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2026:HHC:14728
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr.MMO No.1083 of 2025
Date of Decision: 05.05.2026
_______________________________________________________
Rahul Dadhwal & others
…….Petitioners
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & others
… Respondents
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? 1
For the Petitioners:
Mr. Yug Singhal, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar,
Additional Advocate Generals with Mr. Ravi
Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy
Advocates General, for the respondent-State.
Mr. Abhimanyu Rathour and Ms. Poonam
Gehlot, Advocates, for respondent No.3.
_______________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, Judge:
By way of instant petition filed under Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, prayer has been made on
behalf of the petitioners for quashing of FIR No.99, dated 01.06.2022,
under Sections 498-A, 406 and 34 of IPC, registered at police Station,
Baijnath, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh alongwith consequent
proceedings i.e. case titled State of Himachal Pradesh versus
Rahul Dadhwal and others, pending adjudication in the Court of
learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Baijnath, District Kangra,
Himachal Pradesh.
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2026:HHC:14728
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the
pleadings as well as other material adduced on record by the
respective parties, are that FIR, sought to be quashed in the instant
proceedings, came to be lodged at the behest of respondent No.3,
Ms. Anjali Rana (hereinafter referred to as the ‘complainant’), who
alleged that her marriage was solemnized with petitioner No.1, Sh.
Rahul Dadhwal, on 11.10.2021, as per Hindu rites and customs, at
White Rose Banquet, Sector-18 Vasundhra, Ghaziabad (U.P.)
Allegedly, on 27.02.2022, petitioners, who happen to be the husband
and in-laws of the complainant, came to the parental house of the
complainant in Himachal Pradesh, but while returning, did not take the
complainant back with them and assured her that she could return to
her matrimonial house after residing with her parents for some time.
Since none from the family of the in-laws came thereafter to take the
complainant back, she, alongwith her father, reached her matrimonial
house at Delhi on 04.04.2022, which was found locked. She further
alleged that subsequently, she came to know that her in-laws had
changed their house and petitioner No.1/husband was residing at his
maternal Uncle’s house in Shimla. She alleged that her entire
belongings were lying in possession of her in-laws. In the aforesaid
background, FIR, sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings,
came to be lodged against the petitioners. Though, after completion of
the investigation, police has already presented the challan in the
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competent court of law, but before same could be taken to its logical
end, complainant and petitioner No.1 decided to get their marriage
dissolved by way of mutual consent and accordingly filed joint petition
bearing No. HMA No.245 of 2024 under Section 13-B of the Hindu
Marriage Act before the Court of learned Additional Principal Judge
(Family Court), Palampur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh. Afore
Court, after having recorded statements of both the parties,
proceeded to dissolve the marriage interse petitioner No.1 and the
complainant by way of mutual consent (Annexure P-3). In the
aforesaid background, petitioners have approached this Court in the
instant proceedings for quashing of FIR as well as consequent
proceedings pending in the competent Court of law.
3.
Pursuant to the notices issued in the instant proceedings,
respondent-State has filed status report, wherein the facts noticed
hereinabove, have not been disputed, rather this Court has been
apprised that final challan was filed before the Court concerned on
09.12.2022 and now the case has been fixed for consideration on
charge on 16.01.2026.
4.
Mr. Abhimanyu Rathour and Ms. Poonam Gehlot,
Advocates, have put in appearance on behalf of respondentcomplainant. Above named counsel, while vehemently opposing the
prayer made on behalf of the petitioners, contended that factum of
dissolution of marriage interse petitioner No.1 and the complainant
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may not have any bearing upon the criminal case, rather same shall
be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced on record by the
prosecution.
Learned
counsel
representing
the
respondent/
complainant further argued that prior to filing of the petition at hand,
petitioners herein had filed an application for discharge before the
competent Court of law on the same grounds, but such prayer came
to be rejected. They submitted that since petitioners herein have not
laid challenge to the order passed by competent Court of law, thereby
refusing to discharge the petitioners, present petition is otherwise not
maintainable. They further submitted that statement, if any, made by
the complainant in the proceedings initiated under Section 13-B of the
Hindu Marriage Act to the effect that nothing remains to be given or
taken between the parties may not be sufficient to discharge/acquit
the petitioners for their having allegedly committed the offence
punishable under Section 498-A of IPC. They further submitted that at
the time of passing of decree under Section 13-B of the Hindu
Marriage Act, no comprehensive settlement took place interse parties,
rather statements, if any, were made at that time for the purpose of
dissolution of marriage and same cannot be used in these
proceedings filed for quashing of the FIR.
5.
