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2026:CGHC:27119-DB
MANPREET
KAUR
NAFR
Digitally signed
by MANPREET
KAUR
Date: 2026.07.04
12:23:44 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 2267 of 2024
Radhika @ Geeta Sarathi W/o Late Roshan Sarathi Aged About 30
Years R/o Darripara Ward No. 24, Kawardha, District Kabirdham,
Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant(s)
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Kawardha, District Kabirdham,
Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s)
: Mr. Uttam Pandey, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Priyank Rathi, G.A.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
02.07.2026
1.
The present appeal filed under Section 415(2) of the BNSS, 2023
is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order
of sentence dated 05.10.2023 passed by learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Kabirdham (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.23/2021,
whereby the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant for the
offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for
life and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine amount,
additional rigorous imprisonment for three months.
2.
The prosecution case, in brief, is that the appellant/accused and
the deceased, Vikas @ Vishal Yadav, were acquainted with each
other and were allegedly in a love relationship. According to the
prosecution, the deceased was reluctant to marry the appellant
and, on account of the said dispute, on the intervening night of
27/28.12.2020, the appellant allegedly strangulated the deceased
with her yellow-coloured shawl inside her house situated at Darri
Para, Ward No. 24, Kawardha, District Kabirdham, thereby
causing his death.
3.
It is further the prosecution case that after the alleged incident, the
appellant attempted to conceal the offence by informing her
nephew, Raj @ Dauwa Sarathi, that the deceased had consumed
liquor and had become unconscious inside her house. Acting on
such information, Raj reached the appellant’s house. The
appellant allegedly requested him to assist in shifting the
deceased from her house. Thereafter, with the help of Raj, the
body of the deceased was taken outside and kept behind the
house of one Rahul. According to the prosecution, neither Raj nor
another person, namely Pappu @ Ajay Sahu, who reached the
spot thereafter, was informed by the appellant that the deceased
had already died. On receiving information from Raj and Pappu,
the family members of the deceased reached the place, shifted
him to their house, attempted to revive him by massaging his
body and thereafter took him to the District Hospital, Kawardha,
where the doctors declared him dead.
4.
On 28.12.2020, Arjun Baiga, Ward Boy, District Hospital,
Kawardha, submitted a hospital intimation regarding the death of
the deceased at Police Station Kawardha, on the basis of which
Merg No.107/2020 was registered. During the merg inquiry, an
inquest over the dead body was conducted and the body was sent
for postmortem examination. As per the postmortem report, the
death was found to be homicidal in nature and caused due to
asphyxia resulting from strangulation. During the course of merg
inquiry, the statements of the father and brother of the deceased,
namely Chandu Yadav and Akash Yadav, as well as other
witnesses including Ajay Sahu and Raj Sarathi, were recorded.
On the basis of the material collected during the inquiry, Crime
No.755/2020 was registered against an unknown person for the
offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
5.
During investigation, the Investigating Officer visited the place of
occurrence and prepared the spot map. The witnesses were
examined and the appellant was interrogated. According to the
prosecution, the appellant made a memorandum statement under
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act stating that she had
strangulated the deceased with a yellow shawl, concealed the
said shawl and the mobile phone of the deceased beneath her
pillow, and had thrown the SIM card of the mobile phone into a
drain. Pursuant to the said memorandum, a yellow-coloured shawl
and the mobile phone of the deceased were allegedly recovered
from the house of the appellant, though the SIM card could not be
recovered despite search. The appellant was thereafter arrested.
The investigating agency also collected the call detail records and
customer application forms pertaining to the mobile numbers
allegedly used by the appellant and the deceased and obtained
the certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act.
6.
Upon completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against
the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and
201 of the Indian Penal Code. The case was committed to the
Court of Sessions, where charges under the aforesaid provisions
were framed against the appellant. The appellant denied the
charges and claimed to be tried.
7.
In order to establish its case, the prosecution examined fourteen
witnesses and exhibited documents Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-29. The
appellant, in her examination under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, denied the incriminating circumstances
appearing against her and pleaded false implication. No evidence
was adduced in defence.
