Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
+
Judgment reserved on: 02.12.2025
Judgment pronounced on: 09.01.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 09.01.2026
FAO(OS)116/2018
ROMI GARG
Through:
....Appellant
Mr. Manish Vashisht, Sr. Adv.
With Ms. Nandini Sahni, Mr.
Vedansh Vashisht and Mr.
Swapan Singhal, Advs.
versus
BDR BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD & ORS
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. R.K. Mishra, Adv. for R-1.
Ms. Anumeha Singhai, Adv. for
R-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J
1.
Through present Appeal, the Appellant assails the correctness
of the orders dated 16.01.2018 and 14.03.2018 [hereinafter referred to
as „Impugned Order-1‟ and „Impugned Order-2‟], passed by the
learned Single Judge [hereinafter referred to as „LSJ‟] in a case being
CS(OS) 14/2018 titled “Romi Garg v. BDR Builders & Developers
Pvt. Ltd. & Ors”.
2.
The issue which arises for consideration in the present Appeal
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
16:30:14
FAO(OS)116/2018
is whether in the absence of any specific provision, will it be
appropriate to invoke the inherent power under Section 151 of the
CPC to advance the cause of justice.
3.
For the sake of convenience, the parties before this court shall
be referred to in accordance with their status before the LSJ.
FACTUAL MATRIX
4.
The present case has a chequered history. Sh. Lalit Modi [the
Defendant No.2 herein] was the owner of the property bearing No. 32,
Paschimi Marg, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi [hereinafter referred to as
„Suit Property‟].
5.
The Plaintiff asserts that an Agreement to Sell [hereinafter
referred to as „ATS‟] was executed in his favour by Defendant No.2
on 09.07.2012 with respect to the sale of Suit Property, which was
subsequently novated on 14.07.2016.
6.
BDR Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. [the Defendant No.1
herein] on the other hand, claims that Defendant No.2 executed
another ATS in its favour on 24.06.2014, also pertaining to the Suit
Property.
7.
It is further stated that on account of dispute between Defendant
No.1 and Defendant No.2, Mr. Naresh Gupta [„Defendant No.3‟
herein] was appointed as Sole Arbitrator. The said Arbitrator allegedly
passed a consent award on 21.11.2016, which was published on
12.01.2017 granting the remedy of specific performance of the ATS
dated 24.06.2014 in favour of Defendant No.1.
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
16:30:14
FAO(OS)116/2018
8.
On 05.03.2017, the Plaintiff instituted a suit seeking specific
performance of his ATS, along with the consequential relief of
possession. The Plaintiff also filed another civil suit being CS (OS)
14/2018 for Declaration, that the ATS dated 24.06.2014, the
Arbitration Award dated 12.01.2017 and the General Power of
Attorney [hereinafter referred to as‟GPA‟] and Will dated 10.02.2016
executed by Defendant No.2 in favour of Defendant No.1 is not
binding upon him, in view of prior subsisting ATS in his favour.
9.
The Plaintiff‟s said suit came up for preliminary hearing before
the LSJ on 16.01.2018, where the learned senior counsel for the
Plaintiff was confronted with the Judgement in Lala Durga Prasad v.
Lala Deep Chand1. The counsel on instructions from the Plaintiff,
withdrew the suit, which was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn.
The Plaintiff thereafter filed an application for the recall of Impugned
Order-1, however, the said application was dismissed on 14.03.2018.
10.
While dismissing the recall application, the LSJ distinguished
the judgement relied upon by the learned counsel for the Plaintiff,
namely Bharat
Karsondas
Thakkar
v.
Kiran
Construction
Company,2 and Lala Durga Prasad v. Lala Deep Chand (supra) and
thereafter, held as under:“16. Lala Durga Prasad supra, is a caseof the title of the vendor in
the property, of the contract of sale of which specific performance was
sought, having, after the extension of contract of sale, vested in the
custodian and who was impleaded in the suit. Supreme Court, after
holding the plaintiff/ agreement purchaser to be entitled to a decree of
specific performance, pondered the proper form of decree to be
passed in such a situation. It was noticed that the practice of the
AIR 1954 SC 75
2008 (13) SCC 658
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
16:30:14
FAO(OS)116/2018
courts in India had not been uniform; according to one point of view,
the proper form of decree is to declare the subsequent purchase void
as against the plaintiff and direct conveyance by the vendor alone; a
second considers that both the vendor and vendee should join while
third would limit execution of the conveyance to the subsequent
purchaser alone. It was held (i) that the title to the property had
validly passed from the vendor to the subsequent transferee; the sale
to him was not void but only voidable at the option of the other party
to the contract; (ii) that since the title no longer vested with the
vendor, it would be illogical to compel him to convey title to the
plaintiff unless steps are taken to re-vest the title in him either by
cancellation of subsequent sale or by a reconveyance from the
subsequent purchaser to him; (iii) that the proper form of decree is to
direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the
plaintiff and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance
so as to pass on the title which resides in him, to the plaintiff.
