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* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
+W.P.NO. 30995 OF 2024
% 03.08.2026
#Between:
Rayala Kiran Kumar.
…… Petitioner
$And:
Union of India, and Others.
… Respondents
!Counsel for the Petitioner
: Sri A. Bhaskara Chary
^Counsel for the Respondent No.1
: Sri Tenepalli Niranjan,
Deputy Solicitor General of India
^Counsel for the Respondent No.5
: Sri G.V. Shivaji
^Counsel for the Respondent Nos.2 to 4 : Sri M. Delhi Babu
<Gist:
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. (2009) 1 SCC 768
2. (2018) 17 SCC 92
3. (2009) 5 SCC 65
4. (1997) 1 SCC 35
5. 2024 LawSuit (P&H) 323 : 2024 PHHC 22287
6. 2024 LawSuit (P&H) 447 : 2024 PHHC 42640
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
***
W.P.NO. 30995 OF 2024
Rayala Kiran Kumar
…… Petitioner
And:
Union of India and Others.
….Respondents
DATE OF JUDGMENT RESERVED
:
22.07.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED
:
03.08.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT UPLOADED
:
04.08.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may
be allowed to see the Judgments?
Yes/No
2. Whether the copies of order may be marked
to Law Reporters/Journals?
Yes/No
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair
copy of the Judgment?
Yes/No
__________________________
JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
Page |1
Date of reserved for orders : 22.07.2026
Date of pronouncement
: 03.08.2026
Date of uploading
: 04.08.2026
APHC010592482024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY,
DAY, THE 03rd DAY OF AUGUST, 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
WRIT PETITION NO: 30995 OF 2024
Between:
1. RAYALA KIRAN KUMAR, S/o Siva Ramakrishna Prasad Rao, Aged about
51 years, Occ. Advocate, R/o D.No.
D.No.11-10-729/A, Road No.6, Bhuran puram,
Khammam, Telangana State.
State
...Petitioner
AND
1. UNION OF INDIA, Ministry of Consumer Affairs and Food and Public
Distribution Department of Consumer Affairs, Represented by its Secretary
New Delhi - 110 001.
2. State of Andhra Pradesh, Consumer Affairs, Food and Civil Supplies
Department, Represented by its Principal Secretary, Secretariat Buildings,
Velagapudi, Guntur District - 522503
3. The Ex-officio
officio Secretary to Government, Government of Andhra Pradesh,
consumer affairs, Food
d and Civil supplies department
department, AP Secretariat,
Secretariat
Velagapudi Amaravathi, Guntur District
4. State of Andhra Pradesh, Represented by Secretary to Government
Legislative Affairs and Justice, Law Department. 5th Block, First Floor, AP.
Secretariat, Amaravati, Andhra Pradesh 522 503.
5. Chiranjeevi Nelapudi, Presently working as President, District Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission
Commission, Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh.
...Respondents
Page |2
Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be
pleased to issue a Writ, Order Proceedings more particularly one in the nature
of Writ of Mandamus declaring the G.O.Rt.No.39 Consumer Affairs, Food and
Civil Supplies (CS.II) Department, Dated 28-07-2022, appointing the 5 th
Respondent as President, District Commission, Vijayawada as illegal,
arbitrary, in violation of concerned Rules and cannot stand to legal scrutiny
and further direct the 3rd Respondent to appoint the Petitioner as President,
District Commission, Vijayawada, as per the merit of Committee and pass
IA NO: 1 OF 2024
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
may be pleased to suspend the G.O.Rt.No.39 Consumer Affairs, Food and
Civil Supplies (CS.II) Department, Dated 28-07-2022, pending disposal of the
Writ Petition and pass
IA NO: 1 OF 2025
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
May be pleased grant leave for filing counter affidavit in the Writ petition
No.30995 of 2024 and pass
Counsel for the Petitioner: A BHASKARA CHARY
Counsel for the Respondents: DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA
Counsel for the Respondents: G V SHIVAJI
Counsel for the Respondents: ADDL ADVOCATE GENERAL
The Court made the following order:
Page |3
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
WRIT PETITION NO: 30995/2024
ORDER:
1.
This Writ Petition is filed challenging G.O.Rt.No.39 Consumer Affairs,
Food and Civil Supplies (CS.II) Department, dated 28.07.2022, whereby
respondent No.5 was appointed as the President, District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Vijayawada, with effect from 31.07.2022, as being
arbitrary, illegal and in violation of concerned rules. The petitioner further
seeks a consequential direction to the respondent No.3 to appoint him as
President, District Commission, Vijayawada, in accordance with his position in
the order of merit and pursuant to the recommendations of the Selection
Committee.
2.
Heard Sri A. Bhaskara Chary, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri
Tenepalli Niranjan, learned Deputy Solicitor General appearing for respondent
No.1, Sri G.V. Shivaji, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.5 and
Sri M. Delhi Babu, learned Government Pleader attached to the office of the
Additional Advocate General, appearing for respondents No.2 to 4.
