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2026:CGHC:8012-DB
Digitally
signed by
ANURADHA
ANURADHA TIWARI
TIWARI
Date:
2026.02.16
11:28:35
+0530
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 2284 of 2024
Rajmoti Chauhan @ Baya W/o Hiralal Chauhan Aged About 48 Years
R/o Devpur Chowki - Baya, Police Station - Rajadevri, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh (Accused)
--- Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through - Police Station In-charge Rajadevri,
District - Baloabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondent
CRA No. 57 of 2025
Vasudeo Chouhan @ Choti S/o Mahesh Chouhan Aged About 28 Years
R/o Village - Deopur, Chouki - Baya P.S. Rajadeori, District Baloda
Bazar - Bhatapara (C.G.).
--- Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station - Rajadeori District Baloda Bazar - Bhatapara (C.G.).
--- Respondent
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant
(In CRA No.2284/2024)
For Appellant
(In CRA No.57/2025)
For State/Respondent
: Mr. Sumit Jhanwar, Advocate
: Mr. Ashok Kumar Swarnskar, Advocate
: Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, Government
Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
13.02.2026
1.
Heard Mr. Sumit Jhanwar, learned counsel for the appellant in
CRA No.2284/2024 and Mr. Ashok Kumar Swarnakar, learned counsel
for the appellant in CRA No.57/2025 as well as Mr. Shaleen Singh
Baghel,
learned
Government
Advocate,
appearing
for
the
State/respondent.
2.
Today, though the criminal appeals have been listed for hearing
on I.A. No.01, applications for suspension of sentence and grant of bail
to the appellants, however, with the consent of learned counsel for the
parties, the appeals are heard finally.
3.
Accordingly, I.A. No.01, applications for suspension of sentence
and grant of bail to the appellants in both the cases, stand disposed of.
4.
In these criminal appeals preferred under Section 374(2) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “Cr.P.C.”), the accusedappellants have assailed the legality, propriety and correctness of the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.11.2024 passed
by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Balodabazar (C.G.) in
Sessions Case No.29 of 2020 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Vasudev
Chouhan and another).
5.
By the impugned judgment, the learned trial Court has convicted
the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) and has
sentenced each of them to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a
fine of Rs.1,000/-, with a further direction that in default of payment of
fine, they shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three
months.
6.
The prosecution case, as unfolded during trial, is that the
deceased Anupama Chouhan was married to accused Vasudev
Chouhan and was residing at her matrimonial home along with her
husband and his family members, including co-accused Rajmoti (her
jethani). The marriage was subsisting at the time of the incident, and
the couple had children. On 09.05.2020 at about 10:00 AM, the incident
in question is alleged to have taken place at the matrimonial house.
According to the prosecution, while the deceased was preparing food in
the kitchen, the accused persons, namely her husband Vasudev
Chouhan and her jethani Rajmoti, poured kerosene upon her and set
her saree ablaze with the intention to cause her death. As a result of
the said act, she sustained extensive burn injuries. However,
immediately after the incident, the deceased is stated to have informed
certain persons that she had accidentally caught fire while lighting the
stove. The prosecution case is that such statement was made by her
under fear and anxiety concerning the future of her children and due to
pressure or influence from the matrimonial side.
7.
On 18.05.2020, complainant Neelambar Chouhan (PW-1), father
of the deceased, lodged a written complaint (Ex.P/1) at Police Station
Rajadeori alleging that his daughter had been intentionally set on fire
by her husband Vasudev Chouhan and her jethani Rajmoti on
09.05.2020. On the basis of this complaint, preliminary inquiry was
undertaken. On the same date i.e. 18.05.2020, the victim was
undergoing treatment at Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital
(popularly known as D.K.S.
Hospital),
Raipur. After
obtaining
certification from the attending doctor that the victim was in a fit mental
and physical condition to make a statement, her dying declaration
(Ex.P/13) was recorded by Executive Magistrate Deepak Kumar
Bhardwaj (PW-11). In the said dying declaration, the deceased
categorically stated that on 09.05.2020 at about 10:00 AM, while she
was cooking food, the accused persons poured kerosene on her saree
and set her on fire.
8.
Subsequently, on 19.05.2020, after again obtaining a medical
opinion with respect to her fitness to give statement, a second dying
declaration (Ex.P/17) was recorded by Inspector Nitesh Janghel (PW14). In this statement, she reiterated the allegation that the accused
persons had set her ablaze. She also explained that earlier she had
falsely stated that the burn injuries were accidental and caused while
lighting the stove, as she was apprehensive about the welfare and
future of her children. On 20.05.2020, on the basis of the material
collected, a formal First Information Report was registered against the
accused persons for the offence punishable under Section 307 read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and investigation was
taken up.
9.
During investigation, statements of material witnesses including
the complainant and family members were recorded under Section 161
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The scene of occurrence was
inspected and a spot map (Ex.P/4) was prepared. From the place of
incident, a plastic jerrycan containing substance smelling of kerosene
and certain portions of burnt and kerosene-soaked material from the
cement floor were seized vide seizure memo (Ex.P/3). The seized
articles were sent for chemical examination. The accused persons were
arrested in connection with the crime. As the health condition of the
victim did not show satisfactory improvement, she was discharged from
the hospital and taken by her relatives to her parental village Palsapali,
within the jurisdiction of Police Station Basna. Unfortunately, she
succumbed to her burn injuries on 28.05.2020. Upon her death, merg
intimation (Ex.P/2) was registered at Police Station Basna. Inquest
proceedings were conducted over the dead body and postmortem
examination was carried out by the concerned medical officer. The
postmortem report opined that death occurred due to complications
arising from extensive burn injuries. Consequent upon the death of the
victim and receipt of postmortem and merg inquiry reports, the offence
was altered from Section 307/34 IPC to Section 302/34 IPC.
10.
After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed on
21.08.2020 before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kasdol.
The case was thereafter committed to the Court of Sessions and
ultimately tried by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge,
Balodabazar.
11.
Charges under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC were framed
against both the accused persons. The charges were read over and
explained to them, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be
tried.
12.