To the contrary, Mr. Yug Singhal, learned counsel
representing the petitioners, vehemently argued that at the time of
passing of decree of dissolution of marriage by way of mutual
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consent, complainant had categorically stated before the Court
concerned that parties had amicably settled their dispute and at
present nothing remains to be given or taken interse them. He further
submitted that once, in terms of the compromise arrived interse
parties, marriage interse petitioner No.1 and the respondent/
complainant was dissolved by way of mutual consent, there is
otherwise no occasion, if any, to continue with the proceedings
initiated at the behest of the complainant under Section 498-A of IPC.
While making this Court peruse FIR, which is sought to be quashed in
the instant proceedings, learned counsel representing the petitioners
further argued that no case much less under Section 498-A of IPC is
made out against the petitioners. He further submitted that at no point
of time complainant ever came to be made that dowry, if any, was
ever demanded by the petitioners, rather her case was that she was
duped and cheated by the petitioners, who allegedly left her at her
parental house with the assurance that she would be taken back, but
thereafter they never returned.
6.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have
gone through the record carefully.
7.
Before ascertaining the correctness and genuineness of
the aforesaid submissions and counter submissions made on behalf
of learned counsel representing the parties, this Court deems it
necessary to discuss /elaborate upon the scope and competence of
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this Court to quash the criminal complaint as well as consequent
proceedings, while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
8.
A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case
titled State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2)
SCC 699, held that High Court, while exercising power under Section
482 Cr.P.C (now Section 528 of BNSS) is entitled to quash the
proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding
to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the
ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.
9.
Subsequently, in case titled State of Haryana and
others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the
Hon’ble Apex Court, while elaborately discussing the scope and
competence of High Court to quash criminal proceedings under
Section 482 Cr.P.C( now Section 528 of BNSS) laid down certain
principles governing the jurisdiction of High Court to exercise its
power. After passing of aforesaid judgment, issue with regard to
exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C ( now Section 528 of
BNSS), again came to be considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
case bearing Criminal Appeal No.577 of 2017 (arising out of SLP
(CrL.) No. 287 of 2017) titled Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P.
and Anr., wherein it has been held that saving of the High Court’s
inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to
2026:HHC:14728
achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. court proceedings ought not be
permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution.
10.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State
(NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, relying upon its earlier judgment
titled as Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC
330, reiterated that High Court has inherent powers under Section
482 Cr.P.C ( now Section 528 of BNSS), to quash the proceedings
against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of
committal, or even at the stage of framing of charge, but such power
must always be used with caution, care and circumspection. In the
aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court concluded that while
exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C
( now Section 528 of BNSS), Court exercising such power must be
fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that
would lead to the conclusion, that his/her defence is based on sound,
reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material adduced on record
itself overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the
accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. Besides above,
the Hon’ble Apex Court further held that material relied upon by the
accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to
dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In
such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would
persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C
2026:HHC:14728
(now Section 528 of BNSS) to quash such criminal proceedings, for
that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends
of justice. In the aforesaid judgment titled as Prashant Bharti v. State
(NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held
as under:“22. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal
proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(hereinafter referred to as “the Cr.P.C.”) has been dealt with by
this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor
wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (2013) 3 SCC 330,
paras 29-30)
29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.,
if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against
an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of
committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These
are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial.
The same parameters would naturally be available for later
stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to
hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences,
inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s
case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead
evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with
caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court
has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the
accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that
his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and
indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule
out and displace the assertions contained in the charges
levelled against the accused; and the material produced is
such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the
allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the
prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out,
reject and discard the accusations levelled by the
prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording
any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence
should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be
justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable
quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be
such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and
2026:HHC:14728
condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such
a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would
persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would
prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of
justice.
30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing
paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to
determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an
accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the
accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the
material is of sterling and impeccable quality?
30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the
accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the
charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material
is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions
contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as
would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and
condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.
30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the
accused,
has
not
been
refuted
by
the
prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such,
that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the
prosecution/complainant?
30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would
result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not
serve the ends of justice?
30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative,
judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it
to quash such criminal - proceedings, in exercise of
power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the
accused, would save precious court time, which would
otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as,
proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear
that the same would not conclude in the conviction of
the accused.”
11.
It is quite apparent from the bare perusal of aforesaid
judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court from time to time that
where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
2026:HHC:14728
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him/her due to private and personal grudge, High Court while
exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C (now Section 528 of
BNSS) can proceed to quash the proceedings.
12.
