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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 12.02.2026
Date of decision: 11.05.2026
Uploaded on: 11.05.2026
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W.P.(C) 9849/2016
RAJESHWAR DAYAL AGGARWAL
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Triloki Pandit, Adv.
versus
M/S ENICAR MACHINE (INDIA)
.....Respondent
Through: Ms. Diya Kapur, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Aditya Ladha, Mr. Naibedya Dash,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN
JUDGMENT
SHAIL JAIN, J.
1.
The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India by the Petitioner/workman assailing the Award dated
03.07.2015 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court-XIX,
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in LIR No. 30/2012, whereby the learned
Labour Court held that the Government of NCT of Delhi was not the
“appropriate Government” for making the reference and consequently held
the claim of the Petitioner/workman to be not maintainable before the
Labour Court at Delhi.
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BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE:
2.
Brief facts emerging from the record, necessary for adjudication of
the present writ petition, are that the Petitioner/workman claimed to have
joined the services of the Respondent/management on 20.11.1978 as a
Clerk/Sale Purchase Assistant and alleged that he had continuously worked
under the management till November, 2009. It was further the case of the
Petitioner/workman that the management had been operating under different
names and styles, namely M/s Delhi Industrial Syndicate, M/s Asian
Engineering Company, M/s Enicar Machine (India) and M/s Precision
Tanks and Vessels (P) Ltd., and that he had worked in all the said
establishments under the same management and control.
3.
According to the Petitioner/workman, he lastly attended duties on
27.11.2009 at the establishment of M/s Enicar Machine (India) situated at B616, Nehru Ground, Faridabad, Haryana. The Petitioner/workman alleged
that on the said date, he was orally directed by the management not to report
for duties with effect from 28.11.2009, without issuance of any written
order, charge-sheet or domestic enquiry. It was also alleged that his salary
for the months of October and November, 2009 had been withheld by the
management.
4.
The record further reflects that the Petitioner/workman issued a
demand notice dated 09.12.2009 seeking reinstatement in service along with
back wages and other consequential benefits. The Petitioner/workman also
initiated proceedings for recovery of alleged dues amounting to
Rs.1,63,000/-. Thereafter, conciliation proceedings were initiated before the
Conciliation Officer, which ultimately culminated in a reference being made
by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Government of NCT of Delhi vide
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Reference No. F.24(405)/11/SWD/Lab./7718-7721 dated 25.11.2011 to the
Labour Court-XIX, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi on the following terms:
“Whether there existed an employer-employee
relationship between the management and Shri
RajeshwarDayal Aggarwal S/o Shri Shobha Ram
Aggarwal and if so, whether services of said Shri
RajeshwarDayal Aggarwal have been terminated
illegally and/or unjustifiably by the management and if
so, to what relief is he entitled?”
5.
Pursuant thereto, the Petitioner/workman filed a statement of claim
before the learned Labour Court seeking reinstatement in service with
continuity of service, full back wages and consequential benefits. The
Respondent/management contested the claim by filing its written statement,
wherein the existence of employer-employee relationship was denied. The
management further contended that the establishments referred to by the
Petitioner/workman were separate concerns belonging to different
proprietors/family members.
6.
The Respondent/management also raised a preliminary objection
regarding territorial jurisdiction and maintainability of the proceedings
before the Labour Court at Delhi. It was contended that even as per the
averments contained in the statement of claim, the alleged termination had
taken place at Faridabad, Haryana and, therefore, the cause of action had
arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Haryana. It was thus
contended that the Government of NCT of Delhi was not the “appropriate
Government” competent to make the reference under the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
7.
Upon consideration of the pleadings and material placed on record,
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the learned Labour Court passed the impugned Award dated 03.07.2015
holding, inter alia, that the Government of NCT of Delhi could not be
regarded as the “appropriate Government” for making the reference in the
facts of the present case and consequently held the claim to be not
maintainable before the Labour Court at Delhi. The Award was
subsequently published on 19.11.2015.
