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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No739 of 2025
Date of Decision: 24.4.2026
_____________________________________________________________________
Raja Jai Sayal
……...Petitioner
Versus
Rakesh Kathuria
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Jai Ram Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondent:
Mr. Vinod Kumar Soni, Advocate.
___________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition, lays challenge to judgment
dated 26.11.2025, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (II)
Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal
Appeal No.21-K/X/2023, affirming the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 29.11.2023/4.12.2023, passed by the learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate Kangra, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh in
Complaint No. 85-III/2016, whereby the learned trial Court while holding
the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted
and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six
months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 12.00 lakh to the
complainant.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are
2.
that respondent/complainant lodged complaint under Section 138 of the
Act before the competent court of law, stating therein that accused with a
view to discharge his liability issued cheque bearing No.001879 dated
23.2.2015 amounting to Rs. 9,00,000/- in favour of the complainant,
however aforesaid cheque on its presentation to the bank concerned was
dishonoured with remarks “funds insufficient”. Immediately, after receipt
of aforesaid return memo, complainant served legal notice upon the
accused, thereby calling upon him to make the payment good within
stipulated time. Though aforesaid notice was received by the accused, but
neither he replied to the same nor deposited the amount and as such,
complainant had no option but to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of
the Act in the competent court of law.
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
3.
by
the
respective
29.11.2023/4.12.2023,
parties,
held
the
vide
judgment/order
petitioner-accused
guilty
of
dated
having
committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and
accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per the description given
herein above.
4.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of
conviction recorded by the court below, petitioner-accused preferred an
appeal before the learned first appellate Court, but the same was dismissed
vide judgment dated 26.112025. In the aforesaid background, accused has
approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to setaside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the
court below.
5.
Vide
order
dated
1.1.2026,
this
Court
suspended
the
substantive sentence imposed by the court below, subject to petitioner’s
depositing 30% of the compensation amount and furnishing personal
bonds in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with the trial Court, within four weeks.
Though afore order was complied with, but thereafter despite repeated
opportunity, petitioner failed to pay the remaining amount and as such,
this Court is compelled to decide the petition on merit.
6.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned in the judgment
impugned in the instant proceedings, this Court is not persuaded to agree
with learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that courts below have
failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather this Court
finds that both the courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of
the matter very meticulously and there is no scope of interference.
7.
In the case at hand, at no point of time, petitioner-accused
denied factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signature
thereupon, rather he attempted to carve out a case that cheque in question
was issued as security and same was misused by the complainant,
however, such defence never came to be probablised by leading cogent and
convincing evidence. Once factum with regard to issuance of cheque as
well as signature thereupon never came to be disputed, no illegality can be
said to have been committed by the courts below while invoking Sections
118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which clearly provide that
there shall be presumption available in favour of the holder of the cheque
that same was issued in discharge of the lawful liability. No doubt,
aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but for that purpose, accused is/was
under obligation to raise probable defence. Probable defence could be
raised by the accused by referring to the documents as well as evidence
adduced on record by the complainant or by leading some cogent and
convincing evidence. However, in the case at hand, accused, despite ample
opportunities, failed to raise the probable defence.
8.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence
comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to
25 of the judgment herein:
“23.
Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of
Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a
reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the
legislative
objective
of
improving
the
credibility of
negotiable
instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong
criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent
undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further
observed that it must be remembered that the offence made
punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory
offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a
civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties
involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of
proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of
reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected
to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further
observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to
rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for
doing so is all preponderance of probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable
defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused
can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to
raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the
accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If
however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a
probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable
debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section
139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play
if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by
the complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to
qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a
statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to
avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered
by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of
such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment
within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the
amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour
constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases,
the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or
liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a
matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the
evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption
that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for
a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial
judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where
there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of
funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed
in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”
9.
In the case at hand, complainant in order to prove his case
examined himself as CW4 and Sh. Dalip Singh, Manager, Corporation bank
Kangra as CW1, Sh. Arun Kumar, Chaudhary Advocate, as CW2 and Sh.
Vikas Thakur as CW3.
