceable, and binding contractual obligation, which continued to
operate independent of, and beyond, the stipulated warranty period.
55.
In the considered opinion of this Court, it was, therefore, rightly
held that the mere expiry of the warranty period could not absolve the
Petitioner of its responsibility in respect of the defective cables,
particularly when the failure occurred much prior to the assured life
period. The Petitioner’s reliance solely on Clause 10.1 of the GCCC
relating to warranty cannot be accepted in isolation. Acceptance of
such a contention would run directly contrary to Clause 1.3.2 of the
DOT’s Generic Requirements, as well as the Petitioner’s own
representation and the admissions made by its witness. In the
considered view of this Court, the interpretation adopted by the
learned Arbitrator reflects a harmonious construction of the various
terms and conditions set out in the Agreement and clearly falls within
the realm of a plausible view that may reasonably be ascribed to the
contractual provisions.
56.
The learned Arbitrator, after considering all the material on
record, including both documentary evidence and oral testimony, has
adopted a view which is not only a possible view but also a plausible
and reasonable one. Such a view cannot, by any stretch of
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imagination, be characterized as perverse so as to warrant interference
under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
57.
It is not the Petitioner’s case that it was denied a reasonable
opportunity to present its case before the learned Arbitrator. Nor has it
been contended that the findings recorded are based on no evidence,
or that the learned Arbitrator has taken into account irrelevant
material, or ignored vital evidence on record. In the absence of any
such grounds, the decision rendered by the learned Arbitrator on the
issue of the Petitioner’s liability beyond the warranty period cannot be
said to be vitiated by perversity.
58.
Considering all the aforesaid aspects cumulatively, this Court is
satisfied that the findings recorded in the Impugned Award are neither
arbitrary nor perverse. This Court accordingly affirms that the learned
Arbitrator was fully justified in relying upon the representation made
by the Petitioner while determining its liability, particularly when the
cables failed well before the assured life period.
59.
The Court now turns to the other principal issue raised by the
learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner, namely, the
vehement denial of any deterioration in the OFCs attributable to any
fault on the part of the Petitioner.
60.
The learned Arbitrator has examined this issue in considerable
depth and detail in paragraphs 11.3 to 11.5, 12.2, 12.3, and 13 of the
Impugned Award, and has returned a clear and categorical finding that
the Petitioner cannot be exonerated of responsibility for the
deterioration observed in the OFCs. In arriving at this conclusion, the
learned Arbitrator undertook a comprehensive evaluation of multiple
interrelated factors, including the sources from which the OFCs and
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their constituent components were procured, the diverse geographical
locations where the cables were installed, and the nature and extent of
the offer made by the Petitioner to replace a limited portion of the
affected OFCs.
61.
The learned Arbitrator further took note of the inherent
inconsistencies
and
contradictions
in
the
Petitioner’s
stand,
particularly its assertion that the OFCs had successfully passed the
prescribed water penetration tests, while simultaneously contending
that deterioration had nonetheless occurred due to environmental
factors. Due weight was also accorded to the fact that the OFCs were
installed in coastal and saline environments, a condition expressly
contemplated and addressed under Clause 1.1.2 of the DOT’s Generic
Requirements, which reads as follows:
“1.1.2 The optical fibre cable shall be able to work in a saline
atmosphere in coastal areas and should be protected against
corrosion.”
62.
The learned Arbitrator also recorded that no similar complaints
were received in respect of other ongoing projects along the same
routes where cables supplied by different manufacturers were laid
under identical environmental and installation conditions. It was
further observed that attenuation losses were predominantly reported
in coloured fibres, whereas natural-coloured fibres remained largely
unaffected, a distinction of considerable technical relevance.
63.
Upon examining the rival explanations and the evidentiary
material placed on record, the learned Arbitrator specifically rejected
the Petitioner’s contention that the deterioration was attributable to
improper laying practices or moisture ingress. It was reasoned that if
such factors were indeed the root cause, cables supplied by other
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manufacturers, laid along the same routes and subjected to the same
environmental and installation conditions, would have exhibited
similar deterioration, which was demonstrably not the case.
64.
In addition, complaints regarding deterioration were reported
from multiple regions across the country in respect of cables supplied
by the Petitioner. This geographical spread effectively ruled out the
possibility of isolated installation defects or localised environmental
conditions being the cause of selective failure. The fact that
deterioration was confined almost exclusively to coloured fibres,
while natural-coloured fibres remained unaffected, strongly indicated
that the root cause lay in the colouring material employed during the
manufacturing process.
65.