8.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid Award, the Petitioner/workman has
preferred the present writ petition.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES:
9.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner/workman
assailed the impugned Award dated 03.07.2015 on the ground that the
learned Labour Court had erred in holding that the Government of NCT of
Delhi was not the “appropriate Government” for the purpose of making the
reference under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was contended that the
learned Labour Court failed to appreciate the material placed on record
showing the existence of a substantial nexus of the Respondent/management
with Delhi.
10.
Learned
counsel
for
the
Petitioner
submitted
that
the
Respondent/management has been carrying on business through multiple
concerns under the same management and control, namely M/s Delhi
Industrial Syndicate, M/s Asian Engineering Company, M/s Enicar
Machines India and M/s Precision Tanks and Vessels (P) Ltd and it was
contended that the Petitioner/workman had worked in all the aforesaid
establishments under the same management and control.
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11.
Learned counsel further submitted that the learned Labour Court had
failed to consider documentary material available on record which clearly
established that the respondent/management had its registered office and
principal business activities within the National Capital Territory of Delhi.
In this regard, reliance was placed upon Delivery Challan No. 3105 dated
01.03.1980, Delivery Challan No. C/431/1980, Delivery Challan No. 3097
dated 08.03.1980 and Bill dated 11.06.1996, which allegedly reflected the
addresses of the respondent/management at Shanti Niketan and Naraina
Industrial Area, Phase-II, New Delhi. It was thus contended that the dispute
had a clear territorial nexus with Delhi and, therefore, the Government of
NCT of Delhi was fully competent to make the reference.
12.
It was further contended on behalf of the Petitioner/workman that the
learned Labour Court adopted an unduly technical approach while deciding
the issue of territorial jurisdiction and failed to appreciate that industrial
adjudication ought not to be defeated merely on hyper-technical
considerations, particularly when the material on record demonstrated a
clear nexus of the management with Delhi. It was submitted that the
impugned Award had been passed without proper appreciation of the
documentary evidence and was thus liable to be set aside.
13.
Per
contra,
learned
counsel
appearing
on
behalf
of
the
Respondent/management supported the impugned Award and submitted that
the present writ petition itself is liable to be dismissed on account of
unexplained delay and laches. It was pointed out that the impugned Award
was passed on 03.07.2015 and published on 19.11.2015, whereas the present
writ petition came to be instituted only on 06.09.2016, after an inordinate
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delay of more than ten months, without any application seeking condonation
of delay.
14.
Learned counsel for the Respondent further submitted that the learned
Labour Court rightly held that the Government of NCT of Delhi was not the
“appropriate Government” competent to refer the dispute for adjudication,
inasmuch as the Petitioner/workman himself had admitted in the statement
of claim that he was lastly working at B-616, Nehru Ground, Faridabad,
Haryana and that the alleged termination had also taken place at the said
establishment. It was contended that the situs of employment and the place
where the cause of action substantially arose determine the territorial
jurisdiction in industrial disputes arising out of termination of service.
15.
In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the
Respondent placed reliance upon the judgment in Paritosh Kumar Pal v.
State of Bihar & Ors.,1984 Lab IC 1254 to contend that the situs of
employment of the workman is the determinative factor for deciding
territorial jurisdiction and identifying the appropriate Government under the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
16.
Learned counsel for the Respondent further contended that the
Petitioner/workman cannot be permitted to take contradictory stands
inasmuch as in Para 3 of the statement of claim, the Petitioner/workman had
specifically pleaded that on 27.11.2009 he was working at the Faridabad
establishment of the management where he was allegedly directed not to
report for duties with effect from 28.11.2009. It was submitted that the said
pleading constitutes a clear admission regarding the situs of employment
and cause of action.
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17.