17. Per contra, in Bharat Karsondas Thakkar supra, the plaintiff in
the suit for specific performance of a subsequent Agreement to Sell
was not permitted to amend the plaint to challenge the decree in a suit
pertaining to the earlier Agreement to Sell and to which decree the
vendor had consented. Supreme Court, in para 23 of the judgment,
noticed that Lala Durga Prasad supra was a case of a suit for specific
performance by a prior purchaser against the vendor and a
subsequent purchaser and in the said context held that in a suit filed
by the prior purchaser, the decree of the form laid down had to be
passed. It was further held in para 31 of the judgment that the
decision in Lala Durga Prasad supra could not be brought to the aid
of the case of the plaintiff in Bharat Karsondas Thakkar supra.
18. It would thus immediately be clear that the facts of the present
case match with that of Lala Durga Prasad supra and not with the
facts of Bharat Karsondas Thakkar supra. The plaintiff therein also
claims the Agreement to Sell in its favour to be of a date prior to the
date of the Agreement to Sell in favour of defendant No.l. Thus, the
proper course for the plaintiff in the present case is under Section
19(b) of the Specific Relief Act only and not by way of the present suit.
19. The application for recall of the order dated 16 January, 2018,
irrespective of maintainability thereof, is not maintainable because
the plaintiff himself withdrew the suit, even if on a wrong premise.”
11.
In the meantime, the suit filed by the Plaintiff for specific
performance, after contesting on merits, was decreed on 14.05.2020,
which was subsequently modified to a limited extent on 17.06.2020.
The said decree has attained finality, as the Defendant No. 2 never
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
16:30:14
FAO(OS)116/2018
filed any appeal challenging it.
12.
At present, therefore, the position is that, on the one hand, there
exists an Award passed by the learned Arbitrator i.e. Defendant No.3,
which is based upon the consent of the Defendant No.1 and Defendant
No.2.
13.
It is further noted here that the Defendant No.1 had also filed a
Civil Suit on 26.06.2020 challenging the correctness of the decree for
specific performance dated 14.05.2020, which is stated to be pending
adjudication. Additionally, the Execution Petition filed by the
Defendant No.1 seeking enforcement of the Arbitration Award, which
is deemed to be a decree, is also pending before the Court.
14.
In view of the above factual matrix, this Court is now called
upon to determine whether the Impugned Order No.1 and Impugned
Order No.2 are liable to be set aside.
15.
While dismissing the application made by the Plaintiff for recall
of Impugned Order No.1, the LSJ has observed that the recall
application, irrespective of its maintainability thereof, cannot be
sustained, because the Plaintiff herself withdrew the suit, even if on a
mistaken premise. The LSJ further clarified that it will not preclude
the Plaintiff from seeking appropriate remedies under Section 19(b) of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963 [hereinafter referred to as „SRA”].
CONTENTION OF THE PARTIES
16.
Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff while controverting the
findings of the LSJ has advanced the following submissions:
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
16:30:14
FAO(OS)116/2018
16.1 The Plaintiff asserts that the LSJ erred both in law and on facts
and passed the Impugned Orders on surmises and conjectures. It is
argued that the Plaintiff‟s case was not heard on merits at the first
hearing, and the suit was dismissed solely based on oral arguments
without considering the pleadings or any documentary evidence. It is
further contended that the Plaintiff‟s counsel was persuaded to
withdraw the suit under a mistaken belief and on incorrect legal
advice, particularly concerning the applicability of the judgement in
Lala Durga Prasad (supra). Allegedly, the Plaintiff himself was not
present at the time when Impugned Order-1 was passed.
16.2 On the premise of the alleged applicability of Lala Durga
Prasad (supra), the LSJ erred in holding that the suit filed by the
Plaintiff was not maintainable in view of Section 19(b) of SRA, 1963.