8.
Upon appreciation of the evidence, the learned trial Court
convicted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section
302 IPC, acquitted her of the charge under Section 201 IPC, and
sentenced her accordingly, giving rise to the present appeal.
9.
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned
judgment of conviction is contrary to the evidence available on
record and is based on conjectures and surmises. It was
contended that the present case rests entirely on circumstantial
evidence, but the prosecution has failed to establish a complete
chain of circumstances pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the
appellant. It was argued that there is no eyewitness to the alleged
occurrence and the learned trial Court has failed to properly
appreciate the material inconsistencies and infirmities in the
prosecution case. Drawing attention to the evidence of PW-2
Akash Yadav, learned counsel submitted that the prosecution
story regarding recovery of the mobile phone from the possession
of the appellant is rendered doubtful, as the said witness admitted
that the mobile phone of the deceased had been handed over by
PW-5 Raj Sarathi to the father of the deceased. It was further
submitted that the alleged recovery of the SIM card is wholly
unreliable, as no seizure memo or panchnama was prepared, the
place from where it was allegedly recovered was not identified in
the spot map, and the Investigating Officer failed to disclose who
had actually searched and recovered the SIM card. It was also
argued that the call detail records relied upon by the prosecution
have no evidentiary value, inasmuch as the prosecution itself
failed to establish that the mobile numbers in question belonged
to or were being used by the appellant and the deceased. The
customer application form showed that one of the mobile numbers
stood in the name of Shri Ram Sarathi, whose statement was
never recorded during investigation.
10.
Learned counsel further submitted that the investigation suffers
from serious procedural irregularities and lacks fairness. It was
argued that the appellant was taken into custody on 28.12.2020
and was not permitted to return to her house until she was
produced before the competent Court on 31.12.2020. During this
period, according to the evidence of PW-4 and PW-5, the police
repeatedly searched the appellant’s house after obtaining its keys
from her, thereby rendering the alleged recoveries highly doubtful.
It was further submitted that PW-4, PW-5 and PW-8, along with
other persons, admitted that they had been detained at the police
station for several days during investigation, thereby casting
serious doubt on the fairness of the investigation and suggesting
that the actual offenders had not been properly investigated.
Learned counsel also argued that the memorandum statement
and the consequent recoveries do not inspire confidence, as the
seizure witnesses admitted that they had signed documents
without reading their contents. It was further contended that
although the FIR was initially registered against an unknown
person, none of the witnesses present at the hospital or during the
inquest suspected the appellant’s involvement at the earliest point
of time. Lastly, it was argued that the medical evidence does not
support the prosecution case, as several nail scratch injuries were
found on the body of the deceased, yet neither the nail clippings
of the deceased nor those of the appellant were collected for
forensic examination to ascertain whether any scuffle had taken
place. In the absence of reliable evidence establishing every
incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt, the chain of
circumstances remains incomplete and, therefore, the appellant is
entitled to the benefit of doubt and consequent acquittal.
11.
Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned
judgment and submitted that the learned trial Court has rightly
appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on
record and has recorded a well-reasoned finding of conviction. It
was contended that although the case is based on circumstantial
evidence, every incriminating circumstance has been duly
established by the prosecution. The evidence on record clearly
demonstrates that the deceased was last seen alive in the house
of the appellant, his dead body was subsequently removed from
the appellant’s house with her active participation, and the
medical evidence unequivocally establishes that the death was
homicidal due to strangulation. It was further submitted that the
recovery of the shawl used in the commission of the offence at the
instance of the appellant, coupled with her failure to furnish any
plausible explanation under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure as to how the deceased suffered homicidal death
inside her house, constitutes a strong incriminating circumstance
attracting the principle embodied in Section 106 of the Indian
Evidence Act. It was argued that the alleged discrepancies
pointed out by the defence are minor in nature and do not affect
the core of the prosecution case. The chain of circumstances
stands fully established and is consistent only with the guilt of the
appellant, leaving no reasonable ground for any hypothesis
consistent with her innocence. The appeal, therefore, deserves to
be dismissed.
12.