Learned counsel for the Respondent additionally submitted that the
documentary material relied upon by the Petitioner/workman, namely the
delivery challans of the year 1980 and the bill of the year 1996, had no
relevance for determining the situs of employment as on the date of alleged
termination in November, 2009. It was submitted that the management
witness had categorically deposed that the registered office of the
management was situated at 94, DLF Industrial Estate, Faridabad, Haryana
and that no cogent evidence to the contrary had been produced by the
Petitioner/workman.
18.
Learned counsel for the Respondent also disputed the existence of
employer-employee relationship between the parties and submitted that the
Petitioner/workman was running his own proprietorship concern under the
name and style of M/s Shan Engineering Company at Sultanpuri, Delhi and
was also working as an agent of the Life Insurance Corporation of India. It
was contended that no appointment letter, service record, salary slip or
documentary material had been produced by the Petitioner/workman to
establish
any
employer-employee
relationship
with
the
respondent/management.
19.
On the aspect of maintainability of the present proceedings, learned
counsel for the Respondent further submitted that under Section 17(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, a published award attains finality and cannot
ordinarily be called in question except on limited grounds available in
judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was
submitted that the impugned Award neither suffers from perversity nor from
any jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference by this Court.
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DISCUSSION:
20.
This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
parties and perused the documents placed on record and judgments relied
upon by the parties.
21.
The principal controversy arising for consideration before this Court
is whether the learned Labour Court was justified in holding that the
Government of NCT of Delhi was not the “appropriate Government”
competent to make the reference under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
and, consequently, whether the learned Labour Court was justified in
declining to adjudicate the dispute on merits.
22.
Before adverting to the rival submissions on the aforesaid
controversy, it would be apposite to notice the manner in which the learned
Labour Court approached and decided the dispute. Upon consideration of
the pleadings of the parties, the learned Labour Court framed the following
issues for adjudication on 13.08.2012:
(i) As per terms of reference.
(ii) Whether the claimant is not a workman within the
definition under Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act? OPM
(iii) Whether the workman is self-engaged in his own
proprietorship firm? OPM
(iv) Whether this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to try
and dispose of the present claim? OPM
(v) Relief.
23.
A perusal of the impugned Award reveals that since Issue No. (iv)
pertained to territorial jurisdiction and went to the very root of the
adjudicatory competence of the learned Labour Court, the learned Labour
Court considered it appropriate to first adjudicate the said issue before
entering upon the merits of the industrial dispute. The said approach adopted
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by the learned Labour Court cannot be faulted with, inasmuch as it is a
settled principle of law that where an objection relating to jurisdiction is
raised, the same deserves to be adjudicated at the threshold since the
authority of the forum to entertain the dispute itself depends upon the
outcome of such issue.
24.
The learned Labour Court thereafter proceeded to hear the parties on
Issue No. (iv) and, upon appreciation of the pleadings, evidence and material
placed on record, returned a finding against the Petitioner/workman on the
question of territorial jurisdiction. The relevant observations contained in the
impugned Award read as under:
"15. [...] Herein, the claimant has specifically alleged in Para
no. 3 of the claim that on 27.11.2009 he was performing his
duties with M/s Enicar Machines (India) at B-616, Nehru
Ground, Faridabad, Haryana where the management asked
him not to attend the office w.e.f 28.11.2009. As per pleadings
, it is not case of the claimant that M/s Enicar Machines
(India) was having any office at Delhi or that he was working
with the said management at Delhi. He has specifically
claimed the situs of his employment at Faridabad.
16. In the given facts and circumstances, applying the well
settled law, referred to by Ld. AR(M) and not disputed by Ld.
AR(W), this court finds that Government of NCT Delhi cannot
be said to be the appropriate government to refer the
industrial dispute between the parties to this court at Delhi
and rather, it is the State of Haryana which is the appropriate
government to refer industrial dispute between the parties to
the labour courts at Faridabad. This issue is accordingly
decided in favour of the management and against the
workman."
25.
