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C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16985 of 2024
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2025
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16985 of 2024
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 2 of 2025
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16985 of 2024
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR AMENDMENT) NO. 3 of 2025
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16985 of 2024
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR AMENDMENT) NO. 4 of 2025
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16985 of 2024
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIKHIL S. KARIEL
==========================================================
Approved for Reporting
Yes
No
✔
==========================================================
RELIANCE LIFE SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR RAHUL CHITNIS with MR ARJUN R SHETH(7589) with MS RHEA
SEVAK for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,2
MR NIKUNJ KANARA, ASST. GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the
Respondent(s) No. 2
MR ANKIT SHAH(6371) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
MR UNMESH SHUKLA with MR AYAAN PATEL SINGHI & CO(2725) for the
Respondent(s) No. 4
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIKHIL S. KARIEL
Date : 09/01/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1.
Heard learned Advocate Mr.Rahul Chitnis with learned
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
Advocate Mr.Arjun Sheth with learned Advocate Ms.Rhea
Sevak
on
behalf
of
the
petitioners,
learned
Assistant
Government Pleader Mr.Nikunj Kanara on behalf of the
respondents
no.2
and
and
learned
Senior
Advocate
Mr.Unmesh Shukla with learned Advocate Mr.Ayaan Patel for
Singhi and Company on behalf of respondent no.4.
2.
Originally, by way of this petition, the petitioners had
challenged an order passed by the Micro Small Enterprises
Facilitation Council, Gujarat dated 02.02.2024 – dispatched on
26.04.2024 as well as order dated 10.06.2024 – dispatched on
14.10.2024.
2.1. The right of the petitioners as a respondents before the
Council to file their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim
had been forfeited and application setting aside / recall of the
order dated 02.02.2024 had been rejected.
2.2. Later,
petitioners
have
preferred
application
for
amendment as well as application for stay of an award which
has been passed by the Council on 04.01.2025 i.e. during
pendency
of
the
present
petition.
The
application
for
amendment being Civil Application No.03/2025 is allowed.
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
Appropriate amendment to be carried out by tomorrow.
3.
Considering the nature of issue involved in the present
petition, with the consent of parties, this Court has taken up
the present petition for final disposal. The facts, in brief as
much as are relevant for the purpose of deciding the present
petition, are stated hereinbelow:3.1. The petitioners herein were respondents in arbitral
proceedings before the Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation
Council, initiated by the respondent no.4 herein as the
claimant. (The parties shall be addressed hereinafter as per
their status in the petition, whereas the Micro Small
Enterprises Facilitation Council Council will be addressed as
the Council).
3.2. It
appears
that
the
respondent
no.4
herein
had
approached the Council as regards a transaction between the
respondent no.4 and the petitioners herein and whereas, the
Council had passed an award dated 24.10.2019 in Arbitration
Case No.15/2019 between the parties. It appears that the said
arbitral award had been challenged by the petitioners herein
before this Court by preferring Special Civil Application
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
No.324/2020 and whereas, Hon’ble Division Bench of this
Court vide order dated 09.03.2021, while setting aside the
award dated 24.10.2019 passed by the Arbitrator, had inter
alia directed the Council to proceed afresh in accordance with
the provisions contained in the 1996 Act and not only decide
the Reference, but, also entertain the Counterclaim of the
petitioners and decide the same while deciding the Reference,
strictly in accordance with law.
3.3. Relevant here would be to mention that the Hon’ble
Division Bench had inter alia directed that the Council shall
endeavour to decide the matter afresh as early as possible and
the leaned Counsels for the parties had made their statements
that the parties would cooperate for expeditious disposal. It
appears that thereafter, the proceedings had been listed
before the Council for the first time on 04.03.2022 and
whereas, while the petitioners had remained absent, the
respondent no.4 herein had requested for time to submit
pleading afresh and upon request of the respondent no.4,
fifteen days’ time had been granted.
3.4. It appears that the respondent no.4 had thereafter
preferred their Statement of Claim on 18.11.2022 and
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
whereas, the proceedings before the Council had been listed
for the second time on 13.01.2023 when the respondent no.4
was not present and the petitioner was present had requested
time to file Counterclaim. Time was granted for two weeks to
file Counterclaim and whereas, it is stated that the petitioners
herein
were
directed
to
prefer
the
Counterclaim
and
Statement of Defence before the next date, failing which, no
further chances would given. It appears that the third meeting
of the Council was held on 02.02.2024 and whereas, the
petitioners who had till then not filed their Counterclaim and
Statement of Defence, had requested for some time to file the
same. It appears that the Council being of the opinion that
ample time had been provided to the petitioners, more
particularly, the Council having observed that the respondent
prolonging the proceedings for two years and having failed to
make any submissions during such period, had refused to
grant any further opportunity and had forfeited the right of
the
respondent
to
file
Statement
of
Defence
and
the
Counterclaim vide order of the said date i.e. 02.02.2024, the
same had been dispatched by the Council on 26.04.2024. It
appears that originally, even without getting a copy of the
order dated 02.02.2024, the petitioners herein preferred an
C/SCA/16985/2024
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application on 29.02.2024 inter alia praying for the following:“11.
It is therefore prayed:-
a.
That that the delay in filing the Statement of
Defendant and Counterclaim be condoned and the
Statement of Defence and Counterclaim dated 28 th
February 2024, be taken on file of this Hon’ble
Council.
b.
In the alternative to prayer (a), the Statement
of Defence and Counterclaim dated 12th August 2019,
be considered as the Statement of Defence and
Counterclaim of the Respondent, and the matter be
proceeded with on merits.
c.
For such further and other reliefs as the
nature and circumstances of the case may require.”
3.5. It
appears
that
thereafter,
the
petitioners,
upon
receiving a copy of the order dated 02.02.2024, had preferred
another application which has not been produced on record
and whereas, reference to the same is made on the basis of
observations of the Council in later order which would be
referred to hereinafter. The said application dated 23.05.2024
inter alia contained prayers for setting aside of the order
dated 02.02.2024 and seeking Statement of Defence and
Counterclaim dated 28.02.2024 being taken on file of the
Council, or in the alternative, the Statement of Defence and
Counterclaim of the petitioners which had been filed on
12.08.2019 i.e. prior to the first award which had been set
C/SCA/16985/2024
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aside by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court be
considered as the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim of
the petitioners herein.
3.6. It appears that the said application had been taken up
for hearing by the Council on 10.06.2024 and whereas, the
Council had noted that the respondent was given ample
opportunity for submitting their Statement of Defence and
Counterclaim and the same had been forfeited vide order
dated 02.02.2024 and whereas, the Council also notes that in
absence of any express provision for empowering the Council
to recall its own order and therefore, vide an order of the said
date i.e. 10.06.2024, the Council had disposed of the
application as not maintainable. The said order had been
dispatched on 14.10.2024.
3.7. It appears that after the said order had been received by
the petitioners, they had approached this Court by preferring
this petition which has been affirmed on 12.11.2024 and filed
before this Court on 12.12.2024. It appears that the petition
had been listed before a learned Coordinate Bench of this
Court and whereas, vide an order dated 16.12.2024, the
learned Coordinate Bench had recused from taking up the
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
said petition. It would appear that on the other hand, the
proceeding before the Council was listed on 17.12.2024 and
whereas, the Council was appraised about the fact that
petition was pending before this Court and the Council,
though having taken note of the fact, had on the ground that
there was no stay granted by this Court, had taken up the
hearing of the proceedings and had passed Award No.23/2024
on 17.12.2024 which had been dispatched on 04.01.2025. As
noted hereinabove, the said award has also been challenged
before this Court by an application for amendment.
3.8. The petitioners being aggrieved by the award passed by
the Council as well as earlier orders by the Council dated
10.06.2024 and 02.02.2024, have approached this Court by
way of this petition.
4.
Learned Advocate Mr.Chitnis on behalf of the petitioners
would assail order dated 02.02.2024 whereby the right of the
petitioners had been forfeited by submitting that while the
Council had inter alia observed at paragraph no.12 that the
Council had provided ample opportunity entente to the
respondents to file Statement of Defence and Counterclaim,
yet, the facts would show otherwise. It is submitted by learned
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JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
Advocate that while the fact of the adjournments being of on
or around twelve months could not be disputed, but, at the
same time, it also requires to be noted that after decision of
the High Court dated 09.03.2021, the proceedings had been
listed only on two occasions i.e. on 04.03.2022 on which date
the respondent no.4 had taken time for filing of fresh
statement of fact and on 13.01.2023 when the petitioners had
taken time to file Counterclaim and Statement of Defence
whereafter, on 02.02.2024, the order forfeiting the right to file
Defence Statement and Counterclaim had been passed.
4.1. Learned
Advocate
would
submit
that
while
it
is
undoubtedly true that the petitioners had almost a year to file
his Statement of Claim and the defence statement, yet, the
fact of the claimant – respondent no.4 having filed the
Statement of Claim in the month of November, 2022 was also
a fact which ought not to have been overlooked by the
Council. Learned Advocate would submit that the Council
therefore was not right in observing vide order dated
02.02.2024 that the respondents therein i.e. petitioners herein
had prolonged the proceedings for almost two years i.e. from
04.03.2022 till 02.02.2024.
