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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
*
Date of decision: 18th AUGUST, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
#
CNR No. DLHC010452102022
+
O.M.P. (COMM) 478/2022
RMS AUTOMATION SYSTEM LIMITED
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr.
Ashish
Dholakia,
Senior
Advocate with Ms. Kanika Sinha, Mr.
Satyam Thareja, Mr. Subhoday and
Ms. Mehak Arora, Advocates
versus
TATA POWER DELHI DISTRIBUTION LIMITED .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sudhir Nandrajog, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Anand Kumar
Shrivastava, Ms. Ishita Jain, Mr.
Mudassir,
Ms.
Ankita
Singh,
Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
1.
The present petition has been filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (herein referred to as the ‘A&C Act’) for setting
aside of the award dated 04.08.2022, (herein referred to as the impugned
award) by way of which the Learned Arbitrator had rejected all claims of the
Petitioner on the preliminary ground that they are barred by limitation.
2.
Shorn of unnecessary details, facts leading to the filing of the present
petition are stated as under:
a. M/s RMS Automation Systems Pvt. Ltd, (herein referred to as the
‘Petitioner’) is a company incorporated under the Companies Act,
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2013, specializing in power distribution management and energy
conservation products.
b. Tata Power Delhi Distribution Limited (herein referred to as the
„Respondent’), is the successor in interest to the erstwhile Delhi
Vidyut Board (DVB) since 2002.
c. On 17.05.2000, DVB awarded a work contract to the Petitioner for
providing L.T. Load Management Systems (LTLMS) on a lease basis
for a period of 10 years and for the said purpose, a formal Lease
Agreement was executed between the parties on 25.05.2000 (herein
referred to as the Agreement).
d. As per the terms of the Agreement, the Petitioner was mandated to
install and maintain 200 and 300 KVAR LTLMS panels at various
locations across Delhi, quantified to a total number 500 and 400
respectively, on a lease basis to control load fluctuations. These
LTLMS were brought to Delhi from Nasik and due to this inter-state
movement of goods, sales tax was applicable.
e. Under the terms of the Agreement, the Petitioner was responsible for
the maintenance of the 900 installed panels for a period of 10 years
and the Petitioner’s obligation stood completed by December 2011.
f. Disputes primarily arose between the parties out of concerns
regarding unpaid invoices and the non-issuance of C-Forms under the
Central Sales Tax Act, 1856. For the final phase of the contract from
January 2011 to December 2011, the Petitioner raised invoices
totalling approximately INR 97 lakhs. It is stated that the Respondent
allegedly withheld
Rs. 68,27,825, asserting that the panels were
found to be faulty during inspections carried out between 2011 and
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late 2012. It is further stated that in addition to the above-mentioned
amount, the Respondent had also failed to discharge its obligation of
paying the government levies such as Sales Tax/ C-Form as per the
terms of the agreement.
g. As the concerned tax authorities had refused to issue C-Forms to the
Respondent, the Respondent chose to litigate for the issuance of the
same, which culminated in a Sales Tax Appeal No. 16/2008, where
the Respondent arrayed the Petitioner as a party.
h. In 2015, facing coercive measures from tax authorities, the Petitioner
approached the MSME Facilitation Council, Nashik. While the Sales
Tax Appeal was pending for adjudication, the Respondent moved an
application seeking directions to refrain the Petitioner from
approaching any other forum such as the MSME Council for relief,
arguing that the matter was sub-judice before the High Court.
i. On 11.03.2016, the High Court decided the appeal in favour of the
Respondent and directed the relevant tax authorities to issue the CForms within a period of two weeks. It is stated that on 09.08.2016,
following the judgment of the High Court, the Respondent furnished
the C-forms to the Petitioner covering the 4th quarter of 2010-11 and
the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd quarters of 2011-12 against the pending invoices
for the period of January 2011 to December 2011.
j. That even after the issuance of C-Forms by the Respondent against
the complete amount, it is the case of the Petitioner that the
Respondent failed to disburse the outstanding amount of Rs.
68,27,825/-
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k. On 23.07.2018, The Petitioner formally invoked the arbitration clause
i.e. Clause 14.2 of the Agreement and sent a notice to the Respondent
for the same. It is stated that on 19.11.2018, the Respondent replied to
the notice, alleging for the first time that the installed panels were
faulty and did not meet efficiency standards.
l. As per the terms of the Agreement, the Petitioner approached the
Institute of Engineers for the appointment of an arbitrator and Mr. RR
Garg was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the
disputes that have arisen between the parties. While a preliminary
hearing was scheduled before the arbitrator, the Respondent objected
to Mr. Garg’s appointment. Following several failed attempts at an
amicable resolution, the Petitioner again sought an appointment
through the Institute of Engineers, which the Respondent again
challenged, questioning the Institute's authority to adjudicate the
disputes between the parties.
m. Subsequently on 07.10.2021, the Petitioner filed Arbitration Petition
No. 1015/2021 under Section 11 of the A&C Act before the High
Court of Delhi and on 25.10.2021, the High Court allowed the petition
and appointed Sh. O.P. Gupta (Dist. & Sessions Judge, Retd.) as the
Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes that have arisen
between the parties.
n. It is stated that the parties filed their pleadings before the Arbitral
Tribunal, and on 27.06.2022, despite the Petitioner’s objection that
limitation was a mixed question of fact and law, the Arbitrator framed
a sole preliminary issue regarding whether the claims of the Petitioner
were within the period of limitation.
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o. On 04.08.2022, The Arbitrator passed the Impugned Award rejecting
all the claims of the Petitioner on the ground that they are barred by
limitation.
3.
Hence, the present Petition has been filed by the Petitioner
challenging the impugned award passed by the Sole Arbitrator.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
4.
It is submitted by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the issue
of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law, and the Learned Arbitrator
could not have framed a preliminary issue on this aspect. It is their case that
the same could have been determined only after an opportunity was granted
to the Petitioner to lead evidence.
5.
In addition to this, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the
Petitioner that the Learned Arbitrator has proceeded to frame the preliminary
issue on limitation on a misconceived notion that the documents of the
Respondent have been admitted by the Petitioner. In fact, it is stated by the
Petitioner that the said documents have been specifically denied by the
Petitioner, and hence the impugned award has been passed in complete
violation of principles of natural justice.
6.
On the aspect of limitation, another primary contention of the
Petitioner is that the Learned Arbitrator has ignored documents placed on
record with the Statement of Claims and the Rejoinder, which clearly reflect
the extension of limitation on account of admission of liability on the part of
the Respondents. In light of this, the impugned award has been passed by the
Learned Arbitrator is complete ignorance of Section 18 and 19 of the
Limitation Act, 1963.
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7.
It is further submitted that there was a continuous ongoing jural
relationship between the Petitioner and the Respondent in the nature of a
creditor-debtor, and the Respondent has repeatedly admitted its liability
before various forums, including this Court and the MSME Council. Before
the MSME Facilitation Council, it is stated that the Respondent admitted
liability under the Agreement in its reply dated 11.06.2015 and 30.09.2015
In the ST Appeal No. 16/2008, the Respondent stated it would suffer
irreparable loss and injury and financial hardship if C-forms were not issued,
which the Petitioner views as an admission of liability towards them. The
Petitioner further asserts that the issuance of C-forms in August 2016
constituted an acknowledgement of the transaction and the principal amount
due to the Petitioner because the invoices were composite (rentals + CST)
and the tax/C-form component was part of the total consideration.
Therefore, an admission regarding C-Forms was an admission of the entire
transaction. According to the Petitioner, the reliance by the Learned
Arbitrator on the judgements of Zion Steel v. Subtleweigh Electric (India)
Pvt Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Cal 2044 and Taipack Ltd. v. Ram Kishore
Nagar Mal, 2007 SCC OnLine Del 804 is misplaced as those dealt with
extension of limitation merely on C-Forms, whereas the Petitioner’s case
was built on repeated, clear admissions of liability before various forums.
8.
Per contra, it is the case of the Respondent that issues of
maintainability such as jurisdiction or bar on law should be decided as a
preliminary issue, especially when facts are admitted by the parties. It is also
submitted that it is the discretion of the Court/tribunal to decide if an issue
needs to be adjudicated as a preliminary issue or not. Hence, according to
the Respondent, the Arbitrator has rightly relied on the judgements of Nusli
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Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties, (2020) 6 SCC 557 and Bharat Sanchar
Nigam Ltd. and Ors. v. Nortel Networks India Pvt. Ltd., 2021 5 SCC 738 to
decide the issue of Limitation as a preliminary issue
9.
