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2026:HHC:28284
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 362 of 2026
Reserved on: 22.06.2026
Date of Decision: 13.07.2026
Robin Dhiman
...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & others
...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? No.
For the petitioner
:
Mr Rajesh Kumar, Advocate.
For the respondents
:
Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General, for respondents
No.1 to 3 /State.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for the
quashing of FIR No. No. 237 of 2009, dated 07.10.2009, registered
at Police Station Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P., for the commission
of an offence punishable under Section 379 read with Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code (IPC). and the consequential proceeding
arising out of the said F.I.R.
2.
It has been asserted that the petitioner had applied for
a passport, and an adverse police verification report was issued on
_____________________________
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:28284
01.01.2024, mentioning that an F.I.R was pending against the
petitioner. He had not received any notice, summons, or
intimation from any Court or the police authority regarding the
registration of the FIR. The petitioner approached the Police
Station Nahan, and Station House Officer (SHO) confirmed that
the case file was forwarded to the Court on 04.01.2010 through RC
No. 2 of 2010; however, the record was not traceable in the Police
Station. The petitioner also approached the Court of Learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Srimour at Nahan, H.P, who found that the
record was not traceable and directed the police to supply the
available record, but the Police failed to produce any record. The
FIR was registered 15 years ago, and no proceedings have been
initiated due to the loss of the file. The Court can take cognisance
of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 379
within 3 years, which has lapsed. Therefore, it was prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential
proceedings arising out of it be quashed.
3.
The notice of the petition was issued to the State. The
State filed a reply asserting that the case file was forwarded to the
competent Court vide diary No. 2 of 2010, dated 04.01.2010. The
office of Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirmour at Nahan,
2026:HHC:28284
H.P., informed the police about the non-traceability of the judicial
record and directed the police to provide the available record. The
non-availability of the record would not assist the petitioner. F.I.R
was registered for the commission of theft. The case property was
also recovered, and the F.I.R should not be quashed. Hence, it was
prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
4.
The report of learned Sessions Judge, Sirmour at
Nahan, H.P. was also called in the matter and learned Sessions
Judge, Sirmour at Nahan, H.P. submitted a report that FIR No. 237
of 2009 was available with the office, along with the bail record,
but no formal charge sheet was available in the office
5.
I have heard Mr Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel for the
petitioner
and
Mr
Lokender
Kutlehria,
learned
Additional
Advocate General, for the respondents No.1 to 3/State.
6.
Mr Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the record is not traceable. Fifteen years have
elapsed since the registration of the FIR. There is a limitation of 3
years for taking cognisance of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 379 of the IPC. This period has already
elapsed. No proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner.
2026:HHC:28284
The existence of the F.I.R. would harm the petitioner; therefore, he
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR ordered to
be quashed.
7.
Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondents No.1 to 3 /State submitted that the
charge-sheet was forwarded to the Court; however, the receipt is
not available with the police. The FIR was registered for the
commission of a theft. The case property was also recovered, and
the F.I.R. should not be quashed. Hence, he prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
8.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
9.
The
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
held
in
Niranjan
Hemchandra Sashittal v. State of Maharashtra 2013 (4) SCC 642 that
no time limit can be stipulated for the disposal of a criminal trial,
but the continuation of a trial for a prolonged period violates the
right to speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. It was observed: 16. In Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] a
proponement was advanced that unless a time-limit is fixed
2026:HHC:28284
for the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, the right to
speedy trial would be illusory. The Constitution Bench, after
referring to the factual matrix and various submissions,
opined that there is a constitutional guarantee of speedy trial
emanating from Article 21, which is also reflected in the Code
of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to
state as follows: (SCC p. 268, para 83)
“83. But then, speedy trial or other expressions
conveying the said concept are necessarily relative in
nature. One may ask—speedy means, how speedy? How
long a delay is too long? We do not think it is possible to
lay down any time schedules for the conclusion of
criminal proceedings. The nature of offence, the number
of accused, the number of witnesses, the workload in the
particular court, means of communication, and several
other circumstances have to be kept in mind.”