Hon’ble Apex Court in case tilted Anand Kumar
Mohatta and Anr. v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi)
Department of Home and Anr, AIR 2019 SC 210, has held that abuse
of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the
form of a charge sheet after investigation and as such, the abuse of
law or miscarriage of justice can be rectified by the court while
exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C( now Section 528 of
BNSS). The relevant paras of the judgment are as under:
16. Even otherwise it must be remembered that the provision
invoked by the accused before the High Court is Section 482
Cr. P.C and that this Court is hearing an appeal from an order
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Section 482 of Cr.P.C reads as
follows:“482. Saving of inherent power of the High Court.Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect
the inherent powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order
under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of
any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”
17. There is nothing in the words of this Section which restricts
the exercise of the power of the Court to prevent the abuse of
process of court or miscarriage of justice only to the stage of
the FIR. It is settled principle of law that the High court can
exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C even when
the discharge application is pending with the trial court ( G.
Sagar Suri and Anr. V. State of U.P. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC
636 (para 7), Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh and
Anr. (2013) 10 SCC 591 (para 20). Indeed, it would be a
travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can
be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced,
and the allegations have materialized into a charge sheet. On
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the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused
by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a
charge sheet after investigation. The power is undoubtedly
conferred to prevent abuse of process of power of any court.”
13.
Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Pramod Suryabhan
Pawar v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr, (2019) 9 SCC 608,
has elaborated the scope of exercise of power under Section 482
Cr.P.C, the relevant para whereof reads as under:“7. Section 482 is an overriding section which saves the inherent
powers of the court to advance the cause of justice. Under
Section 482 the inherent jurisdiction of the court can be
exercised (i) to give effect to an order under the CrPC; (ii) to
prevent the abuse of the process of the court; and (iii) to
otherwise secure the ends of justice. The powers of the court
under Section 482 are wide and the court is vested with a
significant amount of discretion to decide whether or not to
exercise them. The court should be guarded in the use of its
extraordinary jurisdiction to quash an FIR or criminal proceeding
as it denies the prosecution the opportunity to establish its case
through investigation and evidence. These principles have been
consistently followed and re-iterated by this Court. In Inder
Mohan Goswami v State of Uttaranchal5, this Court observed.
“23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the scope
and ambit of courts’ powers under Section 482 CrPC. Every
High Court has inherent powers to act ex debito justitiae to do
real and substantial justice, for the administration of which
alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.
Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised:
(i) to give effect to an order under the Code;
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
24. Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC though wide
have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution
and only when exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the
advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to
injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court
would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent
powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute.”
2026:HHC:14728
8. Given the varied nature of cases that come before the High
Courts, any strict test as to when the court’s extraordinary
powers can be exercised is likely to tie the court’s hands in the
face of future injustices. This Court in State of Haryana v Bhajan
Lal6 conducted a detailed study of the situations where the court
may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and laid down a list of
illustrative examples of where quashing may be appropriate. It is
not necessary to discuss all the examples, but a few bear
relevance to the present case. The court in Bhajan Lal noted
that quashing may be appropriate where, (2007) 12 SCC 1 1992
Supp (1) SCC 335
“102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose
a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police
officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2).
…….…
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused
and with a view to spite him due to private and personal
grudge.”
In deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction under Section
482, the Court does not adjudicate upon the veracity of the
facts alleged or enter into an appreciation of competing
evidence presented. The limited question is whether on the
face of the FIR, the allegations constitute a cognizable offence.
As this Court noted in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v State of
Maharashtra, 2018 SCC OnLine SC3100 (“Dhruvaram Sonar”)
:
“13. It is clear that for quashing proceedings, meticulous
analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by
the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence
is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If
the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute
the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is
open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of
its inherent powers.”
14.
Aforesaid law, clearly stipulates that court can exercise
power under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Section
2026:HHC:14728
528 of BNSS), to quash criminal proceedings, in cases, where the
allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even
if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
15.
Now being guided by the aforesaid proposition of law laid
down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would make an endeavor
to examine and consider the prayer made in the instant petition vis-àvis factual matrix of the case.
16.
Admittedly, in the case at hand, after lodging of the FIR,
sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings, petitioner No.1 and
respondent-complainant filed joint petition under Section 13-B of the
Hindu Marriage Act before the competent Court of law for dissolution
of their marriage by way of mutual consent. Court concerned, before
proceeding to pass decree of dissolution of marriage by mutual
consent, recorded the statement of petitioner No.1 as well as
complainant, wherein they both categorically stated that they had
decided to dissolve their marriage by way of mutual consent and
thereafter they would have no claim of any kind against each other.
