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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 21st May, 2026
Judgment pronounced on: 31st July, 2026
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CNR No. DLHC014453832017
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RFA 908/2017, CM APPL. 54504/2023 & CM APPL. 69017/2025
RAJINDER KUMAR
Through:
.....Appellant
Mr. Raman Kapur, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Siddhant Nath, Mr. Amaan Khan,
Mr. Bhavishya Makhija and Mr.
Divyansh, Advocates.
versus
SEWA RAM (SINCE DECEASED) THR HIS LRS
& ANR
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Atul Shankar Mathur and Mr.
Shubhankar, Advocates for R-1.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT BANSAL
JUDGMENT
AMIT BANSAL, J.
1.
The present Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’) has been preferred by the appellant against
the judgment and preliminary decree dated 29th August, 2017 passed by the
Additional District Judge-09 (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in Civil Suit
No.613977/2016 (Old No.167/2011) titled as ‘Shri Sewa Ram v. Shri
Rajinder Kumar & Anr’.
2.
Parties in the present appeal shall be hereinafter referred to as per the
nomenclature in the Trial Court. The appellant shall hereinafter be referred
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to as ‘defendant no.1’ and the respondent no.1 shall hereinafter be referred
to as ‘original plaintiff’ and the respondent no.2 shall hereinafter be referred
to as ‘defendant no.2’.
BRIEF FACTS
3.
Brief facts necessary for deciding the present appeal are as follows:
3.1.
The property being Shop Nos.7 and 8, Esplanade Road, Chandni
Chowk, Delhi (“suit property”) was originally under the tenancy of Shri
Devi Singh, the father of the original plaintiff, Shri Sewa Ram (since
deceased). Upon the demise of Shri Devi Singh in the year 1986, the tenancy
devolved upon the original plaintiff, who continued as the tenant under the
then landlords, Smt. Suman Devi and, thereafter, Shri Preet Kumar Gupta.
3.2.
The original plaintiff and defendants entered into a partnership deed
dated 3rd August, 1989 for carrying on the business of photography under
the name and style of Mona Studio from the suit property.
3.3.
Under the partnership deed, the original plaintiff held a 50% share in
the partnership, whereas the defendants held 25% share each. The original
plaintiff was the sleeping partner, whereas the defendants were entrusted
with the conduct of the partnership business and maintenance of the books
of account. The partnership deed stipulated that the partnership would
continue for a period of ten (10) years, unless extended by mutual consent of
the partners.
3.4.
Upon expiry of the aforesaid period of 10 years, the partnership came
to an end on 2nd August, 1999. The original plaintiff issued a notice dated
20th June, 1999 expressing his intention not to continue the partnership
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business and called upon the defendants to settle the partnership accounts
and hand over possession of the suit property.
3.5.
The defendant no.1 instituted a civil suit for permanent injunction
against the original plaintiff before this Court but the same was dismissed as
withdrawn on 11th March, 2002. The counter claim of the original plaintiff
was directed to be registered separately.
3.6.
After the change of jurisdiction, the suit was transferred to the Court
of Additional District Judge. Since there was some formal defect in the suit,
the original plaintiff moved an application to withdraw the said suit with
liberty to institute fresh suit on the same cause of action, which was allowed
vide order dated 7th September, 2005.
3.7.
Thereafter, the original plaintiff instituted the present suit against the
defendants seeking dissolution of partnership, rendition of accounts and
mandatory injunction directing the defendants to hand over possession of the
suit property.
3.8.
The defendants and original plaintiff filed their respective written
statements. While admitting the execution of the partnership deed dated 3rd
August, 1989, the defendants contended that original plaintiff had executed
an Ikrarnama/Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) dated 29th April, 1995
acknowledging certain loan transactions and agreeing that, in the event of
failure to repay the outstanding amount by 1st January, 1999, he would cease
to be a partner and surrender his tenancy rights in the suit property in favour
of the defendants.
4.
By order dated 7th August, 2006, the Civil Judge framed issues in the
suit.
5.
Issue nos.4 to 7 were treated as preliminary issues.
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6.
Vide order dated 9th May, 2007, the Civil Judge decided the
preliminary issue nos.4 to 6. With regard to issue no.4, the Civil Judge
rejected the objections regarding non-joinder of parties. With regard to issue
no.6, the Civil Judge rejected the bar under Order II Rule 2 of the CPC.