After so stating, the Court gave certain examples relating to a
murder trial where a smaller number of witnesses are
examined and certain trials which involve a large number of
witnesses. It also referred to certain offences which, by their
very nature, e.g., conspiracy cases, cases of misappropriation,
embezzlement,
fraud,
forgery,
sedition,
acquisition
of
disproportionate assets by public servants, cases of corruption
against
high
public
officials,
take
a
longer
time
for
investigation and trial. The Court also took note of the
workload in each court, district, region and state-wise, and
the strikes by the members of the Bar which interfere with the
work schedules. The Bench further proceeded to observe that
in the very nature of things, it is difficult to draw a time-limit
beyond which a criminal proceeding will not be allowed to go,
and if it is a minor offence, not an economic offence and the
delay is too long, not caused by the accused, different
considerations may arise but each case must be left to be
decided on its own facts and the right to speedy trial does not
become illusory when a time-limit is not fixed.
2026:HHC:28284
17. In the said case, in para 86, the Court culled out 11
propositions which are meant to subserve as guidelines. The
Constitution Bench observed that the said propositions are not
exhaustive, as it is difficult to foresee all situations, and
further, it is not possible to lay down any hard-and-fast rules.
The propositions which are relevant for the present purpose
are reproduced below: (Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri)
93], SCC pp. 271-72)
“86. … (5) While determining whether undue delay
has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy
trial), one must have regard to all the attendant
circumstances, including the nature of the offence,
number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the
court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on—
what is called the systemic delays. It is true that it is the
obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial, and the
State includes the judiciary as well, but a realistic and
practical approach should be adopted in such matters
instead of a pedantic one.
***
(8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the
several relevant factors—‘balancing test’ or ‘balancing
process’—and determine in each case whether the right
to speedy trial has been denied in a given case.
(9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the
conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused
has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the
case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only
course open. The nature of the offence and other
circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing
of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In
such a case, it is open to the court to make such other
appropriate order—including an order to conclude the
trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded
or
reducing
the
sentence
where
the
trial
has
2026:HHC:28284
concluded—as may be deemed just and equitable in the
circumstances of the case.”
It has been laid down therein that it is neither advisable nor
practicable to fix any time-limit for the trial of offences
inasmuch as any such rule is bound to be qualified.
18. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of
Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899], another
Constitution Bench, while accepting the principle that denial
of the right to speedy trial to the accused may eventually result
in a decision to dismiss the indictment or a reversal of
conviction, further went on to state as follows: (SCC pp. 63940, para 92)
“92. Of course, no length of time is per se too long to
pass scrutiny under this principle, nor is the accused
called upon to show the actual prejudice by delay of
disposal of cases. On the other hand, the court has to
adopt a balancing approach by taking note of the
possible prejudices and disadvantages to be suffered by
the accused by avoidable delay and to determine
whether the accused in a criminal proceeding has been
deprived of his right of having speedy trial with
unreasonable delay which could be identified by the
factors—(1) length of delay, (2) the justification for the
delay, (3) the accused's assertion of his right to speedy
trial, and (4) prejudice caused to the accused by such
delay.”
19. However, thereafter, certain pronouncements, namely,
Common Cause v. Union of India [Common Cause v. Union of
India, (1996) 4 SCC 33: 1996 SCC (Cri) 589], Common Cause v.
Union of India [(1996) 6 SCC 775: 1997 SCC (Cri) 42], Raj Deo
Sharma [Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, (1998) 7 SCC 507: 1998
SCC (Cri) 1692] and Raj Deo Sharma (2) v. State of Bihar [Raj Deo
Sharma (2) v. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 604: 1999 SCC (Cri)
1324], came to the field relating to prescription of outer limit
for the conclusion of the criminal trial and the consequences
of such delay, being either discharge or acquittal of the
2026:HHC:28284
accused. The controversy required to be addressed and,
accordingly, the matter was referred to a seven-Judge Bench
in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [P. Ramachandra
Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578: 2002 SCC (Cri) 830]
and the larger Bench by the majority opinion, analysing the
dictum of Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v.
R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] and Kartar Singh
case [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC
(Cri) 899] and other legal principles relating to the power of
the legislature, the power of the Court and spectrums of
jurisdiction, recorded certain conclusions. Conclusions 3 and
4, which are pertinent for the present case, are as under: (P.
Ramachandra Rao case [P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578: 2002 SCC (Cri) 830], SCC p. 603,
para 29)
“29. … (3) The guidelines laid down in the Abdul Rehman
Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1
SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] are not exhaustive but only
illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard-andfast rules or to be applied like a straitjacket formula. Their
applicability would depend on the fact situation of each
case. It is difficult to foresee all situations, and no
generalisation can be made.