It is the case of the Respondent that contrary to the stand of the
Petitioner, according to whom payments were withheld due to non-issuance
of C-forms, the payments were actually held due to non-compliance with the
terms of the Agreement by the Petitioner. According to the Respondent, it
had carried out inspection of the panels and it was not satisfied with the
working conditions of the same qua the delivery of its mandated capacity.
The same was communicated by the Respondent to the Petitioner vide its
communications dated 16.05.2011, 30.07.2011, 01.08.2011, 21.09.2011,
31.10.2011, 01.05.2012, 10.05.2012. According to the Respondent, the last
communication between the parties regarding withholding of payment was
on 03.04.2012
10.
It is submitted by the Respondent that with respect to the issue of non-
payment of invoices raised by the Petitioner from 01.12.2010 to 30.11.2011,
the last disputed bill was raised by the Petitioner on 08.12.2011. In addition
to this, the last communication between the parties regarding deficient
panels was on 10.05.2012, and after this date, there was absolute silence
between the parties with respect to disputed bills, withholding of payment or
rectification of panels. Considering these aspects, according to the
Respondent, if the cause of action is considered to have arisen on
10.05.2012, the claims are barred by Limitation.
11.
Secondly, as per the Respondent, the issue of release of C-Forms does
not amount to admission of liability. It is submitted that the C-Form is issued
by the State tax commission in order to give tax concessions when there is
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an interstate sale. The purchaser is given the C-Form for seller to avail
concessional rates of taxation in the seller’s own home state. According to
the Respondent, it is the case of the Petitioner that as C-Form was issued to
them for the entire amount for the FY 2011-12, the entire lease rental
amount would also be disbursed to them despite the Claimant not complying
with the terms of the Agreement.
12.
According to the Respondent, it is settled law that question of C-Form
does not amount to acknowledgement of any liability and at best it only
shows existence of a jural relationship at some point of time between seller
and purchaser. By stretch of imagination, it does not acknowledge the
existence, in praesenti of a debtor-creditor relationship or the existence of a
liability on the date of the making/execution of the C-Form. Furthermore, all
the other payments for several financial years before FY 2011-12 were made
by the Respondent despite C-Forms not being issued to the Respondent. It is
thus contended that the Learned Arbitrator has rightly held that the release
of C-Forms does not amount to acknowledgment of any liability.
13.
It is the Respondent’s case that the proceedings before MSME
Facilitation Council, Nashik was only with respect to C-Forms and did not
concern with the disputed amount. On the other hand, the Petitioner
withdrew its petition before the MSME Council on receipt of the C-forms
stating that the dispute between the parties stood amicably settled.
14.
It is submitted that the Petitioner did not invoke the arbitration clause
until 23.07.2018 more than six years after the cause of action arose and
hence it makes the claims of the Petitioner deadwood.
15.
Heard the Counsels for the parties and pursued the material on record
ANALYSIS
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16.
Before this Court proceeds to analyse the merits in the present
petition, it is pertinent to revisit the scope of interference by this Court under
Section 34 of the A&C Act to an award passed by an Arbitral Tribunal.
17.
In Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2632 following relevant observations have been
made:“9. The object of the Act is to provide for a speedy and
inexpensive alternative mode of settlement of dispute
with the minimum of intervention of the courts. Section
5 of the Act is implicit in this regard and prohibits
interference by the judicial authority with the
arbitration proceedings except where so provided in
Part-I of the Act. The judicial interference, if any, is
provided inter-alia only by means of Sections 34 and
37 of the Act respectively.
10. Section 34 of the Act provides for getting an
arbitral award set aside by moving an application in
accordance with sub-Section (2) and sub-Section (3) of
Section 34 of the Act which inter-alia provide for the
grounds on which an arbitral award is liable to be set
aside. One of the main grounds for interference or
setting aside an award is where the arbitral award is in
conflict with the public policy of India i.e. if the award
is induced or affected by fraud or corruption or is in
contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law or it is in conflict with most basic notions of
morality and justice. A plain reading of Section 34
reveals that the scope of interference by the court with
the arbitral award under Section 34 is very limited and
the court is not supposed to travel beyond the aforesaid
scope to find out if the award is good or bad.
11. Section 37 of the Act provides for a forum of
appeal inter-alia against the order setting aside or
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refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section
34 of the Act. The scope of appeal is naturally akin to
and limited to the grounds enumerated under Section
34 of the Act.
12. It is pertinent to note that an arbitral award is not
liable to be interfered with only on the ground that the
award is illegal or is erroneous in law that too upon
reappraisal of the evidence adduced before the arbitral
trial. Even an award which may not be reasonable or is
non-speaking to some extent cannot ordinarily be
interfered with by the courts. It is also well settled that
even if two views are possible there is no scope for the
court to reappraise the evidence and to take the
different view other than that has been taken by the
arbitrator. The view taken by the arbitrator is normally
acceptable and ought to be allowed to prevail.
13. In paragraph 11 of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. L.K.
Ahuja, (2001) 4 SCC 86 it has been observed as under:
“11. There are limitations upon the scope of
interference in awards passed by an arbitrator. When
the arbitrator has applied his mind to the pleadings,
the evidence adduced before him and the terms of the
contract, there is no scope for the court to reappraise
the matter as if this were an appeal and even if two
views are possible, the view taken by the arbitrator
would prevail. So long as an award made by an
arbitrator can be said to be one by a reasonable
person no interference is called for. However, in cases
where an arbitrator exceeds the terms of the agreement
or passes an award in the absence of any evidence,
which is apparent on the face of the award, the same
could be set aside.”
18.
Reference is also made to the judgment of the Apex Court in OPG
Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions (India) (P)
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Ltd., (2025) 2 SCC 417, wherein the parameters of Section 34 have been
discussed elaborately:“51. As discussed above, till the 2015 Amendment the
expression “in contravention with the fundamental
policy of Indian law” was not found in the 1996 Act.
Yet, in Renusagar [Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v.
General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644] , in the
context of enforcement of a foreign award, while
construing the phrase “contrary to the public policy”,
this Court held that for a foreign award to be contrary
to public policy mere contravention of law would not
be enough rather it should be contrary to:
(a) the fundamental policy of Indian law; and/or
(b) the interest of India; and/or
(c) justice or morality.
52. In the judicial pronouncements that followed
Renusagar [Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General
Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644] , already
discussed above, the domain of what could be
considered contrary to the “public policy of
India”/“fundamental policy of Indian law” expanded,
resulting in much greater interference with arbitral
awards than what the lawmakers intended. This led to
the 2015 Amendment in the 1996 Act.
53. In Ssangyong Engg. [Ssangyong Engg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131 :
(2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 213] , this Court dealt with the
effect of the 2015 Amendment. While doing so, it took
note of a supplementary report of February 2015 of the
Law Commission of India made in the context of the
proposed 2015 Amendments. The said supplementary
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report has been extracted in para 30 of that judgment.
The key features of it are summarised below:
(a) Mere violation of law of India would not be a
violation of public policy in cases of international
commercial arbitrations held in India.
(b) The proposed 2015 Amendments in the 1996 Act
[i.e. in Sections 34(2)(b)(ii) and 48(2)(b) including
insertion of sub-section (2-A) in Section 34] were on
the assumption that the terms, such as, “fundamental
policy of Indian law” or conflict with “most basic
notions of morality or justice” would not be widely
construed.
(c) The power to review an award on merits is contrary
to the object of the Act and international practice.
(d) The judgment in Western Geco [ONGC Ltd. v.
Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 :
(2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 12] would expand the court's
power, contrary to international practice. Hence, a
clarification needs to be incorporated to ensure that
the term “fundamental policy of Indian law” is
narrowly construed. The applicability of Wednesbury
[Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v.
Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] principles
to public policy will open the floodgates. Hence,
Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii) has been
proposed.
