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I ss00 ]
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTY FIFTH DAY OF FEBRUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION NO: 35604 OF 2025
Between:
RISHI KANTH NARESH BETHA, son of Betha Mailesh, aged about 37 years,
occupation Private Employee (Ex-Serviceman), resident of plot No.1 1 ,
TNGO'S Colony, cachibowli, Hyderabad, TS - 500 032
...PETITIONER
AND
1. THE SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENT BOARD, represented by its Chief
Executive Officer, Office at Court Compound, S.P. Road, Secunderabad, TS 500 003
2. RAMALINGAM RAJASHEKARAN, son of Ramalingam, aged about 63 years,
Occupation Business, resident of H. No- 2-6-1, Sikh Road, Sikh Village,
Secunderabad, TS - 500 009
...RESPONDENTS
Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of lndia praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased
to grant a Writ, Order or Direction, more particularly one in the nature of Mandamus
Writ of Mandamus
(a) declaring the inaction on part of the Respondent No. 1 in considering the
representations daled 2O.02.2025, 03.03.2025 & 30j02025 and taking action
against the illegal encroachment, unauthorized structures and fencing erecled by the
Respondent No. 2 on the ingress and egress of the Petilioner through the 15 feet
public lane, situated on the northern and western side of the House bearing
No.2-6-1, running from East to West and turning towards South, situated at Sikh
Village, Secunderabad Cantonment, as illegal, arbitrary, violative of the judgment
passed in 0.5. No. 1182 of 1992 as confirmed in A.S. No. 141 ot 1997, provisions of
the Cantonrnents Act, 2006 and Articles 14, 19,21 and 300-4 of the Constitution of
lndia
(b) to direct the Respondent - No. 1 to forthwith remove the illegal
encroachment, unauthorized structures and fencing erected by the Respondent No.
2 on the ingress and egress of the Petitioner through the 15 feet public lane, situated
on the northern and western side of the House bearing No. 2-6-1, running from East
to West and turning towards South, situated at Sikh Village, Secunderabad
Cantonment
(c) to maintain the said public lane i.e. 15 feet public lane, situated on the
northern and western side of the House bearing No. 2-6-i, running from East to
West and turning towards South, situated at Sikh Village, Secunderabad
Cantonment, to ensure that there are no obstructions whatsoever in the usage of the
public lane by the Writ Petitioner or the public in general.
l.A. NO: 1OF 2025
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the
affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to direct the
Respondent No. 1 to forthwith initiate action in accordance with the Cantonment Act,
to remove the illegal encroachment, unauthorized structures and fencing erected by
the Respondent No. 2 on the ingress and egress of the Petitioner through the .15 feet
public lane, situated on the northern and western side of the House bearing
No.2-6-1, running from East to West and turning towards South, situated at Sikh
Village, Secunderabad Cantonment.
l.A. NO: 2 OF 2025
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the
affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to direct the
Respondent No. 1 to consider the representation dated 30.1O.ZO2S submitted by the
writ Petitioner herein and file Action Taken Report before this Hon'ble court in time
bound manner, pending disposal of the writ petition.
Counsel for the Petitioner: SRI M.HAREESH KUMAR, REp.
SRI ZEESHAN ADNAN MAHMOOD
Counsel for the Respondent No.1: SRI K.R.KOTESWERA RAO,
ST. SC FOR CANTONMENT
Counsel for the Respondent No.2: SRI P.VENUGOpAL, Sr. COUNSEL, asst. by
SRI CH.JAYA KRISHNA
The Court made the following: ORDER
----- ,7
t)
IN THE HIGH COI'RT OF WDICATURE FOR TTIE STATE OF
TELANGANA
HON'BLE SRI .'USTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAXA
WRIT PETITION No. 356O4 OF 2O2s
25.O2.2026
Betweea:
Rishi Kanth Naresh Betha
..-. Petitioner
And
The Secunderabad Cantonment Board,
Rep. by its Chief Executive Officer & another
Respondents
ORDER:
Heard Sri M. Hareesh Kumar, learned counsel
representing Sri Zeeshan Adnan Mahmood, learned counsel for
Petitioner, Sri K. R. Koteswara Rao, learned Standing Counsel for
Respondent No. 1, Sri. P- Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel assisted
by Sri Ch. Jaya Krishna, learned counsel for Respondent No.2-
2.