(4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially
permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for the
conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or
bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made
in Common Cause [Common Cause v. Union of India, (1996) 4
SCC 33: 1996 SCC (Cri) 589], Raj Deo Sharma [Raj Deo Sharma
v. State of Bihar, (1998) 7 SCC 507: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1692] and
Raj Deo Sharma (2) [Raj Deo Sharma (2) v. State of Bihar,
(1999) 7 SCC 604: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1324] could not have been
so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The criminal
courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal
proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed
by the directions made in Common Cause case [Common Cause
v. Union of India, (1996) 4 SCC 33: 1996 SCC (Cri) 589], Raj
2026:HHC:28284
Deo Sharma case [Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, (1998) 7
SCC 507: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1692] and Raj Deo Sharma (2) [Raj
Deo Sharma (2) v. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 604: 1999 SCC
(Cri) 1324]. At the most the periods of time prescribed in
those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the trial
or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be
persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and
circumstances of the case before them and determine by
taking into consideration the several relevant factors as
pointed out in Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]
and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so
inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and
unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will not by
themselves be treated by any court as a bar to further
continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily
obliging the court to terminate the same and acquit or
discharge the accused.” (emphasis added)
20. At this juncture, we may notice a few decisions to show how
the principles laid down in Abdul Rehman Antulay [Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] and P.
Ramachandra Rao [P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka,
(2002) 4 SCC 578: 2002 SCC (Cri) 830] have been applied by this
Court either for the purpose of quashing the prosecution or
refusal to accede to the prayer in that regard.
21. In Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar [(2009) 3 SCC 355 : (2009)
2 SCC (Cri) 95] the two-Judge Bench took note of the factual
scenario that the investigation was conducted by an officer who
had no jurisdiction to do so; that the accused-appellant therein
could not be accused of causing delay in the trial because he had
successfully
exercised
his
right
to
challenge
an
illegal
investigation; that despite direction by the High Court to
complete the investigation within a period of three months on 79-1990, nothing had happened till 27-2-2007 and the chargesheet could only be filed on 1-5-2007 and, accordingly, opined
that it was not a case where there was any exceptional
circumstance which could be possibly taken into consideration
2026:HHC:28284
for condoning the inordinate delay of more than two decades in
investigation and, accordingly, quashed the proceedings before
the trial court.
22. In Sudarshanacharaya v. Purushottamacharya [(2012) 9 SCC
241 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1070], a criminal prosecution was launched
for the commission of an offence for misappropriation and
criminal breach of trust. On an application being filed for
quashing of the proceedings, the High Court declined to quash the
proceedings, taking note of the fact that the accused had also
played a role in the procrastination of the proceedings and
directed that the case be heard on a day-to-day basis. The matter
travelled to this Court, and a contention was advanced that it
would be unfair to submit the appellant-accused to the agony of a
trial after a long lapse of time. The Division Bench referred to the
principles laid down in P. Ramachandra Rao [P. Ramachandra Rao
v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578: 2002 SCC (Cri) 830] and,
further taking note of the conduct of the accused, declined to
quash the proceedings.
23. At this stage, we think it apposite to advert to another aspect
which is sometimes highlighted. It is quite common that a
contention is canvassed in certain cases that unless there is a
speedy trial, the concept of fair trial is totally crucified. Recently,
in Mohd. Hussain v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(2012) 9 SCC 408 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1139], a three-Judge Bench, after referring to
the pronouncements in P. Ramachandra Rao case [P. Ramachandra
Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578: 2002 SCC (Cri) 830],
Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat [(2004) 4 SCC 158:
2004 SCC (Cri) 999], Satyajit Banerjee v. State of W.B. [(2005) 1 SCC
115: 2005 SCC (Cri) 276], pointed out the subtle distinction
between the two in the following manner: (Mohd. Hussain case
[(2012) 9 SCC 408 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1139], SCC pp. 427-28, para
40)
“40. ‘Speedy trial’ and ‘fair trial’ to a person accused of a
crime are an integral part of Article 21. There is, however, a
qualitative difference between the right to a speedy trial and the
accused's right to a fair trial. Unlike the accused's right of fair trial,
2026:HHC:28284
deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the
accused in defending himself. The right to a speedy trial is, in its
very nature, relative. It depends upon diverse circumstances.
Each case of delay in the conclusion of a criminal trial has to be
seen in the facts and circumstances of such a case. Mere lapse of
several years since the commencement of prosecution by itself may
not justify the discontinuance of prosecution or dismissal of
indictment. The factors concerning the accused's right to speedy
trial have to be weighed vis-à-vis the impact of the crime on
society and the confidence of the people in the judicial system.
