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2026:HHC:41487
.IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1694 of 2026
Reserved on: 23.9.2026
Decided on: 28.9.2026
Rohit
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP
…. Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr
N.K.
Thakur,
Senior
Advocate, with Mr Karan Veer
Singh, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking
regular bail in FIR No. 152 of 2023, dated 06.09.2023, registered
at Police Station Kangra, for the commission of offences
punishable under Section 22 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act) and Section 25 of the
Arms Act.
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:41487
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, ASI
Hakam Singh found one abandoned yellow and orange carry bag
on 06.09.2023 at about 2:10 PM. He checked the bag and found
Alprazolam tablets. He associated Som Raj and Akash and
searched the carry bag. He found 10 boxes of Alprazolam tablets,
each containing seven strips, three country-made pistols, two
knives, one magazine, four live cartridges, seventeen live rounds
(8 mm), eighteen live rounds (7.65 mm), and six live rounds
(.32). The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter.
The police arrested one Vinay Bhandari on 19.09.2023, and
recovered two pistols, magazines, and live cartridges from his
house. Vinay Bhandari revealed that he had handed over the carry
bag to Rohit Kumar, the present petitioner. The police arrested
the present petitioner. The allegations against the petitioner are
false. There is no material to connect the petitioner to the
commission of the crime. The petitioner has remained in custody
for about three years, and the trial has not concluded. Hence, it
was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
petitioner be released on bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that ASI Hakam Singh and other police officials were on
2026:HHC:41487
patrolling duty on 06.09.2023. ASI Hakam Singh went to a bowri
near Shiv Temple for drinking water. He found a carry bag in
which the tablets of Alprazolam were visible. He associated Som
Raj and Akash Bahari and searched the carry bag. He found 5,250
tablets of Alprazolam, three country-made pistols, one knife,
one magazine, and cartridges. He seized them. An FIR was
registered. The police arrested Vinay Bhandari based on secret
information and recovered two pistols and live cartridges. He
revealed during interrogation that he had handed over three
country-made pistols, two knives, and live cartridges to Rohit,
alias Chhotu, for concealment. The police checked the CCTV
footage and the call detail records. They found that the petitioner
and the co-accused were in touch with each other. The police
arrested the petitioner. He revealed during interrogation that he
could show the place where he had kept the pistols, knives, and
cartridges. The case property was sent to the SFSL, and as per the
report of the analysis, the tablets were found to contain
Alprazolam, the pistols were found to be working, and the
cartridges were live cartridges that could be used. The police filed
the charge sheet before the court on 24.01.2025. The statements
of six witnesses have been recorded, and the matter is listed
2026:HHC:41487
before the learned Trial Court on 25.09.2026. The petitioner
would indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of
his release on bail. Hence, the status report.
4.
I have heard Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate,
assisted by Mr Karanveer Singh, learned counsel for the
petitioner, and Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda, learned Additional
Advocate General, for the respondent-State.
5.
Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate for the
petitioner/accused, submitted that there is no material to
connect the petitioner with the commission of the crime. The
police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and the
petitioner’s
custodial
interrogation
is
not
required.
The
petitioner will abide by the terms and conditions that the Court
may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
6.
Mr Pawan Kumar Nadda, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner
and the co-accused were seen together in the CCTV footage. The
petitioner had made a disclosure statement showing the place
where he had concealed the pistols and the live cartridges. These
2026:HHC:41487
circumstances prima facie
connect the petitioner to the
commission of the crime. The crime is heinous, and the
petitioner should not be released on bail. Therefore, he prayed
that the present petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person
under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
2026:HHC:41487
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing
of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the
court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic
itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the
accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce
2026:HHC:41487
prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis
supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should
always be coupled with other circumstances warranting
the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the
basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more
heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection
of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual
matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
2026:HHC:41487
regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
2026:HHC:41487
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused,
observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022)
4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time, while
considering an application for bail, courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima
facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported
by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to
the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due
consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the
nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if
any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a
conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an
accused.” (emphasis supplied)
9.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not
jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or
creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences
or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner
2026:HHC:41487
who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not
intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.
So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
10.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11.
The status report shows that the police have relied
upon the statement made by the co-accused, Vinay Bhandari,
that he had handed over the pistols, knives, and live cartridges to
the present petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019)
16 SCC 547: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 361: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 588 that a
statement made by an accused during the investigation is hit by
Section 162 of Cr.P.C. and Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act
and cannot be used as a piece of evidence. It was observed at page
568: 44. Such a person, viz., the person who is named in the
FIR, and therefore, the accused in the eyes of the law, can
indeed be questioned, and the statement is taken by the
police officer. A confession that is made to a police officer
would be inadmissible, having regard to Section 25 of the
Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated under Section
24 of the Evidence Act, would also be inadmissible. A
confession, unless it fulfils the test laid down in Pakala
Narayana Swami [Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor,
2026:HHC:41487
1939 SCC OnLine PC 1: (1938-39) 66 IA 66: AIR 1939 PC 47]
and as accepted by this Court, may still be used as an
admission under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This,
however, is subject to the bar of admissibility of a
statement under Section 161 CrPC. Therefore, even if a
statement contains an admission, the statement being one
under Section 161, it would immediately attract the bar
under Section 162 CrPC.”
