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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+
FAO (COMM) 260/2025 & CM APPL. 56954/2025
RAJU KUMAR
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. J. Sai Deepak, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Anil Kumar Sahu, Mr. Roshan
Kumar, Mr. Suva Batabyal and Mr. Sourav
Kumar, Advs.
versus
VINOD SAH
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Tashriq Ahmad, Ms.
Farzeen Iqbal and Mohd. Abeer, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
13.01.2026
%
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1.
This appeal, under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act
2015, read with Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Code 19081, assails order dated 26 August 2025 passed by the learned
Commercial Court-02, North-West District, Rohini Courts2, in
interlocutory applications filed by the appellants, as the plaintiff, in
CS(Comm) 38/2024 and CS(Comm) 756/2024.
2.
The learned Commercial Court has held that it has, prima facie,
1 “CPC” hereinafter
2 “the learned Commercial Court” hereinafter
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12:32:51
no territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate on the lis before it and has,
nonetheless, in paras 29 to 31 of the order, proceeded to hold that the
principles of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable
loss did not justify grant of any interim injunction.
3.
We are not entering into the aspect of whether the learned
Commercial Court ought to have proceeded to pass an order on merits
in the applications filed by the appellant under Order XXXIX of the
CPC, having held that it had prima facie no territorial jurisdiction to
deal with the matter, because, in our view, the learned Commercial
Court had the territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the lis before it.
4.
The appellant claims to be the proprietor of the registered word
mark “AMRAPALI” in Class 30 w.e.f. 7 January 2020. The appellant
claims user of the mark since 15 October 1997, and claims to be using
the mark for spices.
5.
The plaint instituted by the appellant further avers that the
appellant was using the “AMRAPALI” mark with the trade dress
.
6.
The plaint alleged that the respondent was using the mark
“QUEEN AAMRAPALI”/
for spices.
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The use of the said mark by the respondents was alleged to infringe
the registered trademark of the appellant.
7.
A comparison of the packages of the appellant and respondents
was also provided thus, as reproduced in para 5(ii) of the impugned
order:
Appellant’s Trademark/label/
logo
8.
Respondent’s
impugned
Trademark/ label/logo
The appellant, therefore, prayed, in the suit, that the respondents
be permanently injuncted from using any mark identical or
deceptively similar to “AMRAPALI/
” for spices or
any other allied or cognate products or services.
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9.
The appellant justified invocation of the jurisdiction of the
learned Commercial Court on the basis of the following averments
contained in the plaint:
“12. That the plaintiff has been planning geographical expansion
of its business with wider market coverage all over India. The
demand for Plaintiff's goods and products is one of the fastest
growing. The Plaintiff has already built-up handsome sales under
their said trade mark/label/trade name and has achieved sales
running into crores of rupees. The year wise sales figure/Revenue
from Operation of Plaintiff business is annexed herewith.
13.
That the said business & goods being carried on by the
plaintiff under said trade mark/label/ trademark AMRAPALI is
very extensive one and the said goods and business there under
have been practically sold and distributed in major parts of the
country, including within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble
Court and are highly demanded in the markets on account of their
standard quality and precision. The said business & goods under
the said trade mark said trade mark/trade name of the plaintiff is
identified as exclusively originating from the plaintiff's source and
is identified with the plaintiff. The said trade mark said trade
mark/trade name have already become distinctive and associated
with the plaintiff and the plaintiff's said goods and business on
account of its long, continuous, extensive and exclusive user
thereof since the year 1997.
ADVERTISEMENT BY THE PLAINTIFF
That the plaintiff has been continuously promoting the said
14.
business and goods under the said trademark/label along with its
” through different
trademark "AMRAPALI/
means and modes including visual, audio, print and social media
viz. along with advertisement in leading newspapers, magazines,
advertisement in trade literatures, trade hoardings and boards etc.