It is the case of Petitioner that he is the owner of H. No'
2-6-7 18, admeasuring 65.55 Sq. Yards or 54.34 Sq Meters situated
at Sikh Village, Secunderabacl Cantonment, Telangar-ra having
inherited t]-e same from his father Betha Mallesh, who expired on
20.06.2015. The said Mallesh purchased the same from Ganta
Sangeetha, wife of Ganta Rana Pr'akash Yadav by virtue of a
registered Sale Deed dated 19.09.2OO2 bearing document No' 1425 of
&-:.-
2OO2 of tlre oltce of Sub Registrar, Bowenpally.
,)
Ir is rhe further case of peritioner that in 1992, their
prt'deccssor-in tirlc viz. Ganta Sangeetha hled O.S. .No. l lg2 ot 1992
on rhc filc Of thc I Assistant Judge, City Civil Courts, Secunderabad
against thc fathcr of the Respondent No.2 by name Capt.
Ramalingam, seeking perpetual injunction contending that he is
inlcrfering with the ingress and egress from the 15 feet pubtic road.
Thc father of Respondent No. 2, being the sole Defendant in the
aforesaid suit, had taken an identical stand as talen by Respondent
No. 2 in thc present proceedings and contended that the passage in
qu('stion u.as a private passage which was being used by them for
clcaning thc septic tank. The Civil Court had frarned an issue as to
whether the suit property is a public passage and plaintiff is entitled
for perpetual injunction as prayed for?
2.'2.
It is further contended that civil Court had a:lswered the
issut: in tht: affirmal ive and held as follows:
' .. I therefore conclude on this issue the suit property is a
pu blic passagt' and the Plaintiff and the general public will have got
righl of access through this passage_..',
2.3.
Aggrievcd by the Judgment and Decree in the above suit,
A.S No. 141 ol l99i' rvas preferred by the father/ predecessor-in_title
of Rt,spondent No. 2 namely Capt. Rarnalingam before the I Additional
Chiel Judge. City Civil Courts at Secunderabad and the sarne was
also dismissed on 05.O9.20O3. petitioner contended that despite the
Ordcr of injunction, Respondent No- 2 made constructlons wlthout
an-y )ermission on the public passage/road. petitioner thereforc, is
,,,
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stated to have submitted representations to Respondent No. I on
22.02.2025, 03.05.2025 and 03.10.2025 complaining of the illegat
acts of Respondent No. 2, who, in order to circumvent his illegal acts,
Irled Writ Petition No. 6231 of 2025 with a fa_lse and baseless prayer
by suppressing a-II these facts, and is tr5,rng to re-agitate the issue
which has already been settled try the civil Court.
3.
I-earned counsel for petitioner after reiterating the
pleadings, took this Court to the Judgment in O.S. No. ll82 of 1992,
in detail, by showing this Court the contertion of
the
father/ predecessor in title of Respondent No. 2 in the suit which is
nearly identical to his case in the present proceedings, the issue
framed by the Civil Court and the ultimate decision rendered by the
Civil Court. He vociferously contended that once the civil Court has
decided the issue and categoncally held that ttre subject lane is a
public lane and the said judgment has attained finality on the
dismissal of the appeal against it, it is the statutory duty on the part
of Respondent No. 1 to ensure ttrat access to the said lane is not
restricted in any malner and there is no construction made on the
said public lane. Placing reliance on the photographs and the
representations dated 2O.O2.2O25, 03.03.2025 and 30.10.2O25 given
by Petitioner, it is contended that there is a clear dereliction of duty
by Respondent No. 1, as such, Petitioner was constrained to file the
present Writ Petition.
4.
Learned Standing Counsel for Respondent No. 1
contended that the Board would abide by the Judgment and Decree in
)
+
O.S. No. 1182 of L992 and take all the necessa_rJr
steps to ensure that
public lane is protected from all the encroachments
and would further
ensure that access to the pubric la,e is not restricted
in anv ma,ner
whatsoerrer
5.
