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WP No. 60831 of 2011
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF JANUARY 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S.HEMALEKHA
WRIT PETITION NO. 60831 OF 2011 (S-DIS)
BETWEEN:
R. CHAMAPPA S/O. T.R. RANGANAIK
AGE: 60 YEARS, OCC: RTD. SECOND DIVISION
ASSISTANT, HUBLI-DHARWAD
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, HUBLI.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. ANANT P.SAVADI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
MANJANNA
E
MANJANNA E
Location: HIGH COURT
OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
Date: 2026.02.04 10:28:04
+0530
1.
THE COMMISSIONER
HUBLI-DHARWAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
HUBLI-580020.
2.
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY ITS SECERTARY TO GOVERNMENT,
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT,
VIKAS SOUDHA, BANGALORE-560001.
3.
ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR
ENQUIRIES-1, KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA,
BANGALORE.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. R.H.ANGADI, ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SMT. NANDINI B.SOMAPUR, AGA FOR R2;
SRI. ANIL KALE, ADVOCATE FOR R3)
THIS WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER NO.HDMC
22 GAE 98 DATED 30/08/2010 PASSED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT, THE
COPY OF WHICH IS PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-A, BY ALSO QUASHING
THE ENQUIRY REPORT OF THE 3RD RESPONDENT DATED 12/09/2005
AND NO.LOK/ARE-1/ENQ-60/2002-03 IN ANNEXURE-G; A DIRECTION
MAY KINDLY ISSUED TO THE RESPONDENT TO RELEASE ALL THE
SERVICE BENEFITS OF THE PETITIONER INCLUDING THE PENSION
AMOUNT AND ETC.
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THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDER THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S.HEMALEKHA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioner has called in question the order dated
30.08.2010, passed by respondent No.1, whereby the
petitioner was dismissed from service pursuant to the
departmental enquiry and consequently, denied service and
pensionary benefits, and has sought quashing of the said
order along with the direction to release all terminal
benefits.
Brief facts:
2.
Division
The
petitioner
Assistant
in
was
appointed
as
Hubballi-Dharwad
a
Second
Municipal
Corporation in the year 1976. While he was working, under
Birth and Death Registration Section, a complaint was
lodged
before
the
Lokayukta
alleging
demand
and
acceptance of illegal gratification of Rs.200/- for issuance of
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death certificates. A trap was conducted and the tainted
amount was recovered from the petitioner.
3.
Parallel criminal proceedings were initiated, in
which, the petitioner came to be acquitted by judgment
dated
30.12.2004,
granting
benefit
of
doubt.
Independently, a departmental enquiry was initiated, the
Enquiry Officer found the charges proved and recommended
dismissal. Based on the said recommendation, an order of
dismissal dated 21.07.2006 was passed. The said order was
challenged by the petitioner in W.P.No.10450/2006, which
came to be allowed on 29.07.2010, not on merits of the
charges, but solely on the ground that the enquiry report
had not been furnished before imposition of penalty. The
matter was remitted to the disciplinary authority from the
stage of furnishing the enquiry report. Thereafter, after
furnishing the enquiry report and considering the reply
submitted by the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority
passed
the
impugned
order
dated
30.08.2010,
again
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dismissing the petitioner from service on the last day of his
superannuation.
4.
Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that
the impugned dismissal order is vitiated by non-application
of mind and mechanical deterioration of the earlier order. It
is submitted that the petitioner having been acquitted in the
criminal case, continuation of disciplinary proceedings and
imposition of penalty is arbitrary. The punishment of
dismissal imposed on the date of superannuation is grossly
disproportionate. It is submitted that the entire proceedings
suffer
from
procedural
irregularities
and
violation
of
principles of natural justice. It is further submitted that the
show-cause
notice
and
the
final
order
are
without
jurisdiction and competence.
5.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents
submits that the departmental enquiry was conducted in
accordance with law, and the charges of demand and
acceptance of illegal gratification stood proved by cogent
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evidence. The acquittal in criminal case was only on a
benefit of doubt and does not preclude disciplinary action.
After remand by this Court in W.P.No.10450/2006, the
enquiry report was duly furnished and the petitioner was
afforded full opportunity. The impugned order is passed by
the competent authority with due application of mind.
6.
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties,
the point that arises for consideration is:
“Whether the petitioner has made out a ground for
interference with the impugned order of dismissal
dated 30.08.2010?”
