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2026:HHC:11136
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CWP No. 19916 of 2025
Reserved on: 12.03.2026
Date of Decision: 09.4.2026
Rakesh Kumar
...Petitioner.
Versus
State of H.P. & others
...Respondents.
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner
:
Ms Sheetal Vyas, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy
Advocate General, for the
respondent/State.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
directing respondent No. 2 to grant parole to him. It has been
asserted that the petitioner was convicted of the commission of
an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of
Indian Penal Code (IPC) in F.I.R. No. 260 of 2018, dated
01.09.2018, registered at Police Station Nurpur, District Kangra,
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:11136
H.P. He was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment, pay a fine
of ₹50,000/- and in default of payment of fine to further
undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. The petitioner is
undergoing his sentence in Lala Lajpat Rai District and Air
Correctional Home, Dharamshala, H.P. He has spent seven years
in prison. He applied for parole to do agricultural work and to
maintain social ties with his family members. His application
was rejected, stating that his release on parole would be
detrimental to the security of the area. The petitioner has
satisfactory conduct in jail, and the Panchayat Pardhan has also
recommended his parole. The order passed by respondent No.2
is contrary to the provisions of the H.P. Good Conduct Prisoners
(Temporary Release) Act, 1968, (Prisoners Act) and the Rules
framed thereunder. Hence, the present petition.
2.
The petition is opposed by filing a reply asserting
that the petitioner was convicted for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nurpur, District
Kangra,
H.P.
He
was
sentenced
to
undergo
rigorous
imprisonment for life, pay a fine of ₹50,000/- and in default of
payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for
2026:HHC:11136
one year. The petitioner had undergone a sentence of 7 years, 3
months and 3 days as on 09.12.2025, excluding remissions. The
petitioner applied for parole on 05.12.2024 for agricultural work.
The application was forwarded to the District Magistrate Kangra
at Dharamshala and Superintendent of Police, District Kangra,
H.P. However, the petitioner’s case was not recommended by the
District Magistrate, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. As per the
report of the Superintendent of Police, Nurpur, District Kangra,
H.P., the presence of the petitioner was dangerous to the
security of the area. The offence committed by the petitioner is
heinous in nature.
The recommendations of the District
Magistrate Kangra at Dharamshala are to be preferred to the
report of the Panchayat. Hence, it was prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
3.
I have heard Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the
petitioner, and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate
General, for the respondent/State.
4.
Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that respondent No. 2 erred in rejecting the
petitioner’s application for parole on the ground that the
2026:HHC:11136
petitioner’s release was dangerous to the security of the area.
The application could only have been rejected on the ground
specified in the Prisoners’ Act, and the Rules framed thereunder.
The nature of the offence is not a relevant consideration for
declining parole. Hence, she prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the petitioner be released on parole.
5.
Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General,
for the respondent/State, submitted that the District Authorities
had not recommended the grant of parole to the petitioner
because his release on parole would adversely affect the security
of the area. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed
6.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
7.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan, (2017) 15 SCC 55: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 390:
2017 SCC OnLine SC 1092, that parole grants an opportunity to
the convict to maintain his links with society. Convicts must
breathe fresh air for at least some time. The parole should not be
denied to a convict if he maintains good conduct during
2026:HHC:11136
incarceration and shows a tendency to reform himself. It was
observed at page 60: “10. In the first instance, it would be necessary to
understand the meaning and purpose of the grant of
parole. It would be better understood when considered in
contrast with furlough. These terms have been legally
defined and judicially explained by the courts from time
to time.
11. There is a subtle distinction between parole and
furlough. A parole can be defined as the conditional
release of prisoners, i.e. an early release of a prisoner,
conditional on good behaviour and regular reporting to
the authorities for a set period of time. It can also be
defined as a form of conditional pardon by which the
convict is released before the expiration of his term. Thus,
the parole is granted for good behaviour on the condition
that the parolee regularly reports to a supervising officer
for a specified period. Such a release of the prisoner on
parole can also be temporary on some basic grounds. In
that eventuality, it is to be treated as a mere suspension of
the sentence for the time being, keeping the quantum of
sentence intact. Release on parole is designed to afford
some relief to the prisoners in certain specified
exigencies. Such paroles are normally granted in certain
situations, some of which may be as follows:
(i) a member of the prisoner's family has died or is
seriously ill, or the prisoner himself is seriously ill;
or
(ii) the marriage of the prisoner himself, his son,
daughter, grandson, granddaughter, brother, sister,
sister's son or daughter is to be celebrated; or
(iii) the temporary release of the prisoner is
necessary for ploughing, sowing or harvesting or
carrying on any other agricultural operation of his
2026:HHC:11136
land or his father's undivided land actually in
possession of the prisoner; or
(iv) it is desirable to do so for any other sufficient
cause;
(v) parole can be granted only after a portion of the
sentence is already served.