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
4.2. Learned Advocate Mr.Chitnis would further submit that
insofar as the order dated 10.06.2024 is concerned, while the
petitioners
had
tendered
Statement
of
Defence
and
Counterclaim on 28.02.2024, there was also an alternative
prayer which had been sought for by the petitioners being
that the Statement of Defence and the Counterclaim which
had been preferred by the petitioners in the month of August,
2019 i.e. even before the first award was passed, to be taken
on record. It is submitted that the Council ought to have
atleast considered the said prayer and had ought to have
treated the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim preferred
by the petitioners before the first award as their Statement of
Defence and Counterclaim.
4.3. Learned Advocate Mr.Chitnis, insofar as the Arbitral
Award dated 17.12.2024, would submit that the award is
nothing but a manifestation of the overreach of the Council
more particularly, according to learned Advocate, the Council
was informed about the fact that the petitioners had
approached
the
High
Court
challenging
orders
dated
02.02.2024 and 10.06.2024 and whereas, the Council ought to
have waited for some reasonable time before deciding the
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
dispute between the parties.
4.4. Learned Advocate would submit that as such, the order
of the Council dated 02.02.2024 forfeiting the right of the
parties had been dispatched on 26.04.2024 and whereas,
while an application had been preferred even before the order
had been received, later on, a further application had been
preferred
which
had
been
decided
vide
order
dated
10.06.2024 which again had been dispatched on 14.10.2024.
Learned Advocate would submit that after the order dated
10.06.2024 which had been received by the petitioners after it
was dispatched around 14.10.2024, the petitioners had
immediately approached this Court and the matter had also
been listed before this Court hearing on 16.12.2024. It is
submitted that on the very next day, when the fact of the
matter having been listed and pending before this Court being
brought to the notice of the Council, the Council, according to
learned Advocate, ought to have waited and ought not to have
decided the proceedings finally.
4.5. Learned advocate would further submit that while the
petitioners have an alternative remedy against the award
dated 17.12.2024, but since the award was passed in a clear
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
overreach of the present petition and since the petitioners did
not
receive
appropriate
opportunity
to
defend
the
proceedings, this Court may intervene.
4.6. Learned Advocate Mr.Chitnis would refer to decision of
the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in case M/s. Maruti
Enterprise
Through
Authorized
Partner
Jigneshbhai
Bharatbhai Tarpara vs. State of Gujarat (Special Civil
Application
No.20307/2019
dated
22.01.2020)
and
the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Whirlpool
Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Ors.,
reported on (1998) 8 SCC 1, in support of his submissions.
4.7. Thus submitting, learned Advocate would request this
Court to set aside the Arbitral Award dated 17.12.2024 as well
as orders dated 10.06.2024 and 02.02.2024.
5.
The present petition had been vehemently opposed by
learned Senior Advocate Mr.Unmesh Shukla with learned
advocate Mr.Ayaan Patel on behalf of the respondent no.4
herein.
5.1. Learned Senior Advocate, at the outset, would submit
that the present petition may not be entertained by this Court
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
more particularly learned Senior Advocate relying upon a
decision of the learned Coordinate Bench as upheld by the
Hon’ble
Division
Bench
of
this
Court.
Learned
Senior
Advocate would submit that learned Coordinate Bench in case
of M/s. Ghankun Steels Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.
(Special Civil Application No.4876/2024, dated 02.04.2024),
where a similar issue had arisen, vide order dated 02.04.2024,
relying upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of
M/s. India Glycols Ltd. vs. Micro and Small Enterprises
Facilitation Council, reported in AIR 2024 SC 285 inter alia
held that proceedings under Section 18 of the Micro, Small
and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 would be
governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and
therefore, the remedy to challenge an award passed by the
MSME Council under Section 18 would be under Section 34 of
the 1996 Act.
5.2. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that the decision
of the learned Coordinate Bench had been affirmed by the
Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal
No.545/2024 vide decision dated 11.06.2024 whereby the
Hon’ble Division Bench had dismissed the Letters Patent
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
Appeal. Learned Senior Advocate would thus submit that the
petition invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article
226/227, may not be entertained and whereas, the petitioners
may be directed to avail of the alternative remedy which is
available i.e. by filing an application under Section 34 before
the Appellate Council.
5.3. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that as
such, the conduct of the petitioners herein was to delay the
proceedings and whereas, learned Senior Advocate would
emphasize on the observations by the Council in order dated
02.02.2024 to show that the petitioners though having been
granted time by the Council for more than a year, had not
filed Counterclaim or Statement of Defence and whereas, it is
submitted that the Council was well justified in forfeiting the
right of the petitioners – respondents therein to file Statement
of Defence and Counterclaim. Insofar as the order dated
10.06.2024 is concerned, it is submitted by learned Senior
Counsel that the Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation Council
was well justified in not entertaining the said application more
particularly, according to learned Senior Counsel, the Act did
not envisage the power available with the Council for review
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
or recall and hence, the Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation
Council had rightly not acceded to the request made by the
petitioners.
5.4. Learned Senior Advocate would emphasize on the
decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench in the first round of
litigation
i.e.
order
dated
09.03.2021
in
Special
Civil
Application No.324/2020 and would submit that the Hon’ble
Division Bench having directed the Council to endeavour and
decide the matter afresh as early as possible and having
recorded the statement of the counsels that the parties would
cooperate for expeditious disposal while setting aside the
award dated 24.10.2019, yet, way the proceedings have
moved ahead would show that the order of the Hon’ble
Division Bench took almost four years to be complied with.
Learned Senior Advocate would submit that the respondent
herein having filed its Statement of Claim well within time and
the petitioners having been given more than sufficient time to
file their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim and the
petitioners having not availed of such opportunity, no fault
could be found with the Council in forfeiting the right of the
petitioners
herein
and
not
recalling
the
order
dated
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
02.02.2024.
5.5. Learned Senior Counsel would also submit that the
Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation Council was also justified
in not taking into consideration the submission made by
learned Advocate for the petitioners as regards the matter
pending before this Court. Learned Senior Advocate would
submit that since there was an order of the Hon’ble Division
Bench referred to hereinabove whereby the Hon’ble Division
Bench had directed the Council to decide the matter
expeditiously, the Council was justified in not waiting for the
outcome of the present petition more particularly since there
was no submission as regards any interim order made by this
Court in the present petition.
5.6. Learned Counsel would further submit that Section 19 of
the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act,
2006 inter alia envisages that any application for setting aside
a decree made by the Council shall be entertained only upon
the appellant having deposited 75% of the amount in terms of
the decree or award, as the case may be. Learned Senior
Advocate would submit that the present petition is preferred
only to avoid the petitioners being required to comply with the
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
provisions of the said section and whereas, learned Senior
Advocate submitting that the Counterclaim being possible to
be decided independently, therefore, there is no reason for
this Court to entertain the present writ petition and whereas,
the petitioners may be relegated to avail the alternative
remedy which is available to it.
5.7. Learned Senior Advocate would also draw the attention
of this Court to the averments made at paragraph no. hh of
the writ petition at page-12 wherein it is mentioned that on
hearing held on 13.01.2023, the Advocate for the petitioners
themselves had made a statement that the petitioners would
file a fresh Statement of Defence and Counterclaim within a
period of two weeks, but, inadvertently, the petitioners could
not do the same. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that
the petitioners themselves admitting that they had submitted
to the Council on hearing dated 13.01.2023 as regards the
Statement of Defence and Counterclaim being filed within a
period of two weeks and having not complied with the same,
no indulgence may be shown by this Court.
5.8. Learned
Senior
Advocate
would,
in
conclusion,
emphasize that the conduct of the petitioners being such that
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JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
no liberal view may be taken by this Court, therefore, it is
emphasized that this Court may not intervene.
6.
Learned
Assistant
Government
Pleader
Mr.Nikunj
Kanara on behalf of the respondents no.2 and 3 would submit
that as regards the award etc. it would be for the parties to
make submissions on merits and whereas, to a specific query
raised by this Court as regards the reason for which the
Council
had
not
adjourned
the
matter
on
17.12.2024,
attention of this Court is drawn to observations made by the
Council at paragraph no.24 of the award.
7.
Having heard learned Counsels for the parties and
perused the documents on record, the question that arises for
consideration is whether this Court should entertain the writ
petition more particularly in view of the alternative remedy
which is available to the petitioners as per Section 18 of the
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act or not
and further, whether the award dated 17.12.2024 as well as
orders
dated
10.06.2024
and
02.02.2024
require
any
interference.
7.1. To this Court, it would appear that though an award has
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JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
been passed by the Council and though the Micro, Small and
Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 more particularly
Section 18 thereof which inter alia lays down that provisions
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would apply i.e.
arbitral award could be challenged in terms of Section 34 of
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, yet, to this Court, it
would
appear
that
the
present
is
a
case
where
the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India would have to be exercised.