54. After taking note of the supplementary report, the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 2015
Amendment Act, and the amended provisions of
Sections 28, 34 and 48, this Court held : (Ssangyong
Engg. case [Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd.
v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 213]
, SCC pp. 169-71 & 194, paras 34, 37-41 & 69)
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“34. What is clear, therefore, is that the expression
“public policy of India”, whether contained in Section
34 or in Section 48, would now mean the “fundamental
policy of Indian law” as explained in paras 18 and 27
of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA,
(2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] i.e. the
fundamental policy of Indian law would be relegated to
Renusagar [Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General
Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644] understanding
of this expression. This would necessarily mean that
Western Geco [ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco
International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 : (2014) 5 SCC
(Civ) 12] expansion has been done away with. In short,
Western Geco [ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco
International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 : (2014) 5 SCC
(Civ) 12] , as explained in paras 28 and 29 of
Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015)
3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , would no longer
obtain, as under the guise of interfering with an award
on the ground that the arbitrator has not adopted a
judicial approach, the court's intervention would be on
the merits of the award, which cannot be permitted
post amendment. However, insofar as principles of
natural justice are concerned, as contained in Sections
18 and 34(2)(a)(iii) of the 1996 Act, these continue to
be the grounds of challenge of an award, as is
contained in para 30 of Associate Builders [Associate
Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC
(Civ) 204] .
***
37. Insofar as domestic awards made in India are
concerned, an additional ground is now available
under sub-section (2-A), added by the Amendment Act,
2015 to Section 34. Here, there must be patent
illegality appearing on the face of the award, which
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refers to such illegality as goes to the root of the
matter, but which does not amount to mere erroneous
application of the law. In short, what is not subsumed
within “the fundamental policy of Indian law”, namely,
the contravention of a statute not linked to public
policy or public interest, cannot be brought in by the
backdoor when it comes to setting aside an award on
the ground of patent illegality.
38. Secondly, it is also made clear that reappreciation
of evidence, which is what an appellate court is
permitted to do, cannot be permitted under the ground
of patent illegality appearing on the face of the award.
39. To elucidate, para 42.1 ofAssociate Builders
[Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015)
2 SCC (Civ) 204] , namely, a mere contravention of the
substantive law of India, by itself, is no longer a
ground available to set aside an arbitral award. Para
42.2 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA,
(2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , however,
would remain, for if an arbitrator gives no reasons for
an award and contravenes Section 31(3) of the 1996
Act, that would certainly amount to a patent illegality
on the face of the award.
40. The change made in Section 28(3) by the
Amendment Act really follows what is stated in paras
42.3 to 45 in Associate Builders [Associate Builders v.
DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] ,
namely, that the construction of the terms of a contract
is primarily for an arbitrator to decide, unless the
arbitrator construes the contract in a manner that no
fair-minded or reasonable person would; in short, that
the arbitrator's view is not even a possible view to take.
Also, if the arbitrator wanders outside the contract and
deals with the matters not allotted to him, he commits
an error of jurisdiction. This ground of challenge will
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now fall within the new ground added under Section
34(2-A).
41. What is important to note is that a decision which
is perverse, as understood in paras 31 and 32
ofAssociate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA,
(2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , while no
longer being a ground for challenge under “public
policy of India”, would certainly amount to a patent
illegality appearing on the face of the award. Thus, a
finding based on no evidence at all or an award which
ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would
be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of
patent illegality. Additionally, a finding based on
documents taken behind the back of the parties by the
arbitrator would also qualify as a decision based on no
evidence inasmuch as such decision is not based on
evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also
have to be characterised as perverse.
***
69. We therefore hold, following the aforesaid
authorities, that in the guise of misinterpretation of the
contract, and consequent “errors of jurisdiction”, it is
not possible to state that the arbitral award would be
beyond the scope of submission to arbitration if
otherwise the aforesaid misinterpretation (which would
include going beyond the terms of the contract), could
be said to have been fairly comprehended as
“disputes” within the arbitration agreement or which
were referred to the decision of the arbitrators as
understood by the authorities above. If an arbitrator is
alleged to have wandered outside the contract and
dealt with matters not allotted to him, this would be a
jurisdictional error which could be corrected on the
ground of “patent illegality”, which, as we have seen,
would not apply to international commercial
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arbitrations that are decided under Part II of the 1996
Act. To bring in by the backdoor grounds relatable to
Section 28(3) of the 1996 Act to be matters beyond the
scope of submission to arbitration under Section
34(2)(a)(iv) would not be permissible as this ground
must be construed narrowly and so construed, must
refer only to matters which are beyond the arbitration
agreement or beyond the reference to the Arbitral
Tribunal.”
(emphasis supplied)
55. The legal position which emerges from the
aforesaid discussion is that after “the 2015
Amendments” in Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Section
48(2)(b) of the 1996 Act, the phrase “in conflict with
the public policy of India” must be accorded a
restricted meaning in terms of Explanation 1. The
expression “in contravention with the fundamental
policy of Indian law” by use of the word
“fundamental” before the phrase “policy of Indian
law” makes the expression narrower in its application
than the phrase “in contravention with the policy of
Indian law”, which means mere contravention of law is
not enough to make an award vulnerable. To bring the
contravention within the fold of fundamental policy of
Indian law, the award must contravene all or any of
such fundamental principles that provide a basis for
administration of justice and enforcement of law in this
country.
56. Without intending to exhaustively enumerate
instances of such contravention, by way of illustration,
it could be said that:
(a) violation of the principles of natural justice;
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(b) disregarding orders of superior courts in India or
the binding effect of the judgment of a superior court;
and
(c) violating law of India linked to public good or
public interest, are considered contravention of the
fundamental policy of Indian law.
However, while assessing whether there has been a
contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law,
the extent of judicial scrutiny must not exceed the limit
as set out in Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii).
Most basic notions of morality and justice
57. In Renusagar [Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v.
General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644] this
Court held that an arbitral award is in conflict with the
public policy of India if it is, inter alia, contrary to
“justice and morality”. Explanation 1, inserted by the
2015 Amendment, makes it clear that an award is in
conflict with the public policy of India, inter alia, if it
conflicts with the “most basic notions of morality or
justice”.
Justice
58. Justice is the virtue by which the
society/court/Tribunal gives a man his due, opposed to
injury or wrong. Justice is an act of rendering what is
right and equitable towards one who has suffered a
wrong. Therefore, while tempering justice with mercy,
the court must be very conscious, that it has to do
justice in exact conformity with some obligatory law,
for the reason that human actions are found to be just
or unjust on the basis of whether the same are in
conformity with, or in opposition to, the law [Union of
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India v. Ajeet Singh, (2013) 4 SCC 186, para 26 :
(2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 347 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 321] .
Therefore, in “judicial sense”, justice is nothing more
nor less than exact conformity to some obligatory law;
and all human actions are either just or unjust as they
are in conformity with, or in opposition to, the law [P.
Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, 6th Edn.,
Vol. III, p. 2621.] .
59. But, importantly, the term “legal justice” is not
used in Explanation 1, therefore simple conformity or
non-conformity with the law is not the test to determine
whether an award is in conflict with the public policy
of India in terms of Explanation 1. The test is that it
must conflict with the most basic notions of justice. For
lack of any objective criteria, it is difficult to
enumerate the “most basic notions of justice”. More
so, justice to one may be injustice to another. This
difficulty has been acknowledged by many renowned
jurists, as is reflected in the observations of this Court
in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Gurdip Singh Uban [State
(NCT of Delhi) v. Gurdip Singh Uban, (2000) 7 SCC
296] , extracted below : (SCC p. 310, para 23)
“23. The words “justice” and “injustice”, in our view,
are sometimes loosely used and have different
meanings to different persons particularly to those
arrayed on opposite sides. “One man's justice is
another's injustice” [Ralph Waldo Emerson : Essays
(1803-82), First Series, 1841, “Circles”]. Justice
Cardozo said:„The web is entangled and obscure, shot
through with a multitude of shades and colors, the
skeins irregular and broken. Many hues that seem to be
simple, are found, when analysed, to be a complex and
uncertain blend. Justice itself, which we are wont to
appeal to as a test as well as an ideal, may mean
different things to different minds and at different times.
Attempts to objectify its standards or even to describe
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them have never wholly succeeded.‟ (Selected Writings
of Cardozo, pp. 223-224, Falcon Publications, 1947).”
(emphasis in original)
60. In Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA,
(2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , while this
Court was dealing with the concept “public policy of
India”, in the context of a Section 34 challenge prior to
the 2015 Amendment, it was held that an award can be
said to be against justice only when it shocks the
conscience of the court [ See Associate Builders case,
(2015) 3 SCC 49, para 36 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] .
The Court illustrated by stating that where an arbitral
award, without recording reasons, awards an amount
much more than what the claim is restricted to, it
would certainly shock the conscience of the court and
render the award vulnerable and liable to be set aside
on the ground that it is contrary to justice.