With regard to issue no.5, the Civil Judge directed original plaintiff to
appropriately value the relief relating to possession for the purposes of court
fees and jurisdiction. With regard to issue no.7, the Civil Judge observed
that the objection regarding maintainability would be decided after the
parties had led evidence.
7.
Thereafter, the original plaintiff appropriately enhanced the valuation
of the suit and deposited the deficient court fees. Consequently, the suit
came to be transferred to the Court of the Additional District Judge.
8.
During the pendency of the suit, the original plaintiff expired on 6th
December, 2009 and his legal representatives were brought on record.
9.
By the impugned judgment dated 29th August, 2017, the Trial Court
passed a preliminary decree for rendition of accounts of the partnership firm
for ascertaining the dues of the original plaintiff for the entire period of
partnership firm and appointed a Local Commissioner in this regard. The
Trial Court also passed a decree for mandatory injunction directing the
Local Commissioner to hand over possession of the suit property to legal
representatives of the original plaintiff.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
10.
Notice in the present appeal was issued vide order dated 20th
November, 2017. Vide order dated 16th March 2018, the Court recorded that
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despite service, none appeared on behalf of defendant no.2. Accordingly,
defendant no.2 was proceeded ex parte.
11.
Vide order dated 23rd March, 2018, the Court directed the defendant
no.1 to pay an interim amount of ₹25,000/- per month to the legal
representatives of original plaintiff, subject to restitution in the event the
defendant no.1 succeeds in the appeal. The Court further recorded the
statement made on behalf of the legal representatives of original plaintiff
and directed that no further steps would be taken before the Trial Court for
appointment of the Local Commissioner during the pendency of the present
appeal.
12.
The parties were referred for mediation twice during the pendency of
the present appeal, however, the parties could not arrive at a settlement.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
13.1 Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the
impugned judgment has been passed without appreciating documentary
evidence placed on record, including the Ikrarnama/MoU, the promissory
notes, the statement of accounts, the original title deeds allegedly deposited
by the original plaintiff, the rent receipts issued by the landlord in favour of
the appellant/defendant no.1 and the forensic reports obtained during the
criminal proceedings initiated by the original plaintiff, all of which,
according to the appellant/defendant no.1, establish the genuineness of the
Ikrarnama/MoU and the consequent transfer of tenancy in favour of the
defendant no.1.
13.2 It is further submitted that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the
original plaintiff had executed the Ikrarnama/MoU dated 29th April, 1995
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acknowledging the loan of Rs.10,15,940/- advanced by the defendants and
agreeing that, upon failure to repay the outstanding amount before 1 st
January, 1999, he would cease to be a partner of the partnership firm and
surrender his tenancy rights in favour of the defendants.
13.3 It is submitted that the original plaintiff admittedly failed to repay the
said amount and, consequently, the partnership stood dissolved on 31st
December, 1998 in terms of the Ikrarnama/MoU.
13.4 It is submitted that pursuant thereto, original plaintiff requested the
landlord to transfer the tenancy in favour of the defendant no.1.
Consequently, the tenancy stood transferred in favour of the defendant no.1
with effect from 1st January, 1999, whereafter the landlord accepted rent
from the defendant no.1 and issued rent receipts in his favour. It is further
submitted that no eviction proceedings were ever initiated by the landlord
against the defendant no.1.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.1
14.1 Per contra, counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.1 submits
that the Trial Court has correctly appreciated the pleadings and evidence on
record.
14.2 It is submitted that the defendants failed to prove the execution of
Ikrarnama/MoU dated 29th April, 1995. As per the defendants,
Ikrarnama/MoU was executed in the presence of attesting witnesses,
however, none of the said witnesses were examined. It is further submitted
that mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not dispense with the
requirement of proving its execution in accordance with the provisions of
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the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Reliance is placed on Sait Tarajee
Khimchand & Ors v. Yelamarti Satyam & Ors1.
14.3 It is further submitted that the FSL reports relied upon by the
defendants were never proved by examining the concerned expert during
trial. In any event, the expert opinion by itself cannot constitute conclusive
proof of execution of the disputed document. Reliance is placed on State of
Himachal Pradesh v. Jai Lal & Ors2, S. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra
Pradesh3 and Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy v. Baddam Pratapa Reddy &
Anr4.
14.4 Counsel further submits that the defendants also failed to establish the
alleged loan transactions. The defendant no.1 himself admitted during crossexamination that no loan documents were executed at the time of alleged
loans and that the alleged transactions were not reflected in the partnership
accounts or income tax returns. Therefore, the Trial Court rightly rejected
the defence founded upon the alleged loan transactions.