(vi) if conditions of parole are not abided by, the
parolee may be returned to serve his sentence in
prison; such conditions may be such as those of
committing a new offence, and
(vii) parole may also be granted on the basis of
aspects related to the health of the convict himself.
12. Many State Governments have formulated guidelines
on parole in order to bring out objectivity to the decisionmaking and to decide whether parole needs to be granted
in a particular case or not. Such a decision in those cases is
taken in accordance with the guidelines framed.
Guidelines of some of the States stipulate two kinds of
parole, namely, custody parole and regular parole.
“Custody parole” is generally granted in emergent
circumstances, like:
(i) death of a family member;
(ii) marriage of a family member;
(iii) serious illness of a family member; or
(iv) any other emergent circumstances.
13. As far as “regular parole” is concerned, it may be given
in the following cases:
(i) serious illness of a family member;
(ii) critical conditions in the family on account of
the accident or death of a family member;
(iii) marriage of any member of the family of the
convict;
2026:HHC:11136
(iv) delivery of a child by the wife of the convict if
there is no other family member to take care of the
spouse at home;
(v) serious damage to the life or property of the
family of the convict, including damage caused by
natural calamities;
(vi) to maintain family and social ties;
(vii) to pursue the filing of a special leave petition
before this Court against a judgment delivered by
the High Court convicting or upholding the
conviction, as the case may be.
14. Furlough, on the other hand, is a brief release from
prison. It is conditional and is given in case of long-term
imprisonment. The period of sentence spent on furlough
by the prisoners need not be undergone by him as is done
in the case of parole. Furlough is granted as a good
conduct remission.
15. A convict, literally speaking, must remain in jail for
the period of the sentence or the rest of his life in case he
is a life convict. It is in this context that his release from
jail for a short period has to be considered as an
opportunity afforded to him not only to solve his personal
and family problems but also to maintain his links with
society. Convicts, too, must breathe fresh air for at least
some time, provided they maintain good conduct
consistently during incarceration and show a tendency to
reform themselves and become good citizens. Thus, the
redemption and rehabilitation of such prisoners for the
good of society must receive due weightage while they are
undergoing a sentence of imprisonment.
16. This Court, through various pronouncements, has laid
down the differences between parole and furlough, a few
of which are as follows:
(i) Both parole and furlough are conditional
releases.
2026:HHC:11136
(ii) Parole can be granted in case of short-term
imprisonment, whereas furlough is granted in case
of long-term imprisonment.
(iii) Duration of parole extends to one month,
whereas in the case of furlough, it extends to
fourteen days maximum.
(iv) Parole is granted by the Divisional
Commissioner, and furlough is granted by the
Deputy Inspector General of Prisons.
(v) For parole, a specific reason is required, whereas
furlough is meant for breaking the monotony of
imprisonment.
(vi) The term of imprisonment is not included in the
computation of the term of parole, whereas it is vice
versa in furlough.
(vii) Parole can be granted a number of times,
whereas there is a limitation in the case of furlough.
(viii) Since furlough is not granted for any particular
reason, it can be denied in the interest of society.
(See State of Maharashtra v. Suresh Pandurang
Darvakar [State of Maharashtra v. Suresh
Pandurang Darvakar, (2006) 4 SCC 776: (2006)
2 SCC (Cri) 411] and State of Haryana v.
Mohinder Singh [State of Haryana v. Mohinder
Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 394: 2000 SCC (Cri) 645].)
17. From the aforesaid discussion, it follows that amongst
the various grounds on which parole can be granted, the
most important ground, which stands out, is that a
prisoner should be allowed to maintain family and social
ties. For this purpose, he has to come out for some time so
that he can maintain his family and social contact. This
reason finds justification in one of the objectives behind
sentence and punishment, namely, the reformation of the
convict. The theory of criminology, which is largely
accepted, underlines that the main objectives which a
2026:HHC:11136
State intends to achieve by punishing the culprit are:
deterrence, prevention, retribution and reformation.
