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2026:HHC:39039
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1564 of 2026
Reserved on: 09.09.2026.
Decided on: 14.09.2026
Rinku
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P.
…. Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner
:
Mr J.K. Verma, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking
regular bail in FIR No. 53 of 2026 dated 02.03.2026 registered at
Police Station Sundernagar, District Mandi, for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 21, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short, NDPS Act) 1985.
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police had intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. HP-311
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:39039
9134 on 02.03.2026 during a naka. Surender Kumar and the
petitioner were present in the vehicle. The police searched the
vehicle and recovered a transparent packet containing 134 grams of
heroin. These allegations are false. The recovery was effected from
the vehicle and not from the petitioner’s conscious possession. The
quantity of heroin stated to have been recovered by the police is less
than the commercial quantity, and the rigours of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act do not apply to the present case. The police have
completed the investigation and filed the charge sheet before the
Court. The petitioner's custodial interrogation is not required. No
fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in
custody. The petitioner is a permanent resident of VPO Khurahal,
Tehsil Sundernagar, District Mandi. He has deep roots in the
society, and there is no chance of his absconding. He would abide by
the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be
released on bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police had set up a naka at Alsu Chowk, four lane,
on 02.03.2026. They intercepted a car bearing registration No. HP31-9134 at about 01:30 p.m. Two persons were occupying the car.
2026:HHC:39039
The police demanded the documents of the vehicle, and the
occupants got frightened. The police associated ex-Pradhan Rajesh
Kumar and Saroj Kumar and enquired about the names of the
occupants. The driver identified himself as Surender Kumar and the
person sitting beside the driver identified himself as Rinku, the
present petitioner. The police checked the vehicle in the presence of
independent witnesses and recovered a transparent polythene
containing 134 grams of heroin. The police seized the heroin and
arrested the occupants of the vehicle. The heroin was sent to the
Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) and was confirmed to be a
sample of diacetylmorphine after analysis. FIR No. 175 of 2015 and
FIR No. 200 of 2023 are pending against the petitioner. The
petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence in
case of his release on bail. The police filed the charge sheet before
the Court on 22.04.2026, and the matter was listed for supply of the
copies to the accused.
4.
I have heard Mr J.K. Verma, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the respondent/State.
5.
2026:HHC:39039
Mr J.K. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely
implicated. There is no material to connect the petitioner to the
commission of the crime. The recovery was effected from the
vehicle, and the prosecution has not collected any evidence to show
the petitioner’s conscious possession. The quantity of heroin stated
to have been recovered by the police is less than the commercial
quantity, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply
to the present case. The police have filed the charge sheet before the
Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the
petitioner in custody. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the
following judgments in support of his submissions:
1.
Khusvin Bhatiya @ Chandu vs. State of H.P. 2026:
HHC:37194;
2.
Abhishek Mehra vs. State of H.P. 2025: HHC:20108;
3.
Maulana Mohd. Amir Rashadi vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
Criminal Appeal No. 159 of 2012 decided on 16.01.2012;
4.
Prabhakar Tewari vs. State of U.P. & Anr. Criminal
Appeal No.152 of 2020 decided on 24.01.2020;
5.
Avtar Singh & Ors vs. State of Punjab (2002) Supp. 2
SCR and;
6.
Sorabkhan Gandhkhan Pathan and another vs. State of
Gujarat 2004(13) SCC 608;
6.
2026:HHC:39039
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was found in
possession of 134 grams of heroin, which is a huge quantity and
could not have been meant for self-consumption. The heroin is
adversely affecting society, and no leniency should be shown to the
petitioner. The petitioner has criminal antecedents, and he is likely
to commit a similar offence in case of his release on bail. Therefore,
he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314:
2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC
240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on
the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the
context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid
down the key factors that should be considered while
granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244,
paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
2026:HHC:39039
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears
upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern
Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this
context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is
applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals,
it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order
has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict
further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on
the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a
defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.”
(emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC
280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted
as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature
of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the
severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the
character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused,
circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable
possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial,
2026:HHC:39039
reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered
with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar
other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the
purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the
words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the
evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of
bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a
genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution
will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the
charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in
matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for
bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless
to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon
the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the
court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the
placement of the accused in society, though it may be
considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter
of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other
circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the
offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail
— the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of
rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the
factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application cannot
undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an
elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court
2026:HHC:39039
is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the
grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC
496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a
High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order
would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind,
rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to
the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be
set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided
the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as
under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting
bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the
High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously
and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down
in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well
settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be
borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground
to believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of
the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant
of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of
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discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused
is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2
SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court,
while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu
Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu
Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High
Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows:
(Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2
SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time, while
considering an application for bail, courts cannot lose sight of
the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and
the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly when
the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in
nature but are supported by adequate material brought on
record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion.
While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima
facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be
arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case
brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts
suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of
the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would
follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against
an accused.” (emphasis supplied)
9.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail,
except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing
from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating
2026:HHC:39039
other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or
intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who
seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend
to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to
induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must
weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also,
the heinousness of the crime….”