The learned Labour Court further observed that in view of the finding
returned on Issue No. (iv), namely that the reference had not been made by
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the competent Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the
claim of the Petitioner/workman was not maintainable before it and,
accordingly, declined to adjudicate the remaining issues on merits.
26.
A perusal of the aforesaid reasoning adopted by the learned Labour
Court shows that it proceeded primarily on the basis that the situs of
employment and alleged termination of the Petitioner/workman was at
Faridabad, Haryana and, therefore, the industrial dispute substantially arose
within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Haryana. The learned Labour
Court further observed that no cogent material had been brought on record
to establish that the management had any such nexus with Delhi so as to
confer jurisdiction upon the Government of NCT of Delhi.
27.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner/workman
assailed the aforesaid findings by contending that the learned Labour Court
adopted an unduly narrow and technical approach while determining the
issue of territorial jurisdiction. It was argued that the documentary evidence
placed on record, including the delivery challans and the bill bearing Delhi
addresses of the respondent/management, clearly established that the
respondent/management had been operating from Delhi and that the
industrial dispute had sufficient territorial nexus with Delhi.
28.
It was further contended on behalf of the Petitioner/workman that the
issue of territorial jurisdiction in industrial adjudication cannot be
determined solely on the basis of the place where the workman lastly
discharged duties or where the alleged order of termination operated.
According to the Petitioner/workman, the overall nexus of the establishment
with a particular State, including existence of the registered office,
continuity of service under interconnected establishments and supervisory
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control of the management, are all relevant factors for determining the
“appropriate Government” under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
29.
Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent/management
submitted that the learned Labour Court rightly appreciated the pleadings
and evidence on record and correctly concluded that the Government of
NCT of Delhi lacked territorial jurisdiction. Particular emphasis was placed
upon Para 3 of the statement of claim, wherein the Petitioner/workman
himself specifically pleaded that he was working at B-616, Nehru Ground,
Faridabad, Haryana on 27.11.2009 and that the alleged oral termination also
took place there.
30.
Learned counsel for the Respondent/management further submitted
that once the situs of employment and alleged termination stood admitted by
the Petitioner/workman himself, the issue of territorial jurisdiction stood
concluded and the Petitioner/workman could not subsequently attempt to
create jurisdiction in Delhi merely on the basis of old business documents
reflecting Delhi addresses of the management.
31.
At this stage, it becomes necessary to examine the legal position
governing the concept of “appropriate Government” under the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). Though the Act
does not contain any express provision prescribing territorial jurisdiction of
Labour Courts, Courts have consistently held that the jurisdiction of a
Labour Court to adjudicate an industrial dispute must have a direct and
substantial nexus with the territory of the Government making the reference.
The expression "appropriate Government" as defined under Section 2(a) of
the Act contemplates the Government having jurisdiction over the industry
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or establishment in relation to which the dispute substantially arises. It is in
this context that the situs of employment assumes significance.
32.
The legal position governing the present controversy is now fairly
well settled. In disputes arising out of termination of service, it is ordinarily
the place where the workman was lastly employed and where the alleged
termination took effect that constitutes the determinative factor for deciding
territorial jurisdiction. The principle is founded upon the rationale that the
industrial dispute substantially crystallises at the place where the
employment subsisted and where the adverse employment action operated
against the workman.
33.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in V.G. Jagdishan Vs. Indofos
Industries Ltd, (2022) 6 SCC 167 observed that the place where the
employment existed and where the termination operated constitutes the
place where the cause of action substantially arises. The Apex Court
categorically held that considering the facts of the said case that the
workman therein was employed at Ghaziabad, was working at Ghaziabad
and his services were terminated at Ghaziabad, only the Ghaziabad Court
would have territorial jurisdiction in the said case. The relevant paragraph of
the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“10. From the findings recorded by the Labour Court, Delhi
and the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the
High Court, it is not much in dispute that the workman was
employed as a driver at Ghaziabad office. He was working at
Ghaziabad. His services were retrenched at Ghaziabad. All
throughout during the employment, the workman stayed and
worked at Ghaziabad. Only after the retrenchment/termination
the workman shifted to Delhi from where he served a demand
notice at the Head Office of the Management situated at Delhi.
