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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 29.01.2026
Judgment delivered on: 23.05.2026
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LPA 217/2017
RAMJI LAL & ORS
.....Appellants
versus
DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION
.....Respondent
AND
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LPA 356/2022 & CM APPL. 25422/2022
CHANDER PRAKASH AND ORS
.....Appellants
versus
DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION
.....Respondent
Advocates who appeared in these cases
For the Appellants
:
Mr. S. S. Sastry, Mr. Navin Kumar,
Mr. Brijesh Tiwari and Mr. Umesh
Kumar, Advocates in LPA 217/2017.
Mr. Jawahar Raja, Ms. L. Gangmei
and Ms. Meghna De, Advocates in
LPA 356/2022.
For the Respondent
:
Ms. Manisha Tyagi, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
12:40:41
LPA 217/2017 & LPA 356/2022
JUDGMENT
TEJAS KARIA, J
1.
The present intra-court Appeals have been filed challenging the order
dated 17.08.2016 (“Impugned Order”) passed in W.P.(C) 4989/2016 and
W.P.(C) 6948/2016s (“Writ Petitions”) respectively, dismissing the same in
limine.
FACTUAL MATRIX
2.
The Appellants were among the Petitioners in the Writ Petitions,
which came to be dismissed in limine by the learned Single Judge vide the
Impugned Order, when the matters were listed for filing of reply/counteraffidavit by the Respondent.
3.
The Appellants were appointed as Retainer Crew Conductors in the
year 1985. Their names were sponsored through the Employment Exchange,
Delhi, as required by the Respondent. Upon qualifying the written
examination, medical examination, and interview, the Appellants were
deputed for two months’ practical training.
4.
Upon completion of the training, the Appellants, along with the other
Petitioners in the Writ Petitions, were posted at various depots of the
Respondent and were paid wages at the rate of ₹28.91 per day. The
Appellants also contributed towards the Provident Fund, Family Pension
Scheme, Gratuity Fund, and ESI Scheme in the same manner as other
regular employees of the Respondent.
5.
According to the Appellants, the Respondent’s Rules provided that
the Retainer Crew Conductors were initially engaged on daily rates and were
to be placed on monthly rates after six months. The Appellant contended
that although the tenure of employment was temporary in the first instance,
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
12:40:41
LPA 217/2017 & LPA 356/2022
it was liable to be made permanent as upon satisfactory completion of six
months of service on daily rates, Retainer Crew Conductors were to be
placed in the regular pay scale.
6.
The Appellants, together with the other Petitioners in the Writ
Petitions, continuously served the Respondent for a period of three years
without interruption. Thereafter, the Respondent terminated the services of
503 Retainer Crew Conductors, including the Appellants, vide orders dated
14.05.1988 and 21.05.1988.
7.
According to the Appellants, the Respondent failed to comply with
the mandatory requirements of the applicable law, including Sections 25F
and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“ID Act”). The Appellants
further contended that the orders in question described the termination as
‘retrenchment’ and also purported to pay wages in lieu of notice period and
retrenchment compensation.
8.
Aggrieved by the Respondent’s action in terminating the services of
the Retainer Crew Conductors, an industrial dispute was raised by 377 out of
the 503 Retainer Crew Conductors, including the Appellants. The dispute
was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication on whether the termination
of the services of the Retainer Crew Conductors was illegal and/or
unjustified and, if so, the reliefs to which they were entitled and the
consequential directions required in that regard.
9.
In the Statement of Claim, it was contended, inter alia, that the
termination was illegal and amounted to an unfair labour practice. It was
further asserted that no seniority list had been displayed and that juniors to
the retrenched Retainer Crew Conductors had been brought on monthly rates
and regularised.
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
12:40:41
LPA 217/2017 & LPA 356/2022
10.
In the Reply filed by the Respondent Management to the Statement of
Claim, it was contended that the employment of the Appellants was purely
temporary and that their services were dispensed with in accordance with the
terms of their employment and the applicable Executive Instructions.
11.
In July 1998, during the pendency of the industrial dispute before the
Labour Court, the Respondent, in compliance with Section 25H of the ID
Act, re-employed several persons who had raised the industrial dispute
except the Appellants.
12.
Thereafter, the parties filed their respective affidavits by way of
evidence, and the Respondent contended that the Appellants had become
surplus on account of a reduction in the fleet of buses and that,
consequently, their services were dispensed with in terms of the conditions
accepted by them.
13.
After examining the rival contentions and evidence led on behalf of
the parties, the Labour Court delivered the Award dated 20.01.2016
(“Award”) holding that the termination constituted a discharge simpliciter
falling within the ambit of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act and not
retrenchment. Consequently, the claim of the Appellants came to be
dismissed.
14.
