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2026:HHC:36011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMPMO No.742 of 2025
Reserved on: 18.08.2026
Decided on: 25.08.2026
Uploaded on : 25.08.2026
Rajesh Verma & Ors.
…Petitioners
Versus
Narender Rana @ Bittu Rana
…Respondent
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
_______________________________________________________________
For the petitioners
:
Mr. Shubham Sood, Advocate.
For the respondent
:
Mr. Sunil Mohan Goel, Senior
Advocate, assisted by Mr.
Abhijit
Singh
Chauhan,
Advocate.
__________________________________________________________
Virender Singh, Judge
Petitioners have filed the present petition, under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order
dated
06.11.2025,
passed
by
the
Court
of
learned
Additional District Judge, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P,
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’), in Civil Suit
No.01 of 2024, titled as Narender Rana @ Bittu Rana
versus Rajesh Verma and others.
Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2026:HHC:36011
2.
By way of order dated 06.11.2025, the learned
trial Court, has dismissed the application, filed by the
petitioners, under Order 7, Rule 10 of CPC.
3.
For the sake of convenience, the parties to the
present lis, are, hereinafter referred to, in the same
manner, as were, referred to, by the learned trial Court.
4.
Factual
position,
as
emerges
from
the
documents annexed, with the petition, may be summed up,
as under:4.1.
Plaintiff-Narender Rana @ Bittu Rana, has filed
the suit for mandatory injunction, directing the defendants
to return the balance Gold weighing 1020 grams, having
been deposited with the defendants, by the plaintiff, under
the Kitty Scheme, started w.e.f. 19.03.2022 to 26.06.2023
and in the alternative, he has sought the relief of recovery
of Rs.65,28,000/-, being the price of the said gold, along
with interest @ 18 % per annum, from the date of suit till
its realization.
4.2.
The said suit has been filed, on the ground, that
the plaintiff deals in the business of Gold Jewellery, under
the name and style of sole proprietorship M/s Rana
Jewellery
Empire
at
Main
Bazaar,
Bhuntar,
Tehsil
2026:HHC:36011
Bhuntar, District Kullu, H.P. Defendants are running joint
business
under
manufacturers
the
and
name
and
wholesalers
style
at
Lal
of
NL
Jewels
Bazaar
Gali
Bhattan, Wazir Market, Gali Bhattal, Jallandhar, City
Punjab.
4.3.
Parties to the lis were having the cordial
relations and the defendants had approached the plaintiff
at his Shop at Bhuntar and allured him to join Kitty
scheme, being organized by them.
As per the scheme
explained by them, the plaintiff has to deposit specified
quantity of Gold within specified time, then, the said Gold
was supposed to be returned to the plaintiff, as per his
claim and demand.
4.4.
The plaintiff has consented to the above scheme
and had deposited 2333.910+489.140 grams of gold, total
2823.05 grams, within a period w.e.f. 19.03.2022 to
26.06.2023 and out of the same, defendants have returned
1803.05 grams gold to the plaintiff, up to 27.07.2023 as
per his requirement.
The defendants were required to
return 1020 grams gold to the plaintiff, as on 27.07.2023.
Thereafter, the defendants had not responded to the
repeated calls made by the plaintiff to demand the said
2026:HHC:36011
gold.
Thereafter, the plaintiff served the legal notice on
04.10.2023, calling upon the defendants, either to return
the gold or to pay the price of the same, within a period of
15 days of the receipt of the notice.
5.
On the basis of the above facts, plaintiff has
sought the relief, as claimed, in the petition.
6.
When,
put
to
notice,
the
defendants
put
appearance and filed the application, under Order 7, Rule
10 of CPC for dismissal of the suit.
The said relief has
been sought, on the ground that the suit of the plaintiff is
false, frivolous and against the public policy; as from the
averments made in the plaint, no transactions allegedly
have taken place, within the jurisdiction of the learned trial
Court.
6.1.
Relying upon the provisions of Order 7, Rule 10
of CPC, it is the further case of the defendants that no
cause of action took place, within the territorial jurisdiction
of District Kullu, as such, the learned trial Court has no
territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit.
Raising the question of territorial jurisdiction, a prayer has
been made under Order 7, Rule 10 of CPC, to dismiss the
suit.
6.2.
2026:HHC:36011
This said application has been contested, by the
plaintiff by filing reply, that the application is not
maintainable, as the same has been filed, just to prolong
the adjudication of the case.
Factual position, regarding
filing of the present suit has also not been disputed, but,
according to the plaintiff, the contents of the application
have been controverted, by pleading that the learned trial
Court has the territorial jurisdiction to try and decide the
suit, as the cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff to
file the present suit, within the territorial jurisdiction of
this Court.
7.
The learned trial Court has dismissed the said
application, vide order dated 06.11.2025.
8.
The said order has been assailed by way of the
present petition.
9.
The defendants have moved the application,
under Order 7, Rule 10 of CPC, for dismissal of the suit,
whereas, provisions of Order 7, Rule 10 CPC deals with the
situation, where, the Court is not having the territorial
jurisdiction and Court may return the suit to the plaintiff
to present the same, before the appropriate Court.