12.
Similarly, it was held in Surinder Kumar Khanna vs
Intelligence Officer Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 2018 (8) SCC
271 that a confession made by a co-accused cannot be taken as a
substantive piece of evidence against another co-accused and
can only be utilised to lend assurance to the other evidence. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently held in Tofan Singh Versus
State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 (4) SCC 1, that a confession made to a
police officer during the investigation is hit by Section 25 of the
Indian Evidence Act and is not saved by the provisions of Section
67 of the NDPS Act. Therefore, no advantage can be derived by
the prosecution from the confessional statement made by the
co-accused implicating the petitioner.
13.
The police have also relied upon the call detail records
and the fact that the petitioner and the co-accused were seen
together in the CCTV footage. It was laid down by this Court in
Saina Devi vs State of Himachal Pradesh 2022 Law Suit (HP) 211
2026:HHC:41487
that where the police have no material except the call detail
record and the disclosure statement of the co-accused, the
petitioner cannot be kept in custody. It was observed: “[16] In the facts of the instant case, the prosecution, for
implicating the petitioner, relies upon firstly the confessional
statement made by accused Dabe Ram and secondly the CDR
details of calls exchanged between the petitioner and the wife of
co-accused Dabe Ram. Taking into consideration the evidence
with respect to the availability of CDR details involving the
phone number of the petitioner and the mobile phone number
of the wife of co-accused Dabe Ram, this Court had considered
the existence of a prima facie case against the petitioner and
had rejected the bail application as not satisfying the conditions
of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
[17] Since the existence of CDR details of the accused person(s)
has not been considered as a circumstance sufficient to hold a
prima facie case against the accused person(s), in Pallulabid
Ahmad's case (supra), this Court is of the view that the
petitioner has made out a case for maintainability of his
successive bail application as also for grant of bail in his favour.
[18] Except for the existence of CDRs and the disclosure
statement of the co-accused, no other material appears to have
been collected against the petitioner. The disclosure made by
the co-accused cannot be read against the petitioner as per the
mandate of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tofan Singh Vs State of
Tamil Nadu, 2021 4 SCC 1. Further, on the basis of the aforesaid
elucidation, the petitioner is also entitled to the benefit of bail.
14.
The police also relied upon the statement made by the
petitioner that he could show the place where he had kept the
pistols, knives, and live cartridges. This disclosure statement will
not help the prosecution because the carry bag containing the
pistols, knives, and live cartridges was recovered much before
2026:HHC:41487
the petitioner's arrest. It was laid down by this Court in State of
Himachal Pradesh versus Sanjiv Kumar Alias Sanju 2019 (3) ShimLC
1710 that there cannot be any rediscovery of a fact. When the
place was known to the police, the disclosure made by the
accused regarding a place without any recovery would be
inadmissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was
observed: “(j) Disclosure statement of accused Sanjay Kumar alias
Sanjjan regarding the place from where the dead body was
thrown: The prosecution examined Constable Narpat Ram
(PW-16 in ST No.3/95) to prove the disclosure statement
(Ext. PM) of accused Sanjay Kumar alias Sanjjan in ST No.
3/1995. However, the accused Sanjay Kumar is dead;
therefore, this evidence is also not going to arrive at any
conclusion. Even otherwise, his testimony is also cryptic
and leads to no conclusion because it points out to the
place from where the accused had thrown the dead body.
Whereas the police had already recovered the dead body from
that place. Therefore, in the absence of recovery, such a
confession does not fall within the exception of Section 27 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
(k) In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC
217, a three-member bench of the Supreme Court holds,
20. Then we come to the recoveries. The false beard
and mask were found buried in the grounds of
Dewayat's house, and the appellant is said to have
recovered them in the presence of panchas. But
those discoveries are inadmissible in evidence
because the police already knew where they were
hidden...