The plaintiff has already spent enormous amounts of money on its
publicity thereof. Plaintiff is advertising and promoting its business
under the said trademark through social media pages,
www.facebook.com, www.instagram.com and other social media
pages along with e commerce websites such as
www.indiamart.com etc. By reason of extensive advertisement and
promotional activities coupled with excellent quality and the high
standards of the plaintiff's product the trade level of the plaintiff
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enjoys solid, enduring and first-class reputation in the markets. The
said label of the plaintiff has an indispensable identity of the
plaintiff well known product AMRAPALI Masala. Long and
continuous use, quality of services bundled with extensive
advertisement and promotional activities, has made the plaintiffs
trade mark/trade name extremely popular among the customers and
is accounted as one of the top brands in this category.”
*****
27.
That upon further inspection it was discovered that the
defendant has further extended it impugned business under the
impugned trademark on social media and e-commerce websites.
With the help of these interactive websites' defendant is displaying,
advertising, soliciting and displaying all impugned goods under the
impugned trademark "QUEEN AAMRAPALI”.
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*****
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
40.
That this Hon’ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to try
and adjudicate the present suit. The defendant is making
clandestine and surreptitious sales and 1s supplying its impugned
trade mark/labels/trade dress/packaging/ artistic work to the dealers
and distributors in the markets of Delhi including North-west
District areas i.e., Aman Vihar, Mangol Puri, Keshav Puram,
Rohini, Rithala, Sultan Puri, etc. besides other parts of the country.
The Defendant is soliciting its impugned goods and business under
the impugned trademark/label in the market of Delhi including
North-West District i.e., Aman Vihar, Mangol Puri, Keshav Puram,
Rohini, Rithala, Sultan Puri, etc. which is well within the
jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. The Defendant is committing the
impugned acts of infringement and passing off through online
social media i.e., www.facebook.com, www.youtube.com etc. and
e-commerce
websites
namely
www.indiamart.com
and
www.anar.biz, in the markets of Delhi including North-West
district areas within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court by
soliciting, displaying and marketing networks in relation to the
impugned business and services under the impugned trade
mark/label/trade dress. The Plaintiffs said proprietary rights are
being prejudicially affected or likely to be so affected in NorthWest district areas due to the Defendant's impugned activities.”
10.
At the time of issuance of summons in the suit, an ex-parte ad
interim injunction was granted by the learned Commercial Court on
24 January 2024, in favour of the appellant and against the
respondents, restraining the respondents from using the mark
“QUEEN AAMRAPALI”/
for spices or
any allied or cognate goods or services.
11.
The respondent moved an application under Order XXXIX Rule
4 of the CPC for vacation of the ad interim injunction order dated 24
January 2024.
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12.
Among other objections, the respondent also advanced an
objection with respect to the territorial jurisdiction of the learned
Commercial Court to adjudicate on the lis between the appellant and
respondent.
13.
The impugned order dated 26 August 2025 disposes off the
appellant’s application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 and the
respondent’s application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC.
14.
The learned Commercial Court has held that it did not, prima
facie, possess territorial jurisdiction to deal with the matter but has,
nonetheless, proceeded to reject the application under Order XXXIX
Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC on merits as well.
15.
On the aspect of territorial jurisdiction, para 25 of the impugned
order notes the reliance, by the respondents, on the judgment of a
learned Single Judge of this Court in Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt
Ltd v. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt Ltd3. The learned Commercial Court
notes that, though an appeal had been preferred against the said
decision, and this Bench had stayed the order of the learned Single
Judge, the stay was limited to the extent of return of the plaint, and not
the operation or reasoning of the learned Single Judge.
16.
We may note, at this juncture, that this reasoning of the learned
Commercial Court is inherently flawed. A stay is always of the
operative portion of a judgment, and not of its reasoning. When this
3 (2025) 103 PTC 143, referred to, hereinafter, as “Kohinoor-I”
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Court stayed the return of the plaint, therefore, the learned
Commercial Court could not have sought to distinguish the directions
of the learned Single Judge to return the plaint and the reasoning, in
the judgment of the learned Single Judge, justifying the said
directions. The observation of the learned Commercial Court that the
Division Bench had only stayed the direction to return the plaint, and
not the reasoning of the learned Single Judge in Kohinoor-I is,
therefore, fundamentally flawed.