In support of its case, the prosecution examined 16 witnesses,
including the complainant (PW-1), relatives and independent witnesses,
the Executive Magistrate who recorded the dying declaration (PW-11),
the medical officers who certified fitness and conducted the postmortem
(PW-12 and PW-15), and the investigating officers (PW-13, PW-14 and
PW-16).
Relevant
documentary
exhibits,
including
the
dying
declarations, seizure memo, spot map, merg intimation, postmortem
report and other documents, were brought on record.
13.
After closure of the prosecution evidence, statements of the
accused were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein they denied
the incriminating circumstances. Accused Vasudev Chouhan claimed
that he had been falsely implicated and that he was innocent. Accused
Rajmoti took a specific defence that she was not present at the place of
occurrence at the relevant time. In defence, one witness, namely
Ramkumar Singh (DW-1), was examined.
14.
Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence,
particularly placing reliance upon the dying declarations and medical
evidence, the learned trial Court held the accused persons guilty for
committing murder of the deceased in furtherance of their common
intention and convicted them under Section 302 read with Section 34
IPC, sentencing them to imprisonment for life with fine, as stated
hereinabove.
15.
Being aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and order of
sentence, the present criminal appeals have been preferred.
16.
Mr. Sumit Jhanwar, learned counsel for the appellant in CRA
No.2284/2024 and Mr. Ashok Kumar Swarnakar, learned counsel for
the appellant in CRA No.57/2025 jointly submit that the learned trial
Court has gravely erred in holding that the appellants are guilty of the
offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code. It is submitted that the finding of guilt is wholly
unsustainable and contrary to the evidence available on record. They
would contend that there is no direct, cogent or trustworthy evidence to
establish that the appellants had set the deceased on fire. The
prosecution has failed to examine any reliable eye-witness to the actual
occurrence. The persons who allegedly saw the incident have not
supported the prosecution case in its entirety and have materially
deviated from the version projected during investigation. Thus, the
conviction is not based on any unimpeachable ocular testimony. It is
further submitted that there is no incriminating seizure from the present
appellants which connects them with the alleged commission of
offence. The memorandum and seizure witnesses have not supported
the prosecution case and have been declared hostile. In absence of
any corroborative forensic material firmly linking the appellants to the
crime, the prosecution case rests only upon doubtful oral testimonies.
17.
Learned counsel submit that the entire prosecution case hinges
primarily upon the testimonies of PW-1 Nilamber (father of the
deceased), PW-2 Anil Kumar (brother of the deceased), PW-3 Sanjay
Kumar Chouhan, PW-4 Budhwara Bai (mother of the deceased), PW-5
Bilasari Bariha, PW-6 Laxmi Bai, PW-11 Deepak Kumar Bhardwaj
(Executive Magistrate), PW-14 Hitesh Janghel (Investigating Officer)
and PW-15 Dr. Narayan Sahu. It is urged that these witnesses are
either close relatives of the deceased or official witnesses, and their
statements
suffer
from
serious
contradictions,
omissions
and
improvements. Particular emphasis has been laid on the testimony of
PW-14 Hitesh Janghel (Investigating Officer), who is stated to have
narrated certain facts inconsistent with the version emerging from other
prosecution witnesses. According to learned counsel, the Investigating
Officer himself has admitted material discrepancies in the course of
investigation, which create serious doubt about the authenticity and
reliability of the prosecution case.
18.
It is argued that the learned trial Judge has failed to properly
appreciate the contradictions in the statements of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3,
PW-4, PW-5 and PW-6 with regard to the place and manner of
occurrence, the conduct of the accused and the circumstances under
which the deceased initially stated that the burn injuries were
accidental. The fact that the deceased had first declared the incident as
accidental, and only subsequently attributed overt acts to the accused,
casts a substantial doubt on the voluntariness and reliability of the later
statements. They further submit that the prosecution witnesses being
close relatives of the deceased are interested witnesses, and in
absence of independent corroboration, their testimonies ought not to
have been relied upon implicitly. It is contended that the learned trial
Court has designedly placed reliance upon these witnesses without
scrutinizing their testimonies with the required degree of caution.
19.
It is also contended that the essential ingredients of Section 302
IPC, particularly the existence of intention to cause death or such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death, and the applicability of Section 34 IPC
with regard to common intention, have not been established beyond
reasonable doubt. There is no material on record to indicate prior
meeting of minds or any concerted action attributable to both the
appellants so as to attract Section 34 IPC. They would further submit
that the findings recorded by the trial Court are based on conjectures
and surmises rather than on legally admissible and reliable evidence.
Material contradictions and discrepancies in the prosecution evidence
have been brushed aside without proper reasoning. The appreciation of
evidence by the learned trial Court is stated to be perverse and
contrary to settled principles of criminal jurisprudence.
20.
It is submitted that in a case resting predominantly upon
circumstantial evidence and alleged dying declarations, the chain of
circumstances must be complete and incapable of any hypothesis other
than the guilt of the accused. However, in the present case, the chain is
neither complete nor consistent. The material witnesses having turned
hostile, the seizure witnesses not supporting the prosecution, and the
inconsistencies in statements regarding the manner of occurrence,
cumulatively create grave doubt about the prosecution version. They
emphasize that the benefit of every reasonable doubt must go to the
accused. It is contended that the learned trial Court has misread the
evidence on record, ignored vital contradictions, and arrived at findings
that are manifestly unreasonable and unsustainable.
21.
In these circumstances, it is jointly prayed that the impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned
trial Court be set aside and the appellants be acquitted of the charge
under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC by extending the benefit of
doubt.
22.
On the other hand, Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, learned
Government Advocate, opposes the submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the appellants and submits that the impugned judgment of
conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court is
strictly in accordance with law and based upon proper appreciation of
oral as well as documentary evidence available on record. He would
submit that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt, particularly on the strength of the dying declarations
of the deceased, which are consistent, voluntary and recorded in
accordance with law. It is contended that the first dying declaration
(Ex.P/13) was recorded by PW-11, the Executive Magistrate, after
obtaining certification from the attending doctor regarding the mental
and physical fitness of the deceased. Similarly, the second dying
declaration (Ex.P/17) was recorded by PW-14 after again obtaining
medical opinion about the fitness of the victim to give her statement.