61. In Ssangyong [Ssangyong Engg. & Construction
Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131 : (2020) 2 SCC
(Civ) 213] , which dealt with post the 2015 Amendment
scenario, it was observed that an argument to set aside
an award on the ground of being in conflict with “most
basic notions of justice”, can be raised only in very
exceptional circumstances, that is, when the conscience
of the court is shocked by infraction of some
fundamental principle of justice. Notably, in that case
the majority award created a new contract for the
parties by applying a unilateral circular, and by
substituting a workable formula under the agreement
by another, dehors the agreement. This, in the view of
the Court, breached the fundamental principles of
justice, namely, that a unilateral addition or alteration
of a contract can never be foisted upon an unwilling
party, nor can a party to the agreement be liable to
perform a bargain not entered with the other party [
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See Ssangyong Engg. case, (2019) 15 SCC 131, para
76 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 213] . However, a note of
caution was expressed in the judgment by observing
that this ground is available only in very exceptional
circumstances and under no circumstance can any
court interfere with an arbitral award on the ground
that justice has not been done in the opinion of the
court because that would be an entry into the merits of
the dispute.
62. In the light of the discussion above, in our view,
when we talk about justice being done, it is about
rendering, in accord with law, what is right and
equitable to one who has suffered a wrong. Justice is
the virtue by which the society/court/Tribunal gives a
man his due, opposed to injury or wrong. Dispensation
of justice in its quality may vary, dependent on person
who dispenses it. A trained judicial mind may dispense
justice in a manner different from what a person of
ordinary prudence would do. This is so, because a
trained judicial mind is likely to figure out even minor
infractions of law/norms which may escape the
attention of a person with ordinary prudence.
Therefore, the placement of words “most basic
notions” before “of justice” in Explanation 1 has its
significance. Notably, at the time when the 2015
Amendment was brought, the existing law with regard
to grounds for setting aside an arbitral award, as
interpreted by this Court, was that an arbitral award
would be in conflict with public policy of India, if it is
contrary to:
(a) the fundamental policy of Indian law;
(b) the interest of India;
(c) justice or morality; and/or is
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(d) patently illegal.
63. As we have already noticed, the object of inserting
Explanations 1 and 2 in place of earlier explanation to
Section 34(2)(b)(ii) was to limit the scope of
interference with an arbitral award, therefore the
amendment consciously qualified the term “justice”
with “most basic notions” of it. In such circumstances,
giving a broad dimension to this category [ In conflict
with most basic notions of morality or justice.] would
be deviating from the legislative intent. In our view,
therefore, considering that the concept of justice is
open-textured, and notions of justice could evolve with
changing needs of the society, it would not be prudent
to cull out “the most basic notions of justice”. Suffice it
to observe, they [ Most basic notions of justice.] ought
to be such elementary principles of justice that their
violation could be figured out by a prudent member of
the public who may, or may not, be judicially trained,
which means, that their violation would shock the
conscience of a legally trained mind. In other words,
this ground would be available to set aside an arbitral
award, if the award conflicts with such
elementary/fundamental principles of justice that it
shocks the conscience of the Court.
*****
Patent illegality
65. Sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act,
which was inserted by the 2015 Amendment, provides
that an arbitral award not arising out of international
commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the
Court, if the Court finds that the award is visited by
patent illegality appearing on the face of the award.
The proviso to sub-section (2-A) states that an award
shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an
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erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation
of evidence.
66. In ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC
705, while dealing with the phrase “public policy of
India” as used in Section34, this Court took the view
that the concept of public policy connotes some matter
which concerns public good and public interest. If the
award, on the face of it, patently violates statutory
provisions, it cannot be said to be in public interest.
Thus, an award could also be set aside if it is patently
illegal. It was, however, clarified that illegality must go
to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial
nature, it cannot be held that award is against public
policy.
67. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49,
this Court held that an award would be patently illegal,
if it is contrary to:
(a) substantive provisions of law of India;
(b) provisions of the 1996 Act; and
(c) terms of the contract [See also three-Judge Bench
decision of this Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. SAL
Udyog (P) Ltd., (2022)2 SCC 275].
The Court clarified that if an award is contrary to the
substantive provisions of law of India, in effect, it is in
contravention of Section 28(1)(a) of the 1996 Act.
Similarly, violating terms of the contract, in effect, is in
contravention of Section 28(3) of the 1996Act.
68. In Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v.
NHAI, (2019)15 SCC 131 this Court specifically dealt
with the 2015Amendment which inserted sub-section
(2-A) in Section 34 of the1996 Act. It was held that
“patent illegality appearing on the face of the award”
refers to such illegality as goes to the root of matter,
but which does not amount to mere erroneous
application of law. It was also clarified that what is not
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subsumed within “the fundamental policy of Indian
law”, namely, the contravention of a statute not linked
to “public policy” or “public interest”, cannot be
brought in by the backdoor when it comes to setting
aside an award on the ground of patent illegality [See
Ssangyong Engg. &Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI,
(2019) 15 SCC 131]. Further, it was observed,
reappreciation of evidence is not permissible under this
category of challenge to an arbitral award [See
Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI,
(2019) 15 SCC 131].
Perversity as a ground of challenge
69. Perversity as a ground for setting aside an arbitral
award was recognised in Western Geco [ONGC Ltd. v.
Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263 :
(2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 12] . Therein it was observed that
an arbitral decision must not be perverse or so
irrational that no reasonable person would have
arrived at the same. It was observed that if an award is
perverse, it would be against the public policy of India.
70. In Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA,
(2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] certain
tests were laid down to determine whether a decision of
an Arbitral Tribunal could be considered perverse. In
this context, it was observed that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something
irrelevant to the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision,
such decision would necessarily be perverse.
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However, by way of a note of caution, it was observed
that when a court applies these tests it does not act as
a court of appeal and, consequently, errors of fact
cannot be corrected. Though, a possible view by the
arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as
the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and
quality of evidence to be relied upon. It was also
observed that an award based on little evidence or on
evidence which does not measure up in quality to a
trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on
that score.
71. In Ssangyong [Ssangyong Engg. & Construction
Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131 : (2020) 2 SCC
(Civ) 213] , which dealt with the legal position post the
2015 Amendment in Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it was
observed that a decision which is perverse, while no
longer being a ground for challenge under “public
policy of India”, would certainly amount to a patent
illegality appearing on the face of the award. It was
pointed out that an award based on no evidence, or
which ignores vital evidence, would be perverse and
thus patently illegal. It was also observed that a
finding based on documents taken behind the back of
the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a
decision based on no evidence inasmuch as such
decision is not based on evidence led by the parties,
and therefore, would also have to be characterised as
perverse [ See Ssangyong Engg. case, (2019) 15 SCC
131, para 41 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 213] .
72. The tests laid down in Associate Builders
[Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015)
2 SCC (Civ) 204] to determine perversity were
followed in Ssangyong [Ssangyong Engg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131 :
(2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 213] and later approved by a
three-Judge Bench of this Court in Patel Engg. Ltd. v.
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North Eastern Electric Power Corpn. Ltd. [Patel Engg.
Ltd. v. North Eastern Electric Power Corpn. Ltd.,
(2020) 7 SCC 167 : (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 149]
73. In a recent three-Judge Bench decision of this
Court in DMRC Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express
(P) Ltd. [DMRC Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express
(P) Ltd., (2024) 6 SCC 357 : (2024) 3 SCC (Civ) 112 :
2024 INSC 292] , the ground of patent
illegality/perversity was delineated in the following
terms : (SCC p. 376, para 39)
“39. In essence, the ground of patent illegality is
available for setting aside a domestic award, if the
decision of the arbitrator is found to be perverse, or so
irrational that no reasonable person would have
arrived at it; or the construction of the contract is such
that no fair or reasonable person would take; or, that
the view of the arbitrator is not even a possible view. A
finding based on no evidence at all or an award which
ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would
be perverse and liable to be set aside under the head of
“patent illegality”. An award without reasons would
suffer from patent illegality. The arbitrator commits a
patent illegality by deciding a matter not within its
jurisdiction or violating a fundamental principle of
natural justice.”
19.
The primary grounds that have been raised by the Learned Senior
Counsel for the Petitioner, are namely, that the Learned Arbitrator was
misconceived in framing the issue of limitation as a preliminary issue, as the
same was a mixed question of fact and law, determination of the same would
have required a thorough appreciation of evidence, documentary and oral by
the Learned Arbitrator. Further, the Learned Arbitrator has wrongly held that
the issuance of C-forms does not amount to admission of liability and has
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failed to consider the ongoing jural relationship between the parties from
2012 to 2018. According to the Petitioner, all these aspects were relevant
for extending the period of limitation to invoke Arbitration.
20.