10.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11.
The status report mentions that the petitioner was
occupying the vehicle from which the police had recovered 134
grams of heroin. The status report also shows that the vehicle was a
private vehicle and the petitioner and the co-accused are residents
of the same area. In Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465:
2003 SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874, the contraband was
recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all the occupants of
the vehicle would be in conscious possession of the contraband. It
was observed:
“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be
determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts
which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that
all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle, and as
noted by the trial court, they were known to each other, and
it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled
together from the same destination in a vehicle which was
not a public vehicle.
2026:HHC:39039
20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an
offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which
relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is
submitted that to make the possession illicit, there must be
conscious possession.
21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled
with the requisite mental element, i.e., conscious possession
and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of
such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.
22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term
that assumes different colours in different contexts. It may
carry different meanings in contextually different
backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the Supdt.
& Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja
[(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC 52] to work
out a completely logical and precise definition of
“possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in the
context of all statutes.
23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular
fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.
24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC 194:
1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in a given
case need not be physical possession but can be constructive,
having power and control over the article in the case in
question, while the person to whom physical possession is
given holds it subject to that power or control.
25. The word “possession” means the legal right to
possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC
498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it was
observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his
mother's flat, which is safer than his own home, he must be
considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sullivan v.
Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB 966: (1976) 2
WLR 361 (QBD)].)
26. Once possession is established, the person who claims
that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it
because how he came to be in possession is within his special
2026:HHC:39039
knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory
recognition of this position because of the presumption
available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section
54, where a presumption is also available to be drawn from
possession of illicit articles.
27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only
possession but conscious possession has been established. It
has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the
possession was not conscious in the logical background of
Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.”
12.
This court had also held in Abhishek Mehra (supra) that a
person present in the vehicle would be deemed to be in possession
and the burden would be upon him to explain that he was not in
possession of the contraband.
13.
In Sorabkhan Gandhkhan Pathan (supra), the recovery
was effected from an auto-rickshaw, which was a public vehicle,
whereas the recovery was made from a private vehicle in the
present case. In Avtar Singh & Ors (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that the presence in the vehicle from which the recovery
is effected can be a strong circumstance against the accused, but no
question was asked in the statement recorded under Section 313 of
Cr.P.C, and this circumstance could not be used against the accused.
Therefore, the cited judgments do not apply to the present case.
14.
Therefore, prima facie the petitioner was in possession
of the heroin and the burden would shift upon him to show that he
2026:HHC:39039
was not in conscious possession as per Sections 35 and 54 of the
NDPS Act. The petitioner has not provided any explanation, and the
submission that he was not in possession cannot be accepted at this
stage.
15.
It was submitted that the quantity of heroin stated to
have been found in the vehicle was less than commercial quantity,
the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present
case, and the petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right. This
submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in
Khushi Ram Gupta v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 3779, that the
menace of drug addiction has seriously eroded into the fabric of
society, and the release of an accused on bail in NDPS Act cases will
send a negative signal to society. It was observed:
“8. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents
and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society,
putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future
nation-building into serious peril.
9. It is not a case where the investigating agency is clueless in
respect of evidence against the petitioner. Though allegations
against the petitioner are yet to be proved in accordance with
the law, it cannot be taken singly as a factor to grant bail to the
petitioner. Nothing has been placed on record on behalf of the
petitioner to divulge as to how and in what manner he came in
contact with the persons who were residents of the State of
Himachal Pradesh. Thus, there is sufficient prima facie
material to infer the implication of the petitioner in the crime.
2026:HHC:39039
In such circumstances, the release of the petitioner on bail will
send a negative signal in society, which will definitely be
detrimental to its interests.
10. The prima facie involvement of the petitioner in the
dangerous trade of contraband cannot be ignored merely on
account of the fact that he has no past criminal history. It
cannot be guaranteed that there will be re-indulgence by the
petitioner in similar activities, in case he is released on bail.”
16.
Similarly, it was held in Bunty Yadav v. State of H.P., 2022
SCC OnLine HP 4996, that bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right
even though the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply
to a case. Each case has to be adjudged on its own facts. It was
observed:
“6. The quantity involved in the case is 89.89 grams of
heroin and 3.90 grams of MDMA. Such quantity may not
technically fall under the category of commercial quantity;
nevertheless, such quantity cannot be termed to be less by
any stretch of the imagination. The evident nature of
commercial transactions and dealing with the contraband
aggravates the situation for the petitioner. In a case where
Section 37 of the NDPS Act is not applicable, bail cannot be
claimed as a matter of right. The fate depends on the facts of
each and every case.
7. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents
and students, has seriously eroded the fabric of society,
putting the future generation as well as the prospects of
future nation-building into serious peril.”
17.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union
of India v Namdeo Ashruba Nakade, SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on
2026:HHC:39039
07.11.2025, that there is a concerning increase in drug abuse
amongst the youth. It was observed: 8. This Court is of the view that the issue of substance abuse
has emerged as a global public health crisis in the twentyfirst century, affecting every country worldwide, as drug
trafficking and addiction have become pervasive. The United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in its
2025 World Drug Report that “As at 2023, some 316 million
people worldwide had used drugs in the past year,
representing an increase over the past decade that outpaces
population growth, which indicates a higher prevalence of
drug use.”
