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2026:JHHC:28010-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No.86 of 2022
----- Rahul Choubey, Aged about 40 yrs S/o Sri Ramji Choubey,
R/o Village-Meru, P.O. Meru B.S.F. Camp, P.S.-Muffasil,
Dist-Hazaribagh.
…
…
Appellant
Versus
Poonam Pathak, aged about 39 years, W/o Rahul Choubey,
D/o Hrishikesh Pathak, R/o 203, Ramdas Plaza, Adarsh
Path, CDA Colony More, West Patel Nagar, P.O., P.S. & Dist Patna (Bihar).
…
…
Respondent
PRESENT
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
…..
For the Appellant
: Mr. Shekhar Prasad Gupta, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Atanu Banerjee, Amicus Curiae
…..
C.A.V. on 25.08.2026
Pronounced on 15/09/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer:
1.
The instant appeal has been filed challenging the
legality and propriety of impugned judgment passed on
16.07.2022 and decree signed on 01.08.2022 by learned
Principal Judge, Family Court, Hazaribag whereby and
whereunder the Original Suit No.148 of 2019 filed by the
appellant-husband under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 for a decree of divorce, has been
dismissed.
Factual Matrix
2.
The case of the appellant-husband, in brief as it can
be gathered from the plaint is that the Plaintiff/Appellant and
the respondent are legally married husband and wife and
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their marriage was solemnized on 21.11.2008 at Patna, Bihar
according to Hindu Rites and custom and out of the wedlock
one child has been born namely Akriti Choubey who is now
11 years old.
3.
The couple started their matrimonial life in peace and
love and she was fully respected by the mother and father of
the Appellant. However, after few days the respondent/
started going to Patna every now and then which was later
revealed by the Defendant/Respondent that her parents want
him to leave his parents and to live with them at Patna as
Gharjamai which was not accepted by the Petitioner as his
parents are already old and ailing.
4.
The respondent Poonam Pathak went to Patna on
24.02.2013
and
since
then
she
never
came
to
her
matrimonial house and on asking she used to ask the
Petitioner to live as Gharjamai and as his parents were old
and ailing and there was no one to look after them, but the
appellant always denied this demand.
5.
The respondent is now doing Job at Patna and does
not want to live at her matrimonial house and is adamant
that the appellant leaves his parents and stay at Patna as
Gharjamai. Due to this act of the respondent the appellant
has been in tremendous mental pressure and also facing
social stigma and as such he has lodged the case for decree
of divorce.
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6.
The petitioner has prayed to the court to dissolve his
marriage with the respondent by granting him decree of
divorce under the provision of section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu
Marriage Act on the ground of cruelty.
7.
For securing the appearance of the respondent,
notice
through registered
post
was
sent
and
as
per
acknowledgment, the same was duly served upon her.
Despite that when the respondent did not appear before the
court, notice was also published in the Hindi daily newspaper
“Prabhat Khabar” dated 06.03.2020 and when respondent
did not cause her appearance, ex parte proceeding has been
initiated against the respondent vide order dated 17.05.2022.
8.
The case proceeded for evidence during which the
appellant has
produced
and
examined two witnesses
including himself.
9.
The learned Principal Judge, after hearing learned
counsel for the petitioner-appellant, decided the issues of
cruelty against the appellant-husband and in favour of
respondent-wife.
10. The
appellant-husband,
being
aggrieved
with
the
judgment passed on 16.07.2022 and decree signed on
01.08.2022 by learned Principal Judge, Family Court,
Hazaribagh approached this Court by filing the instant
appeal.
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Submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing
for the appellant:
11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-husband
has taken the following ground in support of his case: (i)
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has
submitted that the order passed by learned
family court suffers from infirmities apparent on
the face of it, and as such the same is bad and
not sustainable in the eye of law.
(ii)
He has submitted that the order refusing divorce
passed by the learned Family Court in favour of
the wife (respondent herein) is palpably wrong,
manifestly
erroneous
and
demonstrably
unsustainable.
(iii) Learned counsel has further submitted that the
learned Family Court failed to appreciate on the
larger background that the respondent wife has
deserted the appellant and does not wish to
continue her matrimonial life with the appellant
and seemed not at all interested in contesting
the Title Matrimonial Suit even after receiving
the notice and also paper publication of the said
notice.
