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2026:HHC:20688
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CWP No. 17519 of 2025
Reserved on: 27.04.2026
Date of Decision: 01.06.2026
Raj Kumar
...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & others.
...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Appellant
:
Mr K.S. Gill, Advocate.
For the Respondents
:
Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for setting
aside the order dated 02.09.2025 and his release on parole. It has
been asserted that the petitioner was convicted by the learned
Special Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, in Sessions Trial No. 8 of
2024 for the commission of offences punishable under Section 21
and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:20688
(NDPS) Act, 1985. He is serving his sentence in Model Central Jail,
Nahan, District Sirmour. The petitioner applied for parole to visit
his home to meet his ailing mother and minor son. This application
was rejected because his release on parole would pose a threat to
society. This rejection is unjustified. Hence the petition.
2.
The petition is opposed by filing a reply asserting that
the release of the convict is governed by Himachal Pradesh Good
Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1968 (Prisoners Act)
and H.P. Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Rules, 1969
(Prisoners Rules). The application submitted by a prisoner is
forwarded to the District Magistrate for his recommendation. The
parole can be denied to a prisoner if his release is likely to endanger
the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. In the
present case, the petitioner was convicted of the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 21 (c) read with Section 29 of the
NDPS Act and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for 14 years, pay a fine of ₹1,40,000/- and in default of payment of
fine to undergo further imprisonment for one year and four
months. The petitioner has undergone a substantive sentence of
one year, 10 months, and 25 days as of 14.11.2025. The petitioner
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had applied for 28 days' parole. His application was forwarded to
the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police, Mandi, for
their recommendation. They did not recommend the petitioner’s
release on parole because he was involved in the commission of a
heinous crime, and he was a habitual offender. His presence is
dangerous to the security of the State or prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order. The competent authority rejected the
parole application after giving it due consideration. Hence, it was
prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
3.
I have heard Mr K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State.
4.
Mr K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner’s application for parole could not
have been rejected on the ground that he was convicted of the
commission of a heinous offence. The application could have been
rejected if the petitioner’s release is likely to endanger the security
of the State or the maintenance of public order. These grounds are
not satisfied in the present case, and the competent authority erred
in rejecting the petitioner’s application. Hence, he prayed that the
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present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on
parole.
5.
Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General
for
the
respondent/State,
submitted
that
the
Superintendent of Police had specifically reported that the release
of the petitioner was likely to be prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order, which is a valid consideration. The competent
authority had rejected the parole based on this report. There is no
infirmity in the order passed by the competent authority.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
6.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
7.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asfaq
v. State of Rajasthan, (2017) 15 SCC 55: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 390: 2017
SCC OnLine SC 1092, that parole grants an opportunity to the
convict to maintain his links with society. Convicts must breathe
fresh air for at least some time. The parole should not be denied to
a convict if he maintains good conduct during incarceration and
shows a tendency to reform himself. It was observed at page 60: -
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“10. In the first instance, it would be necessary to
understand the meaning and purpose of the grant of parole.
It would be better understood when considered in contrast
with furlough. These terms have been legally defined and
judicially explained by the courts from time to time.
11. There is a subtle distinction between parole and furlough.
A parole can be defined as the conditional release of
prisoners, i.e. an early release of a prisoner, conditional on
good behaviour and regular reporting to the authorities for a
set period of time. It can also be defined as a form of
conditional pardon by which the convict is released before
the expiration of his term. Thus, the parole is granted for
good behaviour on the condition that the parolee regularly
reports to a supervising officer for a specified period. Such a
release of the prisoner on parole can also be temporary on
some basic grounds. In that eventuality, it is to be treated as
a mere suspension of the sentence for the time being,
keeping the quantum of sentence intact. Release on parole is
designed to afford some relief to the prisoners in certain
specified exigencies. Such paroles are normally granted in
certain situations, some of which may be as follows:
(i) a member of the prisoner's family has died or is
seriously ill, or the prisoner himself is seriously ill; or
(ii) the marriage of the prisoner himself, his son,
daughter, grandson, granddaughter, brother, sister,
sister's son or daughter is to be celebrated; or
(iii) the temporary release of the prisoner is necessary
for ploughing, sowing or harvesting or carrying on any
other agricultural operation of his land or his father's
undivided land actually in possession of the prisoner;
or
(iv) it is desirable to do so for any other sufficient
cause;
(v) parole can be granted only after a portion of the
sentence is already served.