Besides above, he also tendered in evidence the
documents i.e. cheque Ext.CW1/A, return memo Ext.CW1/B, legal notice
Ext.CW2/A, postal receipt Ext.CW2/B, account statement Ext.CW3/A,
sworn affidavit Ext.CW4/A, return memo Ext.CW4/B and copies of ledger
Ext.CW4/C. Complainant while deposing as CW4 categorically stated that
accused had a liability of Rs. 9.00 lakh and with a view to discharge the
same, he issued cheque in question for a sum of Rs. 9.00 lakh, which was
dishonoured vide return memo Ext.CW4/B on account of insufficient
funds.
He also successfully proved on record that before initiating
proceedings under the Act, he served the accused with legal notice
Ext.CW2/A, but neither legal notice was replied nor amount was paid.
10.
Though accused in his statement recorded under Section 313
CrPC denied the case of the complainant in toto, but despite opportunity, he
failed to lead any evidence. Cross-examination conducted upon this witness
nowhere suggests that petitioner-accused was able to extract something
contrary to what this witness stated in examination-in-chief, rather by
putting certain suggestions to the complainant, petitioner accused virtually
admitted factum of his having issued cheque as well as signature
thereupon.
Accused proposed to set up a defence that he had issued a
blank security cheque to brother of the complainant and on the date of
presentation of the cheque, there was no legal liability towards him.
Though accused attempted to set up a case that cheque in question was
issued to the brother of the complainant as security, but such defence of
him never came to be probablised by leading cogent and convincing
evidence and as such, both the courts below rightly invoked Sections 118
and 139 of the Act.
Besides above, accused raised further defence that
complainant used to operate a committee and committee members used to
issue cheques as security, however aforesaid defence was also not proved
by examining any of the committee members, who had allegedly issued
security cheque.
11.
If the pattern of cross-examination conducted upon afore
witness is seen, there is no denial with regard to issuance of cheque but an
attempt has been made by the accused to carve out a case that cheque
retained as security by the respondent/complainant has been mis-used.
Though aforesaid defence attempted to be established never came to be
probablised by leading cogent and convincing evidence, but even otherwise,
cheque issued as security can always be presented for realization of the
amount for which such security was issued, especially when principal
amount, for which, security cheque was issued, was not paid.
12.
By now it is well settled that dishonour of cheque issued as
security can also attract offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State
of Jharkhand, Criminal Appeal No. 1269-1270 of 2021, decided on
28.10.2021, has held as under:
“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction
cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every
circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state of being safe
and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of
payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the
fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction are
bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower
agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a
cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is
not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no
other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the
payment of amount, the cheque which is issued as security would
mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be
entitled to present the same. On such presentation, if the same is
dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and
the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow.
13.
Needless to say, expression “Security Cheque” is not a
statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act, rather
same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if any, led on
record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The Negotiable
Instruments Act
does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a
“security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would
not be maintainable as there is a debt existing in respect whereof the
cheque in question is issued, same would attract provision of Section 138
of the Act in case of its dishonour.
14.
Though learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued
that bare perusal of legal notice Ext.CW2/A suggests that same was not
signed by the complainant, but such plea of him, deserves outright
rejection being wholly untenable for the reason that once factum with
regard to issuance of cheque, may be as security, stands admitted by the
petitioner-accused, plea of non-signing of legal notice by the complainant
may not be of much relevance. In his statement recorded under Section
313 CrPC, he has admitted the acknowledgment and further accepted that
he had not replied to the notice. He also did not deny the correctness of the
notice.
15.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view
of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held
as under:-
“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying
itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,
sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting
miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be
equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated
even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would
not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence
and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has
already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge
in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the
High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage
of justice.”
16.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the
present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if
any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments,
there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power.
17.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the
process
or
miscarriage
of
justice
or
to
correct
irregularities/
incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or
illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused
has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts
below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts
below.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as
18.
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the courts
below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of
evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
19.
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
before the learned trial Court within fifteen days to serve the sentence as
awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction,
if any, stands vacated. Learned court below is also directed to release the
amount, if any, deposited before it by the accused, on filing appropriate
application by the complainant within one week. Pending applications, if
any, also stand disposed of.
April 24, 2026
(manjit)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
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