(iv)
The learned Family Court failed to appreciate the
case in its entirety and as a result a grossly
perverse finding has been given by the learned
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court below and has also erred in framing the
issue as the issue of desertion and cruelty was
not framed even though respondent has deserted
the Appellant since 2013.
(v)
Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted
that the learned Family Court was manifestly
unfair with the appellant and as such it
proceeded on an assumption and presumption
as the main issue of desertion was not framed
and also it did not take into account that asking
the appellant to leave his old and ailing parents
who are dependent on appellant's income and
settle at Patna as Gharjamai amounts to mental
cruelty.
(vi)
Learned counsel has further submitted that the
most vital mistake committed by the learned
Family Court was that no serious attempt was
made to understand the predicament of the
appellant who was being subjected to cruelty and
whose life has come to a halt and he is unable
enjoy his matrimonial rights and neither is able
to proceed further in life.
(vii) It has been submitted that the learned Family
Court failed to take note of various apex court
judgments wherein time and again the Hon'ble
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Apex Court has given guidelines in the matter of
deciding cruelty for the purpose of granting
divorce in terms of section 13(ia) of the Hindu
Marriage Act. As held by the Hon'ble Apex Court
in Narendra v. K. Meena 2016 SCC Online SC
1114 that "Persistence effort of wife to constrain
the husband to be separated from family would
be torturous and will constitute as act of Cruelty.
(viii) The learned Family Court has failed to appreciate
that the respondent wife was not ready to
cohabit with the appellant for no plausible
reason at all and the respondent has flatly
refused time and again to once again start
matrimonial life afresh with the appellant and
has deserted him and has not been residing with
the appellant since 2013 and the matrimonial
accord
has
been
severed
to
the
point
of
irretrievability.
(ix)
The learned Family Court has failed to appreciate
that when the matrimonial relationship between
the parties had earnestly broken down beyond
repair for 9 years (Approx) of marriage now and
none of the party were ready to restore ties in
any manner whatsoever then in order to avoid
multiplicity of the litigation should have had
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granted divorce to the appellant. As it was held
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Naveen
Kohli V. Neeta Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558 that
once
the
parties
have
separated
and
the
separation has continued for a sufficient length
of time and one of them has presented a petition
for divorce, it can well be presumed that the
marriage has broken down. The Court, no doubt,
should seriously make an endeavour to reconcile
the parties; yet, if it is found that the breakdown
is irreparable, then the divorce should not be
withheld. The consequences of preservation in
law of the unworkable marriage which has long
ceased to be effective are bound to be a source of
greater misery for the parties.
(x)
The learned Family Court has failed to appreciate
this fact that even after several try made by the
Appellant to bring the respondent back the
respondent was never willing and neither willing
to perform matrimonial obligation and such the
case
has
come
to
a
stage
of
irreparable
breakdown and continuation of the case will only
lead to misery of the parties.
(xi)
Learned counsel has further submitted that the
learned Family Court has failed to adduce the
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conduct of the respondent not only demonstrate
a clear intention on her part to dessert the
appellant but also her lack of sensitivity to
physical and emotional need of the appellant. It
was further held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Samar Ghosh V. Jaya Ghosh (2007)
4 SCC 511 that “We have been principally
impressed by the consideration that once the
marriage has broken down beyond repair, it
would be unrealistic for the law not to take
notice of that fact, and it would be harmful to
society and injurious to the interests of the
parties. Where there has been a long period of
continuous separation, it may fairly be surmised
that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The
marriage becomes a fiction, though supported by
a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie the law in
such cases does not serve the sanctity of
marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard
for the feelings and emotions of the parties.”
(xii) Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has
submitted that the learned Family Court has
failed
to
understand
the
conduct
of
the
respondent who has without any rhymes and
reason has deserted the appellant and did not
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even appear before the learned Family Court at
the time of hearing even after notices.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the
aforesaid
grounds,
has
submitted
that
the
judgment
impugned suffers from perversity, as such, not sustainable in
the eyes of law.