The Plaintiff contends that the Lala Durga Prasad (supra) has no
application to the facts and circumstances of the present case, is
clearly distinguishable and therefore, the suit filed by the Plaintiff
ought to have been restored by the LSJ on 14.03.2018. The Plaintiff
submits that her case is squarely covered by the judgement of Bharat
Karsondas Thakkar (supra).
16.3 The LSJ failed to appreciate that the Impugned Award is
collusive and fraudulent, despite the availability of sufficient
documentary evidence including Sale Deeds, which conclusively
indicates that Sh. Naresh Gupta [Defendant No.3 herein], is an
advocate engaged by Defendant No.1. Therefore, his conduct as
arbitrator could hardly be expected to be objective or neutral,
considering he was on the pay rolls of Defendant No.1. Thus, the LSJ
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
16:30:14
FAO(OS)116/2018
failed to appreciate that there was a clear violation of Section 12(1),
12(2), and 12(5) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 2015 [hereinafter
referred to as „ACA”] as learned Arbitrator has failed to disclose his
relationship with Defendant No.1 even prior to entering into alleged
reference or during the pendency of the alleged arbitration
proceedings. Consequently, the entire arbitration proceedings,
including the award, is a nullity.
16.4 The LSJ also failed to appreciate the objections filed by the
Defendant No.2 against the Award under section 34 of the ACA,
which is pending adjudication before the Court. Even Defendant No. 2
has categorically asserted that no arbitration proceedings ever took
place before the Arbitrator and the same is sham and bogus and a
gross abuse of process of law.
16.5 The Plaintiff specifically submits that at the time of hearing on
16.01.2018, the counsel for the Plaintiff did not have a copy of the
judgement of Lala Durga Prasad v. Lala Deep Chand (supra) and
subsequently it became evident that the said judgement is clearly
distinguishable and is not applicable. As held in Bharat Karsondas
Thakkar (supra), a suit for specific performance of an agreement
cannot be permitted to be converted into a suit for declaration of title
and possession nor can its scope be enlarged by impleading a third
party/stranger to the contract to challenge the nature or character of
the suit.
16.6 The Plaintiff further contends that it was pointed out before the
LSJ that due to typographical error, the liberty granted to file fresh
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
16:30:14
FAO(OS)116/2018
suit or any other legal proceedings on same cause of action in
accordance with the law was given to the Plaintiff but was
inadvertently omitted in the Impugned Order No.1. Therefore, there
exists sufficient grounds to modify the said order.
17.
Per contra, the learned counsel for the Defendants herein made
the following observations:
17.1 Learned counsel for the Defendants submits that the suit was
unconditionally withdrawn by the the Plaintiff on 16.01.2018 and
therefore, she cannot be allowed to seek its revival. It is further
contended that an Execution Petition filed by Defendant No.1 is
pending and the Plaintiff may raise objections under Section 47 of the
CPC to challenge the correctness of Award, particularly since the
Plaintiff alleges that the Award is the result of collusion between the
Defendant No.1 and Defendant No.2. Reliance is placed upon the
judgement passed in case being C.R.P 97/2014, titled Smt.
Shakuntala Gupta v. Shri Manmohan Gupta and Order dated
17.12.2020 passed in case being EX.P. 69/2017, titled BDR Builders
& Developers Pvt. Ltd. V. Shri Lalit Modi.
17.2 The Defendant also submits that in the subsequent suit filed by
the Plaintiff seeking a declaration that the Award is not binding on
her, the Plaintiff has not claimed the relief of specific possession.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
18.
This court has heard learned senior counsel for the parties at
length and, with their able assistance, perused the paper book.
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
16:30:14
FAO(OS)116/2018
19.
It is a well settled principle that civil court retains inherent
powers under Section 151 of the CPC to recall or set aside an order
where the interest of justice so demands, and where no express
provision of the Code operates as a bar. While such inherent powers
cannot be invoked to override the substantive framework of the CPC
or to nullify the effect of an unconditional withdrawal of a suit, the
Courts have consistently held that recall is permissible where the
order impugned is shown to have been obtained under a mistaken
belief, due to manifest procedural irregularity, or by reason of fraud,
misrepresentation, or any circumstances demonstrating that the party
was denied an effective opportunity of being heard. In such
exceptional circumstances, the Court is empowered to restore the
proceedings or recall a conditional order, so as to prevent miscarriage
of justice and to ensure that the judicial process is not employed as an
instrument to defeat legitimate rights. The power under Section 151 of
the CPC, though to be exercised sparingly, remains available to cure
palpable injustice where the situation is not expressly covered by any
other provision of law.