3.
The facts of the case, as narrated by the petitioner in the writ petition,
are briefly set out hereunder:
(i)
Petitioner is a practicing Advocate possessing the qualifications of
B.Sc., LLB., LLM., and a Post Graduate Diploma in Consumer Law and
Practice. He has also undergone the training programme for ‘Presidents and
Page |4
Members of the District Consumer Forums’. He was enrolled as an
Advocate in the year 1998 and practiced before the District Courts and other
Courts at Khammam until 03.03.2010. Pursuant to the notification issued by
the A.P. State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (APSCDRC)
inviting applications for appointment to the post of Member of the Khammam
District Consumer Forum, the petitioner submitted his application, appeared
for the written examination, and was selected. He was accordingly
appointed as a Member of the Khammam District Consumer Forum and
discharged his duties from 03.03.2010 to 03.03.2015. Upon completion of
his first tenure, he was again selected and appointed for a second
consecutive term and continued to serve as a Member of the said Forum
until 03.03.2021. After completion of his tenure, the petitioner resumed legal
practice before the Courts at Khammam.
(ii)
Thereafter, pursuant to the notification dated 09.01.2022 issued by
respondent No.3 inviting applications for filling up the vacancies to the posts
of Presidents of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions in
four districts of the State of Andhra Pradesh, the petitioner submitted his
application on 20.01.2022 for appointment as the President of the District
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Vijayawada. He was found
eligible and was called for interview before the Selection Committee, which
was held on 28.02.2022. While the petitioner was legitimately expecting that
his candidature would be considered in accordance with law and merit,
respondent No.2 issued G.O.Rt.No.39, dated 28.07.2022, appointing
Page |5
respondent No.5 as the President of the District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Vijayawada, with effect from 31.07.2022.
(iii) Subsequently, one of the petitioner's friends sought information under
the Right to Information Act, 2005, regarding the marks awarded to the
candidates who had participated in the selection process for the post of
President, District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Vijayawada.
Upon obtaining the information, the petitioner came to know that he had
secured the highest marks, i.e., 21 out of 30, and was placed first in the
order of merit, whereas respondent No.5 had secured 18 out of 30 marks
and was placed second. Despite the petitioner being the first-ranked
candidate, respondent Nos.2 to 4 appointed respondent No.5 by overlooking
the recommendations of the Selection Committee and ignoring the
petitioner's superior merit. Thereafter, on 26.11.2024, the petitioner came to
know that the High Court of Andhra Pradesh had, in similar circumstances
arising out of the very same selection process, set aside the appointments
of certain Presidents of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commissions on the ground that the State Government had departed from
the order of merit recommended by the Selection Committee. The petitioner
claims that he stands on the same footing as the successful petitioners in
those cases, inasmuch as he was placed at Sl.No.1 in the merit list
prepared by the Selection Committee, but his candidature was overlooked
and the candidate placed second in the order of merit was appointed under
Page |6
G.O.Rt.No.39, dated 28.07.2022. Aggrieved by the said action, the
petitioner has filed the present writ petition.
4.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the selection
and appointment to the post of President of the District Commission are
governed by the ‘Consumer Protection (Qualification for Appointment, Method
of Recruitment, Procedure of Appointment, Term of Office, Resignation and
Removal of the President and Members of the State Commission and District
Commission) Rules, 2020 (for short, ‘Rules’) issued by the Ministry of
Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution (Department of Consumer
Affairs) vide Notification, dated 15.07.2020. It is contended that Rule 6 of the
said Rules prescribes the procedure for appointment of the President and
Members of the State Commission and District Commission. In the present
case, sub-rules (9), (10) and (11) of Rule 6 are relevant for consideration. The
said provisions are extracted hereunder:
6. Procedure of appointment – (1) The President and members of the
State Commission and the District Commission shall be appointed by the
State Government on the recommendation of a Selection Committee,
consisting of the following persons, namely:(a) Chief Justice of the High Court or any Judge of the High Court
nominated by him – Chairperson;
(b) Secretary in charge of Consumer Affairs of the State Government –
Member;
(c) Nominee of the Chief Secretary of the State – Member.
…………
(9) The Selection Committee shall determine its procedure for making its
recommendation keeping in view the requirements of the State
Commission or the District Commission and after taking into account the
suitability, record of past performance, integrity and adjudicatory
experience.
Page |7
(10)
The Selection Committee shall recommend a panel of names of
candidates for appointment in the order of merit for the consideration of the
State Government.
(11) The State Government shall verify or cause to be verified the
credentials and antecedents of the recommended candidates.