2026:HHC:36011
10.
Even otherwise, the relief, under Order 7, Rule
10 of CPC, has been sought, on the ground, that no cause
of action took place at Kullu, as such, the Court, in which
the suit has been filed is stated to be having no territorial
jurisdiction
to
entertain,
try
and
decide
the
suit.
Defendants are seeking the relief, on the basis of provisions
of Section 20 of CPC. The said provisions are reproduced,
as under:“20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside
or cause of action arises.—Subject to the limitations
aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within
the local limits of whose jurisdiction—
(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there
are more than one, at the time of the commencement of
the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on
business, or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one,
at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and
voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally
works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave
of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside,
or carry on business, or personally works for gain, as
aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or
(c) The cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
[Explanation].—A corporation shall be deemed to carry
on business at its sole or principal office in [India] or, in
respect of any cause of action arising at any place where
it has also a subordinate office, at such place.”
11.
To decide the question of jurisdiction, only the
averments, made in the plaint, are to be considered and
not the probable defence raised by the defendants.
The
plaintiff has sought the relief of mandatory injunction and
in the alternative, a suit for recovery. As per the provisions
of Section 20 of CPC, as reproduced above, the cause of
2026:HHC:36011
action must have accrued to the plaintiff wholly or partly,
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, in which suit
has been filed. The term ‘cause of action’ denotes a bundle
of essential facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to
prove, before he can succeed, in any suit or which, gives
the plaintiff a right to sue or seek relief, against the
defendants.
12.
The term ‘cause of action’ has elaborately
been discussed by the Privy Council, in the year 1922, in
Muhammad
Hafiz and
Zakariya and others,
another
versus
Muhammad
reported in, 1922 Privy Council
23. The relevant extract of the judgment, is reproduced, as
under:“Their Lordships think, therefore, that the rule
covers the present dispute, and it is only necessary, in
deference to the careful argument that is placed
before the Board, to refer to one or two of the
authorities to which the learned counsel called
attention. The first was Mussummat Chand Lour v.
Partab Singh, 151, All 156 and that can be dealt with
very simply. In that case what happened was that a
Hindu widow having sold the whole of the estate and
a suit being instituted to set aside the sale, the
proceedings were objected to upon the ground that
before the sale was effected other proceedings were
instituted to obtain an injunction to prevent the sale
taking place. It was pointed out that the actual cause
and circumstances which gave rise to the dispute
were different in both cases, because in the old all
that could be alleged was an intention, and all the
relief that could be sought was an injunction. In the
other, the matter alleged was an act done and the
relief sought was the restoration of the property that
had been sold. In the case of The Rajah of Pittapur
vs. Sir Rajah Venkata Mahipastisurya 12 I, A., 116 it
2026:HHC:36011
is said that the cause of action means the cause of
action for which the suit is brought and it does not
say that every suit includes every cause of action.
Their Lordships see no reason to attempt to qualify
or to extend those words, because they are in fact
nothing but a repetition of the exact words of the
Code; the cause of action is the cause of action,
which gives occasion to and forms the foundation of
the suit, and if that cause enables a man to ask for
larger and wider relief than that to which he limits
his claim, he cannot afterwards seek to recover the
balance by independent proceedings. The case of
Yasvant v. Vithal (1985) I.L.R., 21 Bom., 267 really
illustrates this view for there the learned Judge held
that both the causes of action and the remedies were
distinct.”
13.
Similar view has again reiterated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in a case titled as A.B.C. Laminart Pvt.
Ltd. and another versus A.P. Agencies Salem, reported
in (1989) 2 Supreme Court Cases 163.
The relevant
paragraphs-11 to 15 of the judgment, are reproduced, as
under:“11. The jurisdiction of the Court in matter of a
contra ct will depend on the situs of the contract and
the cause of action arising through connecting
factors.
12. A cause of action means every fact, which, if
traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to
prove in order to support his right to a judgment of
the Court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts
which taken with the law applicable to them gives the
plaintiff a fight to relief against the defendant. It must
include some act done by the defendant since in the
absence of such an act no cause of action can
possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual
infringement of the fight sued on but includes all t he
material facts on which it is founded. It does not
comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts, but
every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to
enable him to obtain a decree. Everything which if
not proved would give the defendant a fight to
immediate judgment must be part of the cause of
2026:HHC:36011
action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence
which may be set up by the defendant nor does it
depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by
the plaintiff.
13. Under section 20(c) of the Code of Civil
Procedure subject to the limitation stated theretofore,
every suit shall be instituted in a court within the
local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action,
wholly or in pa rt arises. It may be remembered that
earlier section 7 of Act of 1888 added Explanation III
as under:
"Explanation III--In suits arising out of contract the
cause of action arises within the meaning of this
section at any of the following places, namely:
(1) the place where the contract was made;
(2) the place where the contract was to be performed
or performance thereof completed;
(3) the place where in performance of the contract
any money to which the suit relates was expressly or
impliedly payable."
14. The above Explanation III has not been omitted
but nevertheless it may serve a guide. There must be
a connecting factor.