Learned Senior Counsel Sri. p. Venugopai, based
on the
counter-afhdavit, argued that petitioner is seeking ,,enforcement
judgment" (o. S. No 1 i82 of 1992) alter the
of a
rimitation period for filing
an Execution Petition expired; writ cannot bypass the Limitation
It is further contendcd that though the simple injunctron
decreed in 1992, since petitioner failed to file
suit was
an Executlon petition
wlthin time, they c:mnot now move to the High Court.
According to
learned Scnior Counsel, Writ petition is not maintainable
Arlicle 226 because it involves serious and substantial
questions of fact regarding existence of public
under
disputed
lane and ingress/egress
rights, which require cogent evidence before the common
law court. It
is asserted, btrrden is on petitioner to prove ,,private property,,
''public lane vi:
5.1.
is a
a cir il suit.
Reference is made
to the judgment of [he Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Gout. of Ind.ia u. p. Venkolteshr,
unless representatiolt is traced to a statute, it cannot
5.2.
Act.
to contend that
be considered.
Learned Senior Counsel argued that Respondent
clarms his grardfather purchased the property
Fasli) and obtained building permission. He
No.2
in an auction (1340
explicitly avers that ,,there
is no public place or lar-re therein, and the entire property
rs a private
' 12oto; ts scc 613
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property". It is clarmed, Section 261 (regarding boundary
wa,11s/fences) is misquoted and inapplicable. He relies on 1997 letter
from the Cantonment Board stating they do not maintain land records
for Sikh Village to assert the lale in question is a private [ane.
6.
Learned counsel for petitioner has very articulately
repelled each of the contentions advanced by the learned Senior
Counsel. It is argued that the Decree passed by the civil Court on
merits ih 1992 categorically established the legal status ofthe land as
a "public passage-" This declaration does not expire. Further, by
reading the proviso of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, it was
contended that period of limitation for execution of decrees would not
apply to decrees of perpetual injunction. According to learned
counsel, there are no disputed questions of fact in the prescnt case.
The status of the land was conclusively adjudicated in O.S. No. 1182
of 1992 after a full-fledged trial. Reference is rnade to Para No. 13 of
the judgrnent, wherein the competent Civil Court held as follows:
".., As such the contention of the defendant that this dispured lane is
exclusively belong to him is not at all established. Further more his own
document speaks that it is a public lane. I the.efore conclude on this issue the
suit property is a public passage and th€ Plaintiff and the general public rvill
have got right of access through this passagc".
.
It is further contended that A.S. No. 141 of 1997 was
also dismissed on O5-09.20O3. Thus, the judicial finding that the lale
in question is a public larte has attained finality. lrarned counsel
vehemently contended tllat there is no provision in law requiring a
hnding given by the competent civil Court to be reconfirmed by hling a
subsequent suit. as srrch, the contention that petitioner
approach the ci,.,il Court the second time is wholly
shoulcl
untenable and
unknou.rr to law.
.1.
It is further contended that petitioner is not merely
asking for his representations to be disposed of;
mandamus to compel the Board to perform its
he is seeking a
statutory duty under
Section 26 1 of the Cantonments Act, 2O06,
to remove encroachments
from a public lane (as declared by the civil
Court) in ttre cantonment
area and further praver is sought to ensure
that ingress and egress
from the public road is not obstructed. According
judgment of the lJon,ble Apex Court
to him, the
referred to above, in fact, is in
Iar.our of Petitiont:r as this Court has righfly
followed the procedure
enumerated therein ancl instead of disposing
admission stage, has rightly called for a
Respondents and heard thc matter on
of the case at the
counter to be filed by
mefits. Therefore, reliarce
placed on p. Venkatesh (suprd.)is to the petitioner,s
advantage and
not uice-uersa.
7.2.
It is further contended that the claim of Respondent
No.2 is false based on hrs own flow of title.
