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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 3030 of 2025
Reserved on: 24.02.2026.
Date of Decision: 02.03.2026.
Raman Kumar @ Rambo
….Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P.
…. Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Chetan Thakur, Advocate, vice Mr
Arun Sehgal, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has 昀椀led the present petition for seeking
regular bail in FIR No. 13 of 2025, dated 15.01.2025, registered at
Police
Station
commission of
Dharamshala,
District
Kangra,
H.P.,
for
the
an o昀昀ence punishable under Section 21 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act).
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police were on patrolling duty on 15.01.2025.
They saw the
petitioner carrying a backpack coming from Dadnu. He tried to run
away after seeing the police. The police apprehended him, and the
petitioner identi昀椀ed himself as Raman Kumar (present petitioner), in
the presence of an independent witness. The police checked the
backpack and recovered heroin from it.
Police arrested the
petitioner and seized the heroin. The allegations made against the
petitioner are false. The quantity of heroin stated to have been
recovered from the possession of the accused is an intermediate
quantity, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply
to the present case. The petitioner would abide by the terms and
conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by 昀椀ling a status report
asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 15.01.2025.
They saw the petitioner coming from Dadnu towards Badol at about
5.25 P.M. The petitioner tried to run away after seeing the police.
The police apprehended the petitioner, and he identi昀椀ed himself as
Raman Kumar in the presence of an independent witness.
The
police checked the backpack and recovered 10 grams of heroin.
The police arrested the petitioner and seized the heroin. Heroin was
sent to the SFSL, Junga and as per the report, it was found to be a
sample of Diacetylmorphine (heroin). FIR Nos. 71 of 2018, 23 of
2019, 135 of 2019 and 43 of 2024 are pending against the petitioner.
Petitioner would indulge in the commission of similar o昀昀ences in
case of his release on bail.
A charge sheet was 昀椀led before the
learned Trial Court on 10.03.2025, and the matter was listed for the
recording of statements of the witnesses on 28.02.2026. Hence, the
status report.
4.
I have heard Mr Chetan Thakur, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the respondent/State.
5.
Mr Chetan Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely
implicated. The petitioner was arrested on 15.01.2025, and more
than one year has lapsed since then. The prosecution has failed to
complete the evidence, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is
being violated. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and
conditions that the Court may impose; hence, he prayed that the
present petition be allowed, and the petitioner be released on bail.
6.
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was involved in
the commission of a similar o昀昀ence, and he is likely to indulge in the
commission of a similar o昀昀ence in case of his release on bail.
Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314:
2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating
on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the
context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid
down the key factors that should be considered while
granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244,
paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is con昀椀rmed, also bears
upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern
Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this
context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is
applying for bail to 昀椀nd whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious o昀昀ences while on bail. In regard to habituals,
it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail
order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to
in昀氀ict further crimes on the members of society. Bail
discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record
of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.”
(emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted
as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will
entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the
accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused,
reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused
at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and
similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind
that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has
used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of
“the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant
of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a
genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution
will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the
charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in
matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for
bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to
case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it
may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the
matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled
with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The
nature of the o昀昀ence is one of the basic considerations for
the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater
is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however,
dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis
supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application cannot
undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an
elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court
is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the
grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would su昀昀er from the vice of non-application of mind,
rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to
the circumstances under which an order granting bail may
be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have
guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been
detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting
bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the
High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously
and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down
in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well
settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be
borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground
to believe that the accused had committed the o昀昀ence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or 昀氀eeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of
the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the o昀昀ence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
in昀氀uenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant
of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of
discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused
is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2
SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court,
while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu
Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and
Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of
the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as
follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of
the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and
the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when
the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in
nature but are supported by adequate material brought on
record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion.
While considering an application for the grant of bail, a
prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and
must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the
case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to
facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of
punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the
o昀昀ence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)
9.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
10.
The status report mentions that the petitioner was
coming from Dadnu to Badol, and he tried to run away after seeing
the police. The police apprehended him and recovered 10 grams of
heroin from the backpack carried by the petitioner.
These
allegations prima facie show the petitioner’s involvement in the
commission of an o昀昀ence punishable under Section 21(b) of the
NDPS Act.