Aggrieved by the Award, the Appellants instituted the Writ Petitions
before the learned Single Judge. Notice in the said Writ Petitions was issued
vide orders dated 27.05.2016 and 09.08.2016 in W.P.(C) 4989/2016 and
W.P.(C) 6948/2016, respectively, and the Respondent was directed to file its
reply.
15.
No reply was filed by the Respondent within the time granted. On
17.08.2016, when the Writ Petitions were taken up by the learned Single
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
12:40:41
LPA 217/2017 & LPA 356/2022
Judge, arguments were heard and the petitions were dismissed vide the
Impugned Order.
16.
Aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the Appellants have preferred the
present Appeals.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
17.
The learned Counsel for the Appellants has made the following
submissions:
17.1
The learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petitions without
adverting to the contention that the Appellants had not accepted
re-employment and were seeking reinstatement.
17.2
The termination order itself records that the Appellants were
retrenched and that retrenchment compensation together with
wages in lieu of notice were paid to them. Notwithstanding the
same, the learned Single Judge erroneously held that the
termination of engagement of the Appellants did not amount to
retrenchment.
17.3
During cross-examination, the Management witness admitted
that the Appellants had been retrenched and that retrenchment
compensation as well as wages in lieu of notice had been paid to
them.
17.4
The learned Single Judge failed to advert to the termination
order, wherein the cessation of service was expressly described
as retrenchment, and the Impugned Order did not consider the
admissions made by the Respondent’s witnesses.
17.5
Although the learned Single Judge concluded that the
Petitioners’ engagement had been terminated on the ground that
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
12:40:41
LPA 217/2017 & LPA 356/2022
they were rendered surplus, it was nevertheless erroneously held
in the Impugned Order that such termination amounted to
discharge simpliciter and not retrenchment.
17.6
The Impugned Order is contrary to the settled position of law
laid down by the Supreme Court, namely, that termination of
workmen on the ground of surplusage constitutes retrenchment
and not discharge simpliciter.
17.7
In terms of the law declared by the Supreme Court, Section
2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act is confined to tenure-based or projectbased employment. Further, the work discharged by the
Appellants was of a permanent nature and, therefore, Section
2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act had no application to the facts of the
present case.
17.8
The learned Single Judge erroneously disregarded the unrebutted
and unimpeached evidence/material on record and concluded that
there had been a reduction in the fleet of buses operated by the
Respondent.
17.9
The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that a mere
assertion does not constitute proof of a fact and that the same
was required to be established by cogent evidence. The burden
was upon the Respondent to prove that there had been a
reduction in the fleet of buses. The learned Single Judge further
failed to note that no evidence was adduced by the Respondent to
establish any such reduction at the relevant time.
17.10 The Appellants produced cogent evidence, including a report,
demonstrating that at the relevant time there was no reduction in
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
12:40:41
LPA 217/2017 & LPA 356/2022
the Respondent’s fleet of buses and that, on the contrary, the fleet
had increased. The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate this
unrebutted evidence, which was sufficient to support the
contention that the termination of the Appellants amounted to an
unfair labour practice.
17.11 The Impugned Order does not advert to any of the evidence
brought on record by the Appellants and instead proceeds upon
the submissions advanced on behalf of the Respondent to arrive
at its findings.
17.12 The decisions relied upon in the Impugned Order are
distinguishable on facts and were, therefore, erroneously applied
by the learned Single Judge to the present case.
18.
In view of the above, it was prayed that the Impugned Order be
quashed and set aside.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
19.
The learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that:
19.1
The Appellants were appointed on daily wages in terms of their
appointment letters, and their services were dispensed with in
accordance with the applicable Service Rules. Since the cessation
of the Appellants’ temporary engagement, no person has been
appointed to the regular post of Retainer Crew Conductor.
19.2
The appointment to a regular post required due sanction and, in
the absence of such sanction, the Respondent Management was
not competent to appoint the Appellants against regular posts.
19.3
The duties assigned to the temporary employees were performed
as and when required, and remuneration was paid on a daily
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
12:40:41
LPA 217/2017 & LPA 356/2022
basis. On that basis, the Appellants’ engagement was purely
temporary and that their services were dispensed with in
accordance with the Service Rules and the terms of their letters
of appointment.
ANALYSIS OF THE AWARD
20.
The learned Labour Court, after considering the submissions
advanced by the parties and examining the evidence on record, concluded
that the Appellants were not entitled to any relief and, accordingly,
dismissed the Statement of Claim.
21.
The learned Labour Court examined the oral evidence adduced on
behalf of the Appellants as well as the letters of appointment containing the
terms and conditions governing their service. The Award specifically noted
two stipulations, namely: (i) that the Appellants would be paid ₹20.90 per
day only for the days on which duty was actually performed; and (ii) that
their appointments were purely temporary and their services were liable to
be terminated without notice and without assigning any reason.