8.
The reasons for coming to the above conclusion are as
follows:8.1. At the outset, it requires to be mentioned that while the
Council had passed an award on 24.10.2019, in the very
proceedings, in the first round, the same had been interfered
by Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court vide order dated
09.03.2021 more particularly directing the Council to decide
the Reference by also entertaining the Counterclaim of the
petitioners and the Council was also directed to decide the
Reference strictly in accordance with law.
8.2. It would appear, more particularly as noted in order
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JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
dated 02.02.2024, that for the first time after order of this
Court dated 09.03.2021, the hearing of the Council was
scheduled on 04.03.2021. The claimant – respondent no.4 was
present on the said date whereas, the respondent had
remained absent and the Council had provided fifteen days’
time to the claimant to file a fresh Statement of Claim. As
against the period of fifteen days, it would appear that the the
respondent no.4 – claimant had filed their Statement of Claim
on 18.11.2022.
8.3. It appears that thereafter, the second hearing of the
Arbitration Case had been placed on 13.01.2023 when the
claimant was absent and the respondent had requested for
some time to file its Counterclaim and Statement of Defence
and whereas, the petitioners were granted time till the next
date for filing of the Counterclaim as well as the Statement of
Defence. It appears that the third meeting was held on
02.02.2024, on which date, the request of the petitioners
herein to provide some more time to file Counterclaim and the
Statement of Defence had been rejected and the right of the
petitioners to file Statement of Defence and Counterclaim had
been forfeited. It would appear that the Council vide the said
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JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
order has inter alia noted that ‘the Council is of the view that
it
has
provided
ample
opportunities
and
time
to
the
respondent to file a Statement of Defence / Counterclaim, and
the respondent has been prolonging the proceedings for
almost two years i.e. from 04.03.2022 till 02.02.2024 and
failed to make the submissions within this period wherein the
very objective of the respondent in approaching the Hon’ble
High
Court
of
Gujarat
was
for
adjudication
of
the
Counterclaim.’
8.4. To this Court, it would appear that there is an inherent
fallacy in the above finding. As noted hereinabove, the first
hearing was scheduled on 04.03.2022 after order of this Court
dated 09.03.2021 on which date time had been granted at the
request of respondent no.4 herein for filing a fresh Statement
of Claim and as noted hereinabove, the fresh Statement of
Claim had been filed by the respondent no.4 on 18.11.2022.
The case had thereafter been listed for hearing on 13.01.2023
when time had been sought for by the petitioners herein –
respondents before the Council to file Statement of Defence
and Counterclaim and whereas, as a last chance, time had
been granted till the next date of hearing. While the period
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JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
which had been elapsed in between i.e. from 13.01.2023 to
02.02.2024 would be around thirteen months, but, at the same
time, in terms of adjournments, it was only the third
adjournment after the matter had been remanded back by this
Court to the Council to decide.
8.5. Again, it would also appear that the petitioners –
respondents before the Council could not be saddled with the
liability of prolonging the proceedings from 04.03.2022 till
18.11.2022. The later date being the date on which the
respondent no.4 herein - claimant before the Council had filed
its Statement of Claim. While it is true that sufficient time had
been granted to the petitioners herein for filing of the
Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, but, at the same
time, the fact of the respondent no.4 having taken eight
months
to
file
their
reply
and
there
being
only
one
adjournment thereafter, are also issues which could not be
ignored. The petitioners having sought for adjournment only
once for filing of the reply and the same having been granted
to them, to this Court, it would appear that the next date for
listing being after around thirteen months ought not to be the
only reason for having forfeited the right of the petitioners to
C/SCA/16985/2024
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file Statement of Defence and Counterclaim. The petitioners
thus were entitled for one more opportunity being granted to
file its Statement of Defence and Counterclaim.
8.6. Again, it would appear that the Council had also erred
while passing the order dated 02.02.2024 for another reason
i.e. as found at paragraph no.12 of the said order. It would
appear that in addition to seeking for some time to file its
Counterclaim and Statement of Defence, a further request
had been made on behalf of the petitioners herein that the old
Counterclaim may be taken on record. It would appear that
reference to the old Counterclaim being the Counterclaim
which was preferred by the petitioners before the first
Arbitral Award dated 24.10.2019 which had been set aside by
the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court vide order dated
09.03.2021. To this Court, it would appear that when the old
Counterclaim was already there on record and while the
petitioners
had sought for some time to file a fresh
Counterclaim and Statement of Defence and in alternative had
sought for the old Counterclaim to be taken on record, while
refusing
to
grant
time,
to
balance
the
equities,
the
Counterclaim which was already there on record ought to
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have
been
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
treated
Counterclaim
of
as
the
the
Statement
petitioners
for
of
the
Defence
and
purpose
of
adjudicating the arbitral proceedings. The said request not
being acceded to, to this Court, it would appear that the order
dated
02.02.2024
was
passed
on
absolutely
erroneous
consideration.
8.7. Insofar as the order dated 10.06.2024 is concerned,
while
the petitioners
had sought for the order
dated
02.02.2024 passed by the Council to be set aside in view of
such prayers, this Court agrees with the findings of the
Council that the same was a prayer which could not have been
granted by the Council, yet, it would also appear to this Court
that the prayer for recalling, as noted by the Council, not
being expressly provided, the Council would not be entitled to
maintain the said application, would be a finding which this
Court will advert to little later.
9.
Now coming to the award in question, to this Court, it
would appear that the Council had gravely erred in not
acceding to the request of the petitioners for adjourning the
hearing of the arbitral proceedings in spite of being apprised
about the fact of the present writ petition being filed and
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pending before this Court.
9.1. As the record would indicate, while the writ petition had
been filed on 12.12.2024, the same was listed on 16.12.2024
and as noted hereinabove, on the said date, it was not taken
up by the learned Coordinate Bench. On the very next day i.e.
17.12.2024, in the hearing slated before the Council, the
petitioners had informed the Council about the present
petition having been preferred. The observations of the
Council at paragraph no.29 notes in this regard being as
under:“29.
The fourth arbitral hearing was held in the
th
MSEFC hearing dated 17.12.2024. Sr.Adv.
Unmesh Shukla with Adv. Aayan Patel was present on
behalf of the claimant and Adv. Rahul Chitnis was
present through Video Conference and Adv. Rhea
Sevak was present in person on behalf of the
respondent before the council. The respondent
submitted a purshis during the hearing which stated
that the respondent has approached the Hon’ble
High Court of Gujarat challenging the Order dated
10.06.2024 passed by this council through a Writ
petition being Special Civil Application No.16985 of
2024. The respondent further requested an
adjournment in light of the pending writ petition
before the Hon’ble High Court. On the other hand,
the claimant strongly objected to the adjournment
request of the respondent and submitted that the
dues of the claimant have been pending for more
than 14 years now and the respondent has been
stalling its legal obligation to pay the outstanding
dues through multiple litigation time and again. The
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claimant further submitted that there is no stay from
the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat on the present
proceedings and the respondent must proceed with
its final arguments as decided in the last hearing. The
council unanimously decided not to grant any further
adjournment and directed the respondent to furnish
its final arguments. The respondent however
submitted that the council may take on record the
purshis and may decide as it deems fit. The claimant
submitted that the council may proceed further based
on the written submission made by the claimant. The
Council, after careful consideration of the oral and
written submissions of both parties, decided to pass
an arbitral award on the merits of the case.”
9.2. To this Court, it would appear that when a writ petition
had been preferred challenging orders passed by the Council
and whereas, since the orders which were impugned before
this Court touched upon the right of fair hearing and
appropriate opportunity being granted to the petitioners, then
the Council was expected to grant atleast some reasonable
time so as to ensure that appropriate orders as regards the
further proceedings of the Council could have been passed by
this Court.
9.3. This Court is of the opinion that the present was not a
case where time had been repeatedly sought for under the
guise
of
writ
petition
having
been
preferred
or
in
contemplation of being preferred rather, 17.12.2024 was the
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next day of the petition having been listed before this Court
and learned Coordinate Bench having recused. Furthermore,
as could be seen at paragraph no.29, the fact of the number of
the present petition being recorded by the Council shows that
the Council was aware about the writ petition having been
preferred and the matter being pending at large before this
Court.
9.4. Under such circumstances, to this Court, it would appear
that the Council ought to have waited for some reasonable
time and ought to have granted some time to the petitioners
to make appropriate request to this Court and whereas, to this
Court, it would appear that passing of the arbitral award on
the very date i.e. on 17.12.2024 would almost amount to the
Council infructuating the powers of this Court to hear the
present writ petition against orders dated 02.02.2024 and
10.06.2024 passed by the Council.