The learned Arbitrator also took cognizance of the evidence
demonstrating that the Petitioner had outsourced the colouring process
for certain consignments and had offered to replace a portion of the
defective cables. This conduct, viewed in the context of the technical
evidence, reflected the Petitioner’s own apprehensions regarding the
quality, stability, and long-term performance of the colouring agents
used.
66.
On the basis of evidence, technical reports, and the material
placed on record, the learned Arbitrator concluded that the
deterioration was attributable to defective colouring material, which
underwent chemical degradation over time, resulting in increased
attenuation levels. Consequently, the fault was held to arise from
deficiencies in the Petitioner’s manufacturing process, rather than
from any lapse in installation, handling, or maintenance on the part of
the Respondent.
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67.
This Court finds no infirmity in the findings returned by the
learned Arbitrator, particularly in relation to the technical aspects
governing the deterioration of the OFCs. While the learned Arbitrator
correctly observed that the technical reports and materials produced
by the parties did not furnish absolute or mathematically conclusive
proof establishing, beyond all conceivable doubt, that the deterioration
was exclusively attributable to defective colouring material, the
standard of proof in arbitral proceedings, especially in matters
involving complex technical causation, does not demand such
unattainable certainty.
68.
Acting well within his domain as the final arbiter of facts, the
learned Arbitrator undertook a comparative, critical, and reasoned
evaluation of the competing technical reports and expert opinions, and
thereafter arrived at a scientifically plausible conclusion that the most
probable cause of deterioration was chemical degradation of the
colouring material, progressively resulting in increased attenuation.
Such a conclusion, rooted in established principles of material science
and fibre-optic performance, cannot be characterised as speculative or
conjectural.
69.
Significantly, the learned Arbitrator also took into account the
inherent
design
parameters
and
operational
environment
of
underground OFCs. Cables intended for underground deployment are,
by their very nature, engineered to withstand predictable and routine
exposure to moisture, and the applicable manufacturing and
performance standards expressly factor in such conditions. The DOT’s
Generic Requirements mandate that the cables must successfully pass
stringent water ingress and water penetration tests prior to acceptance,
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thereby recognising that interaction with moisture is a normal and
anticipated operating condition rather than an abnormal event. Once
such compliance is established, any technical explanation attributing
attenuation solely to moisture ingress must necessarily demonstrate
the existence of extraordinary, abnormal, or unforeseen conditions
exceeding the design tolerance of the cable.
70.
This Court is of the view that the Petitioner failed to discharge
this technical burden. No credible evidence was adduced to establish
that the moisture exposure in the present case was excessive, atypical,
or beyond the environmental parameters contemplated under the
applicable standards. In the absence of such proof, the contention that
moisture ingress alone constituted the decisive cause of deterioration
remains a bare assertion. Conversely, the learned Arbitrator’s finding
that chemical degradation of the colouring material triggered
progressive attenuation is fully consistent with the technical evidence
on record.
71.
Viewed thus, the technical conclusions reached by the learned
Arbitrator represent a reasoned synthesis of engineering principles,
contractual standards, and evidentiary material, and clearly fall within
the realm of a possible, plausible, and well-founded view. This Court
cannot, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction under Section 34 of
the A&C Act, supplant such technical findings with its own
assessment, particularly in the absence of perversity, patent illegality,
or manifest disregard of evidence. The findings, therefore, warrant
judicial deference and call for no interference.
72.
It is well settled that the learned Arbitrator is the final authority
on questions of fact and appreciation of evidence. In the present case,
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the findings returned are not shown to be perverse or based on no
evidence. This Court is also mindful of the fact that the learned
Arbitrator is a former Member of the Telecom Commission and,
therefore, a subject-matter expert. His conclusions, drawn upon
technical expertise, practical experience, and the material on record,
do not warrant interference. It is equally significant that the learned
Arbitrator examined and rejected a substantial portion of the
Respondent’s counterclaims on other considerations.
73.
It is trite law that the scope of judicial interference is extremely
narrow, particularly where the arbitral tribunal comprises technical
experts. Where a reasoned and plausible view adopted by an expert
arbitrator, drawing upon specialised knowledge and practical
experience, supports a particular factual or contractual conclusion,
courts ought not to substitute their own views merely because an
alternative interpretation is possible. This position has been reiterated
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v.