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(vi) if conditions of parole are not abided by, the
parolee may be returned to serve his sentence in
prison; such conditions may be such as those of
committing a new offence, and
(vii) parole may also be granted on the basis of aspects
related to the health of the convict himself.
12. Many State Governments have formulated guidelines on
parole in order to bring out objectivity to the decisionmaking and to decide whether parole needs to be granted in a
particular case or not. Such a decision in those cases is taken
in accordance with the guidelines framed. Guidelines of
some of the States stipulate two kinds of parole, namely,
custody parole and regular parole. “Custody parole” is
generally granted in emergent circumstances, like:
(i) death of a family member;
(ii) marriage of a family member;
(iii) serious illness of a family member; or
(iv) any other emergent circumstances.
13. As far as “regular parole” is concerned, it may be given in
the following cases:
(i) serious illness of a family member;
(ii) critical conditions in the family on account of the
accident or death of a family member;
(iii) marriage of any member of the family of the
convict;
(iv) delivery of a child by the wife of the convict if there
is no other family member to take care of the spouse at
home;
(v) serious damage to the life or property of the family
of the convict, including damage caused by natural
calamities;
(vi) to maintain family and social ties;
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(vii) to pursue the filing of a special leave petition
before this Court against a judgment delivered by the
High Court convicting or upholding the conviction, as
the case may be.
14. Furlough, on the other hand, is a brief release from
prison. It is conditional and is given in case of long-term
imprisonment. The period of sentence spent on furlough by
the prisoners need not be undergone by him as is done in the
case of parole. Furlough is granted as a good conduct
remission.
15. A convict, literally speaking, must remain in jail for the
period of the sentence or the rest of his life in case he is a life
convict. It is in this context that his release from jail for a
short period has to be considered as an opportunity afforded
to him not only to solve his personal and family problems
but also to maintain his links with society. Convicts, too,
must breathe fresh air for at least some time, provided they
maintain good conduct consistently during incarceration
and show a tendency to reform themselves and become good
citizens. Thus, the redemption and rehabilitation of such
prisoners for the good of society must receive due weightage
while they are undergoing a sentence of imprisonment.
16. This Court, through various pronouncements, has laid
down the differences between parole and furlough, a few of
which are as follows:
(i) Both parole and furlough are conditional releases.
(ii) Parole can be granted in case of short-term
imprisonment, whereas furlough is granted in case of
long-term imprisonment.
(iii) Duration of parole extends to one month, whereas
in the case of furlough, it extends to fourteen days
maximum.
(iv) Parole is granted by the Divisional Commissioner,
and furlough is granted by the Deputy Inspector
General of Prisons.
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(v) For parole, a specific reason is required, whereas
furlough is meant for breaking the monotony of
imprisonment.
(vi) The term of imprisonment is not included in the
computation of the term of parole, whereas it is vice
versa in furlough.
(vii) Parole can be granted a number of times, whereas
there is a limitation in the case of furlough.
(viii) Since furlough is not granted for any particular
reason, it can be denied in the interest of society.