When we recognise reformation as one of the objectives, it
provides justification for letting out even the life convicts
for short periods, on parole, in order to afford
opportunities to such convicts not only to solve their
personal and family problems but also to maintain their
links with society. Another objective that this theory
underlines is that even such convicts have the right to
breathe fresh air, albeit for short periods. These gestures
on the part of the State, along with other measures, go a
long way towards the redemption and rehabilitation of
such prisoners. They are ultimately aimed at the good of
society and, therefore, are in the public interest.
18. The provisions of parole and furlough, thus, provide
for a humanistic approach towards those lodged in jails.
The main purpose of such provisions is to afford them an
opportunity to solve their personal and family problems
and to enable them to maintain their links with society.
Even citizens of this country have a vested interest in
preparing offenders for successful re-entry into society.
Those who leave prison without strong networks of
support, without employment prospects, without a
fundamental knowledge of the communities to which
they will return, and without resources, stand a
significantly higher chance of failure. When offenders
revert to criminal activity upon release, they frequently do
so because they lack hope of merging into society as
accepted citizens. Furloughs or parole can help prepare
offenders for success.
19. Having noted the aforesaid public purpose in granting
parole or furlough, ingrained in the reformation theory of
sentencing, other competing public interests have also to
be kept in mind while deciding as to whether, in a
particular case, parole or furlough is to be granted or not.
This public interest also demands that those who are
habitual offenders and may have the tendency to commit
2026:HHC:11136
the crime again after their release on parole, or have the
tendency to become a threat to the law and order of
society, should not be released on parole. This aspect
takes care of other objectives of sentencing, namely,
deterrence and prevention. This side of the coin is the
experience that a great number of crimes are committed
by the offenders who have been put back on the street
after conviction. Therefore, while deciding whether a
particular prisoner deserves to be released on parole or
not, the aforesaid aspects have also to be kept in mind. To
put it tersely, the authorities are supposed to address the
question as to whether the convict is such a person who
has the tendency to commit such a crime, or he is showing
a tendency to reform himself to become a good citizen.
20. Thus, not all people in prison are appropriate for the
grant of furlough or parole. Obviously, society must
isolate those who show patterns of preying upon victims.
Yet administrators ought to encourage those offenders
who demonstrate a commitment to reconcile with society
and whose behaviour shows that they aspire to live as
law-abiding citizens. Thus, the parole programme should
be used as a tool to shape such adjustments.
21. To sum up, in introducing penal reforms, the State
that runs the administration on behalf of the society and
for the benefit of the society at large cannot be unmindful
of safeguarding the legitimate rights of the citizens in
regard to their security in matters of life and liberty. It is
for this reason that in introducing such reforms, the
authorities cannot be oblivious of the obligation to society
to render it immune from those who are prone to criminal
tendencies and have proved their susceptibility to indulge
in criminal activities by being found guilty (by a court) of
having perpetrated a criminal act. One of the discernible
purposes of imposing the penalty of imprisonment is to
render society immune from the criminal for a specified
period. It is, therefore, understandable that while meting
out humane treatment to the convicts, care has to be
2026:HHC:11136
taken to ensure that kindness to the convicts does not
result in cruelty to society. Naturally enough, the
authorities would be anxious to ensure that the convict
who is released on furlough does not seize the
opportunity to commit another crime when he is at large
for the time being under the furlough leave granted to
him by way of a measure of penal reform.
22. Another vital aspect that needs to be discussed is
whether there can be any presumption that a person who
is convicted of a serious or heinous crime is to be, ipso
facto, treated as a hardened criminal. The hardened
criminal would be a person for whom it has become a
habit or way of life, and such a person would necessarily
tend to commit crimes again and again. Obviously, if a
person has committed a serious offence for which he is
convicted, but at the same time it is also found that it is
the only crime he has committed, he cannot be
categorised as a hardened criminal. In his case,
consideration should be given as to whether he is showing
the signs to reform himself and become a good citizen, or
there are circumstances which would indicate that he has
a tendency to commit the crime again or that he would be
a threat to society. The mere nature of the offence
committed by him should not be a factor to deny the
parole outright. Wherever a person convicted has suffered
incarceration for a long time, he can be granted
temporary parole, irrespective of the nature of the offence
for which he was sentenced. We may hasten to put a rider
here viz. in those cases where a person has been convicted
for committing a serious offence, the competent
authority, while examining such cases, can be well
advised to have stricter standards in mind while judging
their cases on the parameters of good conduct, habitual
offender or while judging whether he could be considered
highly dangerous or prejudicial to the public peace and
tranquillity, etc.