Submissions advanced by the learned Amicus Curiae
appearing for the respondent:
13. Learned counsel for the respondent-wife, defending
the impugned order, has taken the following grounds: (i)
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent-wife
has
submitted
that
the
respondent-wife has never committed any cruelty
against the petitioner and his family members
rather it is the petitioner himself and his parents
who committed cruelty against her.
(ii)
Learned
counsel
marriage
she
has
submitted
performed
all
that
the
after
marital
obligations towards the petitioner-husband and
his parents but the respondent was being
abused by her father-in-law and husband in
drunken state and that too in front of her
daughter.
(iii) Learned counsel has further submitted that after
the birth of the girl child, the appellant was not
happy and the respondent was being physically,
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mentally and economically tortured. However,
the respondent tolerated everything by remaining
silent in hope of a peaceful and happy conjugal
life in future and that is the reason she did not
take any recourse of law thinking that her
husband would one day realize his mistake.
(iv)
Learned counsel has submitted that during the
pendency of the original suit before the Family
Court, the respondent came to know that the
appellant
intended
to
solemnize
a
second
marriage. Consequently, she promptly filed an
application before the concerned Police Station,
asserting that she is the legally wedded first wife
and requesting that the appellant be restrained
and
the
proposed
marriage
ceremony
be
respondent
has
cancelled.
(v)
Learned
counsel
for
the
submitted that the respondent never thinks
about dissolution of marriage rather she wants
to live with the petitioner- husband, hence, this
suit may kindly be dismissed.
(vi)
Learned counsel for the respondent has further
submitted that learned trial court has rightly
held that the appellant is not entitled for the
decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty
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because the court did not find that there is any
serious nature of cruelty for which a decree of
divorce may be granted to the appellant.
(vii) Learned
counsel
for
the
respondent
has
submitted that the respondent still wants to live
with the appellant and ready to lead a dignified
life to which she is entitled as being wife of the
appellant.
(viii) Learned
counsel
for
the
respondent
has
submitted that the appellant-husband wants to
get married and thus the present suit has been
filed by the appellant in the garb of cruelty.
14.
Learned
aforesaid
counsel
grounds
has
for
the
respondent-wife
submitted
that
the
on
the
impugned
judgment requires no interference by this Court.
Analysis:
15. We have heard the learned counsels appearing for the
parties, gone through the Trial Court Records, as also the
impugned judgment, the testimonies of the witnesses and the
documents exhibited therein.
16. This Court, before looking into the legality and propriety
of the impugned order, requires to refer the testimonies of the
witnesses, as available on record.
17. The appellant, in support of his case, has adduced two
witnesses including himself. The relevant portion of the
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testimonies of the witnesses are mentioned as under:P.W.1 Rahul Choubey, the appellant himself, has
stated in his examination-in-chief that he was
married to Poonam Pathak on 21 November 2008
in Patna as per Hindu customs and traditions.
After marriage, they began living as husband and
wife at Meru B.S.F. Camp, Hazaribagh. After
marriage, they had a daughter named Akriti
Choubey, who was eight years old at the time of
filing the case.
In village Meru, the mother and father of the
appellant gave full respect to respondent but the
respondent started going to her maternal home in
Patna.
He has deposed that he could not understand
why his wife kept going to Patna. Later, he learned
that his wife, Poonam Pathak's parents, wanted to
keep the appellant as a gharjamai (son-in-law).
Since there was no one to care for my parents, so
he did not agree to his wife’s proposal or her
parents' wishes for a gharjamai (son-in-law).
He has stated that the respondent did not
care for his parents or do any household chores.
Their daughter was born on 28.7.2011, even
after that there was no change in the behaviour of
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the respondent towards him and his parents and
she continued to live with her parents and the
respondent never came back home to Meru.
He has further deposed that he called the
respondent and told her to come and live in the
matrimonial house, but she repeatedly told him to
come to Patna and live like a son-in-law, but it was
not possible for the appellant because appellant’s
parents are old and there is no one to take care of
them, so he rejected her request.
He has stated that on 13.05.2019, the
respondent refused to live with him in his house
and said that she did not want to have any
relationship with the appellant or his family.