22.
The Award further records that, prior to the commencement of the
two months’ practical training, the Respondent Management had stipulated
that, upon successful completion of the training and the prescribed tests, the
names of the candidates would be placed on a waiting list in order of merit
and seniority, and employment would be offered to them as and when their
turn arose for appointment to the post of Retainer Crew Conductor. It was
also clarified by the Respondent that there was no assurance whatsoever of
employment and that no claim in that regard could be maintained by any
person.
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
12:40:41
LPA 217/2017 & LPA 356/2022
23.
The Award also examined the Executive Instructions governing the
daily-rated operational crew of the Buses Division, which classified
employees under the categories of Regular (Permanent), Probationary,
Temporary, and Casual.
24.
The Award further set out the terms and conditions governing the
employment of Retainer Drivers and Conductors as contained in the
Executive Instructions and concluded that, in terms of the contractual
stipulations, the services of the Appellants were liable to be terminated at
any time without assigning any reason, thereby attracting the second part of
Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act.
25.
The Award also observed that the mere deduction of amounts from
the wages of the Appellants towards PF and ESI would not, by itself, confer
upon them the status of regular employees, particularly in the absence of any
document on record to establish that they had first been placed on monthly
rates and had thereafter undergone a period of probation culminating in
regularisation. It was further noted that, at the time their services were
terminated, the Appellants were still working as daily wagers.
26.
The Award held that the payment of certain amounts by the
Management to the Appellants at the time of termination did not partake the
character of retrenchment compensation, since the cessation of their services
did not amount to retrenchment but had occurred in accordance with the
terms of the contract of service and the second limb of Section 2(oo)(bb) of
the ID Act.
27.
Accordingly, the Award concluded that there was no illegality in the
termination of the services of the Appellants by the Respondent.
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
12:40:41
LPA 217/2017 & LPA 356/2022
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER
28.
The learned Single Judge, in the Impugned Order, held that there was
no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at in the Award and, accordingly,
dismissed the Writ Petitions.
29.
The learned Single Judge further observed that, having regard to the
evidence adduced by the Respondent, there existed surplus staff on account
of a reduction in the size of the Respondent’s bus fleet and that,
consequently, the Appellants, who had initially been engaged in service for a
larger fleet, became surplus. It was, therefore, held that the conclusion in the
Award with respect to surplus staff arising from the reduction in the
Respondent’s fleet of buses could not be faulted.
30.
The learned Single Judge also observed that the Labour Court, after
examining the terms and conditions of employment, particularly the
categories of employees maintained on the Respondent’s muster roll under
the Executive Instructions, had concluded that the Appellants were casual
employees. Accordingly, it was held that even if the contract of employment
was terminated without assigning any reason, such termination could not be
regarded as retrenchment.
31.
The learned Single Judge further held that mere confirmation in
employment would not clothe an employee with the rights of a permanent
employee and that, therefore, either upon the expiry of the contractual tenure
or upon termination of services in accordance with the terms of the contract,
such cessation of service would not amount to retrenchment.
32.
Accordingly, the Writ Petitions came to be dismissed.
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
12:40:41
LPA 217/2017 & LPA 356/2022
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
33.
We have carefully considered the submissions made on part of the
Parties in both these Appeals as well as the Award and the Impugned Order.
We have also perused to material available on record.
34.
The Appellants were engaged by the Respondents as Retainer Crew
Conductors in the year 1985 on daily wages though the Employment
Exchange, Delhi and their services were terminated in May 1988 after
working for about three years.
35.
At the time of offering the employment to the Appellants, it was made
clear by the Respondents that the Appellants would be paid the stipulated
daily wages only for the days on which duty was actually performed by
them and their appointments were purely temporary in nature, which were
liable to be terminated without notice or without assigning any reason.
36.
Upon qualifying the written examination, medical examination, and
interview, the Appellants were deputed for two months’ practical training.
Prior to the commencement of the practical training, it was made clear that,
upon successful completion of the training and the prescribed tests, the
names of the candidates would be placed on a waiting list in order of merit
and seniority, and employment would be offered to them as and when their
turn arose for appointment to the post of Retainer Crew Conductor. It was
further clarified by the Respondent that there was no assurance whatsoever
of employment and that no claim in that regard could be maintained by any
person.
37.
Although the Appellants have contended that the Respondent’s Rules
provided that Retainer Crew Conductors were initially engaged on daily
rates and were to be placed on monthly rates after six months, the same is
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
12:40:41
LPA 217/2017 & LPA 356/2022
not borne out from the record. The further contention of the Appellants that,
although the tenure of employment was temporary in the first instance, it
was liable to be made permanent upon satisfactory completion of six months
of service on daily rates is also not evidence from by the terms and
conditions stipulated by the Respondent at the time of engagement and prior
to the commencement of the training.