1538 of 1979 executed in favour of his
SaIe Deed bearing Doc. No.
mother, M.R. Saroja. Schedule
of Property lists ,l,ane' as the boundaqz on the
thereby proving that the lane is extemal
to his plot. The plan
sanctioned by the Car-rtonment Board (CBR
10.01. 198O) shows IS_feet passage
North and West,
No. SC (2g) dated
as ,,Road/1ale,, bordering his
(
propertyr not part of it. Furthermore, the competent civil Court in
Judgment dated 1 1.O8. 1997 in O.S. No. 1182 of 1992 held that:
"Further more his own document speaks that it is a public lane.._-".
7.3.
It is further contended that Respondent No. 2 is guilty of
suppression of facts as he has deliberately not filed the Sale Deed
bearing Doc. No. 1538 of 1979 in his counter, which shows that lane
is public lane. Section 261 of the 20O6 Act is directly applicable
because Respondent No.2 has erected unauthorized fencing and
structures on a public lane. The Board has the power to remove
fences and structures that are unsuitable or encroach on public land
falling under the Cantonment area. Reliance placed by Respondent
No. 2 on a purported letter, \trritten 2 months after passing of the
Judgment by the civil Court apart from being self-serving is wholly
untenable. No statutory authority can sit in appeal over the judgment
passed by the civil Court. Once the civil Court has held that the lane
in question is a public lare, only a Court of Appeal/superior
jurisdiction can set asidc the hnding. When the Appeal itself has been
dismissed, the question of placing reliance on a letter to overcome the
judgment of the civil Court is unknown to law and cannot be
countenanced.
8.
This Court has considered the argumenLs on behalf of
Petitioner ald Respondents has also gone through the complete
record and finds considerable force in the submissions advanced by
lear{ed counsel for Petitioner Insofar as the contention that Writ
\
Pctition cannot bypass the Limitation Act and that since no Execution
Petition was filed wrthin 12 years, therefore, the Writ Petition is in the
form of an Execurion Petition is concerned, the same cannot be
accepted. As rightly contended by Petitioner, as pcr the proviso to
Article 136, therc is no period of limitation prescribed for execution of
perpetual injunction decrees. Article 136 of the Limitation Act is
extracted hereunder:
I]6
tor the exc.ulron ol any decree
(othcr than x dccrce granlrng a
manda(or\ rntun.honl or ordcr o[
When thc decree or order beco tes
enforceablc or whe.e thc decree or any
subsequent order dtects any payment
of money or the delivery of any
popert! 10 bc made at a certarn date of
at recunins pcnods, when default rn
making thc payment or delivery in
respcct of whjch executron is soughL,
lakes place
Providcd that an application for lhe
enforcemcnt or executlon of a decrec
granling a perpetual injunctron shall
nor bc subtect to any penod of
hmitation
(Emphasis supplied)
Furthcr, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhudeu Mallick
alias Bhudeb Mallick u. Ranajit Ghoshq.Iz, held as follows
''41... The decrcc for permanent inJunclion can be enforccd or becomes
enforceable rvhcn Lhe judgment debtor. rries to disturb the peaceful possession of
Lhc decree holder or Lrics to dtspossess Lhc dccree irolder in some manncr or the
other or creates obsrruction in the pcaceful enjoyment of the property over
lvirich he has a dcclararion ol utle from rhe civil court in the form of a decree.+2. ht thc albresaid contexL, wc ma] refer- to Article 136 of the
Limitation
Act. I963 rvhich rcads lhus:
43. l'he proviso to Scction 136 of the Limitation Act referred to above
makes it [urthcr c]ear th:rt fot- che enforccment or execution of a decree granting
a perpetual injuncLion shall not be subjccr to any period of limitation.',
'roT SCC Online SC 36O
10.
Therefore, the contention that the present Writ Petition
is a vague attempt to revive a non-executable decree is wholly
misconceived and is rejected.
[n so far as the submission of Respondent No. 2 tiat
11.
Writ Petition is not maintainable since disputed questions of facts are
involved and Petitioner ought to have invoked the common law
remedy is concerned, the same cannot be accepted. As rightly
contended by learned counsel for Petitioner, there is no requirement
in larv to seek conhrmation of the decree passed by the civil Court by
hling another suit. Once civil Court, after a fullfledged trial by
exarnining the evidence and pleadings threadbare, has framed a
categorical issue and conclusively decided that the lane in question is
a public tane and Judgment of the trial Court has been conhrmed in
appeal, there is no need for Petitioner to once again approach civil
Court for the sarne relief. The contention of Respondent No.2 is
directly in the teeth of the principles of res-judicata and is therefore,
rejected.