2026:HHC:11136
23. There can be no cavil in saying that a society that
believes in the worth of the individuals can have the
quality of its belief judged, at least in part, by the quality
of its prisons and services and the recourse made
available to the prisoners. Being in a civilised society
organised with law and a system as such, it is essential to
ensure every citizen a reasonably dignified life. If a person
commits any crime, it does not mean that by committing
a crime, he ceases to be a human being and that he can be
deprived of those aspects of life which constitute human
dignity. For a prisoner, all fundamental rights are an
enforceable reality, though restricted by the fact of
imprisonment. [See Sunil Batra (2) v. State (UT of Delhi)
[Sunil Batra (2) v. State (UT of Delhi), (1980) 3 SCC 488: 1980
SCC (Cri) 777], Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] and Charles
Sobraj v. Supt., Central Jail [Charles Sobraj v. Supt., Central
Jail, (1978) 4 SCC 104: 1978 SCC (Cri) 542].]
24. It is also to be kept in mind that by the time an
application for parole is moved by a prisoner, he would
have spent some time in jail. During this period, various
reformatory methods must have been applied. We can
take judicial note of this fact, having regard to such
reformation facilities available in modern jails. One would
know by this time as to whether there is a habit of
relapsing into crime in spite of having administered
correctional
treatment.
This
habit,
known
as
“recidivism”, reflects the fact that the correctional
therapy has not brought (sic) any change in the mind of
the criminal. It also shows that a criminal is hardcore,
who is beyond correctional therapy. If the correctional
therapy has not been made in itself, in a particular case,
such a case can be rejected on the aforesaid ground, i.e. on
its merits.
25. We are not oblivious of the fact that there may be
hardcore criminals who, by reason of their crime and the
methods of dealing with the crime, form associations,
2026:HHC:11136
loyalties and attitudes which tend to persist. There may
even be peer pressure when such convicts are out to
commit those crimes again. There may be pressure of
being ostracised from delinquent groups, which may lead
them to commit the crime again. Persistence in criminal
behaviour may also be due to personality traits, most
frequently due to pathological traits of personality, such
as mental defectiveness, emotional instability, mental
conflicts, egocentrism and psychosis. In regard to relapse
or recidivism, Frank Exner, a noted criminologist and
sociologist, points out that the chances of repeating
increase with the number of previous arrests and the
interval between the last and the next offence becomes
shortened as the number of previous crimes progresses [
Frank Exner, Kriminologie, pp. 115-120]. The purpose of
the criminological study is the prognosis of the
improvable occasional offenders and that of the
irredeemable habitual offenders and hardcore criminals.
To differentiate the recidivists from non-recidivists and
dangerous and hard-core criminals from occasional
criminals had been enumerated by Exner in the following
flowsheet:
(i) Hereditary weakness in the family life.
(ii) Increasing tempo of criminality.
(iii) Bad conditions in the parental home.
(iv) Bad school progress (especially in deportment
and industriousness).
(v) Failure to complete studies once begun.
(vi) Irregular work (work shyness).
(vii) Onset of criminality before 18 years of age.
(viii) More than four previous sentences.
(ix) Quick relapse of crime.
(x) Interlocal criminality (mobility).
2026:HHC:11136
(xi) Psychopathic personality (diagnosis of an
institutional doctor).
(xii) Alcoholism.
(xiii) Release from the institution before 36 years of
age.
(xiv) Bad conduct in the institution.
(xv) Bad social and family relations during the
period of release.
At the same time, as criminality is the expression of the
“symptom” of a certain disorder in the offenders, they
can be easily reformed if they are rightly diagnosed and
the correct treatment is administered to them.
8.
The custody certificate mentions that the petitioner’s
conduct inside the jail was satisfactory.