9.5. To this Court, it would appear that when any Court or
Tribunal or Authority whose orders would be amenable to
challenge before this Court is appraised about a petition /
proceedings before this Court which petition/ proceedings are
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
closely connected to the proceedings pending before the
Court, Tribunal or Authority concerned, then such Court,
Tribunal or Authority was duty bound to have appropriate
regard to the proceedings pending before this Court. The fact
of a related petition / proceedings pending before the highest
Court of the State ought not to be disregarded. More so, in
the present case, where orders dated 02.02.2024 and
10.06.2024 were under challenge and interference with the
same by this Court would have led the Council to afford
opportunity to the petitioners to file Statement of Defence and
Counterclaim. In the considered opinion of this Court,
propriety demanded that when the fact of the writ petition
having been filed being brought to the notice of the Council,
the Council should have adjourned hearing of the arbitral
proceedings for some reasonable time so as to ensure that
appropriate opportunity could be availed of by the petitioners.
9.6. To this Court, it would appear that there was no
irreversible situation which would have occurred if the matter
had not been taken up for hearing on 17.12.2024. As noted
hereinabove, after the order of the Hon’ble Division Bench
dated 09.03.2021, the matter had been listed on 04.03.2022,
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JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
13.01.2023, 02.02.2024 and 10.06.2024 whereafter the matter
had been listed on 17.12.2024. Thus, it would not appear that
the case had been unnecessarily prolonged at the instance of
the either parties and whereas, as noted hereinabove, while
the period of adjournment was quite lengthy, it does not
appear that the parties i.e. either of the parties had misused
the time granted to them. As noted hereinabove, the claimant
before the Tribunal itself taking around nine months to file
their Statement of Claim, to this Court, a period beyond
thirteen months being granted to the petitioners could not
amount to the petitioners being treated as having misused the
proceedings or having delayed the proceedings before the
Council.
9.7. Thus, to this Court, it would appear that award dated
17.10.2024 requires interference on the very short issue of
the Council not having afforded appropriate opportunity to the
petitioners herein and the Council not having accorded due
regard to the fact of the present writ petition pending before
this Court challenging orders passed by the Council itself
dated 02.02.2024 and 10.06.2024.
9.8. At this stage, it would further be relevant to observe that
C/SCA/16985/2024
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while the Council has passed the first order forfeiting the
right of the petitioners to file Statement of Defence and
Counterclaim
on
02.02.2024,
the
same
appears
to
be
dispatched on 26.04.2024 as mentioned in the order itself.
Again, as far as the order dated 10.06.2024 of the Council is
concerned, the same appears to be dispatched on 14.10.2024
and whereas the petition had been affirmed on 12.11.2024
and has been presented before this Court on 12.12.2024.
While it would be that the petitioners could have been slightly
more vigilant in preferring the proceedings before this Court,
but, at the same time, the chronology of dates would not show
that the petitioners were the indolent litigant purposefully
delaying the proceedings.
10.
Insofar as the decisions relied upon by learned Counsel
for the respondent no.4, it would appear that the learned
Coordinate Bench as well as the Hon’ble Division Bench have
relied upon decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of
M/s India Glycols Limited (supra). While it would appear
that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had inter alia observed that
the petition instituted by appellant to challenge award of the
Facilitation Council was not maintainable in view of the
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
provisions of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, but, in the most
humble opinion of this Court, it would appear that the Hon’ble
Supreme Court was in fact affirming a decision of the Hon’ble
Division Bench of the High Court of Telangana which is
reproduced in the judgment itself where the Division Bench
had inter alia come to a conclusion that the petition ought not
to have been entertained. Paragraph no.5 of the decision is
reproduced hereinbelow for benefit wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has affirmed order of the Division Bench:“5.
In an appeal by the second respondent, the
Division Bench by its judgment dated 21 March 2023,
reversed the view of the Single Judge. The Division
Bench has come to the conclusion that the writ
petition instituted by the appellant was not
maintainable in view of the specific remedies which
are provided under the special statute. The High
Court held that the appellant ought to have taken
recourse to the remedy under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 19962 and having
failed to do so, a writ petition could not be
entertained. The observations of the High Court are
set out in paragraph 38 of the impugned judgment
which is extracted below:
“38. Insofar maintainability of the writ petition is
concerned, when respondents No.2 and 3 had an
adequate, efficacious and “Act of 1996” alternate
remedy under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, learned
Single Judge ought not to have entertained the writ
petition. While maintainability of a writ petition is
one aspect, entertainability is the relevant question.
Considering the objective of the MSME Act and the
provisions of Sections 15 to 23 thereof, learned
Single Judge erred in entertaining the writ petition.”
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A perusal of the above paragraph makes it clear that the
Division Bench has clearly made a distinction between the
maintainability of a writ petition and entertainability and has
concluded that the learned Single Judge has erred in
entertaining a writ petition. Thus, to this Court, it would
appear that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had while holding
that the petition challenging award of the Facilitation Council
was not maintainable, while affirming the decision of the
Division Bench of the Telangana High Court. To this Court, it
would appear that the Hon’ble Supreme Court was affirming a
decision whereby the entertainability was questioned and not
the maintainability per se.
10.1. At this stage, this Court seeks to rely upon a decision in
case of Narmada Clean–Tech vs. Indian Council of
Arbitration reported in (2021) 1 GLR 847 whereby the
Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court (Coram: Hon’ble the
Chief Justice Mr. Vikram Nath & Mr.J.B.Pardiwala, J., both
their Lordships then were) have, after analyzing catena of
judgments, inter alia held that an Arbitral Tribunal under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 is a Tribunal within the meaning of
Article 227 of the Constitution of India and thus would come
C/SCA/16985/2024
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within the purview of the said article. The Hon’ble Division
Bench has also distinguished the difference between the
entertainability and the maintainability of a petition under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India and has observed that
Courts have to be very circumspect in entertaining petitions
against award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India. Paragraphs no.29 and 34 to 55 are reproduced
hereinbelow for benefit:“29.
The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227
is exercised for keeping the subordinate Courts and
Tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction.
When a subordinate Court or Tribunal assumes
jurisdiction which it does not have or fails to exercise
jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction
though available is being exercised by the Court in a
manner not permitted by law and leads to failure of
justice, or grave injustice has occasioned thereby,
then the High Court must step into exercise its
supervisory jurisdiction. The High Court cannot
convert itself into a Court of appeal and start
reappreciating the evidence but can only interfere
when there is an error of jurisdiction. The powers
under Article 227 are very wide and can be used to
secure the ends of justice and to ensure that people
have faith in the judicial system. However, this power
must be exercised sparingly to keep the subordinate
Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their
authority and not to correct mere errors committed
by them. With regard to the inferior tribunals, it has
been held in a number of cases that the High Court
can quash or set-aside the decision of an inferior
tribunal in case the order has been passed without
jurisdiction or is against the principles of natural
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
justice or the Tribunal fails to exercise jurisdiction
vested in it by law. Though every error is not to be
corrected but if there is dereliction of duty or flagrant
violation of law then the High Court must exercise its
jurisdiction. Therefore, when a Tribunal does not
exercise jurisdiction or acts in a manner which will
sully the image of the judicial process or gives
findings which are perverse then the High Court can
and must exercise its powers of superintendence.
35.
The Supreme Court in Srei Infrastructure
Finance Ltd. vs. Tuff Drilling (P) Ltd reported in
(2018) 11 SCC 470 observed thus:
"13. The law of Arbitration was earlier governed
by the Arbitration Act, 1940. The Law
Commission of India and several other
organisations expressed opinion that the 1940
Act needs extensive amendments to make it more
responsive to contemporary requirements. In the
wake of rise in commercial litigation both at
domestic and international level, a need was felt
for a comprehensive law to deal the subject. The
United Nations Organisation on International
Trade Law (UNCILTRAL) adopted a Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration in the
year 1985. Taking into consideration domestic
arbitration as well as international commercial
arbitration, Parliament enacted the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996. Main objective for
introducing the legislation was to make provision
for an arbitral procedure which is fair, efficient
and capable of meeting the needs of the specific
arbitration. In Section 2 of the Act, arbitral
tribunal has been defined to mean a sole
arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators. The arbitral
tribunal was entrusted with various statutory
functions, obligations by the enactment.
14. The arbitration is a quasi judicial proceeding,
equitable in nature or character which differs
from a litigation in a Court. The power and
functions of arbitral tribunal are statutorily
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regulated. The tribunals are special arbitration
with institutional mechanism brought into
existence by or under statute to decide dispute
arising with reference to that particular statute
or to determine controversy referred to it. The
tribunal may be a statutory tribunal or tribunal
constituted under the provisions of the
Constitution of India. Section 9 of the Civil
Procedure Code vests into the Civil Court
jurisdiction to entertain and determine any civil
dispute. The constitution of tribunals has been
with intent and purpose to take out different
categories of litigation into the special tribunal
for speedy and effective determination of
disputes in the interest of the society. Whenever,
by a legislative enactment jurisdiction exercised
by ordinary civil court is transferred or entrusted
to tribunals such tribunals are entrusted with
statutory power. The arbitral tribunals in the
statute of 1996 are no different, they decide the
lis between the parties, follows Rules and
procedure conforming to the principle of natural
justice, the adjudication has finality subject to
remedy provided under the 1996 Act. Section 8
of the 1996 Act obliges a judicial authority in a
matter which is a subject of an agreement to
refer the parties to arbitration. The reference to
arbitral tribunal thus can be made by judicial
authority or an arbitrator can be appointed in
accordance with the arbitration agreement under
Section 11 of the 1996 Act.