This Court will now proceed to assess the findings of the Learned
Arbitrator keeping in mind the parameters of Section 34 of the A&C Act.
21.
The learned Arbitrator has mainly relied on two judicial precedents to
decide on the issue of limitation as a preliminary issue, namely, Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Ltd and Ors. (supra) and Nush Neville Wadia (Supra).
22.
Relying on the aforesaid judgements, the Learned Arbitrator
concluded that when facts are admitted, an issue can be decided as a
preliminary issue, and such jurisdiction is granted upon the tribunal if the
preliminary issue so framed is confined to a question of law.
23.
The specific contention of the Petitioner is that as the issue of
limitation is a mixed question of fact and law, the Learned Arbitrator could
not have framed a preliminary issue on this aspect, and same could only be
decided once the Petitioner had led evidence. It is further denied that the
Petitioner had admitted the documents on the basis of which, this
preliminary issue has been framed by the Learned Arbitrator.
24.
Before this Court proceeds further, it is pertinent to refer to the Order
dated 27.06.2022 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. The same is reproduced as
under:
“Respondent has already sent affidavit of
Admission/Denial of documents. Claimant admits to
have received copy thereof.
Respondent has also sent proposed issues. While
going through the pleadings of the parties, it is
revealed that dispute relates to non-payment of part of
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the money out of invoices raised for the period January
2011 to December 2011 whereas the Claimant invoked
arbitration on 23.07.2018. The Respondent has taken
specific objection in reply to Statement of Claim that
the claim is barred by limitation. I feel that issue of
limitation is purely legal and goes to the roots of the
case. So I proposed to frame a preliminary issue of
limitation, in the first instance.
The counsel for Claimant submitted that
objection of limitation was raised by Respondent
before Hon'ble High Court in proceedings under
Section 11 Arbitration Act, the Hon'ble High Court
observed that it was unable to accept that the claims
made by Claimant were ex-facie barred by limitation.
So according to him the said plea is not to be gone
through by this Tribunal again. I am unable to agree.
In the succeeding line in Para 17 of order dated
11.10.2021 passed by Honble High Court in petition
under Section 11 Arbitration Act goes on to observed
that the plea of limitation is contentious issue and
given the standards of examination under Section 11, it
is not necessary for court to address said issue. The
same falls within the jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal.
The counsel for Claimant also submitted that the
issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact.
According to him it is necessary to record evidence. He
says that all the issues may be framed together.
According to him there are emails sent by Respondent
which has the effect of acknowledgment and extension
of limitation. I think that is the Claimant is relying
upon Certificate-C for the purpose of extension of
limitation. The Respondent has not disputed issuance
of Certificate-C. What is to be seen is the effect of
issuance of Certificate-Co The same does not require
any evidence and is purely legal. It is clarified that in
case some email comes across during arguments and
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the same is disputed by Respondent, necessary
recourse to evidence may be adopted.
Order 14 Rule 2 Sub-Rule 2 (b) CPC lays down
that if the courts think fit, it may postponed the
settlement of further issues until after the bar to the
suit created by any law is determined, The said
provision came up for interpretation before our own
Hon'ble High Court in Mohammad Yasin versus Abdul
Kalam 1987 Rajdhani Law Reporter 262. At page 265
of the report it is observed that description given to the
court under Sub-Rule 2 of order 14 Rule 2 is firstly
whether to frame a preliminary issue or not, secondly
to postpone the settlement of other issues.
In view of the above I frame the following
preliminary issue and postpone the settlement of other
issues.
1. Whether the claim is within limitation?
Adjourned to 15.07.2022 at 04:30 PM for
arguments on above issue, physically in Chamber
number 804, Lawyers Chamber, Saket Court Complex,
New Delhi.”
(emphasis supplied)
25.
A perusal of the aforesaid order passed by the learned Arbitrator
indicates that the issue of limitation was framed as a preliminary issue and
treated as a pure question of law. The basis for adopting such an approach
appears to be the specific case of the Petitioner that the cause of action stood
revived from the date of issuance of the C-Forms by the Respondent, which,
according to the Petitioner, constituted an admission of liability. Since the
date of issuance of the C-Forms was not disputed by the Respondent, the
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learned Arbitrator was essentially required to determine, at the threshold,
whether the issuance of the C-Forms could, in law, be construed as an
acknowledgment or admission of liability and, if so, whether such issuance
had the effect of extending or enlarging the period of limitation. It is in this
respect the Learned Arbitrator had proceeded to frame it as a preliminary
issue based on the principles of Order 14 Rule 2 Sub-Rule 2(b) of the CPC,
as per which, even a mixed question of fact and law, can be proceeded to be
decided as a preliminary issue, if the same can disposed of purely as a
question of law.
26.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner had placed reliance on the
judgement of the Apex Court in Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Fund v.
Neelkanth Realty (P) Ltd., (2026) 4 SCC 166 to substantiate its argument
concerning the nature of a plea of limitation. According to the Petitioner, the
question of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law
divorced from the facts of the case. It is also their case that what should be
the starting point of limitation is itself a question of fact or at best a mixed
question of fact and law.
27.
This court has perused the judgement relied upon by the learned
counsel for the Petitioner. The above judgement on which the Learned
Senior Counsel seeks to place reliance on needs to be read in its entirety.
Relevant principles arising out of the aforesaid judgement are reproduced
below:
“117. The aforesaid discussion on the position of law
prevailing in India may be summarised as follows:
117.1. The plea of demurrer is an act of objecting or
taking exception or a protest. It is a pleading made by
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one party which “assumes” the truth of the matter as
alleged by the opposite party, but sets up that it is
insufficient in law to sustain the claim, or that there is
some other defect in the pleadings which constitutes a
legal reason as to why the suit must not be allowed to
proceed further. In other words, that even assuming
those facts as pleaded are true, the court does not have
jurisdiction as a matter of law. The party raising the
plea
challenges
legal
sufficiency
of
a
complaint/plaint/action rather than its factual
accuracy.
117.2. To put it simply, a decision on demurrer has to
be determined ex facie the plaint.
117.3. The decision of this Court in Man Roland [Man
Roland Druckimachinen AG v. Multicolour Offset Ltd.,
(2004) 7 SCC 447 : (2004) 121 Comp Cas 169]
brought to the fore an important perspective — that
only certain objections are capable of being decided by
way of demurrer. Only those objections which do not
involve questions of facts nor the adducing of any
further evidence, could be decided by way of demurrer.
117.4. The rule that when a mixed question of law and
fact is decided on the basis of a demurrer, the issue
would not be permanently foreclosed was also inherent
in the decision of this Court in Indian Mineral &
Chemicals Co. [Indian Mineral & Chemicals Co. v.
Deutsche Bank, (2004) 12 SCC 376 : (2005) 123 Comp
Cas 4]
117.5. This Court in Ramesh B. Desai [Ramesh B.
Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta, (2006) 5 SCC 638 :
(2006) 132 Comp Cas 479] , was directly concerned
with the issue of limitation being decided by way of
demurrer and it directed attention to the mandate
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under Order 14 Rule 2 which provides that only if the
court is of the opinion that the case or any part thereof
may be disposed of on a pure issue of law alone, it may
try that issue first. This issue of law can very well be
whether the suit is barred by limitation or not, but,
provided that such a question of limitation is purely an
issue of law.
117.6. The parallel between an issue of limitation
raised by way of demurrer and an application for
rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d)CPC was
drawn for the first time in Ramesh B. Desai [Ramesh
B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta, (2006) 5 SCC 638 :
(2006) 132 Comp Cas 479] . Disputed questions
cannot, as a matter of rule, be decided while
considering an application filed under Order 7 Rule
11(d). What has to be decided is whether on the face of
it, the averments made in the plaint, without any doubt
or dispute, show that the suit is or is not barred by
limitation or any other law in force.
117.7. This Court in Ramesh B. Desai [Ramesh B.
Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta, (2006) 5 SCC 638 :
(2006) 132 Comp Cas 479] went on to discuss the
nature of a plea of limitation. It was stated that: (SCC
p. 652, para 19)
“19. A plea of limitation cannot be decided as an
abstract principle of law divorced from facts, as in
every case, the starting point of limitation has to
be ascertained, which is entirely a question of
fact.”
Therefore, it was reiterated that, more often than not, a
plea of limitation would be a mixed question of law
and fact. Therefore, there may arise situations wherein
it cannot be decided whether the suit could be
dismissed as barred by limitation or not without the aid
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of proper pleadings, the framing of an issue of
limitation and the taking of evidence. In other words, it
cannot be decided ex facie the plaint.
