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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Reserved on: 20.11.2025
Pronounced on: 09.02.2026
CRL.M.C. 8722/2024
REENA GROVER
....Petitioner
Through:
Mr. Suhail Sehgal, Mr. Prashant
Drolia, Advocates.
versus
SH. RAMESH GROVER & ORS
......Respondents
Through: Ms. Sudershani Ray and Ms.
Poonam Prajapati, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA
JUDGMENT
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J.
1.
This petition has been filed by the petitioner, challenging the
impugned order date 29th February 2024, passed by learned
Metropolitan Magistrate [“MM”]-03, South District, Saket Court,
New Delhi in Complaint Case No. 1511/2023, in the matter titled
“Reena Grover Vs. Ramesh Grover & Ors.” and order dated 07th
September 2024, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-05,
South District, Saket Courts, New Delhi [“ASJ”] on the ground that
the said orders are illegal, perverse, bad in law and suffer from
infirmity and illegality and therefore liable to be set aside.
Factual Background:
CRL.M.C. 8722/2024
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2.
The facts, as succinctly captured in the judgment passed by the
learned ASJ are that petitioner/wife got married with respondent No. 1
in the year 1964, and since then, she had been residing in the
matrimonial home at C-7, Green Park, South Delhi. Three children
were born out of the said wedlock, two sons and one daughter.
Respondents were not ready to give any share in property to the
daughter. In her complaint filed under Section 12 of the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence [“DV Act”], petitioner alleged
infiction of emotional, mental and economic abuse at the hands of the
respondents. On 13th April 2024, petitioner moved to her daughter’s
house, located in Safdarjung Enclave. She along with her baggage
shifted to her daughter’s house considering that for post-care
treatment, she would be requiring the same. Since the petitioner’s
health started improving, on 08th July 2023, petitioner tried to re-enter
her matrimonial home at C-7, Green Park, but was denied re-entry.
She claimed that she has lived at her matrimonial home for more than
30 years and therefore cannot be denied entry into her matrimonial
home.
3.
Petitioner accordingly filed an application under Section 19
read with Section 23 DV Act before the court of MM, which has been
dismissed vide order dated 29th February 2024, observing that the
petitioner was currently residing at Safdarjung property, which also
belongs to respondent No. 1. The learned Magistrate did not agree
with the argument of the petitioner that as respondent No. 1 himself
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was not in possession of the said property, he cannot be considered to
have provided that accommodation to the petitioner for her residence.
The leaned court was of the view that respondent No. 1 might not be
in actual possession of the property, however, he certainly was in
constructive possession, being the owner of the property. The learned
trial court also repelled the argument of the petitioner that her
daughter is residing in that property and therefore the said property
cannot be provided to the petitioner as an alternate accommodation.
The learned trial court took the view that petitioner cannot insist on
residing in Green Park property when her husband has already offered
a suitable accommodation, and therefore in order to provide further
acrimony between the parties and multiplicity of proceedings, deemed
it appropriate that petitioner continues to reside at Safdarjung property
of respondent No. 1.
4.
The appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act against the order
dated 29th February 2024, passed by the learned MM, has also been
dismissed vide order 07th September 2024. The learned Appellate
Court observed that petitioner has levelled allegations of domestic
violence not only against her husband but also against her son and
grandson, who all are residing in the Green Park house in which
residence order has been sought and therefore considering such
circumstances, observed that it would be highly inappropriate to
permit the petitioner to go and reside in the shared household as it will
simply result in further litigation and dispute between the parties. The
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learned Appellate Court also found that there was nothing on record
for the trial court to come to a conclusion that the complainant has
shifted to Gurgaon from Safdarjung Enclave and thus found no reason
to take a view different from what the trial court had taken.
Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner:
5.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner
is an elderly lady, aged about 81 years and has been deprived of right
to reside in the shared household at C-7, Green Park, New Delhi by
the respondents herein for more than two years where she resided
uninterruptedly for 60 years. She had to go for the proposed surgery
and treatment, and accordingly for the purpose of preparing for the
surgery and recuperation, she left from the shared household on 13th
April, 2023 and went to her daughter’s house in Safdarjung Enclave,
New Delhi. When she sought to return, on 08th July 2023, the
respondents forcibly prevented her from entering and did not allow to
come inside her house and she was left shelter-less. The petitioner has
since then been staying with her daughter and thereafter now with her
grandson at Gurugram.
6.
It is submitted that respondent No. 1 filed a case for eviction
against his daughter from the house situated in Safdarjung Enclave,
and consequently, the daughter of the petitioner asked her to vacate
the said house and go back to the house of respondent No. 1 to reside
with him. Since respondent No. 1 was not allowing the same,
petitioner had to move to the house of her grandson (daughter’s son)
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in Gurugram. It is submitted that if respondent No. 1, who has filed
eviction suit against his daughter was himself not in the possession of
Safdarjung house, he could not have discharged his obligation to
provide shelter to his wife in the shared household by putting the
petitioner in a house which was not in his possession.