Both the statements clearly implicate the appellants in pouring
kerosene upon the deceased and setting her on fire.
23.
It is further submitted that the mere fact that the deceased had
initially stated that the incident was accidental does not demolish the
prosecution case, as she has categorically explained in her subsequent
statement that such earlier version was given out of fear and concern
for the future of her children. The consistent version given
subsequently, while in a fit condition and duly certified by the doctor,
inspires confidence and has rightly been relied upon by the learned trial
Court. He also submits that the evidence of PW-1 Nilamber, PW-2 Anil
Kumar and PW-4 Budhwara Bai cannot be discarded merely on the
ground that they are relatives of the deceased. Their testimonies are
natural, consistent and corroborate the prosecution version. It is settled
law that evidence of related witnesses cannot be rejected solely on the
ground of relationship if it is otherwise trustworthy. The learned trial
Court has appreciated their evidence with due caution and has
assigned cogent reasons for finding them reliable. It is also contended
that the medical evidence supports the prosecution case. The
postmortem report establishes that the deceased sustained extensive
burn injuries which were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course
of nature. The seizure of kerosene-smelling articles from the place of
occurrence and preparation of spot map further corroborate the
prosecution case.
24.
Learned
State
counsel
would
further
submit
that
minor
contradictions and omissions pointed out by the defence are natural
and do not go to the root of the matter. Such discrepancies are bound
to occur in the testimony of witnesses and cannot be made a ground to
discard the entire prosecution case, especially when the core of the
prosecution story remains intact. It is argued that the common intention
of the appellants is clearly established from their joint participation in
the act of pouring kerosene and setting the deceased on fire. The
offence squarely falls under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, and
the learned trial Court has rightly recorded conviction under the said
provisions.
25.
Lastly, learned Government Advocate submits that the findings
recorded by the trial Court are based on proper appreciation of
evidence and do not suffer from perversity or illegality warranting
interference in appeal. It is therefore prayed that the criminal appeals
being devoid of merit deserve to be dismissed and the conviction and
sentence awarded to the appellants be affirmed.
26.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their
rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records
with utmost circumspection.
27.
The first question which arises for consideration is whether the
deceased, Anupama Chouhan, died on account of burn injuries
allegedly sustained in the incident dated 09.05.2020.
28.
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to examine the
oral and medical evidence available on record.
29.
PW-1 Nilamber Chouhan, father of the deceased, has stated that
he received information that his daughter had sustained burn injuries at
her matrimonial house. She was first taken to the Government Hospital
at Pithora and thereafter shifted to Raipur for better treatment. He has
further deposed that after remaining under treatment for several days,
she was brought to her parental village Palsapali, where she ultimately
succumbed to her injuries approximately twenty days after the incident.
His testimony clearly establishes that the deceased had suffered burn
injuries and that her death occurred subsequently while she was
undergoing treatment for the same.
30.
PW-2 Anil Kumar Chouhan, brother of the deceased, has also
corroborated the aforesaid facts. He has stated that the deceased was
admitted to hospital after sustaining burn injuries and despite treatment,
she ultimately died. His evidence remains consistent with that of PW-1
regarding the cause of death.
31.
PW-10 Sushila Sahu, who conducted the inquest proceedings on
29.05.2020 at village Palsapali, has proved the inquest report (Ex.P/7).
She has stated that on receiving information from Police Station Basna,
she conducted the inquest over the body of the deceased in the
presence of Panch witnesses. As per the opinion recorded in the
inquest, the death appeared to have occurred due to burn injuries and
therefore postmortem examination was recommended.
32.
The most material evidence in this regard is that of PW-15 Dr.
Narayan Sahu, who conducted the postmortem examination on
29.05.2020 and proved the postmortem report (Ex.P/22). He has
described in detail the condition of the body. According to him, the
deceased had sustained extensive burn injuries over the lower jaw,
chest, abdomen, both arms, forearms and part of the lower limb.
Certain portions of the body were wrapped in crepe bandages and
there were signs of old burn wounds with secondary infection, including
the presence of pus over the chest and abdomen emitting foul smell.
33.
After conducting external and internal examination, PW-15 opined
that the cause of death was burn injuries and their complications, which
resulted in cardio-respiratory failure. His opinion has not been seriously
challenged in cross-examination. The defence has not suggested any
alternative cause of death nor disputed that the deceased had
sustained burn injuries.
34.
Thus, from the consistent testimony of PW-1 and PW-2, the
inquest proceedings proved by PW-10, and most importantly, the
medical opinion of PW-15 supported by the postmortem report
(Ex.P/22), it stands firmly established that the deceased died on
28.05.2020 due to complications arising from burn injuries.
35.
In view of the unimpeached medical evidence and the
corroborative oral testimony, this Court finds that the learned trial Court
was justified in holding that the death of the deceased occurred on
account of burn injuries sustained in the incident. Accordingly, this
Court affirms the said finding.
36.
Now the question for consideration before us would be whether
appellants are the author of the crime in question or not ?
37.
In the instant case, the prosecution case substantially rests upon
the two dying declarations of the deceased, namely, the first dying
declaration (Ex.P/13) recorded by the Executive Magistrate, Deepak
Kumar Bhardwaj (PW-11), and the second dying declaration (Ex.P/17)
recorded by Inspector Hitesh Janghel (PW-14) after obtaining due
medical certification regarding the fitness of the deceased to make
such statement. In view of the fact that the conviction primarily hinges
upon these dying declarations, it would be appropriate to examine the
evidentiary value of dying declarations and the principles governing
their appreciation in law.
38.
At this stage, it is relevant to notice Section 32(1) of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, which reads thus:
“32. Cases in which statement of relevant
fact by person who is dead or cannot be
found,
etc.,
is
relevant.—Statements,
written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a
person who is dead, or who cannot be found,
or who has become incapable of giving
evidence, or whose attendance cannot be
procured without an amount of delay or
expense which, under the circumstances of
the case, appears to the Court unreasonable,
are themselves relevant facts in the following
cases:—
(1) when it relates to cause of death.—
When the statement is made by a person as
to the cause of his death, or as to any of the
circumstances
of
the
transaction
which
resulted in his death, in cases in which the
cause of that person's death comes into
question.