117.8. Therefore, it is inherent in the nature of a
decision as regards the rejection of a plaint that, if the
court deems it fit to not reject the plaint at the
threshold upon an examination of the averments in the
plaint, the ground that the suit is still barred by any
law can be taken by the defendant in the course of the
suit proceedings, after leading evidence.
117.9. This is because the defendant is not given an
opportunity to put forward his defence as regards the
issue that the suit is barred by any law, on record,
during the Order 7 Rule 11(d) stage. Even if he does,
the court would not look into the defendant's written
statements or any evidence which he may want to
adduce. Therefore, a decision which goes against him,
at the preliminary stage, without giving him an
opportunity to properly defend it, must not be to his
detriment. Since a plea of demurrer is akin to an
application made under Order 7 Rule 11(d), the same
principles must apply.
117.10. It cannot be said that at the stage of rejection
of plaint, the defendant-respondent chooses to waive
his right to plead and instead, adopts the course of
only testing the sufficiency of the plaint in law. At this
stage, there is no choice between either pleading or
demurring and the defendant-respondent cannot be
taken to have elected to demur instead of pleading.
This is simply because, there exists no burden of proof
on him, at that stage, to plead. He can simply pause or
wait for the plaintiff to prove the sufficiency of his
claim in law, without affecting his right to plead or
lead evidence in the future.
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117.11. In Kanhaya Lal [Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank
of India Ltd., 1913 SCC OnLine PC 4] , the Privy
Council clarified that, while the decision on the
objection or the plea raised by way of demurrer would
be given assuming that the averments of the plaint are
true, the defendant, would simultaneously reserve the
right to show that these allegations are either wholly or
partially false in the further stages of the action,
should his objection be overruled. However, insofar as
the decision on the objection which is raised as a
preliminary point is concerned, everything stated in the
plaint would be taken as true. In other words, the Privy
Council had unequivocally and clearly stated that a
decision on a mixed point of law and fact, taken by way
of demurrer, would not be foreclosed in a situation
where the party taking such a plea is unsuccessful.
117.12. The Calcutta High Court in Angelo Bros.
[Angelo Bros. Ltd. v. Bennett, Coleman and Co. Ltd.,
(2017) 203 Comp Cas 180 : 2017 SCC OnLine Cal
7682] also buttressed that when a defendantrespondent raises a plea by way of demurrer, it cannot
be said that it constitutes an admission of the facts in
the suit or the application, whose dismissal is sought
for, for all times to come. In other words, the
assumption made while seeking a decision on a
preliminary point cannot be said to have the
consequence of such an applicant forfeiting his right to
contest the case later. Such an assertion cannot be
made by adverting to the principles contained in Order
8 because a decision herein is sought for on a point of
maintainability and not on the merits of the matter.”
28.
That being said, the learned arbitrator has relied on the judgement of
the Apex Court in Nusli Neville Wadia (Supra) to derive its authority to
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frame the issue of limitation as a preliminary issue. Relevant observations
made in the Award are reproduced hereunder:
“43. In the case law submitted by counsel for Claimant
along with application to place on record additional
documents and submissions in written, filed on
28.07.2022, the counsel for Claimant relied upon
decision in Nusli Neville Wadia versus Ivory Properties
and Ors., AIR 2019 SC 5125. I have carefully gone
through said judgment. Though that judgment is on
interpretation of Section 9A inserted in CPC by
Maharashtra Amendment Act, 1977. Similar
SubSection 9A was introduced in CPC by CPC
Maharashtra (Amendment) Act, 1970 which stood
repealed by way of amendment of CPC by Central
Government in 1976. That section deals with deciding
of issue of jurisdiction as preliminary issue. The word
jurisdiction' has been defmed there under. The said
judgment also deals with scope of Order 14 Rule 2
CPC before amendment of 1976 and after amendment
of 1976. The position pertaining to scope of
preliminary issue before amendment and after
amendment have been exhaustively discussed from
para 52 onwards of the judgment. In fact, this judgment
is encyclopedia of law relating to scope of preliminary
issue.
44. In para 55 of the aforesaid judgment reference has
been made to decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Abdul Rahman versus Prasoni (2003) 1 sec 488, where
it was held that when facts are admitted, suit can be
disposed off on preliminary issue and no particular
procedure need be followed by the Court. It went to lay
down that when facts are admitted, ordinarily the issue
should be decided as preliminary issue.
45. In para 62 of the judgment, it has been observed
that it cannot be laid down as proposition of Jaw under
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Order 7 Rule 11 (d) that plaint cannot be rejected as
barred by limitation. It can be said that it is
permissible to do so mainly in a case where the plaint
averment itself indicate the case of action to the barred
by limitation and no further evidence is required to
adjudicate the issue.
46. In para 76 of the judgment towards end it has been
observed that it is open to decide preliminary issue if it
is purely a question of Jaw. I have already held above
that in the present case the Claimant has cleverly
drafted the Statement of Claim in which nothing has
been mentioned about accrual of cause of action or
starting point of limitation or extension of limitation by
acknowledgment.”
29.
It is undoubtedly correct that the question of limitation frequently
involves a mixed question of law and fact. While the applicability of the law
of limitation depends on disputed foundational facts such as the date on
which the cause of action arose, acknowledgment of liability, exclusion of
time etc., however the aforesaid proposition cannot be elevated into an
inflexible rule that every plea of limitation must invariably await completion
of trial. Whether limitation can be determined at the threshold or not would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
30.
In the present case, a perusal of the Order dated 27.06.2022 leaves
little room for doubt that the sole arbitrator has consciously examined
whether the issue of limitation would, in the facts of the present case, require
adjudication on disputed facts. After recording that the date of issuance of Cforms was not in dispute, it subsequently turned upon a singular legal
question, namely whether the issuance of C-Forms would, in law, constitute
an acknowledgement, or otherwise extend the period of limitation.
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Proceeding on this premise, the Learned Arbitrator invoked the underlying
principles embodied in Order XIV Rule 2(2)(b) of the CPC and proceeded to
frame the issue of limitation as a preliminary issue.
31.
Although the CPC does not strictly govern arbitral proceeding, it is
always the discretion of the arbitrator to draw guidance from its underlying
principles. In fact, Section 19 of the A&C Act bestows sufficient autonomy
and discretion upon the Tribunal to conduct and regulate proceedings as per
its own procedure.
32.
The reliance placed by the Petitioner on Urban Infrastructure Real
Estate Fund (supra), cannot be read as laying down an absolute proposition
that a plea of limitation is incapable of being decided as a preliminary issue
in every case irrespective of the admitted factual position.
33.
Equally apposite is the reliance placed by the learned Arbitrator upon
Nusli Neville Wadia (supra). The Apex Court has recognized that where an
issue relates to a statutory bar and the relevant foundational facts are not in
dispute, such issue may legitimately be decided as a preliminary issue. The
emphasis, therefore, is not merely upon the nomenclature of the issue but
upon whether determination thereof necessitates adjudication of disputed
facts. The learned Arbitrator applied precisely this principle while framing
the issue of limitation as a preliminary issue.
34.
Further reliance on the judgement of BSNL (Supra) is also not
misplaced wherein it has been specifically held that the issue of limitation
can be framed as a preliminary issue. The Apex Court has observed as
under:
“43. Applying the “tribunal v. claim” test, a plea of
statutory time bar goes towards admissibility as it
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attacks the claim. It makes no difference whether the
applicable statute of limitations is classified as
substantive (extinguishing the claim) or procedural
(barring the remedy) in the private international law
sense.
44. The issue of limitation which concerns the
“admissibility” of the claim, must be decided by the
Arbitral Tribunal either as a preliminary issue, or at
the final stage after evidence is led by the parties.”
35.
Significantly, the grievance urged before this Court is not that the
arbitrator lacked jurisdiction in the first place to adjudicate the issue of
limitation. Rather, the challenge is directed against the stage at which the
issue was decided. Such a challenge pertains squarely with the procedure
adopted by the Arbitrator. Once the arbitrator has exercised discretion vested
in it under Section 19 of the A&C Act, after recording cogent reasons, this
Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 cannot substitute its own
procedural preference merely because another course may also have been
possible which could led to a different outcome. In any case, the learned
Arbitrator has backed him stance with numerous judicial precedents and
reached a plausible view.
36.