7.
It is argued that petitioner left the matrimonial home only
temporarily for the purpose of her treatment. She had no intention of
not returning back. It is argued that the impugned order dated 29th
February 2024, passed by the learned MM holding that respondent No.
1 was in constructive possession of the house at Safdarjung Enclave
and that the daughter of the petitioner has taken the possession
illegally, amounts to pre-judging the proceedings pending in the other
courts.
8.
It is argued that the learned MM failed to consider the written
arguments filed in the matter or even note the fact that petitioner was
not staying in Safdarjung Enclave house at the time of passing of the
impugned order and such written arguments cannot be ignored and
have to be dealt with. It is further argued that both the courts below
failed to appreciate that even if it is to be assumed that respondent No.
1 was in constructive possession, he could at best put the petitioner in
constructive possession and not actual possession. Both the courts
ignored the fact that petitioner was not staying at Safdarjung Enclave
house but in Guguram with her grandson. It is also argued that
respondent No. 1, in one of the suits filed by him, has claimed that
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Safdarjung Enclave property is occupied by another tenant and if that
is so, the direction of the learned Magistrate to direct the petitioner to
stay there, would be absurd.
9.
It is thus argued that the property situated in Green Park is the
shared household of the petitioner and therefore the impugned orders
be set aside and the petitioner be directed to re-enter her shared
household situated at Green Park.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondents:
10.
The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the
present litigation in substance is a property dispute between the
parties, which has been filed under the DV Act. It is submitted that
there are two properties namely C-7, Green Park and B-5/204,
Safdarjung Enclave, both admittedly belonging to respondent No. 1,
but respondent No. 1 is residing at Safdarjung Enclave. It has been
submitted that the petitioner voluntarily left the Green Park house in
April 2003 and shifted to the Safdarjung property with her daughter,
where she still continues to reside. It is asserted that there was no act
of domestic violence or forcible dispossession and that the material on
record including the photographs and the following communication do
not support the petitioner’s allegations of forceful eviction.
11.
It is further submitted that petitioner has taken contradictory
stands before different forums regarding her place of residence,
thereby, attempted to mislead the court. While in her affidavit and
police complaints, she admitted that she was residing at Safdarjung
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Enclave property, while before this Court, she has sought to project
herself as shelter-less, which is demonstrably false. Reliance is placed
on pleadings, affidavits and orders passed in eviction and civil
proceedings, wherein, it was categorically admitted that both the
petitioner and her daughter reside at B-5/204, Safdarjung Enclave.
12.
The learned counsel further submits that both the courts below
have correctly appreciated the facts and have rightly held that
petitioner was not without shelter and was residing in Safdarjung
property, owned by respondent No. 1. It has been further submitted
that DV Act is being misused to advance the interest of petitioner’s
daughter in an ongoing property dispute, pending before this Court,
rather than for protection against domestic abuse. It was further
emphasized that permissive use of the Safdarjung property was
granted by the respondent/husband to the petitioner and her daughter
and such possession continues even today.
13.
Upon facts, it has been further submitted that respondent No. 1
permitted his daughter to stay in the Safdarjung property only as a
licensee. However, later respondents came to know that the house was
illegally occupied by a tenant and that his daughter was illegally
receiving the rent in cash from the said property without any lease
agreement. In January 2023, the said property became vacant.
Respondent No. 1 wanted to lease the said premises or himself enter
therein. However, petitioner insisted respondent No. 1 to gift the
property to the daughter. When respondent No. 1 did not succumb to
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the demand of the petitioner, she on 13th April 2023, left C-7, Green
Park with all her belongings and shifted to B-5/204, Safdarjung
Enclave so as to take possession of the property and had put her name
plate outside the house. In July 2023, respondent No. 1 filed a civil
suit in respect of Safdarjung Enclave property against his daughter and
son in law seeking restraint order against creating any third party
interest. The learned counsel submits that the said case was not filed
against the petitioner, even though, she was living there from 13th
April, 2023 and was in actual possession of the house as respondent
No. 1 had no issue or objection to respondent No. 1 living in the said
property.
14.
It is argued that DV Act is meant for the benefit of the genuine
sufferers and not for misusers thereof. Petitioner is already living in
the property belonging to respondent No. 1. It is submitted that the
petitioner has deliberately not placed the correct facts and tried to
mislead the court. The daughter of the petitioner had filed a suit for
partition. However, in the said suit, in the prayer clause, there is no
mention of B-5/204, Safdarjung Enclave and thus she is not seeking
partition with respect to the said property. The present complaint has
been filed by petitioner only with a view to help her daughter in the
civil suit. It was further emphasized that permissive use of Safdarjung
property was granted by respondent No. 1 to the petitioner and her
daughter and such possession continues even today.