The petitioner’s
application for parole was rejected because the presence of the
petitioner is a danger to the area. The copy of the report
submitted by Superintendent of Police, Nurpur, District Kangra,
H.P., shows that the grounds for availing parole were found to be
correct,
and
it
was
simply
stated
in
the
column
of
recommendation ‘not recommended’ without assigning any
reason.
9.
It was submitted that the nature of the offence is
heinous; however, that is not a relevant consideration. It was
held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shor vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh
and
Anr.
(05.08.2020
-
SC
Order):
2026:HHC:11136
MANU/SCOR/34434/2020 that the parole cannot be rejected on
the ground that the crime is heinous. It was observed:
“Merely repeating the fact that the crime is heinous and
that release of such a person would send a negative
message against the justice system in society are factors
de hors Section 2. Conduct in prison has not been referred
to at all, and the Senior Superintendent of Police and the
District Magistrate confirming that the prisoner is not
"incapacitated" from committing the crime is not
tantamount to stating that he is likely to abstain from
crime and lead a peaceable life if released from prison.
10.
This Court held in Harbhajan Singh v. State of H.P.,
2019 SCC OnLine HP 3599, that the nature of the offence cannot
be a ground to deny parole when the prisoner’s conduct shows a
tendency to reform himself. It was observed:
“17. For rejection of an application for parole, there are
two grounds set out in Section 6 of the Act. Firstly, in case
a prisoner is released, he will likely endanger the security
of the State. Admittedly, the petitioner has been convicted
for the offence committed under Section 302 IPC. But, in
no way, could it be inferred that he is likely to endanger
the security of the State, and even if so, the State has got
enormous powers to put restrictions on the petitioner to
protect the Security of the State. The second ground is the
maintenance of public order. In this regard, in the
response made by the District Magistrate, there is no
reference as to whether he made a threat to public order.
18. When these two grounds, set out in Section 6 of the
Act, are not reflected or mirrored in the report of the
District Magistrate, we have to presume that the District
Magistrate has given its report without applying its mind.
When a provision or a statute directs an officer to do a
2026:HHC:11136
particular job in a particular manner, it shall be the duty
of that officer to do the said job in that particular manner
only. When a District Magistrate is directed to make a
report on the basis of an assessment in an objective
manner, he shall do it in that manner only.
19. Further, the rejection by the Government or the officer
authorised by the Government should be on two grounds,
namely, when it is likely to endanger the security of the
State or the maintenance of the public order, which are
lacking in the instant case.
20. In Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, UT Delhi,
(1981) 1 SCC 608: AIR 1981 SC 746, Hon'ble Mr Justice
Marshal has aptly said, and we quote. “I have previously
stated my views that a prisoner does not shed his basic
constitutional rights at the prison gate, and I fully support
the court's holding that the inmate's interest of the
inmate.”
21. In Kharak Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1963 SC 1295, it has
been held that life means more than mere animal
existence. The right to live is not restricted to mere
animal existence. It means something more than just
physical survival.
22. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248:
AIR 1978 SC 597, which was followed in Francis Coralie v.
Delhi Administration, supra, it has been held that the right
to life does not mean mere confinement to physical
existence, but it includes within its ambit the right to live
with human dignity.
23. Seeking parole/remission/premature release, or
furlough, is not a right of a detenu. However, the same
has to be considered in the light of the observations made
hereinabove. The consideration should always keep in
view the rights of the prisoners. The release of a prisoner
from jail for a short period has to be considered as an
opportunity afforded to him not only to solve his personal
and family problems but also to maintain his links with
2026:HHC:11136
society. Convicts, too, must breathe fresh air for at least
some time, provided they maintain good conduct during
incarceration and show a tendency to reform themselves
and become good citizens.
24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Asfaq v. State of
Rajasthan, (2017) 15 SCC 55, in para 15 of the judgment has
held as under:
“15. A convict, literally speaking, must remain in jail for
the period of the sentence or the rest of his life in case
he is a life convict. It is in this context that his release
from jail for a short period has to be considered as an
opportunity afforded to him not only to solve his
personal and family problems but also to maintain his
links with society. Convicts, too, must breathe fresh air
for at least some time, provided they maintain good
conduct consistently during incarceration and show a
tendency to reform themselves and become good
citizens. Thus, redemption and rehabilitation of such
prisoners for the good of societies must receive due
weightage while they are undergoing a sentence of
imprisonment.”