(See State of Maharashtra v. Suresh Pandurang
Darvakar [State of Maharashtra v. Suresh
Pandurang Darvakar, (2006) 4 SCC 776: (2006) 2
SCC (Cri) 411] and State of Haryana v. Mohinder
Singh [State of Haryana v. Mohinder Singh, (2000)
3 SCC 394: 2000 SCC (Cri) 645].)
17. From the aforesaid discussion, it follows that amongst
the various grounds on which parole can be granted, the
most important ground, which stands out, is that a prisoner
should be allowed to maintain family and social ties. For this
purpose, he has to come out for some time so that he can
maintain his family and social contact. This reason finds
justification in one of the objectives behind sentence and
punishment, namely, the reformation of the convict. The
theory of criminology, which is largely accepted, underlines
that the main objectives which a State intends to achieve by
punishing the culprit are: deterrence, prevention, retribution
and reformation. When we recognise reformation as one of
the objectives, it provides justification for letting out even
the life convicts for short periods, on parole, in order to
afford opportunities to such convicts not only to solve their
personal and family problems but also to maintain their
links with society. Another objective that this theory
underlines is that even such convicts have the right to
breathe fresh air, albeit for short periods. These gestures on
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the part of the State, along with other measures, go a long
way towards the redemption and rehabilitation of such
prisoners. They are ultimately aimed at the good of society
and, therefore, are in the public interest.
18. The provisions of parole and furlough, thus, provide for a
humanistic approach towards those lodged in jails. The main
purpose of such provisions is to afford them an opportunity
to solve their personal and family problems and to enable
them to maintain their links with society. Even citizens of
this country have a vested interest in preparing offenders for
successful re-entry into society. Those who leave prison
without strong networks of support, without employment
prospects, without a fundamental knowledge of the
communities to which they will return, and without
resources, stand a significantly higher chance of failure.
When offenders revert to criminal activity upon release, they
frequently do so because they lack hope of merging into
society as accepted citizens. Furloughs or parole can help
prepare offenders for success.
19. Having noted the aforesaid public purpose in granting
parole or furlough, ingrained in the reformation theory of
sentencing, other competing public interests have also to be
kept in mind while deciding as to whether, in a particular
case, parole or furlough is to be granted or not. This public
interest also demands that those who are habitual offenders
and may have the tendency to commit the crime again after
their release on parole, or have the tendency to become a
threat to the law and order of society, should not be released
on parole. This aspect takes care of other objectives of
sentencing, namely, deterrence and prevention. This side of
the coin is the experience that a great number of crimes are
committed by the offenders who have been put back on the
street after conviction. Therefore, while deciding whether a
particular prisoner deserves to be released on parole or not,
the aforesaid aspects have also to be kept in mind. To put it
tersely, the authorities are supposed to address the question
2026:HHC:20688
as to whether the convict is such a person who has the
tendency to commit such a crime, or he is showing a
tendency to reform himself to become a good citizen.
20. Thus, not all people in prison are appropriate for the
grant of furlough or parole. Obviously, society must isolate
those who show patterns of preying upon victims. Yet
administrators ought to encourage those offenders who
demonstrate a commitment to reconcile with society and
whose behaviour shows that they aspire to live as lawabiding citizens. Thus, the parole programme should be used
as a tool to shape such adjustments.
21. To sum up, in introducing penal reforms, the State that
runs the administration on behalf of the society and for the
benefit of the society at large cannot be unmindful of
safeguarding the legitimate rights of the citizens in regard to
their security in matters of life and liberty. It is for this
reason that in introducing such reforms, the authorities
cannot be oblivious of the obligation to society to render it
immune from those who are prone to criminal tendencies
and have proved their susceptibility to indulge in criminal
activities by being found guilty (by a court) of having
perpetrated a criminal act. One of the discernible purposes of
imposing the penalty of imprisonment is to render society
immune from the criminal for a specified period. It is,
therefore, understandable that while meting out humane
treatment to the convicts, care has to be taken to ensure that
kindness to the convicts does not result in cruelty to society.
Naturally enough, the authorities would be anxious to ensure
that the convict who is released on furlough does not seize
the opportunity to commit another crime when he is at large
for the time being under the furlough leave granted to him
by way of a measure of penal reform.