Such statements are relevant whether
the person who made them was or was not,
at the time when they were made, under
expectation of death, and whatever may be
the nature of the proceeding in which the
cause of his death comes into question.
xxx
39.
xxx
xxx”
The general ground of admissibility of the evidence mentioned in
Section 32(1) is that in the matter in question, no better evidence is to
be had. The provisions in Section 32(1) constitute further exceptions to
the rule which exclude hearsay. As a general rule, oral evidence must
be direct (Section 60). The eight clauses of Section 32 may be
regarded as exceptions to it, which are mainly based on two conditions:
a necessity for the evidence and a circumstantial guarantee of
trustworthiness. Hearsay is excluded because it is considered not
sufficiently trustworthy. It is rejected because it lacks the sanction of the
tests applied to admissible evidence, namely, the oath and crossexamination. But where there are special circumstances which gives a
guarantee of trustworthiness to the testimony, it is admitted even
though it comes from a second-hand source. The Supreme Court
emphasized on the principle enumerated in the famous legal maxim of
the Law of Evidence, i.e., nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire which
means a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. Our Indian
Law also recognizes this fact that “a dying man seldom lies” or in other
words “truth sits upon the lips of a dying man”. The relevance of this
very fact, is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence.
40.
Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is famously referred to as the
“dying declaration” section, although the said phrase itself does not find
mention under the Evidence Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court
have considered the scope and ambit of Section 32 of the Evidence
Act, particularly, Section 32(1) on various occasions including in the
matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984)
4 SCC 116, in which their Lordships have summarised the principles
enumerated in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to
“circumstances of the transaction”:
“21. Thus, from a review of the authorities
mentioned above and the clear language of
Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the
following propositions emerge:(1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of
hearsay
and
makes
admissible
the
statement of a person who dies, whether the
death is a homicide or a suicide, provided
the statement relates to the cause of death,
or exhibits circumstances leading to the
death. In this respect, as indicated above,
the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the
peculiar conditions of our society and the
diverse nature and character of our people,
has thought it necessary to widen the sphere
of Section 32 to avoid injustice.
(2) The test of proximity cannot be too
literally construed and practically reduced to
a
cut-and-dried
formula
of
universal
application so as to be confined in a
straitjacket. Distance of time would depend
or vary with the circumstances of each case.
For instance, where death is a logical
culmination of a continuous drama long in
process and is, as it were, a finale of the
story, the statement regarding each step
directly connected with the end of the drama
would be admissible because the entire
statement would have to be read as an
organic whole and not torn from the context.
Sometimes
statements
relevant
to
or
furnishing an immediate motive may also be
admissible as being a part of the transaction
of death.
It is manifest that all these
statements come to light only after the death
of the deceased who speaks from death.
For instance, where the death takes place
within a very short time of the marriage or
the distance of time is not spread over more
than 3-4 months the statement may be
admissible under Section 32.
(3) The second part of clause (1) of Section
32 is yet another exception to the rule that in
criminal law the evidence of a person who
was not being subjected to or given an
opportunity of being cross-examined by the
accused, would be valueless because the
place of cross-examination is taken by the
solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple
reason that a person on the verge of death
is not likely to make a false statement unless
there is strong evidence to show that the
statement was secured either by prompting
or tutoring.
(4) It may be important to note that Section
32 does not speak of homicide alone but
includes
suicide
also,
hence
all
the
circumstances which may be relevant to
prove a case of homicide would be equally
relevant to prove a case of suicide.
(5) Where the main evidence consists of
statements
and
letters
written
by
the
deceased which are directly connected with
or related to her death and which reveal a
tell-tale story, the said statement would
clearly fall within the four corners of Section
32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance
of time alone in such cases would not make
the statement irrelevant.”
41.
Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes it clear that
when a statement, written or verbal, is made by a person as to the
cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction
which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's
death comes into question, such statement is relevant. The Supreme
Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) clearly held that Section
32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible, the
statement of a person who dies, whether the death is homicide or a
suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death or deals
with circumstances leading to the death. The decision of the Supreme
Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) has further been followed
by the Supreme Court in the matter of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab,
AIR 2000 SC 2324 reviewing the earlier authorities.
42.
Thereafter, in the matter of Devinder alias Kala Ram and others
v. State of Haryana, (2012) 10 SCC 763, wherein the deceased, who
sustained burn injuries while cooking meals on stove, had made a
statement to the doctor, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that
statement of the deceased recorded by the doctor is relevant under
Section 32 of the Evidence Act and observed as under:
“14. In the facts of the present case, we find
that PW 7, the Medical Officer of the Civil
Hospital,
examined
the
case
of
the
deceased on 6-8-1992 at 6.30 a.m. and he
has clearly stated in his evidence that on
examination she was conscious and that
there were superficial to deep burns all over
the body except some areas on feet, face
and perineum and there was smell of
kerosene on her body. He also stated in his
evidence that the deceased was brought to
the hospital by her husband Kala Ram
(Appellant 1). He has proved the bed-head
ticket pertaining to the deceased in the
hospital
(Ext.
DD)
as
well
as
his
endorsement at Point ‘A’ on Ext. DD, from
which it is clear that he was told by the
patient herself that she sustained burns
while cooking meals on a stove.
This
statement of the deceased recorded by PW
7 is relevant under Section 32 of the
Evidence Act, 1872 which provides that
statements, written or verbal, of relevant
facts made by a person who is dead, are
themselves
relevant
facts
when
the
statement is made by a person as to the
cause of his death, or as to any of the
circumstances of the transaction which
resulted in his death, in cases in which the
cause of that person’s death comes into
question.”
43.
In the matter of Purshottam Chopra and another v. State
(Government of NCT of Delhi), (2010) 11 SCC 489, principles relating
to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability were
summed up in paragraph 21 as under:
“21. For
what
has
been
noticed
hereinabove, some of the principles relating
to recording of dying declaration and its
admissibility and reliability could be usefully
summed up as under:21.1. A dying declaration could be the sole
basis
of
conviction
even
without
corroboration, if it inspires confidence of
the court.