We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,
considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also
went through the records with utmost circumspection.
13.
The first question for consideration would be, whether death
of deceased was homicidal in nature ?
14.
The prosecution has sought to establish the homicidal nature of
death primarily through the testimony of PW-6, Dr. Swapnil Tiwari,
who conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased, and
the postmortem report (Ex.P-12). PW-6 deposed that on external
examination he found a ligature mark over the middle of the neck
extending towards the right side measuring approximately 13 cm
× 3 cm, abrasions below the right ear and over the left cheek
measuring about 1 cm × 0.2 cm each, another linear abrasion
measuring approximately 3.5 cm × 0.1 cm below the left cheek
and bite marks over the lower lip. The doctor further noticed
subconjunctival
haemorrhage
in
the
eyes.
On
internal
examination, he found haemorrhage in the sternocleidomastoid
muscles and soft tissues of the neck, congestion of the lungs,
liver, spleen and kidneys, blood within the heart and damage to
the tracheal ring. The doctor, however, found that the hyoid bone
was intact and not fractured. According to the witness, the internal
findings were nevertheless consistent with death due to
strangulation and not hanging. He accordingly opined that the
cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation, the nature of
death was homicidal and the time since death was approximately
6 to 12 hours prior to the postmortem.
15.
During cross-examination, PW-6 adhered to his opinion and
denied the suggestions that the injuries were not consistent with
strangulation or that the postmortem report had been prepared
falsely. Merely because the hyoid bone was found intact does not,
by itself, discredit the medical opinion, particularly when the
medical expert has explained that his conclusion was based on
the cumulative external and internal findings noticed during
autopsy. There is no contrary medical evidence on record to
dislodge the opinion of PW-6.
16.
In view of the aforesaid evidence, this Court finds no reason to
differ from the conclusion that the death of the deceased was
homicidal in nature. However, the proof of homicidal death by
itself does not establish the identity of the assailant. The crucial
issue that still requires determination is whether the prosecution
has succeeded in proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that it was
the appellant who committed the offence. That aspect is
considered separately while dealing with the next point for
determination.
17.
The next question which arises for consideration is whether the
prosecution has succeeded in proving a complete and unbroken
chain of circumstances which unerringly points towards the guilt of
the appellant and excludes every hypothesis consistent with her
innocence.
18.
It is not in dispute that the present case is founded entirely on
circumstantial evidence and there is no eyewitness to the alleged
occurrence. The law relating to appreciation of circumstantial
evidence is well settled. Each incriminating circumstance relied
upon by the prosecution must be firmly established by cogent and
reliable evidence, all such circumstances must be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, they must be of a
conclusive nature and tendency, they should exclude every
possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved, and the
chain of circumstances must be so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence
of the accused. If any one of the essential links in the chain is not
proved or if the proved circumstances are capable of two possible
interpretations, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
Suspicion, however strong, can never take the place of legal
proof.
19.
Whether the prosecution has established the circumstance
relating to the alleged telephonic contact between the appellant
and the deceased?
20.
The prosecution has relied upon the call detail records and
customer application forms of the mobile numbers allegedly used
by the appellant and the deceased to establish their frequent
telephonic contact prior to the incident and thereby to prove the
alleged motive as well as their relationship. However, on a careful
scrutiny of the evidence, this Court finds that the prosecution has
failed to establish the foundational facts necessary to render such
electronic evidence incriminating against the appellant.
21.
Shri Chandra Kant Tiwari (PW-11), Assistant Sub-Inspector, Cyber
Cell, who produced the call detail records and the customer
application forms, has categorically admitted in his crossexamination that the customer application form (Ex.P-18)
pertaining to the mobile number allegedly used by the deceased
does not stand in the name of the deceased, Vikas @ Vishal
Yadav. Likewise, the customer application form (Ex.P-17) relating
to the mobile number allegedly used by the appellant is also not in
her name. The witness further admitted that neither of the
application forms indicates who was actually operating the
respective mobile numbers and no panchnama or investigation
was conducted to ascertain the actual user thereof. He further
admitted that the Aadhaar Card and Voter Identity Card appended
with the customer application forms belonged to different persons.