Merely because the workman after termination/retrenchment
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shifted to Delhi and sent a demand notice from Delhi and the
Head Office of the Management was at Delhi, it cannot be said
that a part cause of action has arisen at Delhi. Considering
the facts that the workman was employed at Ghaziabad; was
working at Ghaziabad and his services were terminated at
Ghaziabad, the facts being undisputed, only the Ghaziabad
Court would have territorial jurisdiction to decide the case.”
34.
Similarly, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Eastern Coalfields
Ltd. and Others v. Kalyan Banerjee, (2008) 3 SCC 456, held that mere
existence of the head office or administrative office of the employer at a
different place would not ipso facto confer jurisdiction unless the dispute
itself substantially arose within the territorial limits of that State.The
relevant paragraph of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“13. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court that the entire cause of action arose in
Mugma area within the State of Jharkhand, we are of the
opinion that only because the head office of the appellant
Company was situated in the State of West Bengal, the same
by itself will not confer any jurisdiction upon the Calcutta
High Court, particularly when the head office had nothing to
do with the order of punishment passed against the
respondent.”
35.
The aforesaid principle also stands reiterated by the Division Bench of
this Court in J. Balaji v. The Hindu New Delhi and Anr., LPA 640/2022,
decided on 29.08.2023, wherein it was reiterated that once a workman
accepts transfer to a new place of posting and joins duty there, the situs of
employment shifts to the new location. Consequently, where the services of
the workman are terminated from the new place of posting, the Delhi Courts
lose territorial jurisdiction. The Division Bench further clarified that the
mere existence of an office of the employer at Delhi or the circumstance that
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the workman may have previously worked at Delhi would not, by itself,
confer territorial jurisdiction upon the Delhi Courts.
36.
Keeping the aforesaid legal principles in view, this Court proceeds to
examine the factual matrix of the present case.
37.
A perusal of Para 3 of the statement of claim filed by the
Petitioner/workman before the learned Labour Court leaves little room for
ambiguity. The Petitioner/workman specifically pleaded that on 27.11.2009
he was working with M/s Enicar Machine (India) at B-616, Nehru Ground,
Faridabad, Haryana and that the management directed him not to attend
duties with effect from 28.11.2009. The said averment forms the very
foundation of the industrial dispute raised by the Petitioner/workman.
38.
The aforesaid pleading assumes significance for more than one
reason. Firstly, it constitutes a categorical admission regarding the situs of
employment of the Petitioner/workman at the relevant point of time.
Secondly, the alleged oral termination itself is stated to have taken effect at
Faridabad, Haryana.
Thirdly, it is not even the case of the
Petitioner/workman in the statement of claim that M/s Enicar Machines
(India) was operating from Delhi at the relevant time or that the
Petitioner/workman was discharging duties at Delhi immediately prior to the
alleged termination. On the contrary, the Petitioner/workman specifically
asserted the situs of his employment at Faridabad.
39.
In the considered opinion of this Court, once the Petitioner/workman
himself admitted that he was discharging duties at Faridabad, Haryana on
the date of alleged termination and that the alleged termination operated
there, the learned Labour Court cannot be faulted for holding that the
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industrial dispute substantially arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the
State of Haryana.
40.
An admission made in pleadings is a judicial admission of the highest
order. It is well settled that a party is bound by its pleadings and ordinarily
cannot be permitted to travel beyond the same in an attempt to improve or
alter the nature of their case. In Nagindas Ramdas v. DalpatramIchharam
alias Brijram, (1974) 1 SCC 242, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
admissions contained in pleadings constitute substantive evidence and stand
on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions.
41.