It is stated that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 34 is
merely supervisory and not appellate in nature. Interference would arise only
when the procedure adopted is contrary to the agreement of the parties,
provisions of the A&C Act, principles of natural justice or so arbitrary so as
to shock the conscience of the Court. In the opinion of this Court, no such
circumstance has arisen in the present case. This Court cannot undertake a
fresh evaluation of material merely because an alternative view is possible.
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37.
In NTPC Ltd. v. Deconar Services (P) Ltd., (2021) 19 SCC 694, the
Apex Court has observed as under:
“12. Further, it is also a settled proposition that where
the arbitrator has taken a possible view, although a
different view may be possible on the same evidence,
the court would not interfere with the award. This
Court in Arosan Enterprises Ltd. v. Union of India
[Arosan Enterprises Ltd. v. Union of India, (1999) 9
SCC 449] , held as follows : (SCC p. 475, paras 36-37)
“36. Be it noted that by reason of a long catena of
cases, it is now a well-settled principle of law that
reappraisal of evidence by the court is not
permissible and as a matter of fact exercise of
power by the court to reappraise the evidence is
unknown to proceedings under Section 30 of the
Arbitration Act. In the event of there being no
reasons in the award, question of interference of
the court would not arise at all. In the event,
however, there are reasons, the interference would
still be not available within the jurisdiction of the
court unless of course, there exist a total
perversity in the award or the judgment is based
on a wrong proposition of law. In the event
however two views are possible on a question of
law as well, the court would not be justified in
interfering with the award.
37. The common phraseology “error apparent on
the face of the record” does not itself, however,
mean and imply closer scrutiny of the merits of
documents and materials on record. The court as
a matter of fact, cannot substitute its evaluation
and come to the conclusion that the arbitrator had
acted contrary to the bargain between the parties.
If the view of the arbitrator is a possible view the
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award or the reasoning contained therein cannot
be examined.”
13. From the above pronouncements, and from a
catena of other judgments of this Court, it is clear that
for the objector/appellant in order to succeed in their
challenge against an arbitral award, they must show
that the award of the arbitrator suffered from
perversity or an error of law or that the arbitrator has
otherwise misconducted himself. Merely showing that
there is another reasonable interpretation or possible
view on the basis of the material on the record is
insufficient to allow for the interference by the court
[see State of U.P. v. Allied Constructions [State of U.P.
v. Allied Constructions, (2003) 7 SCC 396] ; Ravindra
Kumar Gupta & Co. v. Union of India [Ravindra
Kumar Gupta & Co. v. Union of India, (2010) 1 SCC
409 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 130] and Oswal Woollen
Mills Limited v. Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. [Oswal Woollen
Mills Limited v. Oswal Agro Mills Ltd., (2018) 16 SCC
219 : (2019) 1 SCC (Civ) 426] ].”
38.
This Court, is therefore satisfied that the Learned Arbitrator acted
within its bounds of procedural autonomy to determine the issue of
limitation as a preliminary issue, which was without doubt preceded by a
conscious examination of the whether disputed facts survived for
adjudication of the said issue.
39.
Now, the only question which remains to be considered is whether the
issuance of C-Forms amounts to acknowledgement of liability or not.
40.
According to the Petitioner, the subsequent
correspondence
exchanged between the parties, including invoices, letters of communication
concerning issuance of C-forms would demonstrate a continuous jural
relationship between the parties. An alternative case of the Petitioner is that
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the Respondent has made admissions with respect to its liability before other
legal forums.
41.
The dates on which the communications were exchanged which
amounts to admissions as per the Petitioner are reproduced hereunder:
42.
A perusal of the Impugned Award indicates that the Sole Arbitrator
has accounted for these communications especially the communication
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dated 06.10.2012 and has come to a conclusion that mere exchange of letters
or settlement talks between the parties cannot be the basis of extending the
period of limitation. Hence, the same cannot be resorted to for establishing
continuous jural relationship between the parties. In Fact, the Apex Court in
BSNL (Supra) has made the following relevant observations:“51. The period of limitation for issuing notice of
arbitration would not get extended by mere exchange
of letters, [S.S. Rathore v. State of M.P., (1989) 4 SCC
582 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 50; Union of India v. Har
Dayal, (2010) 1 SCC 394; CLP (India) (P)
Ltd. v. Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC
185] or mere settlement discussions, where a final bill
is rejected by making deductions or otherwise. Sections
5 to 20 of the Limitation Act do not exclude the time
taken on account of settlement discussions. Section 9 of
the Limitation Act makes it clear that:“where once the
time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or
inability to institute a suit or make an application stops
it.” There must be a clear notice invoking arbitration
setting out the “particular dispute” [ Section 21 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.] (including
claims/amounts) which must be received by the other
party within a period of 3 years from the rejection of a
final bill, failing which, the time bar would prevail.”
43.
A Significant contention of the Petitioner is that the issuance of C-
Forms amounts to admission of liability, and since the same were issued to
the Petitioner in 2016, the period of limitation is to be reckoned from that
day onwards. In this light, the Petitioner is entitled to the benefits under
Section 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
44.
This Court has considered the aforesaid submission. In fact, the
impugned award deals with this issue elaboratively. A perusal of the award
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demonstrates that this contention of the Petitioner was not dismissed
cursorily, but the arbitrator has undertaken an examination of the settled
position governing the evidentiary value of C-forms. In doing so, reliance
has been placed on a catena of judgements, like Zion Steel Ltd. (Supra) and
Taipack Ltd.(Supra) which was also relied upon by the Respondent to
submit that mere issuance of C-forms does not amount to admission of
liability for purpose of determining contractual dues between the parties.
The Arbitrator has observed that C-Forms are statutory declarations under
the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act to enable a purchasing dealer to
avail concessional rates of tax. It is a intrinsically connected with
compliance under the fiscal statue, however, in absence of any independent
acknowledgement or admission, the C-Form, cannot be elevated to the status
of an acknowledgement of liability.
45.
This Court has perused the catena of judgements relied on by the
Learned Arbitrator and is of the view that C-form does not, ipso facto,
constitute an acknowledgment of liability, but it is equally not correct to
suggest that it is incapable of having any evidentiary relevance whatsoever.
46.
This distinction assumes particular significance in the present
proceedings. The learned Arbitrator was not called upon merely to
determine whether C-Forms had been issued by the Respondent. The issue
before the learned Arbitrator was whether, having regard to the nature and
contents of those C-forms and the other material placed on record, they
constituted an admission of the specific contractual liability asserted by the
Petitioner. The learned Arbitrator has dealt with this contention at length and
has considered the judicial authorities relied upon by both sides. The finding
is, therefore, not one rendered mechanically or upon a cursory rejection of
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the Petitioner's case. A perusal of the impugned Award demonstrates that the
learned Arbitrator has specifically considered the evidentiary character of
the C-forms and has proceeded on the basis its issuance establishes a
transaction at some point, but does not, without more, establish the
subsistence of a liability.
47.
This Court has examined the reasoning adopted by the sole arbitrator,
and finds no infirmity warranting interference under Section 34 of the A&C
Act. The view taken by the Arbitrator is founded upon sound legal principles
backed by judicial precedents. Merely because the Petitioner seeks to
attribute a different legal consequence to the issuance of C-forms backed by
its own distinct set of judicial precedents cannot be a ground for this Court
to substitute its own interpretation for that adopted by the Arbitrator,
particularly when the interpretation is both plausible and legally sustainable.
In fact, this Court has independently perused the judgements relied upon by
the Sole arbitrator and is satisfied with its reasoning that the issuance of the
same does not ipso facto determine the liabilities of the contracting parties.
48.
The subsequent decision of this Court in Rattan India Power Ltd. v.
BHEL, (2025) 1 HCC (Del) 306 is particularly relevant in this regard. The
Court held that while a C-Form does not by itself constitute an
acknowledgment of liability, it may nevertheless be relied upon along with
other circumstances for determining whether an implied admission exists.
Significantly, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, this Court declined to interfere with
the Tribunal's conclusion where the C-forms constituted only one of the
factors which had been weighed by the Tribunal in arriving at its finding. In
the present case, as no surrounding circumstances apart from the issuance of
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C- Forms could be established by the Petitioner, the Learned Arbitrator has
rightly held that mere issuance of C-Forms would not amount to admission
of liability.
49.