Significantly, the Investigating Officer (PW-14) also admitted in
paragraph 15 of his cross-examination that he neither investigated
the ownership of the SIM cards nor seized any document
establishing ownership or possession of the mobile phones
allegedly used by the appellant and the deceased. Although one
of the customer application forms disclosed that the SIM card
stood in the name of Shri Ram Sarathi, his statement was never
recorded during investigation to ascertain whether the SIM card
had ever been handed over to the deceased or was being used
by him. In the absence of any evidence establishing that the
appellant and the deceased were the actual users of the mobile
numbers in question, the call detail records lose much of their
evidentiary value and cannot be treated as a circumstance
incriminating the appellant. Consequently, this circumstance
cannot be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt
and does not constitute a reliable link in the chain of
circumstantial evidence sought to be established by the
prosecution.
22.
Whether the prosecution has proved the alleged recovery of the
mobile phone and SIM card from the appellant?
23.
The prosecution has next relied upon the memorandum statement
of the appellant (Ex.P-5) and the consequential recovery (Ex.P-6)
to contend that the deceased’s mobile phone was recovered from
the appellant’s house and that she had disclosed having thrown
the SIM card into a drain after the incident. According to the
prosecution,
such
recovery
constitutes
an
incriminating
circumstance connecting the appellant with the commission of the
offence. However, on a careful appreciation of the evidence, this
Court finds that the alleged recovery is surrounded by serious
contradictions
and
circumstances
which
render
it
wholly
unreliable.
24.
The memorandum (Ex.P-5) records that the appellant stated she
had concealed the mobile phone beneath a pillow in her house
and had thrown the SIM card into a drain. However, PW-1
Chandu Yadav, the father of the deceased, categorically admitted
in his cross-examination that PW-5 Raj @ Dauwa Sarathi had
handed over the mobile phone of the deceased to him, and
thereafter he himself delivered the same to the police. This
version has been fully corroborated by PW-2 Akash Yadav, the
brother of the deceased, who also admitted that the mobile phone
was first handed over by PW-5 Raj Sarathi to his father and only
thereafter to the police. This evidence creates a direct
inconsistency with the prosecution case that the mobile phone
was subsequently recovered from the appellant’s house pursuant
to her disclosure statement. Further, PW-4 Ajay Sahu and PW-5
Raj Sarathi admitted that after the appellant was taken into police
custody on 28.12.2020, she was not permitted to return to her
house, while the police had obtained the keys of the house and
visited it repeatedly during the intervening period before her
formal arrest. PW-2 Akash Yadav has also supported this version.
These admissions create a serious doubt regarding the
genuineness of the alleged recovery from the appellant’s
exclusive possession.
25.
The prosecution case with respect to the SIM card is equally
doubtful. Although it was alleged that the appellant had thrown the
SIM card into a drain and that it was recovered during
investigation, the Investigating Officer (PW-14) admitted that no
seizure memo or panchnama was prepared in respect of such
recovery. He further admitted that the spot map does not indicate
the location of the drain from where the SIM card was allegedly
recovered and there is no material on record to show who had
actually searched for or recovered the SIM card. Such omissions
assume significance because the recovery of the SIM card was
projected as an important incriminating circumstance. In the
absence of compliance with the basic safeguards governing
recovery proceedings and in view of the material contradictions
emerging from the prosecution witnesses themselves, this Court
is of the considered opinion that the alleged recovery of the
mobile phone and SIM card has not been proved beyond
reasonable
doubt
and
cannot
be
treated
as
a
reliable
circumstance against the appellant.
26.
Whether the memorandum statement under Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act and the consequential recoveries inspire
confidence?
27.
The prosecution has further relied upon the memorandum
statement of the appellant recorded under Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act and the alleged recoveries made pursuant
thereto. It is well settled that a disclosure statement leading to
recovery can be relied upon only when the prosecution
establishes that the statement was made voluntarily and that the
consequent recovery is proved through cogent and trustworthy
evidence. Where the witnesses to the memorandum and seizure
do not support the prosecution or serious doubts arise regarding
the manner in which the memorandum was recorded and the
recoveries effected, such evidence cannot safely be made the
basis of conviction.
