Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
#
+
CNR No. DLHC010441052026
O.M.P. (COMM) 438/2026, I.A. 25567/2026, I.A. 25568/2026
I.A. 25569/2026, I.A. 25571/2026 & I.A. 25587/2026
ROAD CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT, NATIONAL
HIGHWAYS WING,GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR,
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Samir Ali Khan, Mr. Jai
Bansal, Mr. Pranjal Sharma,
Mr. Kashif Ali Khan, Ms.
Namrata Kathuri and Ms.
Rakshita Saxena, Advs.
versus
PATEL ENGINEERING LIMITED UJJAIN ENGICON
INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED (JV),
.....Respondent
Through: Ms. Mani Gupta, Mr. Pranav
Malhtora and Mr. Udroipt
Verma, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT(ORAL)
17.09.2026
%
I.A. 25570/2026 (Delay)
1.
The present application has been filed by the Petitioner under
Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961 read with
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay of
178 days in filing the main petition under Section 34 of the Act.
2.
The Petitioner seeks to challenge the arbitral award dated
1 “Act” hereinafter
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
O.M.P. (COMM) 438/2026
19:04:09
19.05.2025 as well as the additional award dated 07.08.2025 passed
by the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
3.
The Petitioner itself herein states that the limitation for filing
the petition under Section 34 is to be reckoned from the date of the
additional award dated 07.08.2025.
4.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that, upon receipt of
the additional award the matter was examined at various levels within
the Road Construction Department, National Highways Wing,
Government of Bihar. The file was stated to have moved through the
Executive Engineer, Superintending Engineer and Chief Engineer.
Thereafter, the Petitioner states that efforts were made to settle the
dispute under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme III.
5.
It is further stated that, pursuant to the Ministry of Road
Transport and Highways guidelines concerning settlement under the
Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme III, correspondence was exchanged on
20.02.2026 and 30.03.2026.
6.
The Petitioner states that the settlement discussions ultimately
did not fructify, whereafter the matter was forwarded to the Law
Department for legal opinion and sanction and subsequently to the
Standing Counsel for preparation of the present petition.
7.
The Petitioner expressly admits in its application that there is a
delay of 178 days beyond the statutory period of three months.
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
O.M.P. (COMM) 438/2026
19:04:09
8.
Learned Counsel for the Respondent strongly opposes the
present application and submits that the petition is barred by limitation
and that the reasons set out by the Petitioner do not constitute
“sufficient cause” within the meaning of the proviso to Section 34(3)
of the Act.
9.
The question which, therefore arises for consideration is
whether the circumstances relied upon by the Petitioner, namely, the
internal administrative processing of the matter and the subsequent
settlement efforts, constitute sufficient cause so as to permit this Court
to entertain the petition beyond the period prescribed under Section
34(3) of the Act.
10.
Section 34(3) of the Act provides that an application for setting
aside an arbitral award may not be made after three months from the
date on which the party making the application received the award or,
where a request under Section 33 has been made, from the date on
which such request was disposed of. The proviso permits the Court,
upon being satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient
cause from making the application within the said period, to entertain
the application within a further period of thirty days, but not
thereafter. Section 34 is reproduced herein:
34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—(1) Recourse to
a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an
application for setting aside such award in accordance with subsection (2) and sub-section (3).
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if—
(a) the party making the application 53[establishes on the basis of
the record of the arbitral tribunal that]—
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
O.M.P. (COMM) 438/2026
19:04:09
(i) a party was under some incapacity; or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which
the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law for the time being in force; or
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice
of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings
or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or
not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission
to arbitration:
Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration
can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the
arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted
to arbitration may be set aside; or
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties,
unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part
from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or
(b) the Court finds that—
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.
[Explanation 1.—For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified
that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only
if,—
(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or
corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or
justice.
Explanation 2.—For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether
there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law
shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.]
[(2-A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than
international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the
Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent
illegality appearing on the face of the award:
Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground
of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of
evidence.]
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three
months have elapsed from the date on which the party making
that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request
had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
O.M.P. (COMM) 438/2026
19:04:09
request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within
the said period of three months it may entertain the application
within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.
(4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court
may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party,
adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in
order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the
arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion
of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the
arbitral award.
[(5) An application under this section shall be filed by a party
only after issuing a prior notice to the other party and such
application shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant
endorsing compliance with the said requirement.]
[(6) An application under this section shall be disposed of
expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from
the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served
upon the other party.]
11.
Although the Court is vested with the power to condone delay
under Section 34(3) of the Act, such power cannot be exercised in a
routine or liberal manner. A liberal approach towards condonation
would defeat the legislative objective underlying the Act, particularly
its emphasis on expeditious resolution of arbitral disputes. The law of
limitation likewise proceeds on the principle that a party must exercise
its right to seek a remedy within the period prescribed by law, thereby
ensuring certainty and finality in legal proceedings.