22. Another vital aspect that needs to be discussed is whether
there can be any presumption that a person who is convicted
of a serious or heinous crime is to be, ipso facto, treated as a
hardened criminal. The hardened criminal would be a person
2026:HHC:20688
for whom it has become a habit or way of life, and such a
person would necessarily tend to commit crimes again and
again. Obviously, if a person has committed a serious offence
for which he is convicted, but at the same time it is also
found that it is the only crime he has committed, he cannot
be categorised as a hardened criminal. In his case,
consideration should be given as to whether he is showing
the signs to reform himself and become a good citizen, or
there are circumstances which would indicate that he has a
tendency to commit the crime again or that he would be a
threat to society. The mere nature of the offence committed
by him should not be a factor to deny the parole outright.
Wherever a person convicted has suffered incarceration for a
long time, he can be granted temporary parole, irrespective
of the nature of the offence for which he was sentenced. We
may hasten to put a rider here viz. in those cases where a
person has been convicted for committing a serious offence,
the competent authority, while examining such cases, can be
well advised to have stricter standards in mind while judging
their cases on the parameters of good conduct, habitual
offender or while judging whether he could be considered
highly dangerous or prejudicial to the public peace and
tranquillity, etc.
23. There can be no cavil in saying that a society that believes
in the worth of the individuals can have the quality of its
belief judged, at least in part, by the quality of its prisons and
services and the recourse made available to the prisoners.
Being in a civilised society organised with law and a system
as such, it is essential to ensure every citizen a reasonably
dignified life. If a person commits any crime, it does not
mean that by committing a crime, he ceases to be a human
being and that he can be deprived of those aspects of life
which constitute human dignity. For a prisoner, all
fundamental rights are an enforceable reality, though
restricted by the fact of imprisonment. [See Sunil Batra (2) v.
State (UT of Delhi) [Sunil Batra (2) v. State (UT of Delhi), (1980)
3 SCC 488: 1980 SCC (Cri) 777], Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
2026:HHC:20688
India [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] and
Charles Sobraj v. Supt., Central Jail [Charles Sobraj v. Supt.,
Central Jail, (1978) 4 SCC 104: 1978 SCC (Cri) 542].]
24. It is also to be kept in mind that by the time an
application for parole is moved by a prisoner, he would have
spent some time in jail. During this period, various
reformatory methods must have been applied. We can take
judicial note of this fact, having regard to such reformation
facilities available in modern jails. One would know by this
time as to whether there is a habit of relapsing into crime in
spite of having administered correctional treatment. This
habit, known as “recidivism”, reflects the fact that the
correctional therapy has not brought (sic) any change in the
mind of the criminal. It also shows that a criminal is
hardcore, who is beyond correctional therapy. If the
correctional therapy has not been made in itself, in a
particular case, such a case can be rejected on the aforesaid
ground, i.e. on its merits.
25. We are not oblivious of the fact that there may be
hardcore criminals who, by reason of their crime and the
methods of dealing with the crime, form associations,
loyalties and attitudes which tend to persist. There may even
be peer pressure when such convicts are out to commit those
crimes again. There may be pressure of being ostracised
from delinquent groups, which may lead them to commit the
crime again. Persistence in criminal behaviour may also be
due to personality traits, most frequently due to pathological
traits of personality, such as mental defectiveness,
emotional instability, mental conflicts, egocentrism and
psychosis. In regard to relapse or recidivism, Frank Exner, a
noted criminologist and sociologist, points out that the
chances of repeating increase with the number of previous
arrests and the interval between the last and the next offence
becomes shortened as the number of previous crimes
progresses [ Frank Exner, Kriminologie, pp. 115-120]. The
purpose of the criminological study is the prognosis of the
2026:HHC:20688
improvable occasional offenders and that of the
irredeemable habitual offenders and hardcore criminals. To
differentiate the recidivists from non-recidivists and
dangerous and hard-core criminals from occasional
criminals had been enumerated by Exner in the following
flowsheet:
(i) Hereditary weakness in the family life.