28.
In the present case, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses
does
not
inspire
confidence
regarding
the
memorandum
proceedings. Akash Yadav (PW-2) admitted in his crossexamination that on 30.12.2020 the police obtained his signatures
on four to five documents at the police station without reading
over their contents to him and that, in haste, he signed the papers
without knowing what had been written therein. PW-4 Ajay Sahu
went a step further and categorically stated that no memorandum
statement was made by the appellant in his presence and that
she was not even interrogated by the police before him. These
admissions strike at the very foundation of the prosecution case
regarding the voluntary disclosure allegedly made by the
appellant. When the attesting witnesses themselves do not
support the manner in which the memorandum was recorded and
admit that they signed documents without knowing their contents,
the evidentiary value of such memorandum becomes highly
doubtful. Consequently, the alleged disclosure statement and the
recoveries purportedly made pursuant thereto do not inspire
confidence and cannot be treated as a reliable incriminating
circumstance forming part of the chain of circumstantial evidence.
29.
Whether the prosecution has established the circumstance of the
deceased having been last seen together with the appellant?
30.
The prosecution has sought to rely upon the circumstance that the
deceased was last seen in the company of the appellant and that
his dead body was subsequently found after being removed from
her house. The “last seen together” theory is undoubtedly a
relevant circumstance in a case based on circumstantial
evidence; however, it is equally well settled that such a
circumstance must be established by clear, cogent and convincing
evidence. Mere suspicion or possibility cannot substitute proof.
Unless the prosecution establishes that the deceased was last
seen alive in the exclusive company of the accused within such
proximity of time that the possibility of intervention by any other
person is completely ruled out, the said circumstance cannot form
the basis of conviction.
31.
In the present case, no independent witness has deposed that he
had seen the deceased entering the house of the appellant on the
night of the occurrence or that he remained in her exclusive
company immediately prior to his death. On the contrary, the
Investigating Officer (PW-14) admitted that the place of
occurrence is situated in a thickly populated locality. PW-1
Chandu Yadav, PW-2 Akash Yadav, PW-4 Ajay Sahu and PW-5
Raj Sarathi have also admitted that Sarathi Mohalla is a densely
populated residential area. Despite the occurrence having
allegedly taken place at about 9.00 p.m. in such a populated
locality, the prosecution failed to examine a single independent
witness who had seen the deceased entering the appellant’s
house or being taken out therefrom. The prosecution has,
therefore, failed to establish the foundational fact necessary for
invoking the “last seen together” theory. In the absence of reliable
evidence proving that the deceased was last seen alive in the
exclusive company of the appellant, this important link in the chain
of circumstantial evidence remains unproved and cannot be
pressed into service against the appellant.
32.
Effect of the evidence relating to the physical condition of the
deceased and the prosecution version of the occurrence.
33.
Another circumstance which assumes significance is the evidence
relating to the physical build of the deceased. PW-1 Chandu
Yadav, the father of the deceased, admitted in his crossexamination that the deceased was physically strong, was
habituated to consuming liquor and, even after consuming
alcohol, ordinarily did not lose his senses. PW-2 Akash Yadav
also supported the aforesaid version by stating that the deceased
was a well-built and physically strong person and that the effect of
liquor on him was not excessive. PW-4 Ajay Sahu further stated
that the deceased was approximately six feet tall, while PW-5 Raj
Sarathi also corroborated the fact that the deceased was a hefty
and physically robust person.
34.
Although the aforesaid evidence by itself cannot lead to an
inference that the appellant was incapable of committing the
offence, it assumes relevance while appreciating the prosecution
case as a whole. According to the prosecution, the appellant, a
woman
of
comparatively
smaller
stature,
single-handedly
overpowered the deceased and strangulated him inside her
house. However, except the medical evidence proving homicidal
death, the prosecution has produced no independent evidence
explaining the manner in which such occurrence allegedly took
place. Significantly, the postmortem report records multiple
abrasions and bite marks suggestive of resistance or a possible
scuffle, yet the Investigating Officer admittedly neither collected
the nail clippings of the deceased nor those of the appellant for
forensic examination. No scientific evidence, such as DNA or
other forensic material, was collected to connect the appellant
with the alleged struggle. In these circumstances, the prosecution
has failed to furnish convincing evidence to establish the manner
in which the offence was allegedly committed, thereby leaving
another important gap in the chain of circumstantial evidence.