25. From the discussion made hereinabove, it is clear that
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has propounded a reformative
theory. Under the said concept, an opportunity is to be
granted to a person to get himself reformed, and in case
he gets himself reformed, he will be a person to live in
society. It is also worthwhile to extract the relevant
portions of paras 17 and 18 of the said judgment herein:
“17. From the aforesaid discussion, it follows that
amongst the various grounds on which parole can be
granted, the most important ground, which stands out,
is that a prisoner should be allowed to maintain family
and social ties. For this purpose, he has to come out for
some time so that he is able to maintain his family and
social contact. This reason finds justification in one of
the objectives behind sentence and punishment,
namely, the reformation of the convict……
2026:HHC:11136
18. The provisions of parole and furlough, thus, provide
for a humanistic approach towards those lodged in
jails. The main purpose of such provisions is to afford
them an opportunity to solve their personal and family
problems and to enable them to maintain their links
with society…”
26. Many a time, the State takes up the ground that the
prisoner has committed a heinous offence, and granting
parole/remission or pre-mature release is likely to
endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of
the public order. From the above discussion, we feel that
the conviction in a serious and heinous crime cannot be
the reason for denying parole per se. Having noted the
aforesaid public purpose in granting parole or furlough,
ingrained in the reformation theory of sentencing, other
competing public interests have also to be kept in mind
while deciding as to whether, in a particular case, parole
or furlough is to be granted or not. This public interest
also demands that those who are habitual offenders and
may have the tendency to commit the crime again after
their release on parole, or have the tendency to become a
threat to the law and order of society, should not be
released on parole. Wherever a person convicted has
suffered incarceration for a long time, he can be granted
temporary parole, irrespective of the nature of the offence
for which he was sentenced.
27. In Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), (1978) 4
SCC 161, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the
behaviour of the prisoners shows responsibility and
trustworthiness, liberal though cautious, parole will be
allowed to them so that their family ties may be
maintained and inner tensions may not further build up.
28. In Shakuntala Devi v. State of Delhi, (1996) 36 DRJ 545, it
has been held as under:
“5. In Poonam Lata v. M.L. Wadhawan, it has been
held by their Lordship that “Release on parole is a wing
of reformative process and is expected to provide
2026:HHC:11136
opportunity to the prisoner to transform himself into a
useful citizen.”
In Inder Singh v. State, the Apex Court has devised
another humanising strategy, viz., a guarded parole
release every year, for at least a month, punctuating the
total prison term, for maintaining his family ties. A
prisoner cannot maintain his family ties by living in a
small world of his own, cribbed, cabined and confined
within the four walls of the prison. In the case of Inder
Singh (supra), their lordships directed that:—
“…….. if the behaviour of the prisoners shows
responsibility and trustworthiness, liberal
though cautious, parole will be allowed to them
so that their family ties may be maintained and
inner tensions may not further build up. After
every period of one year, they should be released
on parole for two months. ‘Their lordships
further added that “Article 21 of the Constitution
is the jurisdiction root for this legal liberalism.”
11.
Rule 3(2) of the Prisoners Act specifically provides
that the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police shall
give their opinion whether the temporary release on parole was
opposed on the ground that the prisoner was dangerous to the
security of the State or prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order. Therefore, the Rule only provides two grounds for
opposing the application for parole.
12.
In the present case, the ground taken by the
respondents does not fall within the purview of Rule 3(2) of the
Act, and the rejection of the application for parole was bad.
2026:HHC:11136
13.
In view of the above, the present petition is allowed
and the petitioner is ordered to be released on parole for 28 days
subject to his furnishing personal bond in the sum of
₹1,00,000/- and two surety bonds of the like amount to the
satisfaction of the Superintendent Jail with an undertaking to
maintain good conduct during the period of parole and to
surrender before the Superintendent Jail after the expiry of the
period of parole. The Probation Officer is also directed to
maintain a close watch on the activities of the petitioner and to
report any deviation from the direction issued by the Court.
14.
The Superintendent Jail is free to impose any other
suitable condition at the time of the release of the petitioner.
15.
The present petition stands disposed of, and so are
the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.
09th April, 2026
(ravinder)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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