In the present case, the Petitioner/workman, having himself pleaded
Faridabad as the place of employment and the place where the alleged
termination operated, cannot now be permitted to contend before this Court
that the learned Labour Court erred in proceeding on the very factual
foundation laid by the Petitioner/workman himself. A litigant cannot be
permitted to approbate and reprobate simultaneously.
42.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner/workman sought to rely upon
certain documentary material, namely delivery challans of the year 1980 and
a bill of the year 1996, in order to contend that the respondent/management
had its office and business operations at Delhi and, therefore, the
Government of NCT of Delhi possessed territorial jurisdiction to make the
reference.
43.
This Court is unable to attach any determinative significance to the
aforesaid documents for more than one reason:
(i) Firstly, The delivery challans relied upon by the Petitioner/workman
pertain to the year 1980 and the bill relied upon pertains to the year
1996. Both sets of documents precede the alleged termination in
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November 2009 by several years. The existence of a business address at
Delhi at some anterior point of time does not establish that the industrial
dispute which arose in November 2009 had any direct, proximate or
substantial nexus with Delhi at the relevant point of time. The relevant
inquiry for determining territorial jurisdiction is not whether the
management at some point of time carried on business from Delhi, but
whether the industrial dispute itself substantially arose within the
territorial jurisdiction of Delhi when the cause of action accrued. The
said documents do not answer the aforesaid question in favour of the
Petitioner/workman.
(ii) Secondly, the management witness specifically deposed before the
learned Labour Court that the registered office of the management was
situated at 94, DLF Industrial Estate, Faridabad, Haryana. No
contemporaneous document was produced by the Petitioner/workman to
controvert the said deposition or to establish that the management was
being controlled or supervised from Delhi at the relevant point of time.
In the absence of any such evidence, old documents reflecting Delhi
addresses cannot displace the admitted factual position emerging from
the pleadings of the Petitioner/workman himself.
(iii) Thirdly, as the legal position now stands authoritatively settled, the
mere existence of a head office, branch office or business establishment
at Delhi would not ipso facto confer territorial jurisdiction upon the
Labour Court at Delhi where the employment and alleged termination of
the workman were admittedly situated elsewhere. As held by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Eastern Coalfields Ltd. and Others v.
Kalyan Banerjee (supra) and reiterated by the Division Bench of this
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Court in J. Balaji v. The Hindu New Delhi and Anr. (supra), the
determinative factor remains the situs of employment and the place
where the industrial dispute substantially arose.
44.
It was also argued on behalf of the Petitioner/workman that the
respondent/management had been operating multiple concerns under the
same management from Delhi and that the Petitioner/workman had served
all such establishments over several decades. This Court finds that even if
the said factual assertion is accepted for the sake of argument, the same
would not materially advance the case of the Petitioner/workman on the
issue of territorial jurisdiction. The critical question for determination is not
where the Petitioner/workman may have worked at some anterior point of
time or how many establishments the management operated, but where the
employment subsisted and where the industrial dispute arose at the relevant
point of time. The answer to that question, on the Petitioner/workman’s own
pleadings, is clearly Faridabad, Haryana.
45.
This Court also does not find merit in the submission advanced on
behalf of the Petitioner/workman that the learned Labour Court, having
returned a finding on Issue No. (iv) pertaining to territorial jurisdiction,
nevertheless ought to have proceeded to adjudicate the remaining issues on
merits. Jurisdiction is not a mere procedural technicality. It goes to the very
root of the authority of the adjudicatory forum to entertain and decide the
dispute.
46.
Once the learned Labour Court arrived at the conclusion that the
Government of NCT of Delhi was not the “appropriate Government”
competent to make the reference under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the
very foundation of the adjudicatory proceedings stood displaced. Any
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adjudication on merits thereafter would itself have been rendered without
jurisdiction. The learned Labour Court, therefore, acted in consonance with
settled principles of law in declining to adjudicate the remaining issues once
it came to the conclusion that the reference itself was incompetent for want
of territorial jurisdiction. In this regard, reference may also be made to the
settled principle enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kiran Singh
v. Chaman Paswan AIR 1954 SC 340 , wherein it was held that a defect of
jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the Court and any adjudication
rendered without jurisdiction is a nullity in the eyes of law.