35.
Effect of the delay in taking the deceased to the hospital and the
conduct of the prosecution witnesses.
36.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution further discloses that
after the deceased was found lying unconscious, he was not
immediately taken to the hospital for medical assistance. PW-1
Chandu Yadav admitted that before informing the emergency
services, the family members first massaged the body of the
deceased with oil. PW-2 Akash Yadav deposed that after the body
was brought home, it remained there for about one to two hours,
during this period oil massage was administered and the body
was also warmed near a fire before an ambulance was called.
PW-4 Ajay Sahu similarly stated that after the body was brought,
attempts were made to warm it because it was winter season,
thereafter two local doctors were contacted who declined to
attend, and only after about one and a half hours was the 112
emergency
vehicle
summoned.
PW-5
Raj
Sarathi
has
substantially corroborated this version.
37.
The aforesaid conduct of the prosecution witnesses appears
unusual, particularly when, according to them, the deceased was
found lying unconscious. Ordinarily, the immediate reaction in
such circumstances would be to obtain prompt medical
assistance. Instead, the evidence reveals that considerable time
was spent in attempting to revive the deceased by oil massage
and warming his body before he was taken to the hospital.
Though this circumstance alone may not be sufficient to discard
the prosecution case, it nevertheless assumes significance while
appreciating the entire chain of circumstantial evidence. It
introduces an element of uncertainty regarding the sequence of
events immediately after the occurrence and further weakens the
prosecution case, particularly when no eyewitness account is
available and the conviction rests solely on circumstantial
evidence.
38.
Effect of the admitted illegal detention of the appellant and
material prosecution witnesses during investigation.
39.
Another important circumstance which cannot be overlooked is
the manner in which the investigation was conducted. The
evidence of the prosecution witnesses themselves reveals that
not only the appellant but also several material witnesses were
kept at the police station continuously for several days during the
course of investigation. PW-2 Akash Yadav admitted that Raj @
Dauwa Sarathi, Ajay Sahu, Ashok Sahu, Raka Sarathi and Gopal
Yadav were called to the police station on 29.12.2020 at about
9:00 a.m. and were detained there till about 11:30 p.m., and that
this practice continued till 31.12.2020. PW-4 Ajay Sahu has
substantially reiterated the said fact and further admitted that the
appellant remained in the Women’s Cell during this period. PW-5
Raj Sarathi has also supported the prosecution witnesses on this
aspect by stating that the appellant remained continuously
detained from 28.12.2020 to 31.12.2020 and that the aforesaid
witnesses were also kept in the police station for prolonged
periods.
40.
Such admissions on the part of the prosecution witnesses cast a
serious shadow on the fairness and transparency of the
investigation. It has also come on record that during the period
when the appellant remained in police custody, the police had
obtained the keys of her house and visited the premises
repeatedly before effecting the alleged recoveries. The cumulative
effect of these circumstances renders the prosecution version
relating to the memorandum, recoveries and other investigative
steps susceptible to doubt. Fair investigation is an integral facet of
a fair trial, and where the conduct of the investigating agency itself
creates a reasonable apprehension regarding the authenticity of
the evidence collected, the Court is required to scrutinize such
evidence with greater caution. In the facts of the present case,
these circumstances materially dent the credibility of the
prosecution case and constitute yet another missing link in the
chain of circumstantial evidence sought to be established against
the appellant.
41.
Whether the cumulative circumstances proved by the prosecution
form a complete chain pointing only towards the guilt of the
appellant?
42.
Having examined each of the circumstances relied upon by the
prosecution individually, this Court is required to consider whether
the cumulative effect of those circumstances forms a complete
and unbroken chain leading only to the hypothesis of the guilt of
the appellant
43.