11.
The Central Government has prescribed 5 grams of
heroin to be a small quantity and 250 grams of heroin as a
commercial quantity.
Therefore, the petitioner was found in
possession of an intermediate quantity of heroin, and the rigours of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case.
12.
The petitioner was arrested on 15.01.2025.
He has
undergone imprisonment for more than one year. If the principle of
proportionality
is
applied,
the petitioner
has undergone a
substantial part of the imprisonment that can be awarded to him in
case of his conviction.
13.
Status report shows that the charge sheet was 昀椀led
before the Court on 10th March, 2025, and the matter was listed
before the learned trial Court on 28.02.2026.
The status report
does not mention whether any witness has been examined or not;
hence, the apprehension of the petitioner that his trial is not likely
to be concluded at the earliest has some substance.
14.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed
Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813: 2024
SCC OnLine SC 1693 that when the State or any prosecuting agency
including the Court concerned has no wherewithal to provide the
right to speedy trial of the accused, the bail should not be opposed
on the ground that crime committed is serious. It was observed at
page 820:
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the
court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect
the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the State
or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea
for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious.
Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the
nature of the crime.
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an
accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of criminal
jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent
until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, however
stringent the penal law may be.
19. We are convinced that the manner in which the
prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded,
the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said
to have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the
Constitution.
15.
It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127
that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused.
It was observed at page 298:
“13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
1948, assures that:
“12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone
has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”
14. More recently, the European Convention on Human
Rights in Article 6(1) promises that:
“6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within
a reasonable time….”
And in its second sub-article, that:
“6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal o昀昀ence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”
15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the
use of nolle prosequi, an inde昀椀nite but ominous and
omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal prosecution
in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386 US 213 (1967)].
16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994
SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court
unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a
fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract
these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp.
638-39, paras 86-87)
“86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21
as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and
liberty
guaranteed
and
preserved
under
our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the
actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent
incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the
stage of the investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and
revision so that any possible prejudice that may result
from the impermissible and avoidable delay from the
time of the commission of the o昀昀ence till it
consummates into a 昀椀nality, can be averted. In this
context, it may be noted that the constitutional
guarantee of a speedy trial is properly re昀氀ected in
Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while dealing
with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has observed
thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable,
fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There
can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by
speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is
an integral and essential part of the fundamental right
to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question
which would, however, arise is as to what would be the
consequence if a person accused of an o昀昀ence is
denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of
his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a longdelayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released
unconditionally, freed from the charge levelled against
him on the ground that trying him after an unduly long
period of time and convicting him after such a trial
would constitute a violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21?”
17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being
present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in
departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court
on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC
(Cri) 93] underscored that this right to speedy trial is implicit
in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also re昀氀ected in
Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; that it
encompasses all stages viz. investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal, revision and retrial; that the burden lies on the
prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that the Court
must engage in a balancing test to determine whether this
right had been denied in the particular case before it.”
16.
It was held in Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of
India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot be
kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial being concluded
expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:
“8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to grant
some relief to those persons who have been deprived of their
personal liberty for a considerable length of time without any
prospect of the trial being concluded in the near future.
Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and the nation
needs to be safeguarded, looking to the nature of the
o昀昀ences these undertrials have been charged with. But the
ultimate justi昀椀cation for such deprivation of liberty pending
trial can only be their being found guilty of the o昀昀ences for
which they have been charged. If such a 昀椀nding is not likely
to be arrived at within a reasonable time, some relief
becomes necessary.”
17.
Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri)
560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be subjected to
unending detention pending trial. It was observed at page 335:
“40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has been
urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that cancellation
of bail by this Court is likely to be construed as an inde昀椀nite
foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is not necessary to
dwell upon the wealth of case law which, regardless of the
stringent provisions in a penal law or the gravity of the
o昀昀ence, has time and again recognised the legitimacy of
seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it di昀昀erently, no
accused can be subjected to unending detention pending
trial, especially when the law presumes him to be innocent
until proven guilty. Even where statutory provisions expressly
bar the grant of bail, such as in cases under the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, this Court has expressly
ruled that after a reasonably long period of incarceration, or
for any other valid reason, such stringent provisions will melt
down, and cannot be measured over and above the right of
liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
(see Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A.
Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] ).”
18.
It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to a
speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right of bail is
curtailed on the premise that the trial would be concluded
expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: 13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused to
secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial discretion (like
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present case), this Court
has upheld them for con昀氀ating two competing values i.e. the
right of the accused to enjoy freedom, based on the
presumption of innocence, and societal interest — as
observed
in Vaman
Narain
Ghiya v. State
of
Rajasthan [Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2009)
2 SCC 281: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 745: (2008) 17 SCR 369] (“the
concept of bail emerges from the con昀氀ict between the police
power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have
committed a crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of
the alleged criminal….”). They are, at the same time, upheld on
the condition that the trial is concluded expeditiously. The
Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar
Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899:
(1994) 2 SCR 375] made observations to this e昀昀ect. In the
Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of India [Shaheen
Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC
(Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123] again, this Court expressed the
same sentiment, namely, that when stringent provisions are
enacted, curtailing the provisions of bail, and restricting
judicial discretion, it is on the basis that investigation and
trials would be concluded swiftly. The Court said that
parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen Welfare
case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC
616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123], SCC p. 624, para
17)
“17. … a conscious decision has been taken by the
legislature to sacri昀椀ce to some extent, the personal liberty
of an undertrial accused for the sake of protecting the
community and the nation against terrorist and disruptive
activities or other activities harmful to society, it is all the
more necessary that investigation of such crimes is done
e昀케ciently and an adequate number of Designated Courts
are set up to bring to book persons accused of such
serious crimes. This is the only way in which society can
be protected against harmful activities. This would also
ensure that persons ultimately found innocent are not
unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.”
19.
The Court highlighted the e昀昀ects of pre-trial detention
and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page 178:
“23. Before parting, it would be important to re昀氀ect that laws
which impose stringent conditions for the grant of bail may
be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials are not
concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the individual is
immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and their living
conditions, more often than not, are appalling. According to
the Union Home Ministry's response to Parliament, the
National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 3112-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against
a total capacity of 4,25,069 prisoners in the country [ National
Crime
Records
Bureau,
Prison
Statistics
in
India
<https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/昀椀les/PSI-2021/Executive_nc
rb_Summary-2021.pdf>]. Of these, 1,22,852 were convicts;
the rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials.
24. The danger of unjust imprisonment is that inmates are at
risk of “prisonisation”, a term described by the Kerala High
Court
in A
Convict
Prisoner v. State [A
Convict
Prisoner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242]
as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner: (SCC
OnLine Ker para 13)
“13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He
loses
personal
possessions.
He
has
no
personal
relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of
freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy of
personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be
dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary
standards. Self-perception changes.”
25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime,
“as crime not only turns admirable, but the more professional
the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” [ Working
Papers - Group on Prisons & Borstals - 1966 U.K.] (also see
Donald Clemmer's “The Prison Community” published in 1940 [
Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart
& Winston, which is referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald
Clemmer's
Concept
of
Prisonisation”,
available
at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/Sob
ecki_sklad.pdf> (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ). Incarceration has
further deleterious e昀昀ects, where the accused belongs to the
weakest economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in
several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of family
bonds and alienation from society. The courts, therefore,
have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of
an acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and
ensure that trials—especially in cases where special laws
enact stringent provisions- are taken up and concluded
speedily.”
20.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed
Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) that the right to speedy trial of the
o昀昀enders facing criminal charges is an important facet of Article 21
of the Constitution of India, and inordinate delay in the conclusion
of the trial entitles the accused to the grant of bail. It was observed
at page 817: “10. Long
back,
in Hussainara
Khatoon
(1) v. State
of
Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC
81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the right
to speedy trial of o昀昀enders facing criminal charges is “implicit
in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted
by this Court”. Remarking that a valid procedure under Article
21 is one which contains a procedure that is “reasonable, fair
and just”, it was held that: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
“5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for
depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair
or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for
determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure
which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be
regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul
of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a
speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably
expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article
21. The question which would, however, arise is as to
what would be the consequence if a person accused of an
o昀昀ence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be
deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a
long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21.”