20.
This Court has carefully read the judgment passed in Lala
Durga Prasad and Anr. (supra). This judgment does not address with
maintainability of a separate suit by a prior agreement holder against
the original owner/subsequent transferee. Moreover, the Supreme
Court in Jet Ply Wood Private Ltd. & Anr. vs. Madhukar Nowlakha
& Ors.3 has clarified that in the absence of specific provisions in the
CPC for enabling the recall of an order permitting withdrawal of a
2006 (3) SCC 699
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
16:30:14
FAO(OS)116/2018
suit, the recourse may be had to Section 151 of the CPC to restore the
suit in the interest of justice.
21.
Notably, in Jet Ply Wood Private Ltd. &Anr. (supra), the suit
for specific performance of ATS was withdrawn on account of
ongoing settlement between the parties. The judgment underscores
that procedural technicalities such as the failure to seek "liberty to file
a fresh suit" at the time of withdrawal cannot obstruct the court's duty
to prevent a miscarriage of justice or an abuse of the judicial process.
22.
A reading of both the Impugned Orders also suggests that the
learned judge proceeded under an erroneous understanding of the
scope of Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In fact, the
judgement was rendered in the year 1953, when the SRA, 1963 had
not yet been enacted. Moreover, Section 19(b) of the SRA provides
for the manner of enforcing a decree for specific performance of
contract. Under Clause (b), the decree-holder is entitled to enforce the
same against any other person claiming a title arising subsequently, to
the contract. Hence, Section 19(b) has no bearing whatsoever upon the
maintainability of the subsequent suit.
23.
A perusal of the Impugned Order No.1 reveals that the Plaintiff
never withdrew the suit voluntarily, rather, the withdrawal was
prompted solely by the prima facie observations of the LSJ. The
Plaintiff‟s act, therefore, cannot be treated as an informed or
unconditional abandonment of rights but as one induced by a
manifestly erroneous legal premise adopted by the Court itself,
thereby undermining the voluntariness of the withdrawal.
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
16:30:14
FAO(OS)116/2018
24.
The Plaintiff has specifically contended that counsel proceeded
to withdraw the suit under a mistaken understanding of law,
particularly regarding the applicability of Lala Durga Prasad (supra)
and the effect of Supreme Court‟s decision in Bharat Karsondas
Thakkar (supra). The latter judgement squarely supports the
Plaintiff‟s position that a suit for specific performance cannot be
converted into a declaratory suit, nor can third parties be impleaded to
alter the scope of the original cause of action, an aspect which directly
undermines the assumption on which the suit was withdrawn. Courts
have consistently held that when the order is procured under a legal
misconception that goes to the root of the matter, the same may be
recalled preventing manifest injustice.
25.
With regard to the Plaintiff‟s grievance concerning the alleged
fraudulent nature of the arbitral award, and the undisclosed
relationship between Defendant No.1 and the learned Arbitrator, these
issues strike at the very validity of the Award. If substantiated, these
grounds strike at the root of the arbitral process. Prima facie, the
Plaintiff has brought on record material showing that Defendant No.3
(Arbitrator) was acting as an advocate for Defendant No.1, and was
therefore in a direct relationship requiring mandatory disclosure under
Section 12(1), 12(2) and 12(5) of the ACA. The statutory mandate is
clear, where such circumstances exist, giving rise to justifiable doubts
as to the independence or impartiality of the arbitrator, the
appointment is invalid and the proceedings are rendered a nullity. The
failure to disclose such relationship impugns the very neutrality,
independence and jurisdiction of the arbitral forum and the Award
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
16:30:14
FAO(OS)116/2018
passed subsequently, is alleged to be collusive and fraudulent. Even
Defendant No.2, in its objections under Section 34 of the ACA, has
categorically pleaded that no arbitration proceedings were ever
conducted and that the purported award is entirely sham and
fabricated. This fortifies the Plaintiff‟s plea of allegation of collusion
and fraud.
26.
It is trite law that fraud vitiates all judicial acts, and where the
Arbitrator‟s award facilitates or shields a fraud by unintentionally
shutting out the Plaintiff‟s remedy, the Court retains inherent power to
recall such order. Thus, the LSJ erred in failing to consider these
serious allegations despite the availability of sufficient material on
record.