Respondent No. 2 placed relialce on the judgment of the
L2.
Hon'ble Apex Court in P. Venkatesh's case (supra), in particular,
Para No. 8, which is extracted hereunder:
This 'disposc of the reprcsentation" mantra is increasingly
permeating the judicial process in the Hlgh Courts and the Tribunals- Such
orders may make for a quick or easy disposal of cases in overburdened
"8.
adjudicatory institutions. But, they do no service to the cause of justicc The
litigant rs back again before the court, as this case shows, having incurred
attendant costs and suffered delays of the legal process. This would have been
otriated by calling for a counter in the lirst instance, thereby resutting in linatity
,1
,/
/
t0
"""r"
th' time the High Court issuc(l its direction
frd elapsed since the date o[ the
t*""O'-"e years
on 9 a 2016'
employee''
A readrng of the said
13.
para makes it crystal clear that
the
of disposing of the
Court deprecated the prac(ice
Supreme
Honble
Orders directing
admission stage by passing
the
at
Writ Petitions
in the present case' this
However'
representations
consideration of
Hon'ble Supreme Court'
of the Judgment of the
conscious
Court being
and
to Respondents to frle their counters
opportunity
an
has aJlorded
procedure as adopted
hearing in the matter. The
detailed
a
conducted
the Hon'tle
the procedurc prescribcd by
with
Iine
in
is
by this Court
in P' Venkatesh (supra) is of
Judgment
the
Therefore'
Supreme CourtNo 2'
no aid to Re spondent
by Respondent No' 2
other contentions advanced
The
t4.
by the
public lar-re ' have been decided
thc
over
<:laim
his
pertaining to
opened by way of a collateral
and the same cannot be
civil Court
present proceedings
cha,llenge in thc
Therefore' the contendons
trying to re-agitate the issue
Counsel
Senior
learned
aclvanced by
a:ry merit and are
by the civil Court are without
decided
conclusivelv
therefore, rejected'
15.
Petifloner contends that Respondcnt
261 of thc
statutory duty under Section
Cantonments Act' 2006 to
free ingress
protect a public lane and ensure
Section 261 of the Cantonments
No 1 has a
and egress therefrom'
Act is extracted hereunder'
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''261. Boundary u,alls, hedges aj]d fences.-(l) No boundary wall, hedge or
fence of any matcrial or descriptron shall be erected in a cantonment without the
permission in writing oI t].e Chief Executive Offtcer.
(2) The Chief Executive Officer may, by noticc in writing, require the owner
or lessee o[any land in the cantonment
(a) to remove from the land any boundary wall, hedge or fence which is in
his opinion unsuitable, unsightly or other('ise objcctronable; or
(b) to construct on the land sufficient boundary walls, hedges or fences of
such material, description or dimensions as may be specilied in the notice; or
(c) to maintain the boundary walls, hedges or fences of such lands in good
order:
Provrded that in the case of any such boundary wall, hedge or fence which
was erected with the consent or under the orders of the Chief Executive Ofhcer
or which was in existence at the commencement of this Act, the Board shall
make compensarion for any damzrge caused by the rcmoval thcreof
(3) Thc Chiet Executive Officer may, by notice ln u'riLing, rcquire the owner,
Iessee or occupier of any such land to cut or trim any hedge on the land in such
manner and within such time as may be specificd in thc notice."
At ttre cost of repetition, once the cit'tl Court has
i6.
categorically held the lane in question to be a public lane, this Court
in exercise of its plenary jurisdiction under Article 226 would not reexzunine the issue or denude the judgrnent of the civil Court in any
manner. Once it is established that lane in question is a public lane,
Respondent No. I Cantonment Board has statutory duty to ensure
that public lane is not encroached and that ingress and egress from
public lane is not hindered /obstructed in any manner. As rightly
conLended by learned counsel for Petitioner, Petitioner has sought a
mandamus compelling the statutory duty of Respondent No. I under
Section 26 I.