5.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the Notification
dated 09.01.2022 issued by respondent No.3 specifically provides that the
Selection Committee, on the basis of the assessment made during the
interview, after satisfying itself regarding the eligibility criteria and after taking
into consideration the suitability, record of past performance, integrity, and
adjudicatory experience of the candidates, shall recommend a panel of names
of applicants for appointment as Presidents from among the eligible
candidates in the order of merit for approval of the State Government and for
issuance of appointment orders to the selected candidates. Pursuant to the
said Rules and the procedure prescribed therein, the Selection Committee
forwarded the panel of candidates to the State Government, wherein the
petitioner was placed at Sl.No.1 by securing 21 marks out of 30 marks.
However, disregarding the order of merit recommended by the Selection
Committee,
respondent
No.2
issued
the
impugned
G.O.
appointing
respondent No.5 as the President of the District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Vijayawada. As per Rule 6(10) of the Rules, 2020, the
Selection Committee is required to recommend a panel of names of
candidates for appointment in the order of merit for the consideration of the
State Government. The Notification dated 09.01.2022 also expressly states
that the panel shall be recommended in the order of merit for approval of the
Page |8
State Government and for issuance of appointment orders to the selected
candidates. Therefore, the appointing authority does not have discretion to
choose any candidate from the panel by overlooking the order of merit. The
State Government is required to act upon the recommendations of the
Selection Committee and appoint the candidate placed higher in the order of
merit, subject only to the verification contemplated under the Rules. In the
present case, since the petitioner was placed first in the order of merit,
respondent No.2 ought to have appointed him as the President of the District
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Vijayawada. However, without
considering the statutory provisions and the recommendations of the Selection
Committee, respondents Nos.2 to 4 proceeded to appoint respondent No.5,
who was placed lower in the order of merit, as the President of the District
Commission,
Vijayawada,
thereby
rendering
the
impugned
action
unsustainable in law.
6.
Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the rules and submitted
that, under Rule 6(9), the Selection Committee is empowered to determine its
procedure for making recommendations, keeping in view the requirements of
the State Commission or District Commission and considering the suitability,
past performance, integrity, and adjudicatory experience of the candidates.
Under Rule 10, the Selection Committee is required to recommend a panel of
candidates in order of merit for appointment by the State Government. Under
Rule 11, the State Government is only required to verify or cause verification
of the credentials and antecedents of the recommended candidates. It was
Page |9
contended that the assessment of suitability, past performance, integrity, and
adjudicatory experience falls exclusively within the domain of the Selection
Committee, and there is no occasion for Respondent No. 2 to undertake such
an evaluation. Therefore, the recommendations of the Selection Committee
cannot be altered unless adverse remarks are found against the candidates,
particularly during the verification process contemplated under Rule 11. In the
present case, the respondents have failed to follow the prescribed procedure
and have proceeded with the selection process in violation of the applicable
rules.
7.
Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B.1, with
regard to delay and latches in approaching the Court, wherein, it was held as
follows:
56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can
be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary
jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court
takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay
and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well
settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for
refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the
petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should
come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate
delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for
refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of
this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume
matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of
third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai
[AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261] , Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court
[AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 136 :
(2009) 1 SCC 768
P a g e | 10
(1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969] ). This principle applies even in case
of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B.
Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110] , Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports &
Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970)
1 SCC 84] ).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person
can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be
decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from
case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and
the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.
62. Though there is considerable force in the argument of the learned
counsel for the State and the contesting respondents that there is substantial
delay on the part of the appellants in approaching this Court, in the light of
factual scenario and the direction which we are inclined to issue, we have
thought it fit not to dismiss the special leave petitions on the ground of delay
but considering merits of the case, we are issuing necessary directions
granting relief to the appellants who were vigilant about their rights.
64. In the result, the appeals are partly allowed. Service of 66 candidates
who were selected and appointed in 1998-1999, whose appointments were
initially not challenged and thereafter who were protected by the Tribunal and
by the High Court have not been disturbed. The appellants who are similarly
situated to 66 respondents who are protected in the present proceedings will
be treated on a par with those respondents. And if on the basis of merit list
prepared as per the order of the High Court, they are found eligible and
qualified, the State Government will consider their cases i.e. the cases of the
appellants and will appoint them in accordance with law. Age bar, if any, will
not come in the way of those candidates. The said benefit, however, is
limited to those candidates who have challenged the selection by
approaching the Tribunal, the High Court and this Court. Our directions will
not apply to those candidates who have approached this Court for the first
time by filing interim applications. Their applications, therefore, stand
dismissed.
8.
Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that in matters concerning delay and latches, there can be no
waiver of a fundamental right. However, while exercising discretionary
jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution of India, the
Court may consider various factors, including the delay and latches on the
part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that the
P a g e | 11
issuance of a writ is discretionary, and delay and laches constitute a valid
ground for declining relief under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution.
