The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
15. Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
16. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself 2026:HHC:19288 before the learned trial Court within thirty days to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction, if any, stands vacated. Learned court below is also directed to release the amount, if any, deposited before it by the accused, on filing appropriate application by the complainant within one week. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. May 21, 2026 (manjit) (Sandeep Sharma), Judge
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2026:HHC:19288
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No.44 of 2026
Date of Decision: 21.5.2026
_____________________________________________________________________
Ravi Dutt
Versus
Sunil Kumar
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
……...Petitioner
…....Respondent
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Naresh Kumar Tomar, Advocate.
For the Respondent:
Mr. Kunal Thakur, Advocate.
___________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition, lays challenge to judgment
dated 11.8.2025, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nahan,
District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No.56-N/4 of 2024
(CIS Regd. No. 56/2022), affirming the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 30.4.2022, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Rajgarh, District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh in Criminal Case
No.113/2018, whereby the learned trial Court while holding the petitioneraccused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted and
sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months
and pay compensation to the tune of Rs.1,10,000 to the complainant.
2.
2026:HHC:19288
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are
that respondent/complainant lodged complaint under Section 138 of the
Act, before the competent court of law, alleging therein that he approached
the accused, who was interested in selling his land, for purchase of land at
Rajgarh, and entered into an agreement to sell of the land comprising
khasra No. 874/791, plot 1, total measuring 01.18 bighas to the extent of
00.02 bighas of the land situate at revenue village Fetahpur Sidhori, Tehsil
Rajgarh, District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh on 6.9.2014 at Rajgarh.
Since accused failed to comply with terms of the sale agreement,
complainant issued legal notice through his counsel on 3.7.2018 calling
upon him to get the sale deed executed in favour of the complainant.
Though after receipt of legal notice, accused agreed to return the money
and issued a cheque bearing No.318683 dated 6.8.2018, amounting to Rs.
85,000/-, in favour of the complainant, however same on its presentation
to the bank concerned was dishonoured with remarks “funds insufficient”.
Immediately, after receipt of aforesaid memo, complainant served legal
notice upon the accused, thereby calling upon him to make the payment
good within stipulated time, but in vain, as such, complainant had no
option, but to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the
competent court of law.
2026:HHC:19288
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
3.
by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 30.4.2022, held the
petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per
the description given herein above.
4.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of
conviction recorded by the court below, petitioner-accused preferred an
appeal before the learned first appellate Court, but the same was dismissed
vide judgment dated 11.8.2025. In the aforesaid background, accused has
approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to setaside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the
court below.
5.
Vide
order
dated
1.1.2026,
this
Court
suspended
the
substantive sentence imposed by the court below, subject to petitioner’s
depositing 30% of the compensation amount and furnishing personal
bonds in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the
satisfaction of the trial Court, within four weeks, however fact remains that
aforesaid order never came to be complied with. Repeatedly, this Court was
informed that talks are going on with the respondent/complainant for
amicable settlement, but no compromise, if any, arrived inter-se parties has
been placed on record.
Since order passed by this Court has not been
2026:HHC:19288
complied with coupled with the fact that petitioner is not coming forward to
impart instructions to his counsel, this Court is compelled to decide the
petition on merit.
6.
Having carefully perused grounds taken in the appeal vis-à-vis
reasoning assigned by the learned Sessions Judge, thereby upholding the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial
Court, this Court is not persuaded to agree with learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner that courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in
its right perspective, rather this Court finds that both the courts below
have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter very meticulously and
there is no scope of interference.
7.
In the case at hand, petitioner-accused at no point of time
denied factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signature
thereupon, rather he attempted to carve out a case that cheque in question
was issued by him to a person namely Dinesh, however, such defence never
came to be probablised by leading cogent and convincing evidence. Once
factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signature thereupon
never came to be disputed, no illegality can be said to have been committed
by the courts below while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, which clearly provide that there shall be presumption
available in favour of the holder of the cheque that same was issued in
2026:HHC:19288
discharge of the lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is
rebuttable, but for that purpose, accused is/was under obligation to raise
probable defence. Probable defence could be raised by the accused by
referring to the documents as well as evidence adduced on record by the
complainant or by leading some cogent and convincing evidence. However,
in the case at hand, accused, despite sufficient opportunity, failed to raise
probable defence.
8.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence
comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to
25 of the judgment herein:
“23.
Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of
Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a
reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the
legislative
objective
of
improving
the
credibility of
negotiable
2026:HHC:19288
instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong
criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent
undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further
observed that it must be remembered that the offence made
punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory
offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a
civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties
involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of
proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of
reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected
to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further
observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to
rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for
doing so is all preponderance of probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable
defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused
can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to
raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the
accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If
however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a
probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable
debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section
139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play
if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by
the complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to
qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a
statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to
2026:HHC:19288
avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered
by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of
such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment
within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the
amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour
constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases,
the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or
liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a
matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the
evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption
that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for
a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial
judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where
there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of
funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed
in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”
9.
To the contrary, complainant while examining himself as CW4
tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ext.CW4/A, reiterating therein
contents of the complaint.
He successfully proved on record that accused
had issued a cheque Ext.CW4/B amounting to Rs. 85,000/-, towards
discharge of lawful liability, but same was dishonoured on account of
insufficient funds in the bank account of the accused vide memo
Ext.CW1/B. He also proved on record that before initiation of proceedings,
he served the accused with legal notice calling upon him to make the
payment good, however accused despite his having received legal notice
failed to do the needful. Cross-examination conducted upon afore witness
2026:HHC:19288
nowhere suggests that accused was able to extract something contrary to
what this witness stated in examination-in-chief, rather pattern of crossexamination conducted upon afore witness clearly establishes factum with
regard to issuance of cheque as well as signature thereupon.
Though
accused attempted to set up a case that cheque issued in favour of the
person namely Dinesh Kumar by the petitioner, however, no explanation
worth credence ever came to be led on record that how cheque in question
came in the hands of the complainant. Best person to prove the defence
taken by the accused could be Dinesh Kumar, but he was never cited as
defence witness.
10.
CW1, an official from UCO Bank, Rajgarh, proved the computer
generated statement of the account of the accused and further deposed that
cheque under reference was being received by their bank from State
Cooperative Bank Rajgarh and cheque was dishonored on account of
insufficient funds in the account of the accused vide memo Ext.CW1/C.
11.
CW2 document writer and CW3, one of the witness of the
agreement under reference Ext.CW2/A, successfully proved agreement as
detailed herein above and they also deposed qua transaction of agreement
between the parties regarding sale purchase of the land as mentioned in
the complaint.
If cross-examination conducted upon afore witnesses is
perused in its entirety, it cannot be said that accused was able to extract
2026:HHC:19288
something contrary to what these witnesses stated in their examination-inchief.
12.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view
of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held
as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying
itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,
sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting
miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be
equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated
even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would
not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence
and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has
already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge
in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the
High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage
of justice.”
13.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the
present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if
2026:HHC:19288
any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments,
there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power.
14.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the process or
miscarriage
of
justice or
to
correct
irregularities/
incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or
illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused
has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts
below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts
below.
15.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the courts
below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of
evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
16.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
2026:HHC:19288
before the learned trial Court within thirty days to serve the sentence as
awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction,
if any, stands vacated. Learned court below is also directed to release the
amount, if any, deposited before it by the accused, on filing appropriate
application by the complainant within one week. Pending applications, if
any, also stand disposed of.
May 21, 2026
(manjit)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
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