NHAI12, wherein it was emphasised that when technical experts acting
as arbitrators adopt a plausible view based on their specialised
knowledge and experience, courts must adopt the path of least
interference. The relevant portion of the said judgment is extracted
hereinbelow:
“24. It is quite evident that in most cases, the view of DRPs and
tribunals, and in two cases, majority awards of tribunals, favoured
the arguments of contractors, that composite embankment
construction took place, as a result of which measurement was to
be done in a composite, or unified manner. Dissenting or minority
views, wherever expressed, were premised on separate
measurements. This opinion was of technical experts constituted as
arbitrators, who were versed in contractual interpretation of the
type of work involved; they also had first-hand experience as
(2024) 2 SCC 613
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engineers who supervised such contracts. When the predominant
view of these experts pointed to one direction i.e. a composite
measurement, the question is what really is the role of the court
under Section 34 of the Act.
25. This Court in Voestalpine Schienen GmbH v. DMRC, (2017) 4
SCC 665 commenting on the value of having expert personnel as
arbitrators, emphasised that “technical aspects of the dispute are
suitably resolved by utilising their expertise when they act as
arbitrators”. Such an approach was commended also inDelhi
Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd. v. DMRC, (2022) 1 SCC 131
wherein this Court held that: (Delhi Airport Metro Express case,
SCC p. 155, para 41)
“41. … The members of the Arbitral Tribunal, nominated
in accordance with the agreed procedure between the
parties, are engineers and their award is not meant to be
scrutinised in the same manner as one prepared by legally
trained minds. In any event, it cannot be said that the view
of the Tribunal is perverse. Therefore, we do not concur
with the High Court's opinion [DMRC v. Delhi Airport
Metro Express (P) Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6562]
that the award of the Tribunal on the legality of the
termination notice is vitiated due to the vice of perversity.”
26. The prevailing view about the standard of scrutiny — not
judicial review, of an award, by persons of the disputants' choice
being that of their decisions to stand — and not interfered with,
(save a small area where it is established that such a view is
premised on patent illegality or their interpretation of the facts or
terms, perverse, as to qualify for interference, courts have to
necessarily choose the path of least interference, except when
absolutely necessary). By training, inclination and experience,
Judges tend to adopt a corrective lens; usually, commended for
appellate review. However, that lens is unavailable when exercising
jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act. Courts cannot, through
process of primary contract interpretation, thus, create pathways to
the kind of review which is forbidden under Section 34. So viewed,
the Division Bench's approach, of appellate review, twice removed,
so to say (under Section 37), and conclusions drawn by it, resulted
in displacing the majority view of the tribunal, and in many cases,
the unanimous view, of other tribunals, and substitution of another
view. As long as the view adopted by the majority was plausible —
and this Court finds no reason to hold otherwise (because
concededly the work was completed and the finished embankment
was made of composite, compacted matter, comprising both soil
and fly ash), such a substitution was impermissible.
27. For a long time, it is the settled jurisprudence of the courts in
the country that awards which contain reasons, especially when
they interpret contractual terms, ought not to be interfered with,
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lightly. The proposition was placed in State of U.P. v. Allied
Constructions, (2003) 7 SCC 396: (SCC p. 398, para 4)
“4. … It was within his jurisdiction to interpret Clause 47
of the Agreement having regard to the fact-situation
obtaining therein. It is submitted that an award made by an
arbitrator may be wrong either on law or on fact and error
of law on the face of it could not nullify an award. The
award is a speaking one. The arbitrator has assigned
sufficient and cogent reasons in support thereof.
Interpretation of a contract, it is trite, is a matter for the
arbitrator to determine (see Sudarsan Trading Co. v. State
of Kerala, (1989) 2 SCC 38). Section 30 of the Arbitration
Act, 1940 providing for setting aside an award is
restrictive in its operation. Unless one or the other
condition contained in Section 30 is satisfied, an award
cannot be set aside. The arbitrator is a Judge chosen by the
parties and his decision is final. The Court is precluded
from reappraising the evidence. Even in a case where the
award contains reasons, the interference therewith would
still be not available within the jurisdiction of the Court
unless, of course, the reasons are totally perverse or the
judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law.”
28. This enunciation has been endorsed in several cases (Ref.
McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006)
11 SCC 181). In MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan,
(2011) 10 SCC 573 it was held that an error in interpretation of a
contract by an arbitrator is “an error within his jurisdiction”. The
position was spelt out even more clearly in Associate
Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, where the Court said that:
(Associate Builders case, SCC p. 81, para 42)
“42. … 42.3. … if an arbitrator construes a term of the
contract in a reasonable manner, it will not mean that the
award can be set aside on this ground. Construction of the
terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide
unless the arbitrator construes the contract in such a way
that it could be said to be something that no fair-minded or
reasonable person could do.”
(emphasis supplied)
74.