7.
On careful consideration of the rival submission
and the material on record, this Court answers the point
framed for consideration in negative for the following
reasons:
i.
It is well settled that in matters arising out of
disciplinary enquiry, this Court does not sit in
appeal as an appellate authority to re-appreciate
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evidence. Interference is warranted only if the
enquiry is vitiated by perversity, violation of
statutory rules or principles of natural justice. No
such infirmity is demonstrated in the present
case.
ii.
The earlier W.P.No.10450/2006, was allowed
only on the ground of non-furnishing of the
enquiry report. After remand, the enquiry report
was admittedly
furnished and the petitioner
submitted his reply. Therefore, the procedural
defect
pointed
out
earlier
cured,
and
the
disciplinary authority was justified in proceeding
to pass a fresh order. The acquittal of the
petitioner in criminal case was not an honorable
acquittal but one based on the benefit of doubt.
The standard of proof in criminal proceedings is
entirely
different
from
departmental enquiries.
that
of
that
in
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iii.
The evidence on record before the Enquiry Officer
was sufficient to establish the misconduct on the
touchstone of preponderance of probabilities.
iv.
The contention regarding lack of competency of
the authority issuing the show-cause notice is
wholly untenable. Significantly, this ground was
not
raised
by
the
W.P.No.10450/2006,
petitioner
though
in
the
earlier
the
very
same
proceedings and authority were under challenge.
Having failed to raise such a plea at the earliest
opportunity, the petitioner is deemed to have
waived the said objection. A party cannot be
permitted to raise such technical plea in a
peaceful manner after having participated in the
proceedings without demur.
8.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed
reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Chairmancum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. and Others
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Vs. Ananta Saha and Others1 (Ananta Saha) to contend
that if initial action is vitiated in law, any subsequent
proceedings would not sanctify the same and that the legal
maxim Sublato fundamento cadit opus meaning that when
the foundation is removed, the superstructure would not
apply. There can be no quarrel with the proposition of law
laid down in the said decision. However, the applicability to
the said principle depends upon finding that foundation
itself is illegal or non est in the eye of law.
9.
The contention urged on behalf of the petitioner
is questioning the authority of the Lokayukta to initiate the
complaint, trigger consequential proceedings and issue
consequential
notice
is
equally
devoid
of
merit.
The
Lokayukta, under the provisions of the Lokayukta Act is
statutory
empowered
to
receive
complaints,
conduct
investigation or enquiry into allegations of corruptions or
maladministration against public servants and upon being
satisfied to submit a report and recommendation to the
(2011) 5 SCC 142
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WP No. 60831 of 2011
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competent authority. The role of the Lokayukta is thus not
adjudicatory but recommendatory and ultimate decision to
impose penalty rests with the Disciplinary Authority alone.
10.
In the present case, the Lokayukta has acted
strictly within the four corners of the statute by initiating
enquiry
on
receipt
of
the
complaint,
conducting
investigation in accordance with law, and forwarding its
report to the competent authority. The issuance of notice,
holding enquiry, submitting of enquiry report, continuation
of disciplinary proceedings thereafter were undertaken by
the Disciplinary Authority, who independently applied its
mind to the enquiry report and the reply submitted by the
petitioner.
Therefore,
it
cannot
be
contended
that
Lokayukta, who served the powers of Disciplinary Authority
are acted without jurisdiction.
11.
It is also significant to note that the petitioner
had participated in the enquiry proceedings without demur,
submitted his explanation and contested the matter on
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merits. No challenge to the competence or jurisdiction of
the Lokayukta was raised at the stage of enquiry nor was
such a plea urged in the earlier writ petition. Even
otherwise, mere initiation of a proceedings by
Lokayukta
does not vitiate the disciplinary action so long as the
enquiry and the disciplinary proceedings as well as the final
order is passed by the Competent Authority after following
due process, which has been done in the present case.
Accordingly, the objections relating to competency of
competence or authority of the Lokayukta to initiate
proceedings or issue notice is untenable both in law and fact
and does not warrant any interference by this Court.
12.
The reliance placed by the petitioner on the
judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Syndicate
Bank Vs. R. Bali Reddy2 (R. Bali Reddy) is also misplaced.
In the said case, the Appellate Authority has dismissed the
appeal by a non-speaking one line order and the reasons
ILR 2015 KAR 46
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were sought to be supplied subsequently, which was held to
be impermissible in law.
13.