Statement of complainant recorded on 04.04.2025 (available at page
No.30 of the paper book) clearly reveals that since petitioner No.1 and
complainant were unable to resolve their dispute despite there being
intervention of elder members of their respective families, they of their
2026:HHC:14728
own volition and consent decided to get their marriage dissolved by
way of mutual consent. At the time of making statements both the
parties categorically stated that after passing of divorce decree, they
shall have no claim of any kind against each other (“हमारा कोई लेनदे न शेष न बचा है”).
17.
It is pertinent to take note of the fact that this Court,
having taken note of divorce granted by the competent Court of law,
coupled with the prayer made in the instant petition, deemed it
necessary to summon both the parties to the Court. Pursuant to the
directions issued by this Court, both the parties came present before
this Court on 02.04.2026, on which date, it transpired that though
respondent-complainant has no objection in quashing the FIR, but
since her belongings, including gold ornaments, are yet to be returned
by the petitioners, she wants to pursue criminal case lodged at her
behest.
18.
Though, on 02.04.2026, it also came to be argued at the
behest of the respondent/complainant that there was some outside
Court settlement interse parties prior to recoding of their statements
before the Family Court, wherein petitioners had allegedly agreed to
return her gold ornaments and other belongings, but such outside
settlement, if any, adduced in writing never came to be produced
before this Court. Though, there was no document to support afore
contention raised at the behest of the respondent/complainant, but yet
2026:HHC:14728
petitioners agreed to pay sum of Rs. 1, 00,000/- in lieu of gold
ornaments, if any, however such offer was not acceptable to the
respondent-complainant. Hence, in afore background, this Court is
compelled to decide the petition at hand on its own merit.
19.
Though, learned counsel representing the respondent-
complainant repeatedly argued that on account of non-placing of
charge-sheet by the petitioners, present petition deserves dismissal,
but this Court is not persuaded to agree with him in view of the facts
and circumstances recorded hereinabove.
20.
Since facts, as have been discussed hereinabove, are
apparent and undisputed, coupled with the fact that bare reading of
the FIR placed on record, clearly suggests that no allegation of
demand of dowry, if any, ever came to be made at the behest of the
complainant, this Court sees no reason to defer the present
proceedings, enabling petitioners to place on record charge-sheet.
Otherwise also, respondent-State has filed status report, wherein
facts otherwise given in final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C, have
been reproduced. Status report, if read in its entirety, nowhere
suggests case, if any, against the petitioners under Section 498-A of
IPC.
21.
At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Section 498-
A of IPC, which reads as under:-
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498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty.—
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the
husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty
shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to three years and shall also be liable to
fine.
Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty”
means—
(a)any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to
drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury
or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical)
of the woman; or
(b)harassment of the woman where such harassment is with
a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet
any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or
is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to
meet such demand.
22.
Careful perusal of the aforesaid provisions of law clearly
reveals that whoever, being the husband or the relative of the
husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years. For the purpose of the aforesaid section, “cruelty” means any
willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the
woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life,
limb or health. Explanation (b) to Section 498-A, further provides that
harassment caused to a woman with a view to coercing her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for property or
2026:HHC:14728
valuable security, or on account of failure by her or any person related
to her to meet such demand, shall also constitute an offence
punishable under Section 498-A IPC.
23.
Careful perusal of the FIR placed on record nowhere
suggests that the petitioners ever made any demand of dowry or at
any point of time they coerced or harassed complainant for bringing
less dowry, rather precise case is that she was not taken back by the
petitioners from her parental house and when she went back to her
matrimonial house same was found to be locked. In status report, it
has come that matrimonial house of the complainant situate at Delhi
was sold by the petitioners, but such act, if any, cannot be construed
to be act of demanding dowry. Since basic ingredients of Section 498A of IPC are totally missing in the case at hand, coupled with the fact
that parties have already settled their matter by getting their marriage
dissolved by way of mutual consent and complainant as well as
petitioner in their statements recorded before the learned Family
Court have categorically stated that they shall have no claim against
each other, no fruitful purpose would be served in case criminal
proceedings initiated at the behest of the complainant are allowed to
sustain, rather that would amount to putting petitioners to ordeal of
protracted trial, which otherwise, in all probabilities, is bound to fail for
the reasons discussed hereinabove.
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24.
Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well
as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court (supra), FIR No.99, dated
01.06.2022, under Sections 498-A, 406 and 34 of IPC, registered at
police Station, Baijnath, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh as well as
consequent proceedings i.e. case titled State of Himachal Pradesh
versus Rahul Dadhwal and others, pending in the Court of learned
Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Baijnath, District Kangra, Himachal
Pradesh, are quashed and set-aside and petitioners-accused are
acquitted of the charges framed against them. Pending applications, if
any, are disposed of. Interim directions, if any, also stand vacated.
2.
May 05, 2026
(shankar)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
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