21.2. The court should be satisfied that the
declarant was in a fit state of mind at the
time of making the statement; and that it
was a voluntary statement, which was not
the
result
of
tutoring,
prompting
or
a
dying
declaration
is
imagination.
21.3. Where
suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity
such as want of fit state of mind of the
declarant or of like nature, it should not be
acted upon without corroborative evidence.
21.4. When the eyewitnesses affirm that
the deceased was not in a fit and
conscious state to make the statement, the
medical opinion cannot prevail.
21.5. The law does not provide as to who
could record dying declaration nor there is
any prescribed format or procedure for the
same but the person recording dying
declaration must be satisfied that the
maker is in a fit state of mind and is
capable of making the statement.
21.6. Although presence of a Magistrate is
not absolutely necessary for recording of a
dying declaration but to ensure authenticity
and credibility, it is expected that a
Magistrate be requested to record such
dying declaration and/or attestation be
obtained from other persons present at the
time of recording the dying declaration.
21.7. As
regards
a
burns
case,
the
percentage and degree of burns would not,
by itself, be decisive of the credibility of
dying declaration; and the decisive factor
would be the quality of evidence about the
fit and conscious state of the declarant to
make the statement.
21.8. If after careful scrutiny, the court
finds the statement placed as dying
declaration to be voluntary and also finds it
coherent and consistent, there is no legal
impediment in recording conviction on its
basis even without corroboration.”
44.
In the matter of Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1982 SC 839, their Lordships of the Supreme Court
held that where there are more than one statement in the nature of
dying declaration made by the accused, one first in time must be
preferred.
45.
In a recent judgment rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme
Court in the matter of Makhan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2022 SCC
Online SC 1019, while considering the issue of multiple dying
declarations, their Lordships have held as under:
“9. It could thus be seen that the Court is
required to examine as to whether the dying
declaration is true and reliable; as to whether
it has been recorded by a person at a time
when the deceased was fit physically and
mentally to make the declaration; as to
whether it has been made under any
tutoring/duress/prompting.
The
dying
declaration can be the sole basis for
recording conviction and if it is found reliable
and trustworthy, no corroboration is required.
In case there are multiple dying declarations
and there are inconsistencies between them,
the dying declaration recorded by the higher
officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon.
However, this is with the condition that there
is no circumstance giving rise to any
suspicion about its truthfulness. In case there
are circumstances wherein the declaration
has not been found to be made voluntarily
and is not supported by any other evidence,
the Court is required to scrutinize the facts of
an individual case very carefully and take a
decision as to which of the declarations is
worth reliance.
xxx
xxx
xxx
20. We therefore find that in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the first
dying declaration (Ex. DO/C) will have to be
considered
to
be
more
reliable
and
trustworthy as against the second one (Ex.
PE). In any case, the benefit of doubt which
has been given to the other accused by the
trial court, ought to have been equally given
to the present appellant when the evidence
was totally identical against all the three
accused.”
46.
In addition to this, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in
the matter of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 has
clearly held that a certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of
caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the
declaration can be established otherwise. Their Lordships held in
paragraph 5 of the report as under:
“5. The Court also in the aforesaid case
relied upon the decision of this Court in Harjit
Kaur v. State of Punjab [(1999) 6 SCC 545]
wherein the Magistrate in his evidence had
stated that he had ascertained from the
doctor whether she was in a fit condition to
make
a
statement
and
obtained
an
endorsement to that effect and merely
because an endorsement was made not on
the declaration but on the application would
not render the dying declaration suspicious in
any
manner.
For
the
reasons
already
indicated earlier,we have no hesitation in
coming
to
the
conclusion
that
the
observations of this Court in Paparambaka
Rosamma v. State of A.P. [(1999) 7 SCC
695] (at SCC p. 701, para 8) to the effect that
"in the absence of a medical certification that
the injured was in a fit state of mind at the
time of making the declaration, it would be
very much risky to accept the subjective
satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that
the injured was in a fit state of mind at the
time of making a declaration" has been too
broadly stated and is not the correct
enunciation
of
law.
It
is
indeed
a
hypertechnical view that the certification of
the doctor was to the effect that the patient is
conscious and there was no certification that
the patient was in a fit state of mind specially
when the Magistrate categorically stated in
his evidence indicating the questions he had
put to the patient and from the answers
elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a
fit state of mind where after he recorded the
dying declaration. Therefore, the judgment of
this court in Paparambaka Rosamma (supra)
must be held to be not correctly decided and
we affirm the law laid down by this Court in
Koli Chunilal Savji v. Stateof Gujarat [(1999)
9 SCC 562].”
47.
The Supreme Court in the matter of Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT
of Delhi), (2019) 8 SCC 779 following the principle of law laid down in
Laxman (supra) has clearly held that even absence of the certificate by
a doctor is not fatal to act upon a dying declaration, however, the
requirement remains that the person who records dying declaration
must ensure that the patient was in a fit condition, both mentally and
physically, to give the declaration.
48.
Further, in the matter of Irfan @ Naka (supra), the Supreme Court
has held that the dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence to
be relied on provided it is proved that the same was voluntary and
truthful and the victim was in a fit state of mind and observed in Para63 as under:
“63. It is the duty of the prosecution to
establish the charge against the accused
beyond the reasonable doubt. The benefit of
doubt must always go in favour of the
accused. It is true that dying declaration is a
substantive piece of evidence to be relied on
provided it is proved that the same was
voluntary and truthful and the victim was in a
fit state of mind. It is just not enough for the
court to say that the dying declaration is
reliable as the accused is named in the dying
declaration as the assailant.”
49.
Recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rajendra v. State
of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 941 has clearly held that once
a dying declaration is found to be authentic inspiring confidence of the
court, then the same can be relied upon and can be the sole basis for
conviction without any corroboration and observed in Para-25 as under:
“25. The law relating to dying declaration is
now well settled. Once a dying declaration is
found to be authentic inspiring confidence of
the court, then the same can be relied upon
and can be the sole basis for conviction
without any corroboration. However, before
accepting such a dying declaration, court
must be satisfied that it was rendered
voluntarily, it is consistent and credible and
that it is devoid of any tutoring. Once such a
conclusion is reached, a great deal of
sanctity is attached to a dying declaration
and as said earlier, it can form the sole basis
for conviction.”