12.
The statutory scheme under Section 34(3) is, therefore, required
to be construed strictly. The period of three months prescribed therein
may be extended by the Court only upon sufficient cause being
shown, and then only for a further period of thirty days, but not
thereafter. The expression “but not thereafter” places an outer limit on
the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a petition under Section 34.
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
O.M.P. (COMM) 438/2026
19:04:09
13.
The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Popular Construction
Co.2, State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers,3 P. Radha Bai v.
P. Ashok Kumar4 held that the expression “but not thereafter” in the
proviso to Section 34(3) amounts to an express exclusion of Section 5
of the Limitation Act. The Court held that permitting an application
beyond the extended period would render the statutory expression “but
not thereafter” otiose.
14.
The principle has continued to be applied by the Supreme
Court. In National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis 5, the
Supreme Court reiterated the mandatory nature of the limitation
prescribed under Section 34(3) and held that delay beyond the
statutory outer limit cannot be condoned. This decision also clarifies
that where a genuine proceeding under Section 33 has been initiated,
limitation commences from the disposal of that proceeding; however,
once such proceedings stand disposed of, the statutory period under
Section 34(3) applies in full.
15.
Even in Chief Engineer, Employees’ State Insurance
Corporation v. Enarch Consultants Pvt. Ltd.6, wherein this Court,
while considering the limitation prescribed under Section 34(3), held
that once the commencement of limitation is determined, the
consequences under Section 34(3) follow inexorably and that the
period of three months together with the further period of thirty days
2 (2001) 8 SCC 470
3 (2010) 12 SCC 210
4 (2019) 13 SCC 445
5 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1060
2026:DHC:5562; O.M.P. (COMM) 529/2024
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
O.M.P. (COMM) 438/2026
19:04:09
contemplated by the proviso constitutes the maximum period within
which the Court is empowered to entertain a petition under Section 34.
16.
In the present case, the Petitioner itself proceeds on the basis
that limitation commenced from the Additional Award dated
07.08.2025. Consequently, on the Petitioner's own reckoning, the
initial period of three months expired on 07.11.2025 and the
maximum further period of thirty days contemplated by the proviso to
Section 34(3) expired on 07.12.2025.
17.
The administrative movement of the file relied upon by the
Petitioner cannot suspend, enlarge or otherwise extend the statutory
period prescribed under Section 34(3). The movement of the file
through different levels of the Government Department is an internal
administrative process of the Petitioner and cannot constitute a
circumstance altering the period of limitation prescribed by statute.
18.
Equally, even the Petitioner’s reliance upon the efforts made for
settlement under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme III was initiated only
in February 2026. The Petitioner relies upon the letter dated
20.02.2026, issued pursuant to the Ministry's guidelines dated
13.02.2026, as the commencement of the efforts to settle the dispute.
The Respondent was thereafter communicated with in this regard on
30.03.2026.
19.
Thus, the settlement efforts relied upon by the Petitioner
commenced after 07.12.2025, i.e. after the expiry of not only the
initial period of three months but also the further period of thirty days
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
O.M.P. (COMM) 438/2026
19:04:09
within which the Court could, upon sufficient cause being shown,
entertain the petition under Section 34(3). The settlement discussions,
therefore, cannot explain or account for the Petitioner's failure to
institute the petition within the statutory period.
20.
Even otherwise, the pendency of settlement discussions, by
itself, does not constitute an impediment to filing a petition under
Section 34. A party may explore an amicable resolution while
simultaneously taking steps to preserve its statutory remedy within the
period prescribed by law.
21.
In the circumstances, neither the internal administrative
processing of the matter nor the settlement efforts undertaken by the
Petitioner disclose any circumstance which prevented it from
approaching
this
Court
within
the
statutory
period.
These
circumstances may explain the sequence of events leading to the filing
of the petition, but they do not constitute sufficient cause for enlarging
the period prescribed under Section 34(3).In view of the above the
application is dismissed.
22.
The Petitioner has admittedly sought condonation of a delay of
178 days beyond the prescribed period. In view of the statutory
scheme and the settled position of law, the Court cannot extend the
limitation period beyond the maximum period contemplated under
Section 34(3). The Petitioner has consequently failed to establish
sufficient cause for condonation of the delay.
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
O.M.P. (COMM) 438/2026
19:04:09
O.M.P. (COMM) 438/2026
23.
Consequently, this petition, having been filed beyond the
statutory period prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act, is also
dismissed as barred by limitation.
24.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands dismissed.
25.
No order as to costs.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J
SEPTEMBER 17, 2026/ss
Signed By:ANUBHAV
TRIPATHI
O.M.P. (COMM) 438/2026
19:04:09
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review