11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and
again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya v. State
of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671:
1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC
225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court re-emphasised
the right to a speedy trial and further held that an accused,
facing a prolonged trial, has no option: (Abdul Rehman
Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1
SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269, para 84)
“84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is,
thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the
case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable
promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large
majority of accused come from poorer and weaker
sections of society, not versed in the ways of law, where
they do not often get competent legal advice, the
application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of
course, in a given case, if an accused demands a speedy
trial and yet he is not given one, it may be a relevant
factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused
from complaining of infringement of his right to a speedy
trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a
speedy trial.”
21.
This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v. State
of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was observed:
7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried
trial is frowned upon as it may not give su昀케cient time to
prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an accused
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in “The
Ballad of Reading Gaol”, wrote the following poignant lines
while being incarcerated:
“I know not whether Laws be right,
Or whether Laws be wrong;
All that we know who be in jail
Is that the wall is strong;
And that each day is like a year,
A year whose days are long.”
22.
It was held in Athar Parwez v. Union of India, (2024) 20
SCC 57: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762 that long incarceration and the
delay in the conclusion of the trial will entitle the accused to bail. It
was observed at page 63:
19. Long incarceration and the unlikely likelihood of the trial
being completed in the near future have also been taken as a
ground for exercising its constitutional role by the constitutional courts to grant bail on violation of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, which guarantees trial be concluded
within a reasonable time. Gross delay in conclusion of the
trial would justify such invocation, leading to a conclusion of
violation of Part III of the Constitution of India, which may be
taken as a ground to release an undertrial on bail.
*****
21. At the initial stage, the legislative policy needs to be appreciated and followed by the courts. Keeping the statutory
provisions in mind, but with the passage of time, the e昀昀ect of
that statutory provision would, in fact, have to be diluted, giving way to the mandate of Part III of the Constitution, where
the accused, as of now, is not a convict and is facing the
charges. Constitutional right of speedy trial in such circumstances will have precedence over the bar/strict provisions of
the statute and cannot be made the sole reason for denial of
bail. Therefore, the period of incarceration of an accused
could also be a relevant factor to be considered by the consti-
tutional courts, not to be merely governed by the statutory
provisions.
23.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tapas
Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322 that
the accused has a right to an expeditious trial. It was observed:
10. However, many times we have made ourselves very clear
that howsoever serious a crime may be, the accused has a
fundamental right of speedy trial as enshrined in Article 21 of
the Constitution.
24.
Hence, the petitioner is entitled to bail because of the
violation of his right to a speedy trial.
25.
It was submitted that the petitioner has criminal
antecedents and he is not entitled to bail on this consideration. This
submission will not help the State. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 3763: 2024:INSC:994 that the criminal antecedents may not be a
reason to deny bail to the accused in case of long incarceration. It
was observed:
“10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only
one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer for
bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused makes out a
strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact situation
and period of incarceration, the presence of antecedents
may not be a ground to deny bail. There may be a case where
a Court can grant bail only on the grounds of long
incarceration. The presence of antecedents may not be
relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court may grant
default bail. Again, the antecedents of the accused are
irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending upon the peculiar
facts, the Court can grant bail notwithstanding the existence
of the antecedents.”
26.
In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and
the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail in the sum of
₹1,00,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of
the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the
following terms and conditions: (I)
The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor
will he in昀氀uence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever;
(II)
The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every
hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments;
(III)
The petitioner will not leave the present address for a
continuous period of seven days without furnishing
the address of the intended visit to the SHO
concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial
Court;
(IV)
The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the
Court; and
(V)
The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and
social media contact to the Police and the Court and
will abide by the summons/notices received from the
Police/Court
through
SMS/WhatsApp/Social
Media
Account. In case of any change in the mobile number
or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to
the Police/Court within 昀椀ve days from the date of the
change.
27.
It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any
of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to 昀椀le a
petition for cancellation of the bail.
28.
The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Lala Lajpat Rai District
Jail, Dharamshala and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.
29.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on
the case's merits.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
02 March, 2026.
(jai)
JAI
PRAKASH
Digitally signed
by JAI
PRAKASH
Date:
2026.03.02
16:52:41 +0530
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