50.
Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law laid down by their
Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned judgments, it
is quite vivid that in the instant case the prosecution’s case substantially
rests upon the dying declaration (Ex.P/13), which was recorded by
Tahsildar/Executive Magistrate Deepak Kumar Bhardwaj (PW-11). In
the said dying declaration, the deceased Anupama Chouhan has
clearly narrated the incident and implicated her husband as well as her
brother-in-law to be the authors of the crime in question.
51.
Before considering the submissions raised on behalf of the
appellants, it would be appropriate to notice a few facts which are
apparent on the face of the record.
52.
The first dying declaration (Ex.P/13) was recorded on 18.05.2020
at about 4:00 PM in D.K.S. Hospital, Raipur by Tahsildar/Executive
Magistrate Deepak Kumar Bhardwaj (PW-11). The said witness has
categorically deposed before the trial Court that at the relevant time he
was posted as Tahsildar/Executive Magistrate in the Nazul Branch of
the Collectorate and on receiving the intimation, he proceeded to the
hospital and, after obtaining certification from the attending doctor that
the patient was in a fit condition to make the statement, recorded the
dying declaration of Anupama Chouhan. He has further deposed that
the deceased disclosed her name as Anupama Chouhan and stated
that on 08.05.2020 in the evening, there was a quarrel between her and
her husband over watching television, and on 09.05.2020 at about
10:00 AM, her husband along with his brother poured fuel and set her
on fire from behind. PW-11 has further stated that the dying declaration
recorded by him is Ex.P/13, which bears the signature/thumb
impression of the deceased at mark ‘A’ to ‘A’ and his own signature at
mark ‘B’ to ‘B’.
53.
The dying declaration of Anupama Chouhan (Ex.P/13) reads as
under: “ मृत्यु पूर्व कथन
मृतिका का नाम – अनुपमा चौहान
पिता का नाम – वासुदेव चौहान
उम्र – 21 वर्ष
ग्राम – देवपुर, चौकी बया, जिला बलौदाबाजार
प्रमाणित किया जाता है कि मरीज बयान देने की स्थिति
में है।
(1) आपका नाम क्या है?
उत्तर – अनुपमा चौहान।
(2) यह घटना आपके साथ कैसे घटी?
उत्तर – 09 मई की सुबह 10:00 बजे मेरे पति और
उसकी भाभी ने दारू के नशे में मुझे पीछे से आग लगा
दिया।
(3) यह घटना क्यों घटी?
उत्तर – मेरा मेरे पति के साथ 08 मई की शाम को टीवी
देखने को लेकर झगड़ा हुआ था।
(4) आपकी आग किसने बुझाई?
उत्तर – हल्ला होने पर मेरे पति, उसकी भाभी और एक
व्यक्ति आकर आग बुझाए।
(5) आपको यहाँ पर कौन लाया?
उत्तर – मेरे पति लोग लाए, पीछे से मेरे भाई लोग आए।
(6) आपको और कुछ कहना है?
उत्तर – मेरे दहेज के सारे सामान को बेचकर मद्य पी गए
हैं, कुछ भी नहीं छोड़े।"
54.
From a plain reading of the first dying declaration (Ex.P/13), it is
manifest that the deceased has clearly named the accused persons
and attributed to them the specific overt act of setting her ablaze. She
has also disclosed the immediate cause for the incident. The statement
is consistent, categorical and free from ambiguity.
55.
In the cross-examination of PW-11, the defence suggested that
the deceased was not in a condition to speak or sign; however, the
witness has denied the said suggestion and has stated that though he
offered to obtain her thumb impression, the deceased voluntarily chose
to put her signature. He has further deposed that before recording the
statement, he had obtained the opinion of the attending doctor
regarding the fitness of the deceased. Nothing substantial has been
elicited in his cross-examination to discredit his testimony.
56.
The record further reveals that Ex.P/13 bears the endorsement,
signature and seal of Dr. Tusharkant certifying that the patient was in a
fit state to give the statement. The testimony of Ishwar Lal Sakar (PW8) also establishes that prior to recording of the dying declaration,
written communication (Ex.P/11) was sent to the hospital authorities
seeking medical opinion regarding the fitness of the victim, and upon
such confirmation, intimation (Ex.P/12) was sent to the competent
Magistrate. The endorsement on Ex.P/11 clearly indicates that on
18.05.2020 at 4:00 PM, the deceased was found fit to make her
statement.
57.
The Executive Magistrate (PW-11), being a responsible public
servant and an independent witness, had no reason to falsely implicate
the accused persons. The procedure adopted by him in recording the
dying declaration appears to be fair and in accordance with law.
58.
Furthermore, the fact that the deceased declined to affix her
thumb impression and instead signed the dying declaration indicates
that she was conscious, oriented and voluntarily making the statement.
The defence has failed to bring on record any material to show that the
said statement was the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination.
59.
Thus, from perusal of the first dying declaration (Ex.P/13), this
Court finds that the same has been recorded after due medical
certification, by a competent Executive Magistrate, and contains a clear
and specific attribution of the act to the accused persons. The said
dying declaration inspires full confidence and can safely be relied upon.
60.
Insofar as the second dying declaration (Ex.P/17) is concerned,
the same was recorded on 19.05.2020 by Sub-Inspector Hitesh
Janghel (PW-14), who at the relevant time was posted as In-charge of
Police Outpost Baya, Police Station Rajadeori. He has deposed that
upon inquiry into the complaint submitted by Neelambar Chouhan, he
sent a written requisition (Ex.P/16) to the Medical Officer, Burn Ward,
D.K.S. Hospital, Raipur, seeking opinion as to whether the victim
Anupama Chouhan was in a fit condition to give her statement. Upon
receiving medical endorsement certifying that the victim was mentally fit
to make the statement, he proceeded to record her dying declaration,
which is Ex.P/17, which reads as under :“कथन पीड़िता
श्रीमती अनुपमा चौहान पति वासुदेव चौहान, उम्र 25 वर्ष,
जाति गांड़ा, निवासी ग्राम देवपुर, चौकी बया, थाना
राजादेवरी, जिला बलौदाबाजार (छ.ग.)