9. In India, there has been a concerning increase in drug
abuse among the youth. Substance abuse not only affects
individuals, families, and communities but also undermines
various aspects of health, including physical, social,
political, and cultural foundations, and mental well-being.
(See: “Bhattacharya S, Menon GS, Garg S, Grover A, Saleem
SM, Kushwaha P. The lingering menace of drug abuse among
the Indian youth–it’s time for action. Indian J Community
Med 2025;50: S9-12, published on 17th April, 2025”)
10. According to many news reports, India faces a clear
dilemma between tackling the narcotics crisis systematically
or sacrificing its most valuable resource, i.e. its young
people. The extent of the menace of drug abuse has also been
highlighted by this Court in the case of Ankush Vipan Kapoor
v. National Investigation Agency, (2025) 5 SCC 155, wherein
this Court has observed as under:
“9.1 The ills of drug abuse seem to be shadowing the
length and breadth of our country, with the Central
and every State Government fighting against the
menace of substance abuse. The debilitating impact of
the drug trade and drug abuse is an immediate and
serious concern for India. As the globe grapples with
the menace of escalating substance use disorders
(“SUD”) and an ever-accessible drug market, the
2026:HHC:39039
consequences leave a generational Page 75 of 84
imprint on public health and even national security.
Article 47 of the Constitution makes it a duty of the
State to regard the raising of the level of nutrition and
the standard of living of its people and the
improvement of public health as among its primary
duties, and in particular, the State shall endeavour to
bring about the prohibition of the consumption except
for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of
drugs which are injurious to health. The State has a
responsibility to address the root causes of this
predicament and develop effective intervention
strategies to ensure that India’s younger population,
which is particularly vulnerable to substance abuse, is
protected and saved from such a menace. This is
particularly because substance abuse is linked to social
problems and can contribute to child maltreatment,
spousal violence, and even property crime in a family.”
18.
Hence, the petitioner cannot be released on bail merely
because the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to
the present case.
19.
The petitioner has criminal antecedents. This Court
dealt with the relevance of criminal antecedents while granting bail
in Champa vs. State of H.P.: 2025:HHC:28899 and held that the
criminal antecedents would disentitle an accused from the
concession of bail, especially when the FIR registered against him
related to the commission of a similar offence. This judgment was
unsuccessfully assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
SLP(Criminal) 19120 of 2025 titled Champa Devi vs State of H.P.,
2026:HHC:39039
decided on 27.11.2025. This position was reiterated in Shakti Sharma
vs. State of H.P. 2026: HHC:33462. Therefore, the relevance of
criminal antecedents cannot be ignored.
20.
In the present case, the registration of the FIR against
the petitioner for the commission of an offence punishable under
the NDPS Act shows that the apprehension of the prosecution is
justified, that the petitioner would indulge in the commission of a
similar offence in case of his release on bail, and the petitioner is
not entitled to bail because of his criminal antecedents.
21.
It was submitted that the co-accused has been released
on bail and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of
parity. This submission cannot be accepted. The principle of parity
demands that the circumstances between the petitioner and the coaccused should be similar. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana,
(2021) 6 SCC 230; (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 722; 2021 SCC OnLine SC 335 that
while determining the parity, the role of the accused has to be
considered. It was observed at page 246
“Parity, while granting bail, must focus upon the role of the
accused. Merely observing that another accused who was
granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not
sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail
2026:HHC:39039
based on parity has been established. In deciding the aspect
of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in
relation to the incident, and the victims is of utmost
importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of
parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which
again cannot pass muster under the law.”
22.
This position was reiterated in
Tarun Kumar v.
Enforcement Directorate, AIR 2024 SC 169: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486,
wherein it was observed:
“18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr Luthra to grant
bail to the appellant on the ground that the other coaccused, who were similarly situated as the appellant, have
been granted bail, also cannot be accepted. It may be noted
that parity is not the law. While applying the principle of
parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached
to the accused whose application is under consideration.”
23.
In the present case, the co-accused does not have
criminal antecedents, and the petitioner cannot claim parity with
him.
24.
In Prabhakar Tiwari (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
found that the High Court had exercised the discretion to grant bail,
and there was no reason to interfere with the discretion exercised
by the High Court. In Maulana Mohd (supra), there was prolonged
incarceration and the criminal antecedents were not found
sufficient to deny bail. In Khusvin Bhatiya @ Chandu (supra), no
prima facie case was found against the petitioner and the criminal
2026:HHC:39039
antecedents were not held sufficient to deny bail to him. In the
present case, the Court had found a prima facie arguable case
against the petitioner and the period of incarceration cannot be said
to be long. Therefore, the cited judgments do not apply to the
present case.
25.
No other point was urged.
26.
In view of the above, the present petition fails and is
dismissed.
27.
The
observation
made
hereinbefore
shall
remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no
bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
14th September, 2026
(Nikita)
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