Inordinate delay in seeking writ relief may justify refusal to exercise such
discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is to prevent
the revival of stale claims and matters that have already been settled or where
third-party rights have accrued. However, there is no fixed upper or lower limit
for approaching a court, and the question of delay has to be determined based
on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court must consider the
nature of the alleged violation, the relief sought, and the circumstances in
which the delay occurred.
9.
Since similar cases have already attained finality, it is the specific case
of the petitioner that no merit list was published by the respondents.
Therefore, the petitioner was under the bona fide impression that the selection
process had been conducted strictly in accordance with the applicable rules.
Only upon obtaining information under the Right to Information Act, the
petitioner become aware that Respondent No.2 had acted contrary to the
prescribed procedure and that the appointment of Respondent No.5 was
inconsistent with the recommendations made by the Selection Committee. In
such circumstances, the delay, if any, cannot be attributed to the petitioner, as
the cause of action arose only upon the disclosure of relevant information
through the RTI process. The petitioner, having approached the Court
immediately upon acquiring knowledge of the alleged irregularities, cannot be
denied relief on the ground of delay and laches.
P a g e | 12
10.
Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Food Corpn. of India v. Head Load Labour
Congress2, wherein it held as follows:
4. In short, the facts of the present two appeals are that the writ petitions
were filed by the Workers' Union against the appellant (FCI) seeking a
mandamus against the appellant (FCI) directing them to implement the
award (Ext. P-1) passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Chennai also in relation to
the employees working in Branch offices at Kerala named above.
………………..
8. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case
coupled with the judicial orders passed against the appellant in relation to
identical matters, we find no good ground to take any other view in the case
than the one taken by the Madras High Court [Food Corpn. of India v.
Workmen, 2006 SCC OnLine Mad 1211] in similar case and in the impugned
orders [Food Corpn. of India v. Head Load Labour Congress, 2010 SCC
OnLine Ker 5186] , [Thrissur Jilla General Mazdoor Sangh v. Food Corpn. of
India, 2014 SCC OnLine Ker 28745] .
11.
A perusal of the aforesaid judgment would indicate that, once a
particular issue has been adjudicated and a consistent view has been taken
by the Court in respect of similarly situated persons, a different view cannot be
adopted merely on the ground of delay in approaching the Court, particularly
when the claim is otherwise found to be covered by the earlier decisions.
12.
Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh3,
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to the judgment in Jaipur
Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain4, and observed as follows:
“The illegal allotment founded upon ultra vires and illegal policy of allotment
made to some other persons wrongly, would not form a legal premise to
(2018) 17 SCC 92
(2009) 5 SCC 65
(1997) 1 SCC 35
P a g e | 13
ensure it to the respondent or to repeat or perpetuate such illegal order, nor
could it be legalized. In other words, judicial process cannot be abused to
perpetuate the illegalities. Article 14 proceeds on the premise that a citizen
has legal and valid right enforceable at law and persons having similar right
and persons similarly circumstanced, cannot be denied of the benefit thereof.
Such person cannot be discriminated to deny the same benefit. The rational
relationship and legal back-up are the foundations to invoke the doctrine of
equality in case of persons similarly situated. If some persons derived benefit
by illegality and had escaped from the clutches of law, similar persons
cannot plead, nor can the court countenance that benefit had from infraction
of law and must be allowed to be retained. One illegality cannot be
compounded by permitting similar illegal or illegitimate or ultra vires acts.”
13.
Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that Article 14 of the Constitution is founded on the principle of
equal treatment among persons similarly situated. However, such equality
must be based on a legal right supported by a rational basis and cannot be
claimed on the basis of an illegality. If certain persons have derived benefits
due to an illegal act and escaped the consequences thereof, others cannot
seek the same benefit by relying upon such illegality. The Court cannot permit
the continuation or repetition of an illegal, illegitimate, or ultra vires act merely
on the ground of parity.
14.
In the present case, the petitioner has challenged the regular
appointment of Respondent No. 5 on the ground that the benefit extended to
Respondent No. 5 has been granted in violation of the prescribed rules
governing the appointment of the President of the District Commission. It is
contended that such appointment amounts to an infraction of the statutory
procedure and is contrary to the principles laid down by this Court as well as
the Hon’ble Supreme Court regarding appointments to the said post.
P a g e | 14
15.
Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the judgment
of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in Ashish Kumar Grover and others
V. State of Punjab and others5, wherein it held as follows:
9. The recommendations of the High Court have always been held to be
binding upon the State Government and similarity can be drawn in view of
the provisions of Article 233 of the Constitution of India. The High Court is
expected to know better in regard to the suitability of a person belonging
either to the judicial service or to the Bar to be appointed as District Judge as
held by the Supreme Court in Chandra Mohan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
1966 AIR(SC) 1987. If the said principle is applied, it was for the Selection
Committee headed by the serving Judge of this Court who keeping in view
the criteria fixed which had selected the persons and fixed their merit.