26. There cannot be a dispute that the power
exercised by the arbitral tribunal is a quasijudicial. In view of the provisions of the 1996 Act,
which confers various statutory powers and
obligations on the arbitral tribunal, we do not
find any such distinction between the statutory
tribunal
constituted
under
the
statutory
provisions or Constitution in so far as the power
of procedural review is concerned. We have
already noticed that Section 19 provides that
arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the rules
of procedure as contained in Civil Procedure
C/SCA/16985/2024
JUDGMENT DATED: 09/01/2025
Code. Section 19 cannot be read to mean that
arbitral tribunal is incapacitated in drawing
sustenance from any provisions of Code of Civil
Procedure. This was clearly laid down in Nahar
Industrial Enterprises Limited Vs. Hong Kong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation, (2009) 8
SCC 646. In Paragraph 98(n), following was
stated:"(n) It is not bound by the procedure laid down
under the Code. It may however be noticed in
this regard that just because the Tribunal is not
bound by the Code, it does not mean that it
would not have jurisdiction to exercise powers of
a court as contained in the Code.
"Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code
of Civil Procedure and the only fetter that is put
on its powers is to observe the principles of
natural justice." (See Industrial Credit and
Investment Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Grapco
Industries Ltd. (1999) 4 SCC 710))"
36.
The scope of powers of superintendence
vested in the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India again came up for consideration
in Shalini Shyam Shetty and another vs. Rajendra
Shankar Patil reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329. The
Apex Court, after detailed exposition of the entire law
on the subject, held as follows:
"47. The jurisdiction under Article 227 on the
other hand is not original nor is it appellate. This
jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227
is
for
both
administrative
and
judicial
superintendence.
Therefore,
the
powers
conferred under Articles 226 and 227 are
separate and distinct and operate in different
fields. Another distinction between these two
jurisdictions is that under Article 226, High
Court normally annuls or quashes an order or
proceeding but in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 227, the High Court, apart from
annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the
impugned order by the order which the inferior
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tribunal should have made. {See Surya Dev Rai,
SCC page 690, para 25 and also the decision of
the Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari
Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and others [AIR 1955 SC 233, para 20 page 243]}.
48. The jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is
exercised where a party is affected but power
under Article 227 can be exercised by the High
Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In fact,
the power under Article 226 is exercised in
favour of persons or citizens for vindication of
their fundamental rights or other statutory
rights. The jurisdiction under Article 227 is
exercised by the High Court for vindication of its
position as the highest judicial authority in the
State. In certain cases where there is
infringement of fundamental right, the relief
under Article 226 of the Constitution can be
claimed ex-debito justicia or as a matter of right.
But in cases where the High Court exercises its
jurisdiction under Article 227, such exercise is
entirely discretionary and no person can claim it
as a matter of right. From an order of a Single
Judge passed under Article 226, a Letters Patent
Appeal or an intra Court Appeal is maintainable.
But no such appeal is maintainable from an order
passed by a Single Judge of a High Court in
exercise of power under Article 227. In almost all
High Courts, rules have been framed for
regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 226. No such rule appears to have been
framed for exercise of High Court's power under
Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise
entirely in the domain of the discretion of High
Court.
49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of
this Court, the following principles on the
exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution may be
formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is different from a petition under
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Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by
High Court under these two Articles is also
different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227
cannot be called a writ petition. The history of
the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High
Courts is substantially different from the history
of conferment of the power of Superintendence
on the High Courts under Article 227 and have
been discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in
exercise of its power of superintendence under
Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the
orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor
can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of
appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal
subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative
statutory mode of redressal has been provided,
that would also operate as a restrain on the
exercise of this power by the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High
Courts
in
exercise
of
their
power
of
superintendence have been repeatedly laid down
by this Court. In this regard the High Court must
be guided by the principles laid down by the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam
Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam
Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by
subsequent Constitution Benches and various
other decisions of this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh
(supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High
Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of
superintendence can interfere in order only to
keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it,
`within the bounds of their authority'.
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such
tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction
which is vested in them and by not declining to
exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
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(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and
(f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its
power of superintendence when there has been a
patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and
Courts subordinate to it or where there has been
a gross and manifest failure of justice or the
basic principles of natural justice have been
flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence
High Court cannot interfere to correct mere
errors of law or fact or just because another view
than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts
subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other
words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly
exercised.
(i) The High Court's power of superintendence
under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any
statute. It has been declared a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra
Kumar vs. Union of India & others, and therefore
abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is
also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of
a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of
the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure
Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and
cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power
under Article 227. At the same time, it must be
remembered that such statutory amendment
does not correspondingly expand the High
Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under
Article
227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be
exercised on equitable principle. In an
appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo
motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and
unfettered power of the High Court under Article
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227, it transpires that the main object of this
Article is to keep strict administrative and
judicial control by the High Court on the
administration of justice within its territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both
administrative and judicial, is to maintain
efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the
entire machinery of justice in such a way as it
does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of
interference under this Article is to be kept to
the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice
does not come to a halt and the fountain of
justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to
maintain public confidence in the functioning of
the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High
Court.
(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial
intervention is not to be exercised just for grant
of relief in individual cases but should be
directed for promotion of public confidence in
the administration of justice in the larger public
interest whereas Article 226 is meant for
protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the
power under Article 227 may be unfettered but
its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial
discipline pointed out above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this
power will be counter-productive and will divest
this extraordinary power of its strength and
vitality."
37.
We shall now look into the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of SBP and company
(supra). In SBP and company (supra), the Supreme
Court held that the Chief Justice or his delegatee,
exercising powers under Section 11(6) of the Act,
1996,
exercises
judicial
powers
and
not
administrative powers. The question whether the
High Court can exercise power of superintendence
under Article 227 or the writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India in case of
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Arbitral Tribunal was also considered in this case.
The Apex Court held as follows:
"45. It is seen that some High Courts have
proceeded on the basis that any order passed by
an arbitral tribunal during arbitration, would be
capable of being challenged under Article 226 or
227 of the Constitution of India. We see no
warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes
certain orders of the arbitral tribunal appealable.
Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an
avenue for ventilating its grievances against the
award including any in-between orders that
might have been passed by the arbitral tribunal
acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party
aggrieved by any order of the arbitral tribunal,
unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of
the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by
the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of
the Act. The arbitral tribunal is after all, the
creature of a contract between the parties, the
arbitration agreement, even though if the
occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute
it based on the contract between the parties. But
that would not alter the status of the arbitral
tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the
parties by agreement. We, therefore, disapprove
of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts
that any order passed by the arbitral tribunal is
capable of being corrected by the High Court
under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of
India. Such an intervention by the High Courts is
not permissible.
46. The object of minimizing judicial intervention
while the matter is in the process of being
arbitrated upon, will certainly be defeated if the
High Court could be approached under Article
227 or under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India against every order made by the arbitral
tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate
that once the arbitration has commenced in the
arbitral tribunal, parties have to wait until the
award is pronounced unless, of course, a right of
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appeal is available to them under Section 37 of
the Act even at an earlier stage."
38.
The majority view in the SBP and company
(supra) is that once the matter reaches the Arbitral
Tribunal or the sole Arbitrator, the High Court should
not interfere with the orders passed by the Arbitrator
or the Arbitral Tribunal during the course of the
arbitration proceedings and the parties should
approach the Court only in the terms of Section 37 of
the Act or in terms of Section 34 of the Act. In other
words, where the Arbitral Tribunal holds that it has
jurisdiction, it shall continue with the arbitral
proceedings and make an arbitral award.
39.
Thus, our understanding of the ratio of the
Supreme Court decision in SBP and company (supra)
is that the High Court should not interfere with each
and every order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal and
judicial intervention should be minimal. We find it
difficult to take the view interpreting the SBP and
company (supra) that the High Court has no power at
all to intervene either in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction or supervisory jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution of India with any of the orders
that may be passed by the Arbitral Tribunal or the
Arbitrator.
40.
There is a fine distinction between the
maintainability and entertainability of a writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution or a petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution in arbitration
matters. Maintainability is not synonymous to
entertainability. This position of law has been well
explained by the Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu
Kamath vs. Ahmed Ishaque reported in 1955 AIR 233.