(ii) Increasing tempo of criminality.
(iii) Bad conditions in the parental home.
(iv) Bad school progress (especially in deportment and
industriousness).
(v) Failure to complete studies once begun.
(vi) Irregular work (work shyness).
(vii) Onset of criminality before 18 years of age.
(viii) More than four previous sentences.
(ix) Quick relapse of crime.
(x) Interlocal criminality (mobility).
(xi) Psychopathic personality
institutional doctor).
(diagnosis
of
an
(xii) Alcoholism.
(xiii) Release from the institution before 36 years of
age.
(xiv) Bad conduct in the institution.
(xv) Bad social and family relations during the period
of release.
At the same time, as criminality is the expression of the
“symptom” of a certain disorder in the offenders, they can
be easily reformed if they are rightly diagnosed and the
correct treatment is administered to them.
8.
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The custody certificate, placed on record, mentions that
the conduct/behaviour of the petitioner while in jail was
satisfactory.
9.
Rule 3(2) of the Prisoners Rules specifically provides
that the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police shall give
their opinion whether the temporary release on parole was
opposed on the ground that the prisoner was dangerous to the
security of the State or prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order. Therefore, the Rule only provides two grounds for opposing
the application for parole. It was laid down by the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1988 SCC
OnLine P&H 638: ILR (1989) 1 P&H 251 that the security of State is
endangered by the crimes of violence intended to overthrow the
government and not by minor breaches of public peace. Public
Order must be distinguished from law and order. It was observed at
page 255:
“7….A key to the scheme of the Act is provided by section 6,
where satisfaction of the State Government or the releasing
authority is expressly limited to endangering the security of
the State and the maintenance of public order. The
expressions “Security of State” and “Public order” occur in
Article 19(2) of the Constitution. These expressions have
been the subject matter of Judicial Consideration, and they
have acquired a precise meaning. Thus, security of the State
2026:HHC:20688
is endangered by crimes of violence, intended to over-throw
the Government, waging of war and rebellion against the
government, external aggression or war, but not by minor
breaches of public peace or tranquillity, such as unlawful
assembly, riot, affray, rash driving, promoting enmity
between classes and the like (vide Ramesh Thappar v. State of
Madras [1950 S.C.R. 594.]. The concept of ‘public order’ must
be distinguished from the popular concept of ‘law and order’
and of ‘security of State’. They refer to ‘three concentric
circles’. Law and order represent the largest circle, within
which is the next circle representing public order, and the
smallest circle represents the security of the State (Vide Ram
Manohar v. State of Bihar [(1966) 1 S.C.R. 709(746)]. Hence, an
activity which affects ‘law and order’ may not necessarily
affect public order, and an activity which may be prejudicial
to public order may not endanger the security of the State.