10. Similarly, in State of Haryana vs. Inder Prakash Anand HCS and others
1976 2 SCC 977, four Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that if the
recommendations of the High Court are not binding on the state, the
consequences of the same are unfortunate.
11. In Hari Datt Kaninthla vs. State of Himachal Pradesh 1980 3 SCC 189, it
has been held that the merit alone must guide it in making the
recommendations and if the State Government finds it difficult to accept the
recommendations of the High Court, it should communicate to the High Court
and effective consultation should be done for achieving the true object.
16.
Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that the recommendations of the High Court have consistently been
held to be binding upon the State Government. A similar principle can be
applied in the present case, keeping in view the constitutional scheme under
Article 233 of the Constitution of India, as the High Court is better placed to
assess the suitability of a person for appointment to judicial service or from the
Bar as a District Judge, as recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It was
further submitted that, if the same principle is applied, the determination of
suitability and merit ought to remain within the domain of the Selection
Committee headed by a serving Judge of the High Court, which, after
2024 LawSuit (P&H) 323 : 2024 PHHC 22287
P a g e | 15
considering the prescribed criteria, evaluates the candidates and prepares the
merit list. The recommendations made by such a Committee, therefore,
cannot be interfered with or substituted by any other authority except in
accordance with the procedure prescribed under the applicable rules.
17.
Learned counsel for the petitioner, further placing reliance on various
other judgments, contended that once the Selection Committee has taken a
decision and forwarded its recommendations to the competent authority, the
same are required to be acted upon and ordinarily ought not to be deviated
from, except for valid and legally sustainable reasons. In the instant case, the
Selection Committee, after duly assessing the suitability of the candidates,
prepared and forwarded the select list on the basis of merit. Therefore, the
recommendations of the Selection Committee cannot be ignored or rejected,
nor can the authorities appoint a candidate of their choice from the panel by
giving a go-by to the merit position reflected in the select list. Any such action
would be arbitrary and contrary to the settled principles governing
appointments to public posts.
18.
Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the judgment of the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Urvashi Agnihotri V. State of Punjab
and others6, wherein while referring to its earlier decision in Ashish Kumar
Grover and others V. State of Punjab and others, the Court observed as
follows:
2024 LawSuit (P&H) 447 : 2024 PHHC 42640
P a g e | 16
27…………..a similar issue was decided by a Co-ordinate Bench for
appointment to the post of President, District Consumer Disputes Redressal
Forum. The Co-ordinate Bench held that once the recommendations were
sent by the Selection Committee, the first candidate had to be appointed to
the post and it was not for the State government to choose persons lower in
merit without having interacted with the candidate. The said judgment
authored by one of us G.S.Sandhawalia, Acting Chief Justice has been
upheld in SLP No.11196 of 2024 decided on April 01, 2024.
19.
A perusal of the aforesaid judgment indicates that, once the Selection
Committee forwards its recommendations based on merit after assessing the
suitability of the candidates, the candidate placed first in the select list is
ordinarily entitled to appointment. Thereafter, the State Government cannot
alter the order of merit or appoint a candidate lower in the select list merely on
its own preference. Any departure from the recommendations of the Selection
Committee is permissible only if the recommended candidate is found
unsuitable or incurs a disqualification upon verification of credentials and
antecedents under Rule 11 or on any other legally sustainable ground.
20.
Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of
this Court in W.P.No.25348 of 2022, which arose out of the very same
notification and involved similar circumstances relating to the appointment to
the post of President, District Commission. It was submitted that, while
considering contentions similar to those advanced in the present case, this
Court allowed the writ petition and passed the following order:
31. Therefore, this Court is inclined to dispose of the writ petition with
following directions:
a) The impugned order issued by the 2nd respondent vide
G.O.Rt.No.8, dated 03.02.2022 to the extent of 5th respondent is
hereby set aside;
P a g e | 17
b) The official respondents are directed to obtain fresh credentials/
antecedents report from the selected candidates as per Circular Memo
No.132/SC.B/A1/2012-I, General Administration (SC.B) Department,
dated 15.11.2012, within one month from the date of receipt of a copy
of this order.
c) Meanwhile, the official respondents are directed to place In-charge
for the post of President, District Commissioner, Guntur as per
procedure to avoid inconvenience to the proceedings of the District
Commission.
d) On submission of credentials/ antecedents report by the police, the
official respondents are directed to consider the same on merit basis
and issue fresh appointment orders to the suitable candidate without
any deviation, within a period of one (01) month thereafter. Entire
exercise shall be completed within two (02) months.
21.