15. In the matter of a contract there may arise causes
of action of various kinds. In a suit for damages for
breach of contract the cause of action consists of the
making of the contract, and of its breach, so that the
suit may be filed either at the place where the
contract was made or at the place where it should
have been performed and the breach occurred. The
making of the contract is part of the cause of action.
A suit on a contract, therefore, can be filed at t he
place where it was made. The determination of the
place where the contract was made is part of the Law
of Contract. But making of an offer on a particular
place does not form cause of action in a suit for
damages for breach of contract. Ordinarily,
acceptance of an offer and its intimation result in a
contract and hence a suit can be filed in a court
within whose jurisdiction the acceptance was
communicated. The performance of a contract is part
of cause of action and a suit in respect of the breach
can always be filed at the place where the contract
should have performed or its performance completed.
If the contract is to be performed at the place where
it is made, the suit on t he contract is to be filed there
and nowhere else. In suits for agency actions the
cause of action arises at the place where the contract
2026:HHC:36011
of agency was made or the place where actions are to
be rendered and payment is to be made by the agent.
Part of cause of action arises where money is
expressly or impliedly payable under a contract. In
cases of repudiation of a contract, the place where
repudiation is received is the place where the suit
would lie. If a contract is plead ed as part of the
cause of action giving jurisdiction to the Court where
the suit is filed and that contract is found to be
invalid, such part of cause of the action disappears
The above are some of the connecting factors.”
14.
Being guided by the above decisions, now, this
Court would proceed further to ascertain whether, any part
of cause of action had accrued to the plaintiff to file the
suit, before the learned trial Court. In Para-3 of the suit
filed by the plaintiff, is reproduced, as under:“That the plaintiff is having good and cordial
relations with the defendants due to gold business.
Due to these relations, the defendants approached
the plaintiff at his shop/place of business at Bhuntar
District Kullu, H.P. and allured the plaintiff to join
“Kitty Scheme” being organized by the defendants
and also given various allurements of profits in it. In
this regard, both the parties remained confabulated
in their phone numbers and they hare having their
whatsapp.”
15.
On the basis of the stand, as taken in para-3,
as reproduced, herein-above, the plaintiff has pleaded
cause of action, in para-12, by asserting that the same has
accrued to him to file the present suit, within the
jurisdiction of the Court.
16.
The
learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
defendants could not point out any averment, in the plaint,
2026:HHC:36011
which shows that the cause of action has not accrued,
within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned trial Court.
The mere fact that the defendants are operating from
Jallandhar does not oust the jurisdiction of the learned
trial Court to try and decide the matter, as the contract to
join the Kitty scheme was materialized at Bhuntar, in the
business premises of the plaintiff.
17.
From
a
bare
reading
of
the
plaint,
the
defendants have failed to make out a case in their favour,
to demonstrate that the learned trial Court lacked
jurisdiction to try and adjudicate the matter.
18.
So far as the case law laid down by Delhi High
Court, in case titled as Unimers India Limited versus The
IFCL Limited and others,
I.A. No.13000/2010, in CS
(OS) No.1656 of 2009, is concerned, with due respect to
the law laid down by the Delhi High Court, the said
decision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of
the
present
case,
as
the
very
basis
of
the
oral
agreement/contract, which has been relied upon by the
plaintiff, had taken place between the parties at Bhuntar.
19.
Even otherwise, the defendants are before this
Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and
2026:HHC:36011
the powers of this Court, under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, have duly been explained, by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in “K. Valarmathi & Ors. Versus
Kumaresan, 2025 INSC 606” has elaborately discussed
the scope of interference. Relevant para 9 of the judgment,
is reproduced, as under:
“Essence of the power under Article 227 being
supervisory, it cannot be invoked to usurp the original
jurisdiction of the court which it seeks to supervise. Nor
can it be invoked to supplant a statutory legal remedy
under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. For example,
existence of appellate remedy under Section 96 of the
Code operates as a near total bar to exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.”
20.
In a recent decision in “Nandi Infrastructure
Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. Versus B. Gurappa
Naidu & Ors., 2026 INSC 434”, the scope of interference
has again been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Relevant paragraph 35 of the judgment, is reproduced, as
under:“35. In short, the principles laid down in the above
matters is as follows:
a)
The power of superintendence under Article 227 is
not to be exercised unless there has been an (a)
unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in
Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an
unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in
Courts or tribunals.
b)
It is also well settled that the High Court while
acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an
appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of
that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is
not apparent on the face of the record.
c)
The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction
does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate,
2026:HHC:36011
reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the
determination under challenge is based. Supervisory
jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a
legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be
supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own
decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior
court or tribunal.”
21.
Judging the facts and circumstances of the
present case, in the light of the above decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is not able to record the
findings that the learned trial Court has wrongly exercised
the jurisdiction vested in it, as the learned trial Court has
considered the pleadings of the plaintiff and thereafter,
concluded that the application, moved by the defendants
deserves to be dismissed, as such, those findings do not
call for any interference by this Court.
22.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stands
disposed of.
23.
Any of the observations made hereinabove shall
not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of
the case, as these observations are confined only to the
disposal of the present petition.
August 25, 2026
(subhash sharma)
(Virender Singh)
Judge
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