14.5 Counsel submits that the partnership deed dated 3rd August, 1989
clearly stipulated a fixed tenure of ten years, designated the original plaintiff
as the sleeping partner and entrusted the defendants with the maintenance of
the books of accounts. Upon expiry of 10 years and issuance of notice by the
original plaintiff, the partnership stood dissolved by efflux of time, entitling
the original plaintiff to rendition of accounts.
14.6 Lastly, it is submitted that the defendant no.1 failed to establish any
lawful transfer of tenancy in his favour. The Trial Court rightly granted the
(1972) 4 SCC 562
(1999) 7 SCC 280
(1996) 4 SCC 596
(2019) 14 SCC 220
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consequential relief of mandatory injunction directing restoration of
possession of the suit property.
ANALYSIS
15. There is no dispute that the tenancy in respect of the suit property was
in favour of the original plaintiff with effect from 1986. There is also no
dispute that a partnership deed dated 3rd August, 1989 [Ex. PW1/B] was
entered into between the parties. The salient provisions of the partnership
deed are set out below:
i.
The partnership deed acknowledged that original plaintiff was the
tenant of the suit property.
ii.
The partnership deed was for a period of 10 years, from 3rd August,
1989 to 2nd August, 1999.
iii.
The original plaintiff held a 50% share in the partnership, whereas the
defendants held 25% share each.
iv.
The original plaintiff would remain the sleeping partner, and the
defendants would actively conduct the business and maintain the books of
accounts of the partnership firm.
v.
Upon dissolution of the partnership, after settlement of the accounts
and discharge of the assets and liabilities of the firm, possession of the suit
property would be given to the original plaintiff and the assets and liabilities
of the partnership would be divided proportionately.
16.
The original plaintiff terminated the partnership deed vide notice
dated 20th June, 1999 and called upon the defendants to settle accounts and
hand over the possession of the suit property. Even otherwise, the
partnership deed came to an end on 2nd August, 1999 by efflux of time.
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17.
The defendant no.1 has admitted the receipt of the aforesaid notice
from the original plaintiff. However, no reply has been filed by the
defendant no.1 to the said notice.
18.
The defendants have taken a defence that the original plaintiff has
relinquished all his rights as a tenant in the suit property and his rights as a
partner in the partnership firm vide Ikrarnama/MoU dated 29th April, 1995
[Ex. D1W1/6]. On the other hand, it is the case of the original plaintiff that
the said document was manipulated and forged.
19.
The Ikrarnama/MoU is premised on a loan of Rs.10,15,940/-, taken
by the original plaintiff from the defendants.
Along with
the
Ikrarnama/MoU, a handwritten document [Ex. D1W1/7] has been filed,
giving the details of various amounts of loans given by the defendants to the
original plaintiff from time to time. As per the said document, the balance
loan on 29th April, 1995, the date on which the Ikrarnama/MoU was
executed, was Rs.10,15,940/-.
20.
In the cross examination of the defendant no.1, he has admitted that
no document or receipt was executed at the time of granting of the loan. The
defendant no.1 has also admitted that the loan, which was the subject matter
of Ex. D1W1/7, was not shown in the income tax returns, nor was any
demand notice issued to the original plaintiff for the loan amount.
21.
In light of the aforesaid evidence, the Trial Court correctly did not
accept the case set up by the defendants with regard to there being a loan
given to the original plaintiff. The Trial Court held that even if a loan was
given by defendants and/or relatives of the defendants to the original
plaintiff, the same was not relevant for the purposes of the suit.
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22.
The defendants have also placed reliance on the FSL reports dated
15th May, 2009 and 25th March, 2010 to show that the Ikrarnama/MoU
contained the signatures of the plaintiff.
23.
The aforesaid FSL reports were filed in a criminal complaint case
bearing CC No.112/1/14 titled Sewa Ram v. Rajinder Kumar, instituted by
the original plaintiff against the defendant no.1. The aforesaid FSL reports
were not proved by the defendants in the present suit by producing any
official/expert from FSL.
24.
The Supreme Court in Jai Lal (supra) has held that an expert’s report
does not automatically become evidence merely because it is placed on
record. The expert is required to enter the witness box and be subjected to
cross-examination. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is set out
below:
“19. The report submitted by an expert does not go in evidence
automatically. He is to be examined as a witness in court and has to
face cross-examination. This Court in the case of Hazi Mohammad
Ekramul Haq v. State of W.B.' concurred with the finding of the High
Court in not placing any reliance upon the evidence of an expert witness
on the ground that his evidence was merely an opinion unsupported by
any reasons.”