17.
The aspect of whether a stay of a judgment erodes it of its
precedential value is, however, vexed. There is a line of decisions
which rely, prominently, on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Assn4,
which hold that a stay of operation of a judgment does not erode the
judgment of its precedential value as a stay is always inter partes and
is only of the operative portion of the judgment.
18.
We are, however, spared the exercise of entering into this aspect
as, after the passing of the impugned order, by the learned
Commercial Court, this Bench has reversed the decision in KohinoorI in its judgment in Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt Ltd v. Veda Seed
Sciences Pvt Ltd5. This Bench has examined the aspect of territorial
jurisdiction, in a case where the defendants have an interactive
website, in detail, in its judgments in Diamond Modular Pvt Ltd v.
Vikas Kumar6 as well as in Kohinoor-II. In para 6.11 of Diamond
Modular, we have, following the earlier decision of the Division
4 (1992) 3 SCC 1
5 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8727, referred to, hereinafter, as “Kohinoor-II”
6 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3755
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Bench in World Wrestling Entertainment v. Reshma Collection7,
held that as the website of the appellant, in that case, was interactive,
and could be accessed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Commercial Court at Saket, that Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate
on the trade mark infringement suit instituted by Diamond Modular on
the basis of the said mark. In Kohinoor-II, this Court held thus:
“14.2 It is elementary that if the suit would lie within the
jurisdiction of this Court on any one ground, the suit would be
maintainable before this Court.
*****
19. Re. availability of the respondent's products on e-commerce
websites
19.1 One of the grounds on which the appellant asserted that this
Court has territorial jurisdiction in the matter, was that the
respondent's products are available on e-commerce websites,
which can be accessed in Delhi. The learned Single Judge has
observed that there are only two e-commerce websites to which
specific allusion is to be found in the plaint, which are IndiaMart
and Kalgudi.
19.2 The impugned judgment holds that availability of the
respondent's marks on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites could
not confer jurisdiction on this Court, as the listings of the products
on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites was not at the instance of
the respondent, but at the instance of some third parties.
19.3 The learned Single Judge has also relied on the judgment of
the Division Bench of this Court in Banyan Tree Holding8 to hold
that as there was no evidence of any orders having been placed on
IndiaMart or Kalgudi for purchasing the allegedly infringing
products of the respondent, the listing of the said products on the
said platforms could not constitute a basis for this Court to exercise
jurisdiction.
*****
19.4.6 The learned Single Judge is, therefore, correct in his view
7 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2031
8 Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780
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that, as per the law declared in Banyan Tree Holding, the mere
existence of an interactive website of the defendant, accessible
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, would not be
sufficient for the suit to be maintainable here. It would additionally
have to be shown that some commercial transaction was concluded
within the jurisdiction of this Court.
*****
19.5.1 Banyan Tree Holding was, however, subsequently diluted
to an extent by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court
in World Wrestling Entertainment9.
*****
19.5.4 The existence of a website of the plaintiff, over which a
commercial transaction could be concluded was, therefore,
regarded by the Division Bench in World Wrestling
Entertainment as sufficient to amount to “carrying on a business”
by WWE within the jurisdiction of this Court. The actual
conclusion of a transaction was, therefore, no longer indispensable,
after World Wrestling Entertainment.
19.5.5 World Wrestling Entertainment undoubtedly is not an
authority for understanding the expression “cause of action” as
contained in Section 20(c) of the CPC. However, it is an authority
for the understanding of the expression “carries on business” in an
era in which business is considerably carried on over e-commerce
websites. The Division Bench has held, in World Wrestling
Entertainment, that, even if the website of the plaintiff was
interactive and one over which a commercial transaction could be
concluded, that would suffice to constitute “carrying on of business
by the plaintiff”, as, in the e-commerce universe, every place where
the website of an entity would be accessible for the purpose of
concluding a commercial transaction would amount to a place
where the entity has a market place. If, therefore, WWE had a
website over which commercial transactions could be concluded at
Delhi, it was equivalent to WWE having a brick and mortar store in
Delhi, resulting in this Court having territorial jurisdiction in the
matter. Thus, the requirement of actual concluding of a commercial
transaction over the website stands diluted in World Wrestling
Entertainment.