As noticed hereinabove, the prosecution has succeeded in
establishing that the death of the deceased was homicidal in
nature. However, the other circumstances relied upon to connect
the appellant with the crime do not withstand close judicial
scrutiny. The prosecution has failed to establish that the mobile
numbers reflected in the call detail records were actually being
used by the appellant and the deceased. The alleged recovery of
the deceased's mobile phone from the appellant's house is
contradicted by the testimony of PW-1 and PW-2, who admitted
that the mobile phone had earlier been handed over by PW-5 Raj
Sarathi to the father of the deceased and thereafter to the police.
The alleged recovery of the SIM card is unsupported by any
seizure memo, panchnama or reliable evidence regarding the
place and manner of its recovery.
44.
Further, the memorandum statement under Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act and the consequential recoveries do not
inspire confidence in view of the admissions made by the attesting
witnesses that they had signed documents without reading their
contents and that no disclosure statement was made in their
presence. The prosecution has also failed to establish the "last
seen together" circumstance through any independent witness,
despite the admitted fact that the locality is a thickly populated
area. No scientific or forensic evidence, such as nail clippings,
DNA analysis or fingerprints, was collected to connect the
appellant with the alleged struggle indicated by the injuries found
on the body of the deceased. Moreover, the admitted prolonged
detention of the appellant and several prosecution witnesses at
the police station during investigation casts a serious doubt on the
fairness of the investigation and on the authenticity of the alleged
recoveries and statements recorded during that period.
45.
In a case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence, every link in
the chain must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the
present
case,
several
links
remain
missing,
doubtful
or
inconsistent. The circumstances proved by the prosecution may
create a suspicion against the appellant, but suspicion, however
strong, cannot take the place of proof. The evidence on record
does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the
innocence of the appellant. Consequently, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish a
complete chain of circumstances unerringly pointing towards the
guilt of the appellant.
46.
Accordingly, Point No. (ii) is answered in favour of the appellant by
holding that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that it was the appellant who committed the
murder of the deceased.
47.
It is a settled principle of criminal law that in a case based on
circumstantial evidence, each circumstance must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, and all such circumstances must form
a chain so complete that it leaves no reasonable ground for a
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. If any
link in the chain is found to be missing or doubtful, the benefit
thereof must go to the accused.
70. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish:
(i) a reliable “last seen” circumstance,
(ii) a trustworthy recovery of incriminating articles,
(iii) a conclusive forensic link, and
(iv) a cogent and compelling motive.
48.
Thus, the chain of circumstances is not only incomplete but also
suffers from serious infirmities, contradictions, and gaps.
49.
In view of the foregoing discussion, although the prosecution has
successfully established that the death of the deceased was
homicidal in nature, it has failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that it was the appellant who committed the offence. The
conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is founded on a
chain of circumstances which is neither complete nor incapable of
any hypothesis other than the guilt of the appellant. Several
material circumstances relied upon by the prosecution have
remained unproved, while others are rendered doubtful due to
material contradictions, procedural lapses and deficiencies in the
investigation.
50.
It is trite that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of
proof. The prosecution is required to stand on its own legs and
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The benefit of every
reasonable doubt must necessarily go in favour of the accused.
51.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge under
Section 302 of the IPC against the appellant beyond reasonable
doubt. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt.
52.
Consequently, the appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed.
53.
The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence
dated 05.10.2023 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge Kabirdham (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 23/2021 is hereby
set aside.
54.
The appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code.
55.
Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (now
Section 481 of BNSS), the appellant is directed to furnish a
personal bond in terms of from No.45 prescribed in the Code of
Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.5,000/- with 2 reliable sureties in
the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be
effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that
in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant
judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt
of notice thereon shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
56.
The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to transmit the trial Court
record alongwith the copy of this judgment back immediately to
the trial Court concerned as well as to the Principal and District
Sessions Judge concerned for being communicated to the
appellant in jail where she is confined, for compliance and
necessary action.
Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
Manpreet
Sd/(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
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