The respondent-wife is working in Patna and
earning a lot, so she wants to live in Patna only.
Therefore, he is being mentally and physically
tortured by the wife/respondent and that is why he
has filed this case for a decree of divorce.
P.W.2 Ramji Chouby, the father of the
petitioner, has deposed more or less similar to the
deposition of PW-1 (appellant).
He has stated that the plaintiff/appellant
Rahul Choubey is his son whose marriage was
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solemnized with Poonam Pathak on 21.11.2008 as
per Hindu customs at Patna.
That after marriage, his son-plaintiff and
Punam Pathak-defendant came to Hazaribagh and
started living as husband and wife.
On 28.07.2011 my son was blessed with a
daughter named Akriti Choubey who is about
eleven years old now.
After marriage, Poonam Pathak treated his
and his wife with respect, and we also treated her
with respect. Subsequently, his daughter-in-law
(defendant) repeatedly tried to visit her parents'
home in Patna. Even when my son (plaintiff) tried
to stop her from going to Patna, she refused.
He
has
deposed
that
despite
repeated
warnings to Poonam Pathak, there was no change
in her behaviour and she went to Patna on
24.02.2013, thereafter she did not return to Meru,
Hazaribagh.
He has stated that everyone tried to bring her
back but she said that she would keep her
husband Rahul Choubey in Patna only and her
parents would keep him as their "gharjawai".
It has been stated that on 13.05.2019, a final
attempt was made to bring the defendant Poonam
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Pathak home, but this was unsuccessful and
defendant refused to come to Meru, Hazaribagh.
Therefore, his son (plaintiff) has filed this case.
He has deposed that at the time of marriage,
Tilak, Madwa, date of marriage and later dates for
marriage reception were fixed and marriage cards
were printed.
He has proved the marriage card in which the
date of Tilak is written as 14.11.2008, date of
marriage as 21.11.2008 and date of reception as
25.11.2008, has been printed, the same has been
marked as Ext.1.
He has lastly deposed that his son Rahul
Choubey has not solemnized second marriage.
18. Since the respondent wife has not appeared in the case,
the learned Family Judge, from the statements of the
witnesses so produced on behalf of the appellant, has come
to the conclusion that plaintiff/appellant has miserably failed
to prove the grounds of alleged cruelty pleaded by him in
his petition.
19. The appellant has taken the ground of cruelty that the
respondent-wife and her relatives wanted him to live as
Gharjamai which he did not agree since his parents are old
and there is no one to look after them.
20. The next ground of the appellant towards cruelty is that
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the respondent-wife was very frequently visiting her parental
house.
21. The learned Family Judge, from the material available
on record as also the submission made in the pleading, has
found that the element of cruelty has not been established.
The said finding of the learned Family Court has been
assailed herein by way of filing the instant appeal.
22. Herein since appellate jurisdiction has been invoked
therefore, before entering into merit of the case, at this
juncture it would be purposeful to discuss the appellate
jurisdiction of the High Court.
23. It needs to refer herein that under section 7 of the
Family Courts Act, the Family Court shall have and exercise
all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any
Sub-ordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in
force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature which
are described in the explanation to section 7(1).
24. Sub-section (1) to section 19 of the Family Courts Act
provides that an appeal shall lie from every judgment or
order not being an interlocutory order of a Family Court to
the High Court “both on facts and on law”. Therefore, section
19 of the Family Courts Act is parallel to section 96 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the scope of which has been dealt
with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in series of judgments.
25. The law is well settled that the High Court in a First
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Appeal can examine every question of law and fact which
arises in the facts of the case and has powers to affirm,
reverse or modify the judgment under question. In “Jagdish
Singh v. Madhuri Devi” (2008) 10 SCC 497 the Hon'ble
Supreme Court observed that it is lawful for the High Court
acting as the First Appellate Court to enter into not only
questions of law but questions of fact as well and the
appellate Court therefore can reappraise, reappreciate and
review the entire evidence and can come to its own
conclusion. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the
said judgment is being quoted as under:
25. It is no doubt true that the High Court was
exercising power as the first appellate court
and hence it was open to the Court to enter into
not only questions of law but questions of fact
as well. It is settled law that an appeal is a
continuation of suit. An appeal thus is a
rehearing of the main matter and the appellate
court can reappraise, reappreciate and review
the
entire
evidence—oral
documentary—and
can
come
as
well
as
to
its
own
conclusion.