In the said case, the question that arose before the
Supreme Court was, as to whether the High Court
had the jurisdiction to entertain a Writ Petition for
the issue of a Writ of Certiorari against the order of
Election
Tribunal
constituted
under
the
Representation of People's Act, 1951, as it stood in
1955, deciding an election dispute. Placing reliance
on Article 329 of the Constitution, it was contended
before the Supreme Court that as an election to the
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Parliament or State Legislature could be challenged
only by means of an Election Petition, petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution would not lie before
the High Court for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari
against the decision of the Election Tribunal also. The
Supreme Court negatived the contention. In doing so,
the Supreme Court pointed out that the bar created
under Article 329 of the Constitution was against
interfering in election matters and the said Article
did not curtail the power of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution to issue Writ of
Certiorari to any Tribunal and the Election Tribunal
was no exception. The relevant portion of the
Judgment reads:
"6. The first question that arises for decision in
this appeal is whether High Courts have
jurisdiction under Article 226 to issue Writs
against decisions of Election Tribunals. That
Article confers on High Courts power to issue
appropriate writs to any person or authority
within their territorial jurisdiction, in terms
absolute and unqualified, and Election Tribunals
functioning within the territorial jurisdiction of
the High Courts would fall within the sweep of
that power. If we are to recognise or admit any
limitation on this power, that must be founded on
some provision in the Constitution itself."
41.
In the aforenoted paragraph, the Supreme
Court has emphatically laid down that any restriction
on the power of the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution, can be recognised only if it is
incorporated in any of the provisions of the
Constitution itself. In view of the above decision of
the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, it is
clear that unless the jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution stands curtailed by
any other provision of the Constitution, it cannot be
said that a Petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution does not lie or this Court has no
jurisdiction to interfere in arbitration matters. The
principle laid down by the Supreme Court is that in
respect of election matters, unless an extraordinary
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case is made out in a given case, a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution should not be
entertained. This clearly means that a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the
legality of actions taken or orders made in the course
of an election to a local authority or any other body
on the ground of violation of law, is maintainable but
should not be entertained by the High Court unless
the violation of law made out is such as would justify
the interference under Article 226 of the Constitution
immediately to prevent abuse of power and waste of
public time and money and the alternative remedy by
way of Election Petition after the elections is not an
efficacious remedy. The same principle of law should
apply even to the arbitration matters.
42.
In the Union of India v. Varindera
Constructions Ltd., (2018) 7 SCC 794, the Supreme
Court held:"12. The primary object of the arbitration is to
reach a final disposition in a speedy, effective,
inexpensive and expeditious manner. In order to
regulate
the
law
regarding
arbitration,
legislature came up with legislation which is
known as Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
In order to make arbitration process more
effective, the legislature restricted the role of
courts in case where matter is subject to the
arbitration. Section 5 of the Act specifically
restricted the interference of the courts to some
extent. In other words, it is only in exceptional
circumstances, as provided by this Act, the court
is entitled to intervene in the dispute which is the
subject- matter of arbitration. Such intervention
may be before, at or after the arbitration
proceeding, as the case may be. In short, court
shall not intervene with the subject-matter of
arbitration unless injustice is caused to either of
the parties."
43.
The aforesaid observations of the Supreme
Court have been quoted with approval in a recent
pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of
M/s. ICOMM Tele Ltd. vs. Punjab State Water Supply
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and Sewarage Board and another [Civil Appeal
No.2713 of 2019 decided on 11 th March 2019].
44.
However, the recent trend of case law is that
the High Court should not interfere with any order
passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. The same does not
mean that the petition itself is not maintainable. We
may refer to and rely upon a recent order passed by
the Supreme Court in the case of Sterling Industries
(supra). The same reads thus:
"1. Having heard learned counsel for the parties
at length, we find that the judgment of the High
Court is liable to be set aside on one ground
alone. The High Court entertained a writ petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
against an order of the learned District Judge,
Gautam Budh Nagar purportedly passed under
Section 20 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (for short, "the Arbitration Act") read
with Section 19 of the Micro, Small & Medium
Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (for short,
"the MSME Act"). This application was made to
the District Judge by respondent No. 1Jayprakash Associates Ltd. against a partial
award made under Section 16 of the Arbitration
Act. Such an application was not tenable vide
Section 16 (6) of the Arbitration Act. Since such
an application was not tenable, we fail to
understand how in a writ petition filed against an
order made by the District Judge in an untenable
application, the High Court could have set aside
the partial award. This is clearly contrary to law.
This court in the case of SBP & Co. vs. Patel
Engineering Ltd. & Anr., reported in (2005) 8
SCC 618 in Paragraph No. 45 held as follows.
"45.It is seen that some High Courts have
proceeded on the basis that any order passed by
an arbitral tribunal during arbitration, would be
capable of being challenged under Article 226 or
227 of the Constitution of India. We see no
warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes
certain orders of the arbitral tribunal appealable.
Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an
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avenue for ventilating his grievances against the
award including any in-between orders that
might have been passed by the arbitral tribunal
acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party
aggrieved by any order of the arbitral tribunal,
unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of
the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by
the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of
the Act. The arbitral tribunal is after all, the
creature of a contract between the parties, the
arbitration agreement, even though if the
occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute
it based on the contract between the parties. But
that would not alter the status of the arbitral
tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the
parties by agreement. We, therefore, disapprove
of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts
that any order passed by the arbitral tribunal is
capable of being corrected by the High Court
under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of
India. Such an intervention by the High Courts is
not permissible."
2. In these circumstances, we are of the view
that the judgment of the High Court is liable to
be set aside. Ordered accordingly."
45.
We shall now look into the four decisions,
upon which, reliance has been placed on behalf of the
appellant.
46.
In M/s. Deep Industries Limited (supra), the
Supreme Court observed as under:
"At the same time, we cannot forget that Article
227 is a constitution provision which remains
untouched by the non- obstane clause of section
5 of the Act. In these circumstances, what is
important to note is that though petitions can be
filed under Article 227 against the judgments
allowing or dismissing first appeals under
Section 37 of the Act, yet the High Court would
be extremely circumspect in interfering with the
same, taking into account the statutory policy as
adumbrated by us herein above so that
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interference is restricted to orders that are
passed which are patently lacking in inherent
jurisdiction."
47.
The
bare
reading
of
the
aforesaid
observations of the Supreme Court makes it clear
that it was a case which had travelled right upto the
stage of Section 37 of the Act. It is suggestive of the
fact that an appeal was filed before the High Court
against the order passed by the District Court under
Section 34 of the Act. In such circumstances, a
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
would definitely be maintainable with a rider that the
High Court should be extremely circumspect in
interfering with the same. In other words, the
interference should be restricted to orders that are
passed, which are patently lacking any inherent
jurisdiction. However, the ratio, as propounded in M/
s. Deep Industries (supra) does not, in any manner,
dilute the principles propounded by the Supreme
Court in the SBP and company (supra). This decision,
in our opinion, is not in any manner helpful to Mr.
Trivedi, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant.
48.
In Punjab Agro Industries Corporation
(supra), the appellant had entered into a
collaboration agreement with the respondent for
setting up of a project through a company to be
jointly promoted by them. Certain disputes arose
between the parties and the appellant by notice
appointed its Arbitrator and called upon the
respondent to appoint his Arbitrator. As the
respondent failed to comply, the appellant filed a
petition under Section 11(4) of the Act, 1996 in the
Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Chandigarh
(a designate of the Chief Justice of Punjab and
Haryana High Court). The said designate, by order
dated 16th February 2002, dismissed the petition
holding that the appointment of Arbitrator was not
called for, as the matter had already been decided by
the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction
(for short, "BIFR"). Being aggrieved, the appellant
approached the High Court for quashing the order of
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the designate and for appointment of an Arbitrator in
terms of the agreement. A Division Bench of the High
Court disposed of the said writ petition by the
following short order:
"The Petitioner is aggrieved by rejection of
application for appointment of arbitrator under
Section 11(4) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996.
Learned Counsel for the Respondent raises a
preliminary objection that Writ Petition is not
maintainable in view of judgment of Seven
Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.B.P. &
Co. Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. - 2005 (8) SCC
618 wherein it has been held that power of
deciding an application for appointment of an
arbitrator is judicial power and is not amenable
to writ jurisdiction.
After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we
uphold the preliminary objection and dismiss the
Writ Petition. It is made clear that this will not
debar the Petitioner from taking such other
remedy as may be available under the law."
49.
The aforequoted order of the High Court was
challenged in appeal by special leave, on the
following grounds:
"(a) The order of the High Court is a non
speaking order and it upholds the preliminary
objection of the respondent without assigning
any reason.
(b) A writ petition under Article 227 was
maintainable against the order of the Civil Judge,
Senior Division (designate of the Chief Justice)
and the High Court was wrong in assuming that
the writ petition was not maintainable in view of
the decision of this Court in SBP."
50.