Petitioner has shown existence of a legal right
l7
1.
e.
existAce of a public lane declared by the civil Court and confirmed in
)
)
Appeal, nor.r-pcrformance of a statutory duty, which is evident from
thc photograplrs, u,trich clcarly show that l:rne has becn encroached
:rnd ingress rrnd cgress is being restricted, has sensitized the
authorities by grving represcntations dated 20.O2.2O25, 03.03.2025
and 3O.10.2025 clearll' stating the facts aforementioned and
Respondent No. I Board has, admittedly, n()t taken any action on the
said represen tation s. Learned Standing Counsel for Respondent No. 1
has lairly contenderl that it would abide by the decision rendered by
thc ciwil Court and u'ould take aJ[ necessary actions to ensure that
encroachment in public lane is removed and furttrer ensured that
there is no o bstruction / hinclrance in the ingress and egress from the
public lane. Therefore, this Court holds that Petitioner made out a
clcar case for grant of mandamus.
I8.
Roads. public streets, lanes etc., are not matters of
private convenience but the very arteries o[ urban life, dcdicated to
thc use of pubhc at large. Thcy exist ro secure safe and unobstructed
movement for all persons, including children, senior citizens and
persons with disabilities, whose ability to access the city with safety
and dignity is now recognizcd as an incident of the nght to life under
Article 21. No inclividual, however placcd, can assert a legallyenforceable cli m to encroach upon, appropriate or otherwise obskuct
these ways frrr private bencfit. Any such act is, in substance, a
trespass upon public property and rs liable to be removed in
acc, rrdance \',r th Ia\\'.
T
19.
These spaces are held by the State ard 1ocal authorities
in trust for the community, and the public trust doctrine obliges them
to use and regulate such property only for public purposes and in
furtherarce of fundamental rights. It is, therefore, a constitutiona_l as
well as statutory duty of these authorittes to ensure that public
streets and footpatls are kept free from obstruction and
encroachment, so that the guarantees under Articles 14 and 2l
equality before the law, meaningful mobility, personal safety and right
to live wrth dignity should not remain a mere statement of principle
but rnust be ensured and realized in the darly life of every citizen.
20.
In view of the above, Respondent No. I is obligated to
protect the public lale in question and ensure tllat the same is free
from al1 encroachments ald that general public have a free arrd
unfettered right of access and usage in respect of the said public lane.
2L.
The Wrir petition is therefore allowed, directing
Respondent No. 1 to ensure that 15 feet public lane as declared by the
Judgment and Decree in O.S. No. 7182 ot 1992, dated 1 1.08. 1997 on
the file of the I Assistant Judge, City Civil Courts, Secunderabad as
confrrmed in A.S. No. t41 of 1997 by the I Additional Chief Judge,
City Civil Courts at Secunderabad dated O5.O9.2O03 is free from all
encroachments and further ensure that ingress and egress to the said
public lane is not restricted or obstructed in any mzrnner. The entire
exercise shall be completed wrthin four weeks from the date of receipt
ofa copy of this order. No costs.
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22.
Consequcntly,
the miscellaneous Applications, il any
shall stard closed.
Sd/-P.PONNA KRISHNA
ANT REGI
AS
//TRUE COPY//
CTION OFFICER
To,
Board' Office at
1' The Chief Executive Officer, Secunderabad-Cantonment
S.P. Road' Secunderabad' TS
Coutt Co.pound,
Advocate [OPUC]
One CC to SRI ZEESHAN ADNAN MAHMOOD'
One CC to SRI CH.JAYAKRISHNA, Advocate [OPUCI
4, ONE CC tO SRI K.R.KOTESWERA RAO, ST. SC FOR CANTONMENT
loPUCl
5 Two CD CoPies
BSR
PMK
4'D--
HIGH COURT
DATED: 2510212026
iHE.
t
o
o
ORDER
,-
ALLOWING THE WRIT PETITION,
WITHOUT COSTS
6)
A\
li
f t'lAB
l|
WP.No.35604 of 2025
l
nt
7rl2r
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