(l) In Thimma v. State of Mysore, 1970 2 SCC 105, a three-
2026:HHC:41487
member bench of the Supreme Court holds,
10. Reliance on behalf of the prosecution was also
placed on the information given by the appellant,
which led to the discovery of the dead body and
other articles found at the spot. It was contended
that the information received from him related
distinctly to the facts discovered and, therefore,
the statement conveying the information was
admissible in evidence under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act. This information, it was argued, also
lends support to the appellant's guilt. It appears to
us that when P. W. 4 was suspected of complicity in
this offence, he would in all probability have
disclosed to the police the existence of the dead
body and the other articles at the place where they
were actually found. Once a fact is discovered from
other sources, there can be no fresh discovery, even if
relevant information is extracted from the accused,
and Courts have to be watchful against the ingenuity
of the investigating officer in this respect so that the
protection afforded by the wholesome provisions of
Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act is not whittled
down by the mere manipulation of the record of the
case diary. It would, in the circumstances, be
somewhat unsafe to rely on this information for
proving the appellant's guilt. We are accordingly
disinclined to take into consideration this
statement. (Emphasis supplied)
15.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Thimma and Thimma Raju v. State of Mysore, (1970) 2 SCC 105:
1970 SCC (Cri) 320 that where the police had discovered some fact
from other sources, it cannot be re-discovered at the instance of
the accused. It was observed on page 112:
2026:HHC:41487
“10. Reliance on behalf of the prosecution was also placed
on the information given by the appellant, which led to the
discovery of the dead body and other articles found at the
spot. It was contended that the information received from
him related distinctly to the facts discovered and,
therefore, the statement conveying the information was
admissible in evidence under Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act. This information, it was argued, also lends
support to the appellant's guilt. It appears to us that when
PW 4 was suspected of complicity in this offence, he
would, in all probability, have disclosed to the police the
existence of the dead body and the other articles at the place
where they were actually found. Once a fact is discovered from
other sources, there can be no fresh discovery even if relevant
information is extracted from the accused, and courts have to
be watchful against the ingenuity of the investigating officer
in this respect so that the protection afforded by the
wholesome provisions of Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian
Evidence Act is not whittled down by mere manipulation of
the record of the case diary. It would, in the circumstances,
be somewhat unsafe to rely on this information to prove
the appellant's guilt. We are accordingly disinclined to
take into consideration this statement.” (Emphasis
supplied)
16.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Vijender v. State of Delhi, (1997) 6 SCC 171: 1997 SCC (Cri) 857 that
where the fact was within the knowledge of the police, it cannot
be discovered at the instance of the accused. It was observed at
page 179:
“17. Another elementary statutory breach which we notice
in recording the evidence of the above witnesses is that of
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Evidence was led through
the above three police witnesses that, in consequence of
information received from the three appellants on 30-6-
2026:HHC:41487
1992, they discovered the place where the dead body of
Khurshid was thrown. As already noticed, the dead body of
Khurshid was recovered on 27-6-1992, and therefore, the
question of the discovery of the place where it was thrown
thereafter could not arise. Under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act, if information given by the accused leads to
the discovery of a fact which is the direct outcome of such
information, then only it would be evidence, but when the
fact has already been discovered, as in the instant case,
evidence could not be led in respect thereof.”
17.
A similar view was taken in Allarakha Habib Memon
Etc. v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1910, wherein it was
observed:
“41. We find that these so-called confessions are ex facie
inadmissible in evidence for the simple reason that the
accused persons were presented at the hospital by the
police officers after having been arrested in the present
case. As such, the notings made by the Medical Officer, Dr
Arvindbhai (PW-2), in the injury reports of Mohmedfaruk
@ Palak and Amin @ Lalo would be clearly hit by Section
26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to
as ‘Evidence Act’). As a consequence, we are not inclined to
accept the said admissions of the accused as incriminating
pieces of evidence relevant under Section 21 of the
Evidence Act. The circumstance regarding the identification
of the place of incident at the instance of the accused is also
inadmissible because the crime scene was already known to
the police, and no new fact was discovered in pursuance of the
disclosure statements.” (Emphasis supplied)
18.
Therefore, no advantage can be derived by the police
from the fact that the accused had pointed out the place.
2026:HHC:41487
19.
There is no other evidence to connect the petitioner to
the commission of the crime.
20.
In view of the above, the present petition is allowed,
and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to his
furnishing bail bond in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety in
the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.
While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following
conditions: (i)
The petitioner will not intimidate the
witnesses, nor will they influence any evidence in
any manner whatsoever.
(ii) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each
and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary
adjournments.
(iii) The petitioner will not leave the present
addresses for a continuous period of seven days
without furnishing the address of the intended visit
to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned
and the Trial Court.
(iv) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if
any, to the Court; and
(v)
The petitioner will furnish his mobile number
and social media contact to the Police and the Court
and will abide by the summons/notices received
from the Police/Court through SMS/ WhatsApp/
Social Media Account. In case of any change in the
mobile number or social media accounts, the same
will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days
from the date of the change.
2026:HHC:41487
21.
It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file
a petition for cancellation of the bail.
22.
The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Lala Lajpat Rai
District-cum-Open
Air
Correctional
Home,
Dharamshala,
District Kangra, H.P. and learned Trial Court by FASTER.
23.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the
merits of the case.
28th September, 2026
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
(Chander)
CHANDER
SHEKHAR
Digitally signed
by CHANDER
SHEKHAR
Date: 2026.09.28
16:26:23 +0530
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