19.6 Section 20(a) of the CPC permit a plaintiff to sue a
defendant wherever the defendant carries on business. The law
declared by this Court in World Wrestling Entertainment with
9 World Wrestling Entertainment v. Reshma Collection
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respect to the carrying on business by the plaintiff, in an ecommerce regime, for the purpose of Section 134(2) of the Trade
Marks Act, would equally apply to carrying on a business by the
defendant for the purpose of Section 20(a) of the CPC. Wherever,
therefore, the defendant would have an interactive website, over
which a commercial transaction could be concluded, any Court
having jurisdiction over every place where this could be done
would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
19.7 But then, submits Mr. Raj Shekhar Rao, there is no
interactive website of the respondent, over or across which the
allegedly infringing goods could be purchased at Delhi. At least,
the plaint does not so aver. The placement of the goods for sale
over e-commerce websites by third parties, without the
concurrence or authorization of the respondent, tacit or express,
could not create a cause of action for the appellant, for the purposes
of territorial jurisdiction.
19.8 The submission is unquestionably weighty. After all, the
tort of infringement is not infringer innocent. Section 29 of the
Trade Marks Act envisages infringement only vis-à-vis an
infringer, who must be using the infringing marks without
proprietorial or permissive right to do so. The finding of the
learned Single Judge that, if the respondent has nothing to do with
the listing of the allegedly infringing products on the IndiaMart and
Kalgudi websites, the respondent cannot be held to account
therefor is, therefore, prima facie correct.
19.9 Where, however, the learned Single Judge, in our
considered opinion, has erred on this issue is in the observation, in
para 42 of the impugned judgment, that the listing of the products
on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites was not at the instance of
the respondent. In so observing, the learned Single Judge, in our
considered opinion, failed to realize the fact that the issue before
him was the right of the appellant to sue. Insofar as the appellant
was concerned, the allegedly infringing goods were available, for
sale and purchase, across e-commerce websites, over which a
transaction could be concluded within the territorial limits of the
jurisdiction of this Court. There is no admission, in the plaint, that
the listing of the products on the IndianMart or Kalgudi websites
was not at the instance of the respondent. It would be for the
respondent to so aver, and that averment, which could emerge at
the earliest in the respondent's written statement, could not be
considered while examining the aspect of territorial jurisdiction
under Order VII Rule 10, which has to be limited to the assertions
in the plaint. At the highest, therefore, the issue of whether the
respondent had anything to do with the listing of the allegedly
infringing goods over the IndiaMart or Kalgudi websites would be
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a matter of trial. Arguendo, if the appellant were able to establish,
in trial, that the entities who placed the respondent's goods for sale
and purchase on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites did so at the
instance of the respondent, or with its knowledge, the respondent
might still be answerable therefor.
19.10 That the goods were, in fact, available for purchase across
the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites, is not disputed. That the
goods could be purchased across the said websites within the
jurisdiction of this Court, is equally not disputed. Whether the
respondent, directly or indirectly, was involved in the said listings,
is, at best, a matter of trial. The learned Single Judge could not,
therefore, have held that the appellant could not sue the respondent
in this Court, even when the allegedly infringing goods could be
purchased, across the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites, within its
jurisdiction, on the premise that the respondent was innocent of the
listings.
19.11 For the purposes of an application under Order VII Rule
10 of the CPC, these assertions, in the absence of anything to the
contrary either in the plaint or in the documents filed with the
plaint, had to be treated as correct.
19.12 The assertion that the allegedly infringing goods of the
respondent were available on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites,
and that orders could be placed on these websites within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court were, therefore, sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on this Court to adjudicate on the suit.