38.
According to the Appellants, the Respondent failed to comply with
the mandatory requirements of the applicable law, including Sections 25F
and 25G of the ID Act. The Appellants further contended that the orders in
question described the termination as ‘retrenchment’ and also purported to
pay wages in lieu of notice period and retrenchment compensation.
39.
However, the learned Labour Court has held that merely paying the
compensation at the time of termination does not make the termination as
retrenchment. The learned Single Judge has also upheld the Award by
confirming that the termination of services in terms of the Contract would
not amount to retrenchment.
40.
As regards the submission of the Appellants that Section 24F and
Section 25G of the ID Act were not complied with by the Respondent, the
learned Labour Court has relied upon Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act which
provides as under:
“2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in
the subject or context,—
***
***
***
(oo) “retrenchment” means the termination by the employer of the
service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as
a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not
include—
***
***
***
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
12:40:41
LPA 217/2017 & LPA 356/2022
(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the
non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer
and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being
terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein;”
41.
The above provision shows that the services of the Appellants were
terminated in accordance with the second limb of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the
ID Act as held by the learned Labour Court thereby concluding that there
was no illegality in the termination of services of the Appellants by the
Respondent. In view of the same, we are of the view that the provisions of
ID Act were not applicable to the facts of the present case.
42.
Having examined the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the
Appellants as well as considering the letters of appointment containing the
terms and conditions governing their service, the learned Labour Court held
that the Appellants were daily wagers, and their appointment was purely
temporary in nature. Therefore, the services of the Appellant could be
terminated without notice and without assigning any reason.
43.
The Award has held that prior to the commencement of the two
months’ practical training, the Respondent Management had stipulated that
upon successful completion of the training and the prescribed tests, the
names of the candidates would be placed on a waiting list in order of merit
and seniority, and employment would be offered to them as and when their
turn arose for appointment to the post of Retainer Crew Conductor. It was
also clarified by the Respondent that there was no assurance whatsoever of
employment and that no claim in that regard could be maintained by any
person. Thus, the Appellants were fully aware about the terms of the
employment prior to commencement of the training.
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
12:40:41
LPA 217/2017 & LPA 356/2022
44.
The Award also examined the Executive Instructions governing the
daily-rated operational crew of the Buses Division, which classified
employees under the categories of Regular (Permanent), Probationary,
Temporary, and Casual and set out the terms and conditions governing the
employment of Retainer Drivers and Conductors as contained in the
Executive Instructions and concluded that, in terms of the contractual
stipulations, the services of the Appellants were liable to be terminated at
any time without assigning any reason, thereby attracting the second part of
Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act.
45.
In view of the above, the learned Labour Court, after considering the
submissions advanced by the parties and examining the evidence on record,
concluded that the Appellants were not entitled to any relief and,
accordingly, passed the Award rejecting the prayers in the Statement of
Claim filed by the Appellants.
46.
The learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition filed
challenging the Award considering the evidence adduced by the
Respondent. It is observed in the Impugned Order that the excess staff on
account of a reduction in the size of the Respondent’s bus fleet was
established and that, consequently, the Appellants, who had initially been
engaged in service for a larger fleet, became surplus. Therefore, the Award
was upheld with respect to surplus staff arising from the reduction in the
Respondent’s fleet of buses. The learned Single Judge also observed that the
Labour Court, after examining the terms and conditions of employment,
particularly the categories of employees maintained on the Respondent’s
muster roll under the Executive Instructions, had concluded that the
Appellants were casual employees. Accordingly, it was held that even if the
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
12:40:41
LPA 217/2017 & LPA 356/2022
contract of employment was terminated without assigning any reason, such
termination could not be regarded as retrenchment.
47.
The learned Single Judge further held that mere confirmation in
employment would not clothe an employee with the rights of a permanent
employee and that, therefore, either upon the expiry of the contractual tenure
or upon termination of services in accordance with the terms of the contract,
such cessation of service would not amount to retrenchment.
48.
We are of the considered opinion that both the Award as well as
Impugned Order have examined the evidence and submissions made on
behalf of the Parties and come to conclusion that the termination of the
services of the Appellants was not retrenchment under the provisions of the
ID Act. Taking into consideration the terms of the employment, the
conclusion arrived at by the learned Labour Court and the learned Single
Judge regarding the termination of the services of the Appellant is justified.
The concurrent finding of the learned Labour Court and the learned Single
Judge clearly provide that the Appellants were daily wagers and the
termination of the serves was in accordance with the terms of the contract.
49.
Therefore, we do not find any infirmity with the Impugned Order,
which is hereby upheld. The present Appeals are consequently dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
TEJAS KARIA, J
DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ
MAY 23, 2026/sms
Signed By:NEELAM
SHARMA
12:40:41
LPA 217/2017 & LPA 356/2022
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