28. Further, it needs to refer herein that under section 3 of
the Indian Evidence Act a fact is said to be proved when the
Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so
probable that a prudent man under the circumstances would
proceed on the supposition that such fact really exists.
Therefore, the normal rule of preponderance of probability
2026:JHHC:28010-DB
is the rule which governs the civil proceedings but herein
since grave allegation of extra-marital affair has been alleged
therefore cogent evidence is required to be laid by the
plaintiff/appellant.
29. The expression “preponderance of probability” is not
capable of exact definition nor can there be any strait-jacket
formula or a weighing machine to find out which side the
balance is tilted. The preponderance of probability would
imply a positive element about possibility of existence of a
fact. This means a higher degree of probability of happening
of something and existence of a fact.
30. In “A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur” (2005) 2 SCC 22
the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the concept, a
proof beyond the shadow of doubt, is to be applied to
criminal trials and not to civil matters and certainly not to
matters of such delicate personal relationship as those of
husband and wife. Therefore, the Court has to see what are
the probabilities in the case and legal cruelty has to be found
out, not merely as a matter of fact, but as the effect on the
mind of the complainant spouse caused by the acts or
omissions of the other.
31. Since this Court are exercising the power of appeal as
referred hereinabove and as per the settled position of law
which require the consideration of the appellate Court is that
the order/judgment passed by the appropriate Forum, if
2026:JHHC:28010-DB
suffers from perversity, the same is to be taken as a ground
for its reversal.
32. It needs to refer herein that the interpretation of the
word “perverse” as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex
Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous
consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in
Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public
Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately
discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt,
true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or
excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration
irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies
logic as so to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the
blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm
in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of
the said judgment reads as under:
“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt
with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v.
Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this
Court observed that the expression “perverse”
means that the findings of the subordinate
authority are not supported by the evidence
brought on record or they are against the
law or suffer from the vice of procedural
irregularity.
25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v.
Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court
observed that “perverse finding” means a
finding which is not only against the weight of
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evidence
but
is
altogether
against
the
evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v.
CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC
1341] the Court observed that this is not a case
where it can be said that the findings of the
authorities are based on no evidence or that
they are so perverse that no reasonable person
would have arrived at those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR
1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any
order
made
pleading
in
and
conscious
violation
law
a
is
of
perverse
order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331]
the Court observed that a “perverse verdict”
may probably be defined as one that is not
only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v.
Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined
“perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right;
distorted from the right; turned away or
deviating from what is right, proper, correct,
etc.
27. The
expression
defined
by
“perverse”
various
has
dictionaries
in
been
the
following manner:
1.
Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of
Current English, 6th Edn.
“Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination
to behave in a way that most people think is
wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”
2.
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary
English, International Edn.
Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is
normal and reasonable.
2026:JHHC:28010-DB
3.
The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the
weight of evidence or the direction of the judge
on a point of law.
4.
The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of
the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic
Edn.)
Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted
or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or
wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
5.
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words
& Phrases, 4th Edn.
“Perverse. —A perverse verdict may probably
be defined as one that is not only against the
weight of evidence but is altogether against
the evidence.””
33. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that if any order
made in conscious violation of pleading and law then it will
come under the purview of perverse order. Further “perverse
verdict" may probably be defined as one that is not only
against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the
evidence.
34. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law
this Court is now adverting to examine that whether the
prayer of the appellant for dissolution of marriage is fit to be
allowed on the ground of cruelty alleged to be committed by
the respondent wife.
Issue of cruelty
35. Now this court is adverting to the issue of cruelty. It
2026:JHHC:28010-DB
needs to refer herein that the “cruelty” has been interpreted
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane
vs. Mrs. S. Dastana, (1975) 2 SCC 326 wherein it has been
laid down that the Court has to enquire, as to whether, the
conduct charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause
in the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable apprehension
that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the
respondent.