19.13 We are in agreement with Mr. Agarwal that the issue of
whether the listings on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi e-commerce
platforms, of the allegedly infringing goods of the respondent, for
sale, were at the instance of the respondent or of some other party,
is extraneous to the aspect of territorial jurisdiction. Once the
infringing goods were available for sale, the tort of infringement,
which predicates use of the infringed mark, or a mark which is
deceptively similar thereto, for trade, stood committed. The suit,
seeking relief thereagainst, could be filed before every Court
having territorial jurisdiction over the situs of sale of such
goods. World Wrestling Entertainment extends, in a case of ecommerce, the situs to include every place where a commercial
transaction could be concluded and the goods bought or sold.
Every Court having jurisdiction over such place can, therefore,
adjudicate on the aspect of infringement, or passing off. The
decision of the learned Single Judge is clearly contrary to this
principle.
19.14 There is no dispute about the fact that the allegedly
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infringing products of the respondent were available on IndiaMart
and Kalgudi. It was specifically asserted, in the plaint, that the
IndiaMart and Kalgudi websites were accessible in Delhi. In paras
49 and 50 of the plaint, it was further specifically pleaded that, as
orders could be placed across these websites, the dynamic effect of
the availability of the respondent's goods on the said e-market
platforms was felt within the jurisdiction of this Court.
19.15 The findings of the learned Single Judge with respect to the
listing of the products on the IndiaMart and Kalgudi platforms is
also, therefore, not sustainable in law.”
19.
On the aspect of territorial jurisdiction in trademark matters, the
Supreme Court has held, in Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi10 as well
as in Indian Performing Rights Society v. Sanjay Dalia11 that
territorial jurisdiction can be invoked either under Section 34 of the
Trade Marks Act or under Section 20 of the CPC. It would be open to
the plaintiff to invoke the jurisdiction of any court within whose
jurisdiction the suit would lie under either of these provisions.
20.
Section 20 of the CPC specifically empowers a plaintiff to sue a
defendant before any court within which the defendant principally
carries on its business or where the whole or part of the cause of
action has arisen. As we have held in our decisions in Diamond
Modular and Kohinoor-II, prominently following the earlier Division
Bench in World Wrestling Entertainment, in the e-commerce age,
every virtual platform over which the defendant’s goods or services
would be available operates as a brick and mortar store present in
every location where that website is accessible. Though, in Banyan
Tree Holding, the Court had held that it is necessary to show
conclusion of a commercial transaction over the said website, that
10 (2006) 9 SCC 41
11 (2015) 10 SCC 161
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position now does not survive after the decision in World Wrestling
Entertainment, which postulates that even the possibility of
concluding a commercial transaction would be sufficient. Tata Sons
further dilutes the principle by holding that even the possibility of
interacting over a website, without any commercial element involved,
would also be sufficient to invoke territorial jurisdiction of a particular
court within whose jurisdiction the website is accessible.
21.
By applying these principles, it is clear that the decision of the
learned Commercial Court, to the extent it holds that it was not
possessed of territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit, is not correct.
22.
Insofar as the merits of the matter are concerned, the reasoning
of the learned Commercial Court is restricted to para 29 of the
impugned judgment, which does not consider any of the relevant
aspects to deal with the infringement or passing off. Indeed, it appears
that the learned Commercial Court has not concentrated on the merits
of the matter, as it has proceeded on the prima facie belief that it has
no territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute.
23.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the
learned Commercial Court is in error in holding that the suit was not
territorially maintainable before it. On the prima facie merits, there is
no reasoning except para 29 of the impugned order.
24.
Accordingly, we dispose of this appeal in the following terms:
(i)
We hold that the suit was territorially maintainable before
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the learned Commercial Court. The impugned order, to the
extent it holds that the learned Commercial Court did not have
territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit, is quashed and set
aside.
(ii)
We remand the appellant’s application under Order
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC to the learned Commercial
Court for adjudication afresh.
(iii)
In order to expedite matters, we direct the parties to
appear before the learned Commercial Court on 5 February
2026. Learned Counsel for the parties undertake not to take any
adjournment from the learned Commercial Court on that date.
(iv)
We request the learned Commercial Court to take up the
application and hear it finally on the said date and to pass orders
thereon as expeditiously as possible.
25.
The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
JANUARY 13, 2026
dsn/AR
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