"मैं उपरोक्त पते पर रहती हूँ। कक्षा 10 वीं तक पढ़ी हूँ। घर
का काम करती हूँ। मेरी शादी दिनांक 11 अप्रैल 2014 को
वासुदेव चौहान के साथ हिन्द ू रीति-रिवाज से हुई। दिनांक
08.05.2020 को रात 09 बजे कोटवार के घर टीवी देखने
गई थी। मेरे पति बुलाने आए और घर बुलाकर टीवी देखने
क्यों गई थी कहकर मारपीट कर झगड़ा किए। बच्चों को भी
मारे, जिससे मेरे ससुर ने मना किए तो घर से भाग गया।
दिनांक 09.05.2020 को सुबह लगभग 08 बजे मेरे पति
शराब पीकर आए और मुझे गाली देकर झगड़ा कर अपनी
भाभी राजमोती के घर चला गया और वहाँ से मेरे पति
और जेठानी राजमोती शराब पीकर घर आए। लगभग सुबह
10 बजे मैं खाना बनाने के लिए चूल्हे में आग सुलगा रही
थी। मेरे पति और जेठानी वहीं पास में बैठे कुछ बड़बड़ा
रहे थे। चूल्हा जलाते समय मुझे मिट्टी तेल की गंध आई तो
मैं पीछे पलटकर देखी, मेरा साड़ी का पल्लू जल रहा था।
पल्लू के पास मेरे पति और जेठानी राजमोती खड़े थे। मैं
पल्लू को बुझाने की कोशिश की, लेकिन आग मेरी साड़ी में
भी पकड़ लिया था। मैं आग को बुझाने की बहुत कोशिश
कर चिल्लाने लगी। मेरे पति व जेठानी पास खड़े थे लेकिन
आग नहीं बुझाए। मेरी आवाज सुनकर ससुर के बेटे संजय
चौहान आकर पानी डालकर आग बुझाया। संजय को
देखकर मेरे पति और जेठानी भी आग बुझाने लगे। बच्चों के
भविष्य के डर के कारण मैंने घटना के बारे में गलत बताया
कि चूल्हा जलाते समय खुद धोखे से जल गई। मुझे 108
गाड़ी से रायपुर लेकर आए। यहाँ भी मैं सभी को खुद धोखे
से जली हूँ बताया। मेरे पति शराबी हैं, जो मेरे दहेज के
सामान को बेचकर शराब पी गया। मेरे पति वासुदेव चौहान
व जेठानी राजमोती मुझे जान से मारने के लिए मेरी साड़ी
में आग लगाए हैं। यही मेरा कथन है। कथन को पढ़कर
सुनी हूँ।"
61.
A perusal of the second dying declaration (Ex.P/17) would reveal
that the deceased has elaborately narrated the sequence of events.
She stated that on 08.05.2020 at about 9:00 PM she had gone to the
house of the Kotwar to watch television, whereupon her husband
brought her back home and quarrelled with and assaulted her for
having gone there. On the following morning i.e. 09.05.2020 at about
8:00 AM, her husband came home under the influence of liquor, abused
and quarrelled with her and thereafter went to the house of Rajmoti.
Subsequently, at about 10:00 AM, while she was lighting the stove for
preparing food, she smelt kerosene and on turning back saw that her
saree was on fire and her husband and Rajmoti were standing near
her. She tried to extinguish the fire, but it spread. Though her husband
and Rajmoti were present, they did not immediately extinguish the fire.
On hearing her cries, her father-in-law’s son Sanjay Chouhan came
and poured water to douse the flames. She further stated that due to
fear for the future of her children, she initially gave a false version that
she had accidentally caught fire while lighting the stove. She
categorically asserted that her husband Vasudev Chouhan and Rajmoti
had set her saree on fire with an intention to kill her. She also reiterated
that her husband was addicted to liquor and had sold her dowry articles
for consuming alcohol. The statement concludes with her affirmation
that it was read over to her and found correct.
62.
From perusal of the second dying declaration (Ex.P/17), it is
evident that the deceased has once again specifically implicated the
accused persons and has attributed to them the act of setting her saree
on fire after pouring kerosene. She has also furnished details
explaining why she had initially given a different version of accidental
burn, thereby lending assurance to the truthfulness of her subsequent
statement.
63.
As regards the mental fitness of the deceased at the time of
recording Ex.P/17, the requisition letter (Ex.P/16) sent by PW-14 to the
hospital clearly bears the endorsement of the attending doctor certifying
that on 19.05.2020 at about 3:00 PM the victim was mentally fit to give
her statement. Thus, the requirement of medical certification prior to
recording the dying declaration stands duly satisfied. The defence has
not been able to elicit anything in the cross-examination of PW-14 so as
to render the recording of Ex.P/17 doubtful.
64.
The second dying declaration (Ex.P/17), therefore, not only finds
support from the earlier dying declaration (Ex.P/13) recorded by the
Executive Magistrate, but also reinforces and corroborates the material
particulars stated therein, particularly with regard to the role attributed
to the accused persons and the motive behind the occurrence.
65.
Consequently, this Court finds that the second dying declaration
(Ex.P/17) also inspires confidence, having been recorded after due
medical certification and containing a consistent and specific narration
of the incident. It provides substantive corroboration to the first dying
declaration and further strengthens the prosecution case.
66.
Now, with regard to the oral dying declaration is concerned, the
prosecution has relied upon the testimony of Anil Kumar (PW-2), who is
the brother of the deceased Anupama Chouhan. Anil Kumar (PW-2)
has deposed that after the incident, the deceased was admitted in
D.K.S. Hospital, Raipur for treatment. He has further stated that he had
visited the hospital on three occasions to see his sister. According to
him, during his subsequent visit, upon making inquiry from Anupama
about the incident, she disclosed that accused Vasudev Chouhan and
Rajmoti had jointly set her on fire. His testimony further indicates that
after learning about the true incident from the deceased, he informed
his father, pursuant to which a written complaint (Ex.P/1) was lodged by
Neelambar (PW-1), leading to registration of the offence under Section
307/34 of the IPC and commencement of investigation.
67.