The twin grounds of endangering the security of the State
and public order may or may not be exhaustive of the
grounds for refusing temporary release, but these grounds
go a long way to suggest that grounds for refusal must be
these and like grounds. The apprehension that the prisoner
may indulge in violence, especially directed towards the
members of the opposite party or the witnesses on whose
testimony he was sentenced to imprisonment, does not
broadly speaking justify the refusal of the benefit of release
envisaged under the Act. This conclusion is justified because
the Act and the Rules framed thereunder contain a larger
number of in-built safeguards. To mention a few of such
safeguards, the temporary release is subject to such
conditions as may be imposed before the release. The release
is for a limited period of 4 to 6 weeks under section 3 and 3
weeks during the first year and 2 weeks during each
successive year under section 4. The temporary release under
section 4 is available only to prisoners who have been
sentenced to long terms of imprisonment of not less than 5
years. A condition precedent under section 4 is that the
prisoners must have earned at least three annual good
conduct remissions. A habitual offender, as defined in clause
2026:HHC:20688
(3) of section 2 of the Punjab Habitual Offenders (Control
and Reform) Act, 1952, or a person convicted of robbery or
dacoity or such other offences as the State Government may
by notification specify, is not entitled to be released. Under
sub-section (2) of section 8 of the Act, if a prisoner fails to
surrender himself within a period of 10 days from the date on
which he should have surrendered, he is liable to be arrested
by the police without a warrant in order to undergo the
unexpired portion of the sentence. If he surrenders within
the said period of 10 days before the Superintendent of Jail,
the prisoner is liable to be awarded any of the jail sentences
mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3) of section
8. Section 9 makes it an offence for the prisoner if he fails to
surrender within the time aforesaid, and he is liable to a
sentence of up to 2 years' Imprisonment. Elaborate
provisions have been made for constant watch on the
prisoner by the local police at the place or places where the
prisoner spends his period of parole or furlough. If the
prisoner, while on parole or furlough, commits any offence,
his release order is liable to be cancelled forthwith. These
provisions have been intended to provide adequate
safeguards to ensure that the released prisoner surrenders to
jail custody to undergo the remaining sentence, besides
ensuring that during his release, he commits no offence. The
aim of a sentence of imprisonment, especially a long-term
imprisonment, is to reform the prisoner, besides being a
deterrent to him as well as others. The aim is not to make
him more hardened, more brutal, more cunning and more
dangerous to society. (See Rakesh Kaushik v. B.L. Vig,
Superintendent, Central Jail, New Delhi [1980 Supp SCC 183:
AIR 1981 S.C. 1767]. Prisoner or detenu is not stripped of his
fundamental or other legal rights, save those which are
inconsistent with his incarceration, and if any of those rights
is violated, the Court which is to use the words of Krishna
Iyer J. (as his Lordship then was) “net a distant abstraction
omnipotent in the books but an activist institution which is
the cynosure of public hope” will immediately spring into
action and run to his rescue. (Vide Francis Coralie
2026:HHC:20688
Mullin v. Administration of Union Territory of Delhi [(1981) 1
SCC 608: AIR 1981 S.C. 746.]. One of these rights is personal
liberty. Personal liberty would include the right to socialise
with members of the family and friends, subject, of course,
to any valid prison regulations and under Articles 14 and 21,
such prison regulations must be reasonable and nonarbitrary. If any prison regulation or procedure laid down by
it regulating the right to have interviews with members of
the family and friends is arbitrary or unreasonable, it would
be liable to be struck down as invalid as being violative of
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. (Francis Coralie
Mullin), (supra). A long period of incarceration, where a
person is cut off from the established influence of the family,
tends to brutalise the prisoner and blunt his finer
sensibilities so that the end product may perhaps be more
criminal than the one at the point of entry into the jail. The
aforesaid observations made by the highest Court of the
country apply with equal force to the case under
consideration. This then is the philosophy underlying the
Act.
10.
In the present case, the report submitted by the SHO
Police Station, Joginder Nagar, to the Superintendent of Police
mentions that the police had no objection in case the petitioner
would abide by the conditions of the parole. The Superintendent of
Police submitted a report to the District Magistrate stating that the
offence punishable under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act
represents a significant threat to society, especially the youth.
Therefore, parole is not recommended in this case. The District
Magistrate mentioned that in the light of the report, the presence
of the petitioner is dangerous to the security or prejudicial to the
2026:HHC:20688
maintenance of public order. Therefore, the parole was not
recommended. The record does not show how the release of the
petitioner would be prejudicial to the security of the State or the
maintenance of public order. Simply because the petitioner was
involved in the commission of an offence punishable under the
NDPS Act cannot lead to any inference that his release would be
prejudicial to the security of the state or maintenance of public
order.
11.