The Supreme
appeal, held as under:
Court,
while
allowing
the
"8. We have already noticed that though the
order under section 11(4) is a judicial order,
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having regard to section 11(7) relating to finality
of such orders, and the absence of any provision
for appeal, the order of the Civil Judge was open
to challenge in a writ petition under Article 227
of the Constitution. The decision in SBP does not
bar such a writ petition. The observations of this
Court in SBP that against an order under section
11 of the Act, only an appeal under Article 136 of
the Constitution would lie, is with reference to
orders made by the Chief Justice of a High Court
or by the designate Judge of that High Court. The
said observations do not apply to a subordinate
court functioning as Designate of the Chief
Justice. This Court has repeatedly stressed that
Article 136 is not intended to permit direct
access to this Court where other equally
efficacious remedy is available and the question
involved is not of any public importance; and that
this Court will not ordinarily exercise its
jurisdiction under Article 136, unless the
appellant has exhausted all other remedies open
to him. Therefore the contention that the order of
the Civil Judge, Sr. Division rejecting a petition
under section 11 of the Act could only be
challenged, by recourse to Article 136 is
untenable. The decision in SBP did not affect the
maintainability of the writ petition filed by
Appellant before the High Court.
9. We therefore allow this appeal and set aside
the order of the High Court. As a consequence,
Civil Writ Petition No.9889 of 2002 shall stand
restored to the file, and the High Court is
requested to dispose it of in accordance with
law."
51.
The aforesaid decision, in the case of Punjab
Agro Industries (supra) has laid down the same
principle of law as explained in the case of M/s. Deep
Industries (supra).
52.
KKR India Financial Services Limited (supra)
is a Division Bench decision of this High Court to
which one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J.) is a party. In the
said case, the subject matter of challenge was an
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interim consent order passed by the Small Causes
Court at Ahmedabad in a Commercial Civil Suit
instituted by the Axis Bank Limited against Sintex
Company Limited. KKR India Financial Services
Limited was not impleaded as one of the defendants
in the suit. The consent order obtained by the parties
to the suit was hurting the KKR India Financial
Services Limited. KKR had two options available to it
for the purpose of questioning the legality and
validity of the consent order passed by the Small
Causes Court at Ahmedabad. The first option was to
seek leave of the High Court to appeal against the
consent order and the second option was to question
the legality and validity of the consent order by
coming to the High Court invoking its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India. Having regard to the gross facts of the case,
the Division Bench of the High Court thought fit to
entertain the application filed by the KKR India
Financial Services Limited under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India by overruling the preliminary
objection raised on behalf of the Axis Bank as regards
the alternative remedy available with the KKR India
Financial Services Limited of filing an appeal after
seeking leave from the High Court. While deciding
the matter, the Division Bench of this High Court
considered various provisions of the law, more
particularly, Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
This Court took the view that a petition under Article
227 of the Constitution of India was maintainable
although the petitioner was not a party in the suit
proceedings. The Division Bench took the view that to
prevent serious miscarriage of justice, it was
necessary to interfere with the consent order in
exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution of India.
53.
At this stage, we once again go back to the
impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge.
At the cost of repetition, we once again incorporate
para 12 of the impugned order passed by the learned
Single Judge, which reads thus:
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"In view of the foregoing reasons, the petitions
fail and are accordingly dismissed. It is, however,
made clear that the petitions are dismissed
without entering into merits of the matter, only
on the ground that the order passed during
course of arbitration proceedings cannot be
challenged under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the
constitution of India and it would be open for
both the sides to raise all the contentions on
merits before the appropriate forum in
appropriate proceeding at appropriate time in
accordance with law. Interim relief, if any stands
vacated. Rule is discharged with no order as to
costs."
54.
It is apparent on plain reading of the para 12
quoted above that the learned Single Judge rejected
the petition without entering into the merits of the
matter only on the ground that the order passed
during the course of the arbitration proceedings
cannot be challenged under Articles 226 and/or 227
of the Constitution of India and it would be open for
both the sides to raise all the contentions on merits
before appropriate forum in appropriate proceedings
at an appropriate time in accordance with law. The
learned Single Judge saying so held that the petitions
were not maintainable in law.
55.
To the aforesaid extent, we find it difficult to
agree with the learned Single Judge. It would have
been altogether a different matter if the learned
Single Judge would have said that having regard to
the nature of the order passed by the Arbitral
Tribunal, no case is made out for interference. The
learned Single Judge is very clear in his mind. The
learned Single Judge says that His Lordship has not
gone into the merits of the order passed by the
Arbitral Tribunal as no order passed by the Arbitral
Tribunal can be questioned before the High Court
either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution as
the petition itself is not maintainable.”
From the above quoted paragraphs, while it would be
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undoubtedly clear that a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India challenging an order under Section 34 of
the Arbitration Act, 1996 would be maintainable, whether to
entertain the same or not, would be a different issue. The
Hon’ble Division Bench has inter alia laid down that the High
Court must step into and exercise its supervisory jurisdiction
where Tribunals assume jurisdiction which they do not have
or fails to exercise jurisdiction which leads to failure of justice
or grave injustice. The Hon’ble Division Bench has further
reiterated
that
petitions
under
Article
could
be
entertained against an order where an alternative remedy is
available, where there has been a gross and manifest failure
of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been
flouted (paragraph no.36).
10.2.
Furthermore,
this
Court also would rely upon
observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of
Whirlpool
Corporation
(supra)
whereby
the
Hon’ble
Supreme Court has inter alia held that a writ petition would
not be entertained by High Court if there is an effective and
efficacious remedy available and whereas, the alternative
remedy has not been considered to operate as a bar inter alia
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where there has been violation of principles of natural justice.
Paragraph no.15 of the said decision being relevant for the
present purpose, is reproduced hereinbelow for benefit:“15.
Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the
High Court, having regard to the facts of a case, has
a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ
petition. But the High Court had imposed upon itself
certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective
and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court
would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the
alternative remedy has been consistently held by this
Court not to operate as a bar in at least three
contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has
been filed for the enforcement of any of the
Fundamental Rights or where there has been a
violation of the principle of natural justice or where
the order or proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There
is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down
this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on
some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the
constitutional law as they still hold the field.”
10.3. Reference is also made to decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in case of M/S Godrej Sara Lee Limited. vs.
The
Excise
And
Taxation
Officer-Cum-Assessing
Authority & Ors., reported in (2023) SCC OnLine SC 95.
Paragraphs no.4 to 8 of the said decision are reproduced
hereinbelow for benefit:“4.
Before answering the questions, we feel the
urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ
powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution
having come across certain orders passed by the high
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courts holding writ petitions as “not maintainable”
merely because the alternative remedy provided by
the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the
parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction.
The power to issue prerogative writs under Article
226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the
exercise of such power must be traceable in the
Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard
may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other
similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article
226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or
restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs.
While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite
availability of a remedy under the very statute which
has been invoked and has given rise to the action
impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in
a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the
petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has
not pursued the alternative remedy available to
him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground
for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts
(bearing in mind the facts of each particular case)
have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition
or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the
exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved
through judicial precedents is that the high courts
should normally not entertain a writ petition, where
an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is
available. At the same time, it must be remembered
that mere availability of an alternative remedy of
appeal or revision, which the party invoking the
jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has
not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the
high court and render a writ petition “not
maintainable”. In a long line of decisions, this Court
has made it clear that availability of an alternative
remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the
“maintainability” of a writ petition and that the rule,
which requires a party to pursue the alternative
remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy,
convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law.
Though elementary, it needs to be restated that
“entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ
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petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real
distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight
of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the
root of the matter and if such objection were found to
be of substance, the courts would be rendered
incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication.
On the other hand, the question of “entertainability”
is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high
courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ
petition despite being maintainable may not be
entertained by a high court for very many reasons or
relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite
setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed
relief would not further public interest. Hence,
dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the
ground that the petitioner has not availed the
alternative remedy without, however, examining
whether an exceptional case has been made out for
such entertainment would not be proper.
5.
A little after the dawn of the Constitution, a
Constitution Bench of this Court in its decision
reported in 1958 SCR 595 (State of Uttar Pradesh vs.
Mohd. Nooh) had the occasion to observe as follows:
“10. In the next place it must be borne in mind
that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as
there is with mandamus, that it will lie only
where there is no other equally effective remedy.
It is well established that, provided the requisite
grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right
of appeal has been conferred by statute,
(Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 11,
p. 130 and the cases cited there). The fact that
the aggrieved party has another and adequate
remedy may be taken into consideration by the
superior court in arriving at a conclusion as to
whether it should, in exercise of its discretion,
issue a writ of certiorari to quash the
proceedings and decisions of inferior courts
subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior
court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved
party has exhausted his other statutory
remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the
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exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ
will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience
and discretion rather than a rule of law and
instances are numerous where a writ of
certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that
the aggrieved party had other adequate legal
remedies. ***”
6.
At the end of the last century, this Court in
paragraph 15 of the its decision reported in (1998) 8
SCC 1 (Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade
Marks, Mumbai and Others) carved out the
exceptions on the existence whereof a Writ Court
would be justified in entertaining a writ petition
despite the party approaching it not having availed
the alternative remedy provided by the statute. The
same read as under:
(i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of
any of the fundamental rights;
(ii) where there is violation of principles of
natural justice;
(iii) where the order or the proceedings are
wholly without jurisdiction; or
(iv) where the vires of an Act is challenged.