47.
Before concluding, this Court also deems it appropriate to notice that
the impugned Award was passed on 03.07.2015 and published on
19.11.2015, whereas the present writ petition came to be instituted only on
06.09.2016, that is, after a considerable delay. No application seeking
condonation of delay or explaining the delay in approaching this Court has
been placed on record
48.
It is trite that jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India is discretionary in nature. Though no rigid period of limitation governs
the exercise of writ jurisdiction, a litigant approaching the writ Court after
unexplained and substantial delay cannot claim relief as a matter of right.
The doctrine of laches is founded upon considerations of diligence, equity
and finality.
49.
However, since the matter has been heard extensively on merits and
this Court has independently examined the legality and correctness of the
impugned Award, this Court does not deem it appropriate to non-suit the
Petitioner/workman solely on the ground of delay. The unexplained delay is,
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nevertheless, an additional factor disentitling the Petitioner/workman to any
discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
50.
It is equally well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court does not sit as a Court of
appeal over findings recorded by the Labour Court. Interference is warranted
only where the findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence,
suffering from patent illegality or vitiated by jurisdictional infirmity.
51.
In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a writ of certiorari can be issued only
where the inferior tribunal acts without jurisdiction, commits an error
apparent on the face of the record or arrives at findings based on no
evidence. The High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, cannot
re-appreciate evidence as an appellate forum.
52.
In the present case, this Court finds that the conclusion arrived at by
the learned Labour Court is founded upon the pleadings and evidence placed
before it. The learned Labour Court has considered the statement of claim,
the evidence adduced by the parties and the documentary material relied
upon by the Petitioner/workman before arriving at the conclusion that the
Government of NCT of Delhi was not the “appropriate Government”
competent to make the reference.
53.
Viewed thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
impugned Award dated 03.07.2015 does not suffer from any perversity,
patent illegality or jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference in
exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Signed By:KAPIL
KUMAR
15:09:09
W.P.(C) 9849/2016
CONCLUSION:
54.
For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the learned Labour Court rightly held that the Government of NCT of
Delhi was not the “appropriate Government” competent to refer the
industrial dispute between the parties for adjudication under the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. The situs of employment of the Petitioner/workman at
the time of the alleged termination was admittedly at Faridabad, Haryana
and the industrial dispute substantially arose within the territorial
jurisdiction of the State of Haryana. The documents relied upon by the
Petitioner/workman do not establish any contemporaneous or substantial
nexus between the dispute in question and the territory of Delhi.
55.
This Court further holds that the findings returned by the learned
Labour Court are based upon proper appreciation of the pleadings, evidence
and settled legal principles governing territorial jurisdiction and the concept
of “appropriate Government” under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The
impugned Award neither suffers from perversity nor from any patent
illegality or jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference in exercise of
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
56.
Consequently, the impugned Award dated 03.07.2015 passed by the
learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. XIX, Karkardooma Courts,
Delhi in LIR No. 30/2012 is hereby upheld.
57.
It is, however, clarified that dismissal of the present writ petition shall
not preclude the Petitioner/workman from availing such remedies as may be
available to him in accordance with law before the appropriate forum and
the appropriate Government having jurisdiction, if so advised and if not
otherwise barred by law.
Signed By:KAPIL
KUMAR
15:09:09
W.P.(C) 9849/2016
58.
The writ petition is accordingly dismissed along with pending
application(s), if any. There shall be no order as to costs.
SHAIL JAIN
JUDGE
MAY 11, 2026
DG
Signed By:KAPIL
KUMAR
15:09:09
W.P.(C) 9849/2016
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