It was submitted that the nature of the offence is
heinous; however, that is not a relevant consideration. It was held
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shor vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Anr. (05.08.2020 - SC Order): MANU/SCOR/34434/2020 that the
parole cannot be rejected on the ground that the crime is heinous.
It was observed:
“Merely repeating the fact that the crime is heinous and that
release of such a person would send a negative message
against the justice system in society are factors de hors
Section 2. Conduct in prison has not been referred to at all,
and the Senior Superintendent of Police and the District
Magistrate confirming that the prisoner is not
"incapacitated" from committing the crime is not
tantamount to stating that he is likely to abstain from crime
and lead a peaceable life if released from prison.
12.
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This Court held in Harbhajan Singh v. State of H.P., 2019
SCC OnLine HP 3599, that the nature of the offence cannot be a
ground to deny parole when the prisoner’s conduct shows a
tendency to reform himself. It was observed:
“17. For rejection of an application for parole, there are two
grounds set out in Section 6 of the Act. Firstly, in case a
prisoner is released, he will likely endanger the security of
the State. Admittedly, the petitioner has been convicted for
the offence committed under Section 302 IPC. But, in no way,
could it be inferred that he is likely to endanger the security
of the State, and even if so, the State has got enormous
powers to put restrictions on the petitioner to protect the
Security of the State. The second ground is the maintenance
of public order. In this regard, in the response made by the
District Magistrate, there is no reference as to whether he
made a threat to public order.
18. When these two grounds, set out in Section 6 of the Act,
are not reflected or mirrored in the report of the District
Magistrate, we have to presume that the District Magistrate
has given its report without applying its mind. When a
provision or a statute directs an officer to do a particular job
in a particular manner, it shall be the duty of that officer to
do the said job in that particular manner only. When a
District Magistrate is directed to make a report on the basis
of an assessment in an objective manner, he shall do it in
that manner only.
19. Further, the rejection by the Government or the officer
authorised by the Government should be on two grounds,
namely, when it is likely to endanger the security of the State
or the maintenance of the public order, which are lacking in
the instant case.
20. In Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, UT Delhi,
(1981) 1 SCC 608: AIR 1981 SC 746, Hon'ble Mr Justice Marshal
2026:HHC:20688
has aptly said, and we quote. “I have previously stated my
views that a prisoner does not shed his basic constitutional
rights at the prison gate, and I fully support the court's
holding that the inmate's interest of the inmate.”
21. In Kharak Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1963 SC 1295, it has been
held that life means more than mere animal existence. The
right to live is not restricted to mere animal existence. It
means something more than just physical survival.
22. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248: AIR
1978 SC 597, which was followed in Francis Coralie v. Delhi
Administration, supra, it has been held that the right to life
does not mean mere confinement to physical existence, but
it includes within its ambit the right to live with human
dignity.
23. Seeking parole/remission/premature release, or
furlough, is not a right of a detenu. However, the same has to
be considered in the light of the observations made
hereinabove. The consideration should always keep in view
the rights of the prisoners. The release of a prisoner from jail
for a short period has to be considered as an opportunity
afforded to him not only to solve his personal and family
problems but also to maintain his links with society.
Convicts, too, must breathe fresh air for at least some time,
provided they maintain good conduct during incarceration
and show a tendency to reform themselves and become good
citizens.
24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan,
(2017) 15 SCC 55, in para 15 of the judgment has held as
under:
“15. A convict, literally speaking, must remain in jail for
the period of the sentence or the rest of his life in case he is
a life convict. It is in this context that his release from jail
for a short period has to be considered as an opportunity
afforded to him not only to solve his personal and family
problems but also to maintain his links with society.
Convicts, too, must breathe fresh air for at least some
2026:HHC:20688
time, provided they maintain good conduct consistently
during incarceration and show a tendency to reform
themselves and become good citizens. Thus, redemption
and rehabilitation of such prisoners for the good of
societies must receive due weightage while they are
undergoing a sentence of imprisonment.”