36. This Court deems it fit and proper to take into
consideration the meaning of ‘cruelty’ as has been held by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar
Reddi, (1988)1 SCC 105 wherein the wife alleged that the
husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon’ble Apex
Court emphasized that “cruelty” can have no fixed definition.
37. According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the
“conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct
in respect of matrimonial obligations”. It is the conduct
which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty can be
either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or unintentional.
For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the
middle of the night may be mental cruelty; intention is not an
essential element of cruelty but it may be present. Physical
cruelty is less ambiguous and more “a question of fact and
degree.”
38. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed therein
2026:JHHC:28010-DB
that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty it is
important for the court to not search for a standard in life,
since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another case.
What must be considered include the kind of life the parties
are used to, “their economic and social conditions”, and the
“culture
and
human
values
to
which
they
attach
importance.”
39. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal
conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations against
the spouse in the written statement filed before the court in
judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute cruelty.
40. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337,
the wife alleged in her written statement that her husband
was suffering from “mental problems and paranoid disorder”.
The wife’s lawyer also levelled allegations of “lunacy” and
“insanity” against the husband and his family while he was
conducting a cross-examination. The Hon’ble Apex Court
held these allegations against the husband to constitute
“cruelty”.
41. In Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay
Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon’ble Apex Court
has observed by taking into consideration the allegations
levelled by the husband in his written statement that his wife
was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity with a person
outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital
2026:JHHC:28010-DB
affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated
Indian woman, were held to constitute “cruelty” itself.
42. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v.
Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742, has been
pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct is
cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct,
which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of
the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make
one live with the other. The conduct may take the form of
abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and
anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct complained
of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial irritations and
normal wear and tear of marriage would not constitute
mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.
43. Further in the case of Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla
Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288, the Hon’ble Apex
Court has held as follows:—
22. The expression “cruelty” has an inseparable
nexus with human conduct or human behaviour. It
is always dependent upon the social strata or the
milieu to which the parties belong, their ways of
life, relationship, temperaments and emotions that
have been conditioned by their social status.
26. After
so
stating,
this
Court
observed
in
Shobha Rani case about the marked change in
life in modern times and the sea change in
matrimonial duties and responsibilities. It has been
observed that : (SCC p. 108, para 5)
2026:JHHC:28010-DB
“5. … when a spouse makes a complaint about the
treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or
relations, the court should not search for standard
in life. A set of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one
case may not be so in another case. The cruelty
alleged may largely depend upon the type of life
the parties are accustomed to or their economic
and social conditions. It may also depend upon
their culture and human values to which they
attach importance.”
27. Their Lordships in Shobha Rani case referred to
the observations made in Sheldon v. Sheldon
wherein Lord Denning stated, “the categories of
cruelty are not closed”. Thereafter, the Bench
proceeded to state thus: (Shobha Rani case, SCC
p. 109, paras 5-6)
“5. … Each case may be different. We deal with
the conduct of human beings who are not generally
similar. Among the human beings there is no limit
to the kind of conduct which may constitute
cruelty. New type of cruelty may crop up in any
case
depending
capacity
upon
the
human
behaviour,
or incapability to tolerate the conduct
complained of. Such is the wonderful (sic) realm of
cruelty.
6. These preliminary observations are intended to
emphasise that the court in matrimonial cases is
not concerned with ideals in family life. The court
has only to understand the spouses concerned as
nature made them, and consider their particular
grievance.
As
Lord
Reid
observed in
Gollins v. Gollins : (All ER p. 972 G-H)
‘… In matrimonial affairs we are not dealing with
objective standards, it is not a matrimonial offence
to fall below the standard of the reasonable man
(or the reasonable woman). We are dealing with
this man or this woman.’”
44. In the case of Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (supra) it
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has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court as follows: —
99. Human mind is extremely complex and human
behaviour is equally complicated. Similarly human
ingenuity has no bound, therefore, to assimilate
the entire human behaviour in one definition is
almost impossible. What is cruelty in one case may
not amount to cruelty in other case. The concept of
cruelty differs from person to person depending
upon
his
educational,
financial
upbringing,
level
of
sensitivity,
family
cultural
background,
position,
and
social
status,
customs,
traditions, religious beliefs, human values and
their value system.