It is true that in paragraph 4 of his cross-examination, the witness
admitted that during his earlier visit to the hospital, Anupama had not
disclosed anything to him and that at that time she was not in a position
to speak. However, in paragraph 5, he has categorically denied the
suggestion that his sister had never told him anything about the
incident and that he was falsely implicating the accused. From the tenor
of his cross-examination, it appears that the so-called admission in
paragraph 4 was not in response to a clear and specific suggestion,
and the same does not demolish the substance of his testimony.
68.
The overall evidence of PW-2 indicates that although initially the
deceased did not disclose the true facts, subsequently she narrated the
actual incident to him. This circumstance finds support from the second
dying declaration (Ex.P/17), wherein the deceased herself has
explained that immediately after the incident she had falsely stated
before others and even before the hospital authorities that she had
accidentally caught fire while lighting the stove, out of fear for the future
of her children.
69.
The explanation furnished by the deceased in Ex.P/17 appears to
be natural and plausible. The deceased was a rural woman having
three minor children. The evidence on record shows that at the time of
taking her for treatment, the accused and their family members were
present with her. In such circumstances, the possibility of her
suppressing the true facts initially, either due to fear or in consideration
of the future of her children, cannot be ruled out.
70.
The defence has examined Ramkumar Singh (DW-1), who has
stated that at the Primary Health Centre, Pithora, the deceased had
told him and the doctor that she had caught fire accidentally while
cooking. However, his presence in the hospital is admitted from
Ex.P/20, which only establishes that he was present during treatment.
In view of the categorical explanation given by the deceased in her
subsequent dying declaration (Ex.P/17), the initial version of accidental
burn loses its significance.
71.
It is also noteworthy that the postmortem report (Ex.P/22)
indicates burn injuries over both hands, back, chest and abdomen of
the deceased. The extent and distribution of burn injuries, as reflected
in the sketch annexed to the postmortem report, prima facie suggest
that the burns were not confined to a localized accidental flare-up from
a stove, but were consistent with the pouring of kerosene and setting
the saree on fire. This medical evidence lends assurance to the
prosecution case.
72.
The plea of alibi taken by accused Rajmoti, to the effect that she
was not present at the place of occurrence, has not been substantiated
by leading any cogent evidence. The burden to prove such plea was
upon her, which she has failed to discharge.
73.
On cumulative consideration of the two written dying declarations
(Ex.P/13 and Ex.P/17), the oral dying declaration made to Anil Kumar
(PW-2), the medical evidence and the surrounding circumstances, this
Court finds that the prosecution has been able to establish that both the
accused persons, in furtherance of their common intention, poured
kerosene upon the deceased and set her saree on fire. The act was
done with the knowledge that such act was so imminently dangerous
that it would, in all probability, cause death.
74.
Accordingly, the question framed for consideration, namely,
whether the accused persons are the authors of the crime in question,
is answered in the affirmative.
75.
Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the entire evidence
available on record and having examined the impugned judgment in the
light of the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has succeeded
in establishing the guilt of the accused persons beyond reasonable
doubt.
76.
The case of the prosecution rests primarily upon the two written
dying declarations (Ex.P/13 and Ex.P/17), which have been recorded
after due medical certification regarding the fitness of the deceased.
The first dying declaration (Ex.P/13) was recorded by an independent
Executive Magistrate (PW-11) and the second (Ex.P/17) by SubInspector Hitesh Janghel (PW-14), both after obtaining medical opinion
that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement. In
both the dying declarations, the deceased has consistently and
categorically implicated the accused persons and attributed to them the
specific act of pouring kerosene upon her and setting her saree on fire.
There is no material contradiction between the two declarations on the
core aspect of the prosecution case.
77.
The dying declarations inspire full confidence. They were
recorded in accordance with law, bear medical endorsement as to
mental fitness, and have been duly proved by the witnesses concerned.
The defence has not been able to demonstrate any circumstance
suggesting tutoring, prompting, coercion or fabrication. On the contrary,
the explanation offered by the deceased in her second dying
declaration as to why she initially gave a version of accidental burn
appears to be natural and consistent with the social circumstances in
which she was placed.
78.
The oral dying declaration made to Anil Kumar (PW-2), the
brother of the deceased, further corroborates the prosecution case.
Though the defence attempted to impeach his testimony, nothing
substantial has been elicited to discredit his version. His evidence finds
assurance from the contents of the written dying declarations and the
surrounding circumstances.
79.
The medical evidence, including the postmortem report (Ex.P/22),
also lends support to the prosecution version. The nature and extent of
burn injuries, as reflected in the postmortem report, probabilise the
case that kerosene was poured and the deceased was set ablaze. The
theory of accidental burn while cooking on a stove does not fit in with
the distribution and severity of burn injuries noticed on the body of the
deceased.
80.
The plea taken by accused Rajmoti that she was not present at
the place of occurrence has remained unsubstantiated. No cogent
evidence has been adduced to prove the plea of alibi. The burden to
establish such plea was upon the accused, which she has failed to
discharge.
81.
On cumulative evaluation of the entire evidence — the two
consistent and reliable dying declarations, the oral dying declaration,
the medical evidence, and the attendant circumstances — this Court
finds no perversity, illegality or infirmity in the appreciation of evidence
made by the learned trial Court. The findings recorded by the trial Court
are based on proper analysis of evidence and are neither contrary to
law nor against the weight of evidence on record.
82.
Accordingly, the conviction of the appellants for the offence
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and the
sentence of imprisonment for life with fine imposed upon them are fully
justified and commensurate with the gravity of the offence.
83.
Consequently, both the criminal appeals (CRA No.2284/2024 and
CRA No.57/2025) being devoid of merit deserve to be and are hereby
dismissed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
20.11.2024 passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge,
Balodabazar in Sessions Case No.29 of 2020 are hereby affirmed. The
appellants shall continue to undergo the sentence awarded to them, in
accordance with law.
84.
The Registry of this Court is directed to sent a copy of this
judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellants
are languishing, informing them that they are at liberty to assail this
judgment before the Supreme Court by preferring an appeal under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India with the aid and assistance of the
Chhattisgarh High Court Legal Services Committee or that of the
Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
85.
Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record
be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary
information and compliance.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Anu
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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