7.
Not too long ago, this Court in its decision
reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 884 (Assistant
Commissioner of State Tax vs. M/s. Commercial Steel
Limited) has reiterated the same principles in
paragraph 11.
8.
That apart, we may also usefully refer to the
decisions of this Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC 724
(State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. vs. Indian Hume Pipe
Co. Ltd.) and (2000) 10 SCC 482 (Union of India vs.
State of Haryana). What appears on a plain reading
of the former decision is that whether a certain item
falls within an entry in a sales tax statute, raises a
pure question of law and if investigation into facts is
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unnecessary, the high court could entertain a writ
petition in its discretion even though the alternative
remedy was not availed of; and, unless exercise of
discretion is shown to be unreasonable or perverse,
this Court would not interfere. In the latter decision,
this Court found the issue raised by the appellant to
be pristinely legal requiring determination by the
high court without putting the appellant through the
mill of statutory appeals in the hierarchy. What
follows from the said decisions is that where the
controversy is a purely legal one and it does not
involve disputed questions of fact but only questions
of law, then it should be decided by the high court
instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground
of an alternative remedy being available.”
After explaining the difference between entertainability
and maintainability, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has inter alia
reiterated the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case
of Whirlpool Corporation as regards exercise of power by the
High Court even if an alternative is available.
10.4.
Having regard to the observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court as well as the Hon’ble Division Bench of this
Court referred to hereinabove, it would appear to this Court
that while a petition where the party has an alternative
remedy would be maintainable, entertaining the same would
be different issue. A writ petition where the party has an
alternative remedy could be entertained subject to the selfimposed restrains on exercise of such powers within the
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parameters as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and
Division Bench of this Court. In the instant case, it would
appear that the Council has passed an order without following
the principles of natural justice for which reason the present
petition challenging the order of the Council could be
entertained. Furthermore, this Court would also entertain the
present petition under Article 227 to ensure that the Tribunal
i.e. the Facilitation Council here is kept within the bounds of
its jurisdiction.
10.5. Insofar as the issue of violation of principles of natural
justice, to this Court, it would appear that while the
petitioners herein were afforded an opportunity to file the
Statement of Defence and Counterclaim vide order dated
13.01.2023 and whereas, while the petitioners did not file the
same by the next date, yet, as would be clear from the order
dated 02.02.2024, in addition to seeking additional time to file
their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, the petitioners
had also requested the Council to treat their Statement of
Defence and Counterclaim before passing of the first award,
as their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim. As noted
hereinabove, while rejecting the request for granting of
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further time, the aspect of the Statement of Defence and
Counterclaim which was already there on record to be taken
as the stand of the petitioners, could have been considered
which would have been in adherence to the principles of
natural justice. The said aspect has completely escaped the
attention of the Council vide order dated 02.02.2024. Again,
while the petitioners had preferred recall application with
regard to order dated 02.02.2024 forfeiting the right of the
petitioners to file Statement of Defence and Counterclaim and
whereas, even in the application a prayer had been sought for
that the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim being on
record may be treated as the Statement of Defence and
Counterclaim, yet, even the said application had not been
considered. Thus, it would appear that the petitioners were
denied an appropriate opportunity to present their stand
before the Facilitation Council.
10.6.
On the other hand, insofar as the Council being
required to be kept within their bounds, to this Court, it would
appear that when the fact of the present writ petition pending
before this Court was brought to the notice of the Council,
then the Council should have deferred the hearing so as to
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afford appropriate opportunity to the petitioner more so to
ensure that the petition which was pending before this Court
would not be infructuated. To this Court, it would appear that
when the fact of challenge to orders dated 02.02.2024 and
10.06.2024 by way of present petition was brought to the
notice of the Tribunal and since setting aside of the said
orders would have led an opportunity being granted to the
petitioners to file Statement of Defence and Counterclaim,
then ideally the Facilitation Council should have waited for
some time to have the validity of the orders examined by this
Court.
10.7.
While it is not an intent of this Court to hold that
whenever a subordinate Court or a Tribunal over which the
High Court holds supervisory jurisdiction is informed about
the pendency of a writ petition, which petition would have
direct bearing on the case before the Court or Tribunal, then
the Court or Tribunal should stay its hands rather the intent of
this Court is to observe that in appropriate situations when
orders of subordinate Courts, Tribunals or Authorities are
under scrutiny by this Court, then unless there is an element
of extraordinary urgency or an element of dilatory tactics
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being adopted under the guise of pendency of the petition, the
Courts or Tribunals or Authorities should normally wait till the
High Court passes some interim or final order in the matter
concerned.
10.8. Again, while learned Counsel for the petitioners has
urged that the award is nothing but overreaching the due
process of this Court, in view of the observations made
hereinabove and considering that there are no malafides
alleged, this Court restrains itself from observing any further
in that regard.
11.
Having observed as above, it would also be required to
be mentioned here that the present is a case where equities
are required to be balanced. The respondent no.4 having
approached the Council somewhere in the year 2016 for the
first time, had an award passed in his favour on 24.10.2019
which, as noted hereinabove, had been interfered by the
Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court vide order dated
09.03.2021. It appears that thereafter, while the matter had
been listed for the first time on 04.03.2022 and fifteen days’
time had been sought for by the claimant – respondent no.4 to
file its Statement of Claim and while the same had been filed
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on 18.11.2022, it was always open thereafter for the
respondent herein to have filed its Statement of Defence and
Counterclaim anytime thereafter.
11.1. Again, while the same is not specifically mentioned by
the Council in order dated 02.02.2024, yet, it would appear
that the petitioners have very fairly stated at paragraph no. hh
of the petition as pointed out by learned Counsel for the
respondent no.4 that on hearing dated 13.01.2023, the
Advocate for the petitioners had made a statement that the
petitioners would file a fresh Statement of Defence and
Counterclaim within a period of two weeks. While the next
date, as noted hereinabove, had come after a period of
thirteen months, the petitioners could not be heard to contend
that they were not provided enough opportunity more
particularly as noted hereinabove, it was always open for the
petitioners to after November, 2022 to have filed their
Counterclaim and Statement of Defence.
11.2.
Furthermore, it would appear, as noted hereinabove
that while the petitioners may not be termed as an indolent
litigant, yet, the fact of the petitioners having taken things a
bit too lightly, cannot be but observed more particularly
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looking to the fact that the petitioners, having got more than
thirteen months, did not file their Statement of Defence and
Counterclaim and on 02.02.2024 had again requested for
time. Again, after order dated 10.06.2024 having been
received by them, had approached this Court after near about
two months from the date of dispatch i.e. 14.10.2024. Further,
while the matter had been filed on 12.12.2024, it was listed
only a day earlier then the matter which was fixed before the
Council on 17.12.2024 and whereas, the petitioners, to this
Court, could have always requested the appropriate Court or
have resorted to appropriate procedure to ensure that the
petition could have been heard as expeditiously as possible. It
would also appear that the Court, for no fault of the claimant –
respondent no.4 herein, would be required to interfere with a
arbitral award which has held in favour of the original
claimant – respondent no.4 whereby the Council has inter alia
directed the respondent to pay large sums to the petitioners
which would in total come to around Rs.11 Crores.
11.3.
Thus, to this Court, it would appear that while the
orders dated 02.02.2024 and 10.06.2024 and award dated
17.12.2024 are required to be interfered with, but, at the
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same time, appropriate cost also is required to be imposed
upon the petitioners, to be paid to the respondent no.4 herein
and whereas, this Court would also deem it appropriate to lay
down an appropriate timeline for the Council to decide the
arbitral proceedings once again.
12.
Having regard to the above discussion, observations and
conclusions, to this Court, the following directions would meet
with the ends of justice:(i)
The order dated 02.02.2024, 10.06.2024 passed by the
Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation Council are hereby
quashed and set aside. Furthermore, the Arbitral Award dated
17.10.2024 is also hereby quashed and set aside.
(ii)
Costs calculated of Rs.11,00,000/- (Rupees Eleven Lakhs
Only) is imposed upon the petitioners to be paid to the
respondent no.4 herein within a period of six (06) weeks from
the date the present order is uploaded on the portal of the
Gujarat High Court.
(iii)
The State Micro Small Enterprises Facilitation Council,
Gujarat is directed to take the Statement of Defence and
Counterclaim of the petitioners dated 12.08.2019 i.e. filed
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prior to the Arbitration Award dated 24.10.2019 on record
and treat it as the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim of
the
petitioners
herein
and
whereas,
the
arbitration
proceedings shall be completed positively by the Council
within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of
this order albeit after affording appropriate opportunity to
both the parties.
13.
With the above observations and directions, the present
petition stands disposed of as allowed. Civil Applications
which are not allowed, are treated as disposed of as having
become infructuous.
(NIKHIL S. KARIEL,J)
Bhoomi
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