100. Apart from this, the concept of mental cruelty
cannot remain static; it is bound to change with the
passage of time, impact of modern culture through
print and electronic media and value system, etc.
What may be mental cruelty now may not remain a
mental cruelty after a passage of time or vice
versa. There can never be any straitjacket formula
or fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty
in
matrimonial
matters.
The
prudent
and
appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to
evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances
while
taking
aforementioned
factors
in
consideration.
45. Thus, from the aforesaid settled position of law it is
evident that “Cruelty” under matrimonial law consists of
conduct so grave and weighty as to lead one to the
conclusion that one of the spouses cannot reasonably be
expected to live with the other spouse. It must be more
serious than the ordinary wear and tear of married life.
46. Cruelty must be of such a type which will satisfy the
conscience of the Court that the relationship between the
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parties has deteriorated to such an extent that it has become
impossible for them to live together without mental agony.
The cruelty practiced may be in many forms and it must be
productive of an apprehension in the mind of the other
spouse that it is dangerous to live with the erring party.
Simple trivialities which can truly be described as a
reasonable wear and tear of married life cannot amount to
cruelty. In many marriages each party can, if it so wills,
discover many a cause for complaint but such grievances
arise
mostly
from
temperamental
disharmony.
Such
disharmony or incompatibility is not cruelty and will not
furnish a cause for the dissolution of marriage.
47. Herein allegation of cruelty has been specifically made
by plaintiff/appellant wherein it has been stated that the
differences arose between him and respondent (wife) as the
respondent-wife and her relatives wanted him to live as
Gharjamai which he did not agree since his parents are old
and there is no one to look after them.
48. Further, the next ground of the appellant towards
cruelty is that the respondent-wife was very frequently
visiting her parental house.
49. From the testimony so recorded of the appellanthusband, the learned Principal Judge, Family Court has
come to the conclusion that visiting parental house is as
good as a right to every bride and it cannot be termed cruelty
2026:JHHC:28010-DB
for the purpose of divorce, at any stretch of imagination.
50. The learned Family Judge has also observed that
practice of Gharjamai is a very old custom prevailing in our
society but it remains to be absolute choice of groom to agree
or not and there is no case that the appellant was compelled
or forced to live as Gharjamai. Mere wish of respondent-wife
that the appellant-husband should live as Gharjamai will not
constitute cruelty for the purpose of Hindu Marriage Act.
51. Thus, on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove
this Court is of the view that the appellant has failed to
substantiate the commission of alleged cruelty of respondent
upon him and since the learned Family Court while negating
the claim of cruelty has duly appreciated the evidences
brought on record, therefore the finding of the learned Court
on the alleged act of cruelty, is not perverse.
52. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussions is of
considered view that the issue of cruelty as has been alleged
by the appellant-husband against his wife could not be
proved and the learned Family Judge has rightly observed
that that visiting parental house is as good as a right to every
bride and mere wish of respondent-wife that the appellanthusband should live as Gharjamai will not constitute cruelty
for the purpose of Hindu Marriage Act and it cannot be
termed cruelty for the purpose of divorce, at any stretch of
imagination.
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53. This
Court,
on
the
basis
of
discussions
made
hereinabove, is of the view that the judgment dated
16.07.2022 and decree signed on 01.08.2022 by learned
Principal Judge, Family Court, Hazaribag whereby and
whereunder the Original Suit No.148 of 2019 filed by the
appellant-husband under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 for a decree of divorce has been
dismissed, requires no interference by this Court.
54. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.
55.
Pending interlocutory application, if any, also stands
disposed of.
56. Before parting with this Judgment, we must record
that we have been given able assistance by learned amicus
curiae Mr. Atanu Banerjee. We direct the Secretary, High
Court Legal Services Committee, to make the payment of the
prescribed remuneration to the learned amicus curiae.
57. Let a copy of this Judgment be sent to the Secretary,
High Court Legal Services Committee, Ranchi, for the
needful.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I agree.
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
Dated : 15/09/2026
Birendra /
A.F.R.
Uploaded on 18/09/2026
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