27.
In line with, the Plaintiff has further demonstrated that the LSJ
declined to consider the pleadings, documents, and merits of the case,
and dismissed the suit merely based on oral submissions at the very
first hearing. This procedural irregularity, coupled with an incorrect
application of law, prevented the Plaintiff‟s case from being
adjudicated on merits. It is a settled principle that where an order is
passed without proper appreciation of the record or without affording
adequate opportunity, such order can and ought to be revisited under
the Court‟s inherent jurisdiction to secure the ends of justice.
28.
The Defendants contend that the Plaintiff may raise objections
under Section 47 of the CPC in the pending execution petition. The
Executing Court will be bound to get the decree implemented.
Keeping in view the scope of the court while deciding objection under
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
16:30:14
FAO(OS)116/2018
Section 47 of the CPC, the alternative remedy suggested by learned
counsel for the Defendants may not be sufficient. Moreover, the mere
existence of an alternative remedy does not bar the Plaintiff from
seeking recall/restoration of his own suit, particularly when the
original withdrawal was induced by a mistake of law. Additionally,
the pendency of objections under Section 34 of the ACA by
Defendant No.2 itself indicates that the validity of the so-called
arbitral award is already sub-judice. In these circumstances, the
Plaintiff cannot be shut out at the threshold, especially when the
challenge raised by him is distinct, substantive and supported by
independent material.
29.
Further, the Plaintiff has further explained that the order dated
16.01.2018 was intended to grant him liberty to institute fresh
proceedings but the operative portion inadvertently omitted the said
liberty due to a typographical error. The Plaintiff raised this issue
promptly. Such an omission, when it affects the substantive rights of a
litigant and is brought to the Courts attention at the earliest,
constitutes a sufficient ground for modification/recall.
30.
It is pertinent to note that the Defendants have failed to
demonstrate that recall or restoration of the suit would cause any
prejudice or harm to them. On the contrary, allowing adjudication on
merits would ensure a fair determination of rights and obviate the
need for multiplicity of proceedings.
31.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff cannot be left without any remedy.
The suit filed by the Plaintiff for specific performance of ATS has
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
16:30:14
FAO(OS)116/2018
already been decreed, albeit a conditional one, which has attained
finality. In contrast, the so-called Arbitral award in favour of
Defendant No.1 is in essence, nothing more than a consent award, its
character being that of a contractual arrangement between the
consenting parties, merely clothed with the nomenclature of an
arbitration award. The legal position is unequivocal that an arbitration
award passed with the consent of the parties cannot be binding upon
the persons who were not parties to the arbitration award, hence, the
suit filed by the Plaintiff, was in substance a suit seeking declaration
claiming that such arbitration award is not binding upon him having
been procured with the clear intent to defeat and circumvent the rights
accrued to him under a prior and subsisting ATS in his favour. The
Plaintiff was therefore justified in seeking judicial intervention to
protect the sanctity of his earlier decree and to prevent the misuse of
arbitral machinery to nullify his vested rights.
32.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, this court finds merit in
the Plaintiff‟s contentions. The Court is of the view that invocation of
the inherent powers under Section 151 of the CPC is not only justified
but imperative to recall the Impugned Order No.1. Such intervention
is necessary to prevent miscarriage of justice, to correct manifest
procedural and substantive errors, and to restore the suit, so that the
Plaintiff‟s rights may be adjudicated on their true merits. Therefore,
the Impugned Orders deserves to be set aside, directing the LSJ to
adjudicate the suit on merits.
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
16:30:14
FAO(OS)116/2018
CONCLUSION
33.
Accordingly, in light of the above findings, it is concluded that
the LSJ has erred in passing the Impugned Orders. Keeping in view
the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is inclined to allow the present
Appeal.
34.
Hence, the present Appeal is hereby allowed. The Impugned
Orders are hereby set aside and the suit is restored to its original
number.
35.
The parties through their counsels are directed to appear before
LSJ (Roster Bench) on 22.01.2026.
36.
The present Appeal stands disposed of.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
HARISHVAIDYANATHANSHANKAR, J.
JANUARY 09, 2026
s.godara/kb/ra
Signed By:SAVITA
PASRICHA
16:30:14
FAO(OS)116/2018
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review