[emphasis supplied]
25.
A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Novartis AG & Ors v. Natco
Pharma Ltd.5 reiterated the principles laid down in Jai Lal (supra) and held
as follows:
“58. In view of the above judgments, it is clear that the report of the
expert does not go in evidence automatically. He is to be examined as a
witness in court and has to face cross-examination. The scientific
opinion, if convincing, becomes an important factor for consideration
alongwith other evidence of the case.”
2021 SCC OnLine Del 4849
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26.
A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Gautam Saluja v. Jitender
Kumar Sethi & Anr6 has observed that an FSL report is merely an opinion
of an expert and cannot be treated as substantive evidence. The relevant
paragraphs of the said judgment are set out below:
“34. However, it cannot be overlooked that FSL Report is only an
opinion and supporting evidence and cannot be treated as substantive
piece of evidence. As has been held in S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P.,
(1996) 4 SCC 596 that the expert evidence constitutes opinion rather
than direct substantive evidence, and that it must not replace substantive
evidence. Furthermore, an expert testimony necessitates corroboration,
which can only be gained through clear, direct or circumstantial
evidence.
35. The Apex Court has further emphasized in State of Karnataka v. J.
Jayalalitha, (2017) 6 SCC 263 that an Expert witness does not provide
factual testimony; rather merely offers advisory insights. The Apex Court
has cautioned against complete reliance on expert opinions alone, which
was reaffirmed in the case of Jalapathi Reddy v. Baddam Pratapa Reddy,
(2019) 14 SCC 220.”
[emphasis supplied]
27.
Therefore, this Court is of the view that the FSL reports relied upon
by the defendants have not been proved in accordance with law.
28.
The Ikrarnama/MoU [Ex. D1W1/6] contains signatures of two
attesting witnesses present at the time of execution. However, the said
witnesses were not produced by the defendants during trial. In fact, in his
cross-examination, the defendant no.1 has stated that he does not remember
the name of the witnesses, or whether the said document was attested or
registered, or by whom and from where the stamp paper was purchased.
2025 SCC OnLine Del 895
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29.
In Sait Tarajee Khimchand (supra) the Supreme Court has held that
mere marking of the document as an exhibit does not dispense with the
requirement to prove the said document in accordance with the law.
30.
Accordingly, even though the Ikrarnama/MoU is marked as an
exhibit, the same has not been proved in accordance with law by the
defendants.
31.
The defendant no.1 contended that the tenancy of the suit property
was transferred by the landlord, Mr. Preet Kumar Gupta in the name of the
defendant no.1 with effect from 1st January, 1999. Even though receipts
have been filed by the defendants [Exhibit D1W1/8 to D1W1/34], the
defendants had failed to prove the said receipts by summoning the landlord
to appear as a witness.
32.
The defendant no.1 in his evidence had stated that the original
plaintiff had written a letter to the landlord Preet Kumar Gupta to transfer
the tenancy in favour of the defendant no.1. However, in his cross
examination, the defendant no.1 has admitted that he does not have the
original or a copy of the said letter.
33.
In the affidavit filed by PW-1, i.e., son of the original plaintiff, it is
stated that the original landlord, Shri Preet Kumar, had sold the suit property
to Shri Nepal Giri and Shri Girish Giri. Upon purchase of the property, the
said purchasers attorned the tenancy in the suit property in favour of his
mother, Smt. Asha Devi. It is further stated that Smt. Asha Devi expired on
5th November, 2010, and thereafter, PW-1 and his brother continued as
tenants under Shri Nepal Giri and Shri Girish Giri.
34.
Significantly, PW-1 was not cross-examined by the defendants on this
aspect, and therefore his testimony remained unrebutted. Hence, the
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defendant no.1’s plea that the tenancy had been transferred in his favour
with effect from 1st January, 1999 was rightly rejected by the Trial Court.
35.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, in the opinion of this Court, there
is no infirmity in the judgment of the Trial Court which requires interference
by this Court. The Trial Court has passed a well-reasoned judgment, after
analysing the pleadings of the parties and the evidence led on behalf of the
parties.
36.
Accordingly, there is no merit in the present appeal and the same is
dismissed.
37.
Pending applications stand disposed of.
AMIT BANSAL
(JUDGE)
JULY 31, 2026
Vivek/-
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