In the present case, however the impugned order
is not cryptic or mechanical affirmation. The Disciplinary
Authority has considered the enquiry report, the reply
submitted by the petitioner and the material on record and
has assigned reasons for imposing the penalty. Therefore,
R. Bali Reddy's case is clearly distinguishable.
14.
Learned counsel appearing for the Lokayukta has
placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this
Court in Gopal Hanumanth Kase Vs. The State of
Karnataka and Others3 (Gopal Hanumanth Kase), wherein
while interpreting clause 12 of Section 2 of the Karnataka
Lokayuktha Act, 1984 (‘Act, 1984’ for short), it has held as
under:
“Having examined the decisions aforesaid and the
statutory provisions applicable to the case, we have no
hesitation in finding that the petitioner answers to the
WP.No.5674/2018 D.D 13.04.2018
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definition of “public servant” as occurring in clause (12)
of Section 2 of the Act of 1984, being in the service of
local authority in the State of Karnataka; and in his
case, the Competent Authority for the purpose of
dealing with the matter under the Act of 1984 would be
such Authority, as may be prescribed, by virtue of subclause (d) of clause (4) of Section 2 thereof. The
relevant clauses read as under:
“2. Definitions.xxx
(4)
“competent authority” in relation to a
public servant means,(a)
in the case of Chief Minister or a
member of the State Legislature, the
Governor acting in his direction;
(b) in the case of a Minister or Secretary, the
Chief Minister;
(c)
in the case of a Government servant
other than a Secretary, the Government of
Karnataka;
(d) in the case of any other public servant,
such authority as may be prescribed;
(12) “public servant” means a person who is
or was at any time,xxx
(g) a person in the service or pay of,(i) a local authority in the State of
Karnataka
xxx”
It has been pointed out that under the Rules of
1985, the Government of Karnataka is the prescribed
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Competent Authority for the public servants referred to
in sub-clause (d) of clause (4) of Section 2 of the Act of
1984. Rule 3 of the Rules of 1985, reads as under:
“3.
Competent
Authority.In
respect of the public servants referred to in
sub-clause (d) of clause (4) of Section 2, the
Government of Karnataka shall be the
Competent Authority.”
In view of the above, the submission that the
matter has not been dealt with by the Competent
Authority because of applicability of the Rules of 2010
to the service of the petitioner, is required to be
rejected. Even under the said Rules of 2010, it is but
clear that the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 do apply in regard to
the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The
applicability of the said Rules of 1957 is distinctly
stated in clause (1) of Rule 11 of the Rules of 2010,
which reads as under:
“11. Application of certain other rules:
Without prejudice to these rules, the
provisions of,(1)
The
Karnataka
Civil
Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1957 shall apply subject to modifications
specified in Schedule III.
xxx”
Of course, under the said clause (1) of Rule 11,
the Rules of 1957 apply to the employees like the
petitioner, subject to the modifications specified in
Schedule
III
to
the
Rules
of
2010.
But,
such
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modifications in Schedule III have no bearing on the
subject
matter
of
this
petition.
Under
the
said
Schedule-III, only the authorities, who are competent
to impose punishment, as also the Appellate Authorities
have been specified. Such provisions do not, in any
manner, nullify or override the effect of the Act of 1984
and the Rules made thereunder. The first submission
as made on behalf of the petitioner is, therefore,
required to be rejected.”
15.
The Division Bench categorically held that a
public servant in service of a local authority falls within the
sweep of the said definition and that the competent
authority for the purpose of action under Act, 1984 is to be
determined having regard to the nature of service and
controlling authority. The Division Bench, after an elaborate
examination
of
the
statutory
scheme
and
relevant
provisions, has observed that the operation of Act, 1984, is
not in any manner nullified, diluted or overridden by any
other service regulations. The said principle squarely applies
to the present case and answers the objections raised as to
the jurisdiction and competency against the petitioner.
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16.
The misconduct proved against the petitioner
relates to demand and acceptance of illegal gratification,
which strikes at the root of public service. Such misconduct
cannot be treated lightly. That punishment of dismissal
cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate so as to
warrant interference.
17.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds no
merit in the writ petition and the impugned order does not
suffer from illegality, arbitrariness or jurisdictional error
warranting interference. Accordingly, the following:
ORDER
The writ petition is dismissed.
Sd/JUSTICE K.S.HEMALEKHA
AT
Ct:VH
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 25
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