25. From the discussion made hereinabove, it is clear that the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has propounded a reformative theory.
Under the said concept, an opportunity is to be granted to a
person to get himself reformed, and in case he gets himself
reformed, he will be a person to live in society. It is also
worthwhile to extract the relevant portions of paras 17 and 18 of
the said judgment herein:
“17. From the aforesaid discussion, it follows that amongst
the various grounds on which parole can be granted, the
most important ground, which stands out, is that a prisoner
should be allowed to maintain family and social ties. For this
purpose, he has to come out for some time so that he can
maintain his family and social contact. This reason finds
justification in one of the objectives behind sentence and
punishment, namely, the reformation of the convict……
18. The provisions of parole and furlough, thus, provide for a
humanistic approach towards those lodged in jails. The main
purpose of such provisions is to afford them an opportunity
to solve their personal and family problems and to enable
them to maintain their links with society…”
26. Many a time, the State takes up the ground that the prisoner
has
committed
a
heinous
offence,
and
granting
parole/remission or pre-mature release is likely to endanger
the security of the State or the maintenance of the public order.
From the above discussion, we feel that the conviction in a
serious and heinous crime cannot be the reason for denying
parole per se. Having noted the aforesaid public purpose in
granting parole or furlough, ingrained in the reformation
theory of sentencing, other competing public interests have
also to be kept in mind while deciding as to whether, in a
2026:HHC:20688
particular case, parole or furlough is to be granted or not. This
public interest also demands that those who are habitual
offenders and may have the tendency to commit the crime
again after their release on parole, or have the tendency to
become a threat to the law and order of society, should not be
released on parole. Wherever a person convicted has suffered
incarceration for a long time, he can be granted temporary
parole, irrespective of the nature of the offence for which he
was sentenced.
27. In Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), (1978) 4 SCC
161, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the behaviour of
the prisoners shows responsibility and trustworthiness, liberal
though cautious, parole will be allowed to them so that their
family ties may be maintained and inner tensions may not
further build up.
28. In Shakuntala Devi v. State of Delhi, (1996) 36 DRJ 545, it has
been held as under:
“5. In Poonam Lata v. M.L. Wadhawan, it has been held by
their Lordship that “Release on parole is a wing of
reformative process and is expected to provide opportunity to
the prisoner to transform himself into a useful citizen.”
In Inder Singh v. State, the Apex Court has devised another
humanising strategy, viz., a guarded parole release every
year, for at least a month, punctuating the total prison term,
for maintaining his family ties. A prisoner cannot maintain
his family ties by living in a small world of his own, cribbed,
cabined and confined within the four walls of the prison. In
the case of Inder Singh (supra), their lordships directed that:
—
“…….. if the behaviour of the prisoners shows
responsibility and trustworthiness, liberal though
cautious, parole will be allowed to them so that their
family ties may be maintained and inner tensions
may not further build up. After every period of one
year, they should be released on parole for two
months. ‘Their lordships further added that “Article 21
2026:HHC:20688
of the Constitution is the jurisdiction root for this legal
liberalism.”
13.
In view of the above, the present petition is allowed and
the petitioner is ordered to be released on parole for 28 days subject
to his furnishing personal bond in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- and two
surety bonds of the like amount to the satisfaction of the
Superintendent Jail, Model Central Jail Nahan, District Sirmour,
H.P. with an undertaking to maintain good conduct during the
period
of
parole
and
to
surrender
before
the
concerned
Superintendent Jail after the expiry of the period of parole. The
Probation Officer is also directed to maintain a close watch on the
activities of the petitioner and to report any deviation from the
direction issued by the Court/State Authorities.
14.
The Superintendent Jail is free to impose any other
suitable conditions at the time of the release of the petitioner.
15.
The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the
pending miscellaneous applications, if any.
1st June, 2026
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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