Analysis & Conclusion:
CRL.M.C. 8722/2024
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15.
Upon careful consideration of record and the rival submissions
made by both the parties, this Court is of the prima facie view that the
present proceedings predominantly arise out of an inter se property
dispute between the parties rather than a case warranting interference
under the protective framework of DV Act. The material on record
demonstrates that the petitioner is not without shelter and has been
residing in the property bearing No. B-5/204, Safdarjung Enclave,
New Delhi. The consistent stand of respondent No. 1 as also recorded
in the impugned order dated 29th February, 2024 is that he has no
objection to the petitioner residing in the said Safdarjung property.
16.
Section 19 of the DV Act empowers the Magistrate to pass
residence orders to ensure that an aggrieved woman is not rendered
roofless or left without a safe place of residence. The object of the
statute is protective and remedial and not to confer an indefeasible
right upon the aggrieved person to insist upon residence in a particular
property when suitable alternate accommodation of the same standard
is available and offered.
17.
The preamble of DV Act indicates that the said legislation has
been enacted for providing more effective protection of the rights of
women guaranteed under the constitution who are the victims of
violence of any kind occurring with the family and for the matters
connected thereto or incidental thereto.
18.
The phrase “domestic relationship” has been defined under
Section 2 (f) of the DV Act to mean a relationship between two
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persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a
shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or
through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or family
members living together as joint family. Similarly, the word “shared
household” has been defined under Section 2 (s) of the DV Act, which
reads as under:“2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires,—
.......
(s) “shared household” means a household where the person
aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship
either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a
household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the
aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by
either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or
the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title,
interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong
to the joint family of which the respondent is a member,
irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has
any right, title or interest in the shared household.”
19.
Section 17 of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in
a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared
household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficially
interest in the same. The Section further provides that aggrieved
person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or
any part of it by the respondent except in accordance with the
procedure established by law. The Act confers powers upon the Court
under Section 19 of the Act to restrain dispossession, direct restoration
of the possession or provide alternate accommodation if restoration is
CRL.M.C. 8722/2024
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impractical. The court generally grants restoration when household
was genuinely shared in a domestic relationship, her shifting was not
voluntary, permanent separation and there is no serious safety risk in
returning and the request is bona fide. The court should ordinarily
consider restoration unless she has permanently settled somewhere by
choice, there are safety concerns or restoration is impracticable.
Otherwise, denial of entry is justified by Section 19 of the residence
order.
20.
The case of the petitioner is that she previously resided at Green
Park property since after marriage and the same constitutes a shared
household. It has been contended that she later shifted to another
accommodation owned situated at Safdarjung Enclave for the purpose
of undertaking treatment and that upon attempted return, she was
denied entry, which is alleged to constitute domestic violence in the
nature of economic abuse.
21.
On the contrary, the stand of the respondents is that petitioner
voluntarily left the disputed premises and established a separate
residence at Safdarjung Enclave. Her relocation was not temporary but
a conscious and permanent decision. The Green Park property is
presently occupied by respondent No. 1, his son, grandson and his
family and there is no subsisting domestic relationship in the said
premises.
CRL.M.C. 8722/2024
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22.
The points for determination in the present matter are as under:-
i)
Whether the premises situated at Green Park qualify as a shared
household under Section 2 (s) of the Act;
ii)
Whether denial of entry in the facts of the case constitute
domestic violence; and
iii)
Whether the petitioner is entitled to a residence order under
Section 19.
23.
It is not disputed that petitioner resided in the disputed premises
at Green Park for a long period since after her marriage. It is the stand
of the petitioner herself in Paragraph Nos. 20 & 21 of the complaint
that she was advised surgery and therefore on 13th April 2023, she
moved to her daughter’s house located at Safdarjung Enclave. She
along with her baggage shifted to her daughter’s house. Undoubtedly,
a mere fleeting or casual living at a different place would not
constitute a shared household and therefore it is important to consider
the intention of the parties, nature of living and nature of the
household to determine whether the premises is share-hold. In her
complaint filed before the leaned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, in
the memo of parties, petitioner herself categorically mentioned her
current residence as B-5/204, Safdarjung Enclave. The affidavit in
support of the complaint also mentions her present address as B-5/204,
Safdarjung Enclave. The Court takes note of a police complaint made
by the petitioner on 17th April 2023, wherein also, she stated that on
account of mental harassment, she had to move to B-5/204, Safdarjung
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Enclave with her daughter and her family. In such complaint, she
mentioned her address to be that of B-5/204, Safdarjung Enclave. In
her complaint dated 08th July 2024 made to the police, she again
mentions her address to be that of B-5/204, Safdarjung Enclave. The
learned Appellate Court did not find anything on record to come to the
conclusion that petitioner has shifted to Gurugram from Safdarjung
Enclave. With regard to the passing of the status quo order, the
learned Appellate Court rightly observed that the said order in no way
affects the Appellant’s right of the residence as she had already shifted
at Safdarjung house on 13th April, 2023, that is prior to the passing of
such status quo order. Both the courts below, on appreciation of
material on record, concluded that petitioner voluntarily shifted from
Green Park premises to Safdarjung Enclave house, owned by
respondent No. 1.
