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2026:JHHC:1675
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (Cr.) No. 801 of 2025
-----Rakhi Agrawal, W/o Sanjay Kumar Agrawal, R/o Plot No. 73, Oslo
Society, Opposite Ambaji Temple, Sector-4, Gandhidham, P.O.
Gandhidham, P.S. Gandhidham, District Kachchh-370201 (Gujarat)
....
.... …. Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Anup Sharma, S/o Santosh Sharma, R/o Manbad, P.O. & P.S.Jharia,
District Dhanbad (Jharkhand)
....
....
....
Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GAUTAM KUMAR CHOUDHARY
For the Petitioner
: Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Rishav Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Mayur Khandelwal, Advocate
Ms. Gopika Kaul, Advocate
For the State
: Mr. Ranjan Kumar, AC to Sr. SC-I
For the Resp. No.2
: Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate
Mrs. Shilpi Sandil, Advocate
Mr. Prakhar Harit, Advocate
Ms. Nidhi Lall, Advocate
-----Order No.04 / Dated : 20.01.2026.
1. Heard, learned counsel for the parties.
2. The instant Writ Petition (Cr.) has been filed for issuance of Writ in the
nature of Certiorari for quashing the entire criminal proceedings in
connection with First Information Report being Bankmore (Dhanbad) P.S.
Case No.280 of 2025 dated 07.11.2025 (Annexure-1) registered for the
offence punishable under Sections 316(5), 318(2), 338, 336(3), 340(2) &
3 (5) of the B.N.S, 2023 against the Petitioner.
3. Petitioner is the non-executive woman Director of Vimla Fuels & Metals
Private Limited, whereas her husband is the Director of the said company.
4. The gravamen of allegation, as disclosed in the FIR, is that Vimla Fuels
and Metals Private Limited and Vimala Met Coke Limited contracted a
loan of Rs.5.85 Crores from the informant-company on executing one
memorandum of understanding dated 30.09.2024 with Narayan Coke
Private Limited (second party). The original title deeds were mortgaged
by the first party which included the following properties as detailed in
Para-2 of the Memorandum of Understanding: 1
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Sr.
Address of the Property
Current Owner
1.
Office No.113, 1st Floor,
Rishabh Arcade, Plot No.83,
Sector-8,
Gandhidham370201
Survey No.525
Village- Shikra,
Taluka : Bhachau-370140
Survey No.361,
Village : Lunva,
Taluka : Bhachau-370140
Survey No.362/P2,
Village Lunva,
Taluka : Bhachau-370140
Sanjay
Agrawal
2.
3.
4.
Registered
Deed
Details
Kumar 2201/ 12.03.2021
Vimla Metcoke 3579/17.11.2021
Ltd.
Vimla Fuels & 2794/05.06.2023
Metals Pvt. Ltd.
Vimla Fuels & 2796/05.06.2023
Metals Pvt. Ltd.
5. The allegation against the first party is two folds.
Firstly, loan was taken by mortgage of property as detailed in Column-2
although the same had been transferred by Vimla Metal Coke Limited on
07.11.2023 in favour of the present petitioner.
Secondly, the properties as detailed in Column Nos.3 and 4 of Vimla
Fuels and Metals Private Limited is being claimed by erstwhile owners
for having been transferred to the company without any consideration
amount.
ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER
6. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that she being nonexecutive woman Director had not executed the said memorandum of
understanding and was not directly involved in the negotiation leading to
the execution of memorandum of understanding, therefore, she cannot be
held liable for the same.
7. It is further argued that Hon’ble the Supreme Court in (2022) 10 SCC 152
[Sunita Palita and Ors. Vs. Panchami Stone Quarry] has held that liability
depends on the role one plays in the affairs of one company and not on the
designation or status alone as held by the Apex Court in S. M. S.
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla [(2005) 8 SCC 89]. In the said
case, the Apex Court held that the appellant being non-executive Director
of the company was not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the company,
therefore, the proceeding under Section 138 of the N. I. Act was dropped.
8. It is argued that even if, it is assumed that the consideration amount has
not been received by the sellers with respect to the property(s), as detailed
in Column -3 & 4, it was incumbent on the part of the said sellers to have
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instituted a money suit and it will have no bearing on the execution of the
sale-deed(s) executed in favour of the company. Even otherwise, it is
contended that absence of a complete title will not operate as a bar to
create a mortgage by deposit of a title deed as held by the Apex Court in
2007 (8) SCC 361 [Para-28] (Syndicate Bank vs. Estate Officer &
Manager, APIIC Ltd. & Ors.)
9. Lastly, it is argued that even if it is assumed that the petitioner was fullfledged Director of the said company, unless and until her role in
execution of the memorandum of understanding could be delineated,
vicarious liability per se cannot be attached in view of the ratio laid down
by the Apex Court in 2020 (3) SCC 240 [Para 7.5] [Sushil Sethi and Anr.
Vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh and Ors.]
ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT
10.Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 2 opens his
argument by disputing the assertions made on behalf of the petitioner that
she was not a Director in the Company, rather she was a non-executive
Director. An interlocutory application dated 19.12.2025 has been filed
enclosing photostat copy of MCA data base dated 17.02.2025 in which
she has been shown to be director of Vimala Fuels and Metals Private
Limited. Further, the photostat copy of Form No. DIR- 12 along with the
receipt thereof by which the petitioner submitted her resignation and
ceased to be director of the said company with effect from 06.02.2025 has
also been filed by way of Annexure-1 A-E to the interlocutory application.
In letter addressed by Chief Manager, State Bank of India to Inspector of
Police, Gandhidham Police Station dated 28.10.2024 whereby the position
of the petitioner has been shown to be director of the said company.
11.It is further submitted that the plea of non-executive director in the
company taken by this petitioner before the High Court of Gujarat in
R/Criminal Misc. Application No. 10055 of 2025 with R/Criminal Misc.
Application No. 6701 of 2025 for grant of anticipatory bail was not
accepted and the anticipatory bail application was rejected against which
the petitioner preferred Special Leave Petition before Hon’ble Supreme
Court. The Apex Court also did not accept the said plea and allowed
anticipatory bail only on the condition of deposit of sum of Rs. 7.5 crore
as security.
2026:JHHC:1675
12.With regard to the specific role, it is submitted that petitioner being the
director of the company, the loan amount was advanced to the company
only on the basis of mortgage of the land which did not even exist in the
ownership of the company on the date of execution of the said mortgage.
The said loan, in question, had already been transferred in the name of this
petitioner; therefore, she can be imputed with knowledge about the
transfer of land and despite that said knowledge, the deed was executed in
favour of the informant-company.
ANALYSIS
13.The matter for consideration before this Court is “Whether not joining the
memorandum of understanding and signing over it can be a ground for
quashing the FIR against the petitioner or any other director?”
14.What is there in a name? Shakespearean idiomatic expression to a large
extent captures the principles of liability of a director for the acts
committed in the name of a company. It is not the name that matters so
much, but the role played in the alleged act that is relevant to ascribe
liability of the person so involved.
15.Section 149(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 saddles the directors with
liabilities for the acts of the Company. Further, under Section 149(12)
even a non-executive director shall be liable for an act or omission which
has been committed and is within his knowledge. With regard to the
liability of the non-executive director, the extent of liability has been dealt
with in (2022) 10 SCC 152 (Sunita Palita & Ors. Vs. Panchami Stone
Quarry) wherein it has been held that it depends on the role one plays in
the affairs of a Company and not on designations or status alone as earlier
held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. Neeta
Bhalla {(2005) 8 SCC 89}.
16.Further, the scope of judicial scrutiny at the stage of quashing of the FIR
has been set out in Niharika Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of
Maharashtra {(2021) 19 SCC 401} wherein it has been held that while
examining an FIR/complaint, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as
to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in
the FIR/complaint. In Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd.
v. Datar Switchgear Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 479 criminal liability was sought
to be fastened on the Chairman of the Electricity Board for use of a forged
2026:JHHC:1675
document in an arbitral proceeding. It was held that such a liability cannot
be fixed, as the relevant resolution merely authorised the Chief Engineer
to file counter-claim before the Arbitral Tribunal who was made
responsible for looking after the interest of Appellant 1 in those
proceedings.
17.Matter boils down to the role played by the petitioner in obtaining loan on
behalf of the company by mortgaging a bogus document of title, with
respect to a property in which the title had been transferred from the name
of the company to the name of the Petitioner.
18.So far, this petitioner is concerned allegation is that out of the four sale
deeds which were mortgaged, to obtain the loan, one of them pertaining
to Survey No.525, village Shikra, Taluka: Bhachan-370140 had not
remained in the ownership of the company, as the same had been
transferred by registered sale deed, no.3579 on 17.11.2021 in her name.
One of the Director of the company, being her husband, it does not stand
to reason that she was completely oblivious of the fact that loan was being
contracted in the name of the company by mortgaging a property which
had ceased to be in its ownership. Although she was not a signatory to the
MOU, but being the director of the company can also be said to be an
overall beneficiary of the loan contracted.
19.Under the circumstance and for the reasons discussed above, this Court is
of the view that this is not a fit case for quashing of FIR.
Writ Petition accordingly stands dismissed. Pending I.A., if any,
stands disposed of.
(Gautam Kumar Choudhary, J.)
Pawan /Sandeep/
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22.01.2026
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