While considering the aforesaid case, this Court placed reliance on
various judgments and finally held that the Selection Committee consists of
three persons, namely, Hon’ble Judge of High Court, Secretary in-charge of
Consumer Affairs of the State Government and Law Secretary of the State,
who recommended the names of the candidates for final appointment after
obtaining necessary antecedent reports from the police. It is only option for the
government to issue appointment orders to the selected candidates basing on
the recommendations, but not interfere with the recommendations made by
the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee has placed the names of
the candidates as per merit shown as 1, 2 and 3. The duty cast upon the
government is to issue appointment order to the first meritorious person after
getting antecedents and credentials report obtained by the police. If
antecedent report is adverse to the first meritorious candidate, then
automatically shall consider case of the second meritorious candidate for
appointment for the respective post.
P a g e | 18
22.
Based on the aforesaid reasoning, this Court allowed W.P.No.25348 of
2022. Aggrieved by the said order, an appeal was preferred before the
Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.945 of 2024. The Division Bench, after
considering the matter in detail and recording its findings, passed the following
order:
21. Under Rule 6(8) and (9), the Selection Committee is given the liberty to
prescribe the criteria for shortlisting of eligible applicants and formulate the
procedure for recommendation after taking into account the suitability, record
of past performance, integrity and adjudicatory experience. In the present
case, in the process of shortlisting of applicants for interview, the Selection
Committee having liberty to formulate the procedure for recommendation had
sought for antecedent report from the State Government as a criteria for
shortlisting the applicants for interview and thereupon recommended
candidates after taking into account their suitability, record of past
performance, integrity and adjudicatory experience.
22. The scope of the State Government under Rule 6(11) is to verify the
antecedents and credentials of the recommended candidates i.e. to examine
whether recommended candidates suffer any disqualification prescribed in
Rule 5. The Rule 5 reads as under:
5. Disqualification for appointment of President or member of State
Commission and District Commission. – A person shall be disqualified
for appointment as the President or a member of a State Commission
or District Commission if he—
(i) has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for an
offence which involves moral turpitude; or
(ii) has been adjudged to be insolvent; or
(iii) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent
court; or
(iv) has been removed or dismissed from the service of the State
Government or Central Government or a body corporate owned
or controlled by such Government; or
(v) has, in the opinion of the State Government, such financial or
other interest as is likely to prejudicially affect his functions as the
President or a member.
23. The above extracted Rule has facets of eligibility as well as suitability.
The Rules 5 (i),(ii),(iii) and (iv) are aspects of eligibility and matters of fact,
whereas Rule (v) falls in the domain of suitability and a matter of opinion.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Registrar General, High Court of Madras Vs
P a g e | 19
R. Gandhi and Others explained the distinction between eligibility and
suitability as under:
“As stated above, “eligibility” is a matter of fact whereas
“suitability” is a matter of opinion.”
24. There would not be any issue for bypassing the recommendations in the
order of merit of the Selection Committee if the individuals recommended
suffer from disqualifications under Rule 5 (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of the Rules as
they would be documented and are aspects of eligibility.
25. The grey area in Rule 5 is the sub-rule(v) which is quite uncontrolled and
enables the State Government to examine the suitability and integrity of the
recommended candidates even though the said function is the exclusive
domain of the Selection Committee under Rule 6(9) of the Rules as stated
above.
26. It is to be noted that aspects prescribed in Rule 5(v) come under
“Suitability” and within the scope of the Selection Committee as recognized
in parallel legislations. The Section 85 of the Electricity Act, 2003 provides for
selection of Chairperson and members of the Electricity Regulatory
Commission. As per Section 85, a Selection Committee will be constituted
for selection of Chairperson and members and the mandate of the Selection
Committee under Section 85(5) is verbatim similar to Rule 5(v) of the Rules.
The Section 85(5) of the Electricity Act, 2003 reads as under:
“(5) Before recommending any person for appointment as the
Chairperson or other Member of the State Commission, the
Selection Committee shall satisfy itself that such person does not
have any financial or other interest which is likely to affect
prejudicially his functions as such Chairperson or Member, as the
case may be.”
27. Ideally, the Rule 5(v) should have been included in Rule 6 of the Rules
within the exclusive scope of Selection Committee. Coming back, in the
event, the State Government after receiving the antecedent report is of the
opinion that candidate ranked No.1 in the order of merit is not suitable, there
would be a conflict of opinion vis-a-vis suitability and integrity of the
recommended candidates. The superimposed opinion of the State
Government on suitability and integrity gives scope for favouritism and allied
allegations apart from tilt in the balance in favour of the State in making
appointments to judicial posts.
23.
The Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.945 of 2024 held that in
cases where the Government is of the opinion that a particular individual
ranked first in the order of seniority is not considered to be fit for appointment
as Chairman/member on account of antecedent report vis-à-vis suitability and
P a g e | 20
integrity, then such a report along with the opinion of the State Government
should be placed before the Selection Committee for reconsideration of order
of merit. If the Selection Committee after taking note of the antecedent report
and the opinion of the Government may still recommend the said individual
and then the Government is bound to appoint the individual. The Selection
Committee is required in appointments of this nature, firstly for the reason, no
other service rule enables the State Government to re-evaluate the suitability
and integrity after recommendation by the Selection Committee, secondly to
avoid politico-executive overreach and thirdly to maintain primacy to the
recommendation made by Selection Committee headed by the Chief Justice
or his nominee Judge.