24.
In Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2021) 1 SCC 414,
the Supreme Court held that the definition of “shared household” must
receive a broad interpretation, but it remains a fact sensitive
determination. The said judgment does not lay down that any premises
where the wife resided at any point of time becomes a shared
household for perpetuity. The statutory scheme is aimed to protect
dispossession and not to revive residential arrangements consciously
given up. A shared household must be a subsisting sharehood in
praesenti, not one surviving merely in historical memory.
CRL.M.C. 8722/2024
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25.
In the case of Ajay Kumar Jain Vs. Baljeet Kaur Jain,
160(2009) DLJ 401 (DB), the Court observed that the wife cannot
have the right to live in a particular property and the same cannot
become a clog on the property denying the right of the husband to deal
with the property when he is willing to provide an alternative
matrimonial home to her. It was also held that she cannot insist on
residing in the suit property alone when the husband had offered a
suitable alternative arrangement for her. The petitioner, as per her own
complaint, has been residing at Safdarjung house and not at the
Gurugram residence, as claimed in the arguments. Her intent to shift,
is also evident from the photograph placed on record showing the
name of the petitioner on the name plate fixed outside the property.
26.
It is a settled law that where the wife voluntarily establishes a
separate residence or has access to alternate accommodation, a
direction or restoration to a previously occupied premises is not
automatic and may be declined. The DV Act secures protection
against dispossession, it does not compel reinstatement into a
residence abandoned by choice.
27.
From the material on record, it is apparent that petitioner shifted
from Green Park to alternate accommodation at Safdarjung, owned by
respondent No. 1. Such shifting is not shown to be compelled by
violence or coercion, inasmuch as, petitioner herself in her complaint
states that she had shifted there for the purpose of treatment. If the
shifting was only temporary, she would not have affixed the name
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plate showing her name outside property No. B-5/204, Safdarjung
Enclave. These factors collectively indicate conscious place of
residence, not a temporary displacement. The relief under Section 19
is discretionary and equitable. The DV Act balances the rights of the
aggrieved woman with the rights of other occupants and owners.
Compelling the restoration in the present case would disturb the
settled possession of the current occupants and convert a protective
statute into a rule for re-entry to any past residence and thus would
amount to travelling beyond the legislative intent.
28.
Applying the above facts and law, the premises at Green Park,
though previously occupied by the petitioner after marriage, do not
qualify as a “shared household” in presenti under Section 2(s) of the
DV Act, as the petitioner voluntarily and consciously shifted in April
2023 to an alternate residence at Safdarjung Enclave, where she has
since established her settled residence and continues to have shelter.
Consequently, the alleged denial of re-entry into the Green Park
premises does not, in the facts of the case, constitute domestic
violence in the nature of economic abuse, since there was no forcible
dispossession, coercion, or rendering of the petitioner roofless.
Therefore, in view of the availability of suitable alternate
accommodation of the same standard and the discretionary and
protective nature of relief under Section 19, the petitioner is not
entitled to a residence order directing restoration or re-entry into the
Green Park property.
CRL.M.C. 8722/2024
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29.
It is a well settled law that jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. PC
is to be exercised by the High Court in cases of apparent perversity
and illegality. In R.K. Vijayasarathy Vs. Sudha Seetharam, (2019) 16
SCC 739, the Supreme Court held that the inherent powers under
Section 482 Cr. PC must be exercised with great caution to prevent
misuse of criminal proceedings.
30.
In view of the above, this Court finds no perversity, infirmity or
jurisdictional error in the impugned orders dated 29th February, 2024
and 07th September, 2024 warranting interference in exercise of its
jurisdiction. Petitioner is not roofless, the statutory object of the DV
Act stands satisfied and the relief sought would effectively convert a
property dispute into a domestic violence proceeding, which is
impermissible.
31.
The petition is accordingly dismissed.
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J.
09th February, 2026/na
CRL.M.C. 8722/2024
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