The Court now turns to the submission advanced on behalf of
the Petitioner that similar complaints had, in the past, arisen in respect
of cables supplied by other manufacturers, for instance, Sterlite Ltd.
and Optel Communications Ltd. It has been contended that, in those
cases, the Respondent’s own Telecom Engineering Centre had
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attributed degradation to water penetration caused by improper splice
closures during installation and had issued specific recommendations
for water-tight jointing. According to the Petitioner, although these
reports were placed before the learned Arbitrator, they were allegedly
ignored.
75.
In support of this contention, the learned senior counsel for the
Petitioner relied upon an extract from such report, the relevant portion
of which reads as under:
“8.0 Conclusion:
8.1 On Optical Fibre Cables manufactured and supplied by
M/S Sterlite Industries Ltd.
It may be concluded from the various tests taken and the
results obtained that the penetration of water and the moisture
in the splice closure have degraded the optical fibres in which
the colored fibres were effected more than the natural fibres
because the coloring ink is more susceptible to moisture and
the OH ions have traveled along the length of fibre below the
colour coating and above the primary coating of the fibres and
it might have applied excessive pressure on the glass fibres
resulting in micro bending etc. leading to more attenuation
along the length.
The detailed report and the observation taken by OTDR has
been sent to Southern Telecom Region Chennai.”
76.
This Court has carefully considered the aforesaid submission
and the extract relied upon. Even on a plain reading of the conclusion
contained in the said report, it is evident that the findings recorded
therein are tentative and inferential in nature, and do not conclusively
establish, with any degree of certainty, the precise cause of
deterioration. Significantly, the learned Arbitrator has himself taken
note of the existence of such reports and has recorded a finding that
none of them conclusively established the cause of degradation.
77.
Mere reliance on an isolated portion of a prior technical report,
divorced from the contractual framework, tender conditions, and the
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totality of evidence on record, cannot alter the material conclusions
reached in the Impugned Award. Particularly in proceedings under
Section 34 of the A&C Act, this Court finds no reason to take a view
different from that already arrived at by the learned Arbitrator after
considering all relevant factors, as discussed in the preceding
paragraphs.
78.
This Court next considers the Petitioner’s assertion that its offer
to replace approximately 5,200 fibre-kilometres of cables was merely
a commercial or goodwill gesture intended to preserve customer
relations and did not amount to any admission of defect or liability. It
was contended that the Respondent misconstrued this gesture as an
acknowledgment of fault and proceeded to demand replacement of
quantities far in excess thereof.
79.
In the considered opinion of this Court, this submission carries
little weight. The Impugned Award does not proceed on the basis of
this offer in isolation. The learned Arbitrator has taken into account a
multitude of factors, including contractual provisions, technical
evidence, and expert reports, while arriving at the findings in question.
In that view of the matter, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to
delve into the subjective intent behind the said offer or to characterise
it as a goodwill gesture or otherwise.
80.
The Court now turns to the alternative submission advanced by
the learned senior counsel for the Petitioner that, even assuming that
deficiencies in the OFCs occurred due to the Petitioner’s fault, the
Respondent cannot be completely exonerated from liability. It was
argued that since various processes, from inception to completion,
were carried out under the supervision of the Respondent, the present
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case would be one of contributory negligence, and therefore, the
Petitioner alone could not have been held liable.
81.
This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid submission. At the
outset, it is noted that this contention does not form part of the
grounds raised in the present petition under Section 34 of the A&C
Act. In any event, the plea of contributory negligence involves a
mixed question of law and fact, requiring detailed examination of
evidence and factual adjudication, which is wholly impermissible
within the narrow confines of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the
A&C Act. The argument, therefore, appears to be an afterthought and
is clearly beyond the permissible scope of interference available to
this Court.
82.
So far as the reliance placed on an isolated portion of the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxman Iyer (supra) is
concerned, the said decision was rendered in the context of motor
accident claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and arose from a
completely different statutory framework and factual matrix. The
principles enunciated therein have no application to the present case,
which arises out of a commercial contract and arbitral adjudication.
Accordingly, the said judgment does not advance the Petitioner’s case
in any manner.
CONCLUSION:
83.
In view of the foregoing discussion and the reasons recorded
hereinabove, this Court finds no ground whatsoever to interfere with
the Impugned Award passed by the learned Arbitrator. The Petitioner
has failed to make out any case falling within the limited and welldefined grounds of interference permissible in law under Section 34 of
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the A&C Act. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed.
84.
The present petition, along with pending application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the above terms.
85.
No Order as to Costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 13, 2026/sm/her
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