24.
This Court in the above Writ Appeal, placing reliance on the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kavita Kamboj V. High Court of Punjab &
Haryana, and the judgment of High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Ashish
Kumar Grover and others (cited supra) and Urvashi Agnihotri (cited supra)
held that in the matter of appointment of judicial officers, the opinion of the
High Court is not a mere formality because the High Court is in the best
position to know about the suitability of candidates to the post of District
Judge. The Constitution therefore expects the Government to engage with the
High Court before appointing persons to the post of District Judges under
Article 233. Primacy of the recommendations of the Selection Committee was
held. The Division Bench judgments of Kerala High Court in the above cited
judgment, also considered the rules for appointment framed under the
P a g e | 21
Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the Selection Committee was headed by the
Chairman of the State Consumer Forum and there was no requirement of
order in those rules, and as there is substantial variance in the present rules,
the said judgments were held to be not relevant, accordingly, the Writ Appeal
was disposed of by affirming the order of the learned Single Judge, insofar as
it related to the appellant therein, and upholding the setting aside of the
Government Order. The State Government was directed to place its opinion,
along with the relevant material, before the Selection Committee to enable it to
reconsider the matter and take appropriate further action. Though the said
judgment
was
challenged
before
the
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court
in
S.L.P.No.14661 of 2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court declined to interfere with
the impugned judgment and further clarified that, in the event that the State
Government finds some material against the candidate recommended in the
order of merit, the only option left with it, is to bring the aforesaid material to
the notice of the Selection Committee for taking appropriate action, instead of
the State Government changing the list by itself. As the issue is covered by
the above said judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner pleased to
pass the very same order.
25.
The learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that upon
scrutiny of the applications, call letters were sent to all shortlisted candidates
to appear for an interview before the Selection Committee. Petitioner herein
also appeared for the interview for the post of President, District Commission,
Vijayawada, along with other candidates. The Selection Committee, after
P a g e | 22
assessing the performance of each candidate in the interview, awarded marks
accordingly, placed the relevant records in a sealed cover, and forwarded the
same to the State Government. Under rule 6(10) of the Consumer Protection
Recruitment Rules, 2020, the Selection Committee is required to recommend
a panel of candidates for appointment in the order of merit for consideration by
the State Government. In compliance with the said provision, the Selection
Committee forwarded the panel of candidates to the State Government for
appointment to the post of President, District Commission, Vijayawada. In
terms of Rule 6(11) of the Consumer Protection Recruitment Rules, 2020, the
State Government shall verify the credentials and antecedents of the
recommended candidates. After due consideration of the recommendations
made by the Selection Committee and the antecedent verification report, the
State Government issued issued G.O.Rt.No.39, Consumer Affairs Food and
Civil Supplies (CS-II) Department dated 28.07.2022 appointing respondent
No.5 as President, District Commission, Vijayawada. It was further contended
that mere inclusion of a candidate in the selection list does not confer any
vested right to appointment and, therefore, requested to dismiss the Writ
Petition.
26.
Having considered the judgments relied upon by the parties, this Court
is of the view that the principles laid down in W.P.No.25348 of 2022, as
affirmed by the Division Bench in W.A.No.945 of 2024 and not interfered with
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.P.No.14661 of 2025, squarely apply to
the present case. As already observed above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
P a g e | 23
held that if the State Government finds some material against the candidate
recommended in the order of merit, the only option left with it, is to bring the
aforesaid material to the notice of the Selection Committee for taking
appropriate action, instead of the State Government changing the list by itself.
Thus, it was held in the aforesaid judgment by the learned single judge, as
affirmed by the Division Bench, that the selection list furnished by the
Selection Committee cannot be interfered with by the State Government. The
role of the State Government is confined to obtaining verification of the
antecedents and credentials of the recommended candidates in terms of
Rules 6(11) of the rules. In the event any adverse material is found, the same
shall be placed before the Selection Committee along with the antecedent
report, and it is for the Selection Committee to reconsider the suitability of the
candidate in accordance with the Rules. Therefore, the State Government has
no authority to alter the order of merit or appoint a candidate of its choice by
disregarding the recommendations of the Selection Committee. Consequently,
the appointment of respondent No.5 as President, District Commission,
Vijayawada, cannot be sustained.
27.
Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5 submitted that the
petitioner, having attained the age of about 51 years, is not eligible for
appointment as a District Judge, as he has crossed the prescribed age limit
for such appointment as on the relevant date. It was contended that, under
Rule 4 of the Rules governing the qualifications for appointment of President
and Members of the District Commission, a person shall not be qualified for
P a g e | 24
appointment as President unless he is, or has been, or is qualified to be
appointed as a District Judge. Placing reliance on the aforesaid provision,
learned counsel submitted that since the petitioner does not satisfy the
eligibility criteria for appointment as a District Judge on account of the age bar,
he cannot be considered as a person qualified to be appointed as President of
the District Commission. Consequently, it was contended that the petitioner
lacks the requisite qualification and, therefore, has no locus standi to
challenge the appointment of respondent No.5 as President of the District
Commission.
28.
It is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner’s candidature
was rejected on the ground of lack of qualification or that any adverse remarks
or disqualification was found against him during the selection process. The
only issue for consideration is whether the State Government was justified in
selecting respondent No.5 for appointment as President from the panel
forwarded by the Selection Committee, who was admittedly placed at sl.No.2
in the selection list. As already observed, the Selection Committee, being the
authority constituted under the Rules, is entrusted with the responsibility of
assessing the suitability of the candidates and examining the relevant
eligibility criteria. Once the Selection Committee has conducted such an
assessment and forwarded the panel in the order of merit, the State
Government cannot independently reassess the suitability of the candidates or
make an appointment contrary to the recommendations of the Selection
P a g e | 25
Committee. Therefore, the contention that the State Government was entitled
to choose respondent No. 5 from the panel cannot be accepted.
29.
That apart, the qualification prescribed under the Rules is that a person
shall be eligible for appointment as President if he is, or has been, or is
qualified to be appointed as a District Judge. In the present case, the
petitioner was considered eligible by the Selection Committee and, after
assessing his suitability, his name was included in the panel recommended for
appointment as President, District Commission. Therefore, once the Selection
Committee has considered the eligibility and suitability of the petitioner and
included his name in the merit panel, the same cannot be questioned by
respondent No.5 to contend that the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the
appointment in question.
30.
It is brought to the notice of this Court that the tenure of respondent
No.5 is likely to expire shortly. However, the issue involved in the present writ
petition cannot be said to have become infructuous merely on account of the
impending expiry of the tenure. It is pertinent to note that the action of the
State Government in deviating from the recommendations of the Selection
Committee has already been held to be impermissible in the judgments
referred to above. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the petitioner’s claim
for consideration in accordance with the merit-based recommendations of the
Selection Committee would survive for future appointments. Further, in the
event of any extension of the tenure of respondent No.5, the petitioner would
continue to have a right to seek consideration in accordance with law.
P a g e | 26
Therefore, the cause raised in the present writ petition survives for
adjudication.
31.
Considering the submissions advanced by the learned counsel
appearing for the parties and the judgments relied upon, particularly the
judgment of this Court in W.P.No.25348 of 2022, as affirmed by the Division
Bench in W.A.No.945 of 2024, and the clarification issued by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in S.L.P.No.14661 of 2025, the legal position is well settled
that the scope of interference by the State Government with the
recommendations made by the Selection Committee is limited to the extent
provided under Rule 6(11) of the Rules. In terms of Rule 6(11) of the Rules,
the State Government is required to verify the credentials and antecedents of
the candidates recommended by the Selection Committee. In the event any
adverse material is found during such verification, the State Government is
required to place the same, along with its opinion, before the Selection
Committee for reconsideration of its recommendation. If, after such
reconsideration, the Selection Committee reiterates its recommendation, the
State Government has no option except to act upon the said recommendation
and
issue
the
appointment
order.
The
State
Government
cannot
independently alter the order of merit or appoint a candidate of its choice by
overlooking the recommendations of the Selection Committee.
32.
In the present case, the State Government, without following the
procedure contemplated under Rule 6(11) of the Rules and without placing
any adverse material before the Selection Committee for its consideration,
P a g e | 27
proceeded to appoint respondent No. 5 as President, District Commission,
Vijayawada, vide G.O.Rt.No.39, Consumer Affairs, Food and Civil Supplies
(CS-II) Department, dated 28.07.2022, by deviating from the merit-based
recommendations of the Selection Committee. Such action is contrary to the
settled legal position and cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the order issued
vide G.O.Rt.No.39, Consumer Affairs, Food and Civil Supplies (CS-II)
Department, dated 28.07.2022, is liable to be set aside.
33.
Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The orders issued vide
G.O.Rt.No.39, Consumer Affairs, Food and Civil Supplies (CS-II) Department,
dated 28.07.2022, is hereby set aside. The State Government is directed to
place its opinion, along with the antecedent verification report, if any, along
with all other relevant material, before the Selection Committee within a period
of four (04) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, enabling the
Selection Committee to reconsider the matter and take appropriate further
action in accordance with law.
Interim orders, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated, and all
pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
__________________________
JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
Date: 03.08.2026
SAK
Whether the order is:
Speaking
Reportable
☑
Reasoned
Non-reportable
☑
P a g e | 28
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
WRIT PETITION NO: 30995 OF 2024
Date: 03.08.2026
SAK
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