Appreciation of pleadings, assessment of evidence, including
interpretation of documents, lie within the domain of the arbitral tribunal. It
is for the tribunal to assess the weight to be given to any piece of evidence,
and to adjudicate upon the sufficiency of evidence. Interference with the
factual findings of an arbitral tribunal is justified only if it is based on no
evidence at all, or if material evidence has not been adverted to, or the
conclusions arrived at are manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary, in the sense
that no reasonable tribunal could have reached the same conclusion. As the
Court does not exercise appellate jurisdiction, it will not set aside an award,
even if it perceives that a different view was possible, on a reading of the
pleadings, appreciation of the evidence, or even in understanding of the
relevant legal position.
50.
With respect to the plea of Section 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act,
1963, a perusal of the Impugned Award indicates that it has been observed
by the Learned Arbitrator that as the plea for extension of limitation under
Section 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has not been raised by the
Petitioner in its Statement of Claim, the benefit of the same cannot be
extended to the Petitioner by pleading the same at a later stage in its
rejoinder.
51.
Relevant observations made by the Arbitrator on this aspect is
reproduced hereunder:
“40. The Counsel for Respondent went on to urge that
Section 5 to 20 of the Limitation Act provides different
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situations in which limitation is extended. The
Claimant has to plead specifically one of those section
as to under which the limitation is extendable, in his
case. He submitted that now the Claimant is trying to
seek extension of limitation on the basis of
acknowledgment which is covered under Section 18
Limitation Act, 1963, by way of para 4 of Rejoinder in
which it has referred to issue of Form-e amounting to
acknowledgment. But the Claimant has not pleaded the
same in Statement of Claim and so it cannot rely upon
the same now.
41. In support of his submissions he relied upon para
38 of decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Ltd. and Ors. versus Nortel Networks
India Pvt. Ltd. AIR 2021 SC 2849. It was observed in
the said para that unless, there is pleaded case
specifically adverting to the applicable section, and
how it extends the limitations from the date on which
the cause of action originally arose, there can be no
basis to save the time of limitation.
42. The counsel for Claimant could not satisfactorily
answer the above objection. She urged that since
Respondent is referring to documents viz invoice,
email, it becomes a mixed question of fact and law.
Hence, the same should not be decided as a
preliminary issue. Rather the same should be taken up
along with other issues at final stage after recording
evidence.”
52.
While observing so, the arbitrator has also taken a view that the
Petitioner had cleverly drafted its Statement of Claim devoid of any
averments with respect to an accrual of any cause of action, starting point of
limitation or extension of limitation by acknowledgment of liability.
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53.
This Court has perused the aspect of Section 18 and 19 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. These provisions, without doubt, do not operate
automatically. In fact, they are mixed questions of fact and law. That being
said, the applicability of the aforesaid provisions depends upon the factual
stratum such as date, nature and contents of the alleged acknowledgement. It
has been observed by the Learned Arbitrator that the plea of Section 18 and
19 was only taken up at a later stage in the rejoinder, and not before that. It
is not alien to legal practice that while a rejoinder is intended to traverse new
facts pleaded in the statement of defence, the same cannot be used to
introduce an entirely new cause of action. Additional pleadings raised in the
rejoinder cannot form a part of the Statement of Claim. At best, the
Petitioner could have sought for an amendment of its statement of claim
which it failed to do.
54.
In light of the procedural autonomy bestowed upon an Arbitral
Tribunal under section 19 of the A&C Act and in light of the scope of
section 19 as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, this court is of the view
that no interference is warranted on this aspect in light of the settled position
of law.
55.
Insofar as the Petitioner's submission regarding alleged admissions
made by the Respondent before other fora is concerned, the Petitioner has
referred to the application filed by the Respondent in the Sales Tax Appeal
No. 16 of 2008, wherein according to the Petitioner, there is a clear
admission of liability. Per contra, it is the case of the Respondent that once
the C-forms were supplied to the Petitioner, the disputes between the parties
stood resolved. For this purpose, the learned Counsel for the Respondent has
brought before the knowledge of this Court a communication dated
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16.11.2016, wherein it was the case of the Respondent that through this
communication, the Petitioner has explicitly admitted that there is nothing
left in the matter. The same has also been considered by the Arbitrator. For
the sake of reference, the relevant communication is reproduced hereunder:
“SUBJECT: - PETITION NO. 54/2015 FILED BY RMS
AUTOMATION SYSTEMS LIMITED
REF.:- Letter dated 12th May, 2016 submitted by RMS
Automation Systems Ltd. to the Hon'ble Micro and
Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Nashik
Division
Dear Sir,
1. We, RMS Automation Systems Limited (hereinafter
referred to as “RMS”), write to your good offices in
furtherance of our earlier correspondence dated 12th
May, 2016 (letter Enclosed) and in furtherance of
proceedings dated 12th May, 2016 in our Petition No.
54/2015.
2. On 12th May, 2016, we had submitted to your good
offices (by way of letter and oral submissions) that
once we obtain the C-Forms, the dispute in the Petition
would be resolved amicably and we would accordingly
withdraw the Petition.
3. We are pleased to inform you that, on account of this
Hon'ble Council's indulgence in our Petition, TPDDL
(Tata Power Delhi Distribution Limited) has provided
us the C-Forms relevant to the dispute in the Petition.
4. With the receipt of these C-Forms from TPDDL, the
dispute, in Petition No. 54/2015, between RMS and
TPDDL stands resolved amicably and nothing further
remains to be done in the matter.
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5. Now that our dispute is resolved, we state that we
wish to withdraw the Petition filed by us in Petition No.
54/2015. Accordingly we request that your good offices
may kindly order that the Petition in Petition No.
54/2015 has been withdrawn because the dispute has
been resolved amicably, and nothing further remains in
the matter. We also request that no further proceedings
be held in the matter as the same are no longer
necessary.
6. Being SSI unit, we are thankful to you for your kind
consideration and constant support till date.”
56.
The Petitioner, before this Court, essentially seeks a different
inference to be drawn from the same material.
57.
Where the same evidentiary material is capable of being interpreted in
more than one manner, the mere fact that the Petitioner seeks to persuade
this Court to adopt an interpretation different from that adopted by the
learned Arbitrator cannot, by itself, furnish a ground for interference under
Section 34 of the A&C Act. The Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Section 34, is not called upon to determine whether the view adopted by the
Arbitral Tribunal is the only possible view. The inquiry is whether the view
adopted is a plausible and legally permissible view on the material available
before the Tribunal.
58.
When this Court pointed a specific question and asked the learned
Counsel for the Petitioner as to whether the Petitioner sought for the due
amount from the Respondent before the MSME Council, when it was
always open for the Petitioner to raise the same, the answer was in the
negative. It appears that nothing prevented the Petitioner from raising the
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claim before the MSME Council along with the issue of C-Form. Further,
nothing has been produced in the reply before the MSME Council or during
the proceedings before this Court that would show that there is a mutual
understanding between the parties that only on the issuance of C-Forms
would the question of release of due payments by the Respondent would
arise. In light of the fact that there is no material on record that would show
any form of acknowledgement of liability by the Respondent, the plea of
Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 goes for a toss. In the opinion of this
Court, C-Form is only for ascertaining the tax liability of any seller in a
interstate transaction. The fact that C-Form has or has not been issued does
not amount to an acknowledgment that any amount is due and payable.
There is no bar that without the issuance of C-Form, a seller cannot, in the
alternative, demand the due amount payable to it under the terms of the
contract. In the opinion of this Court, the entire case of the Petitioner that till
the issue C-Form was not resolved, the Petitioner could not have raised its
claim of due amount is bereft of any merit and is rightly rejected by the
Arbitral Tribunal.
59.
The mere existence of the C-Forms cannot, in the circumstances of
the present case, supply this missing link. As noticed hereinabove, the
issuance of C-forms may establish the underlying commercial transaction
and may have evidentiary relevance in determining the dealings between the
parties. However, the same does not, without more, establish that a
particular sum remained outstanding or that the Respondent had
unequivocally acknowledged its liability to pay such amount.
60.
This Court is particularly conscious that the power under Section 34 is
supervisory and not appellate in nature. The Court cannot substitute its own
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evaluation of the evidence for that of the Arbitral Tribunal merely because
the Court may, on an independent examination of the record, be inclined to
attach a different degree of weight to a particular document. Interference is
warranted only where the conclusion of the Arbitral Tribunal is such that it
cannot reasonably be sustained on the material before it or where the
Tribunal has reached to a conclusion without any evidence.
61.
In light of the principles set out above with respect to the scope of
interference of this Court under Section 34 of the A&C Act along with the
analysis done subsequently on merits, this court is of the opinion that no
grounds have been made out warranting interference by this Court.
62.
Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed, with pending
applications, if any.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
AUGUST 18, 2026
VG
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