Speedy trial secures rights to an accused, but it does not
preclude the rights of public justice. The nature and gravity of
crime, persons involved, social impact and societal needs must
be weighed along with the right of the accused to speedy trial
and if the balance tilts in favour of the former the long delay in
conclusion of criminal trial should not operate against the
continuation of prosecution and if the right of the accused in
the facts and circumstances of the case and exigencies of
situation tilts the balance in his favour, the prosecution may
be brought to an end.” (emphasis added)
24. It is to be kept in mind that on the one hand, the right of
the accused is to have a speedy trial and on the other, the
quashment of the indictment or the acquittal or refusal for
sending the matter for re-trial has to be weighed, regard being
had to the impact of the crime on the society and the
confidence of the people in the judicial system. There cannot
be a mechanical approach. From the principles laid down in
many an authority of this Court, it is clear as crystal that no
time-limit can be stipulated for the disposal of the criminal
trial. The delay caused has to be weighed on the factual score,
regard being had to the nature of the offence and the concept
of social justice and the cry of the collective.
10.
In the present case, the charge sheet was submitted to
the court, as per the police; however, the charge sheet is not
traceable in the Court. The police do not have any record of the
2026:HHC:28284
submission of the charge sheet before the Court. Therefore, the
plea taken by the State that the charge sheet was sent to the court
is not acceptable.
11.
Section 468 of the CrPC deals with the period of
limitation for taking the provisions and provides that the period of
limitation is 3 years, when the offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year, but not exceeding 3
years. The offence punishable under Section 379 of the IPC is
punishable with imprisonment for 3 years. Thus, the period of
limitation for taking cognisance would be 3 years. It was laid down
by the Patna High Court in Meera Devi v. State of Bihar, 2011 SCC
OnLine Pat 479, that the Court cannot take cognisance of the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 379 after
three years. It was observed:
It appears that the period of limitation for taking cognizance
for the offence punishable under Section 379 of the I.P.C. is
three years, and the maximum period of sentence is also three
years. It does not appear from the impugned order that the
learned Magistrate has considered the period of limitation as
to whether the cognisance is barred by the period of limitation,
and it is necessary to condone the delay in the interest of
justice or not.
In the case of Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2005 (2)
PLJR (SC) 193, it has been held in paragraph 8 that “……..the
learned Magistrate should have paused to consider the question of
limitation before taking cognisance and he should have addressed
2026:HHC:28284
himself to the question whether there were grounds to extend the
period of limitation. On account of failure to do so, we would have,
in the normal course, quashed the order of the Magistrate taking
cognisance and directed him to consider the question of
applicability of Section 473. However, having regard to the facts
and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to exercise our
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution to remit the
matter to the trial court for taking a decision on this
aspect…………..”
It appears that in that decision also, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has taken note of the fact that the learned Magistrate
should have considered the question of limitation before
taking cognisance.
In this view of the matter, the decision in the case
of Ramesh (Supra) is not helpful to the opposite parties; rather,
it appears that it is helpful to the petitioners.
Admittedly, it does not appear from the impugned order that
while taking cognisance, the learned Magistrate has taken
note of the fact that the occurrence has taken place on
24.11.1998 and the cognisance is being taken for the offence
punishable under Section 379 of the I.P.C.
12.
In the present case, no charge sheet has been filed, and
no cognisance has been taken. It would be impermissible for the
learned Magistrate to take cognisance at this stage after the expiry
of the period of limitation.
13.
No proceedings are being conducted against the
petitioner, and only the FIR is shown to be pending against the
petitioner, which would not be taken to the logical conclusion in
the absence of the record. The petitioner cannot be condemned
2026:HHC:28284
forever simply because an FIR was lodged against him, and the
continuation of the FIR cannot be permitted.
14.
In view of the above, the present petition is allowed,
and F.I.R. No. 237 of 2009, dated 07.10.2009, registered for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 379 read with
Section 34 of IPC at Police Station Nahan, District Sirmaur,
Himachal Pradesh and consequential proceedings arising out of
the said F.I.R. are quashed.
Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also
pending applications, if any.
16.
Parties are permitted to produce a copy of this
judgment, downloaded from the webpage of the High Court of
Himachal Pradesh, before the authorities concerned, and the said
authorities shall not insist on the production of a certified copy
but, if required, may verify passing of the order from the website
of the High Court.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
13th July, 2026
(Ravinder)
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