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2026:HHC:22395
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 941 of 2025
Reserved on: 5.5.2026
Date of Decision: 16.6.2026.
Purshotam Lal
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP
…. Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
Yes.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr. Mohar Singh, Advocate.
For the Respondent-State
:
Mr. Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
quashing of FIR No.43 of 2020, dated 24.5.2020, registered at
Police
Station
Fatehpur,
District
Kangra,
H.P.,
for
the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 188, 269 and
270 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 51 of the Disaster
Management Act pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate
First Class, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P.
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2.
2026:HHC:22395
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the police had set up a naka on 3.4.2020 at Gholi
Chowk. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-38F-6918 came
from Khatiyar towards Fatehpur. The police signalled the driver
to stop the vehicle. The driver identified himself as Purshotam
Lal (the present petitioner). He was asked to produce a curfew
pass. He produced an acknowledgment slip issued by the office of
the District Magistrate. The police told the petitioner that it was
merely an acknowledgment slip and not a valid pass. Golwan was
declared a containment zone due to COVID-19 infection, and no
person was permitted to move. The police registered the FIR and
investigated the matter. The police filed the charge sheet after
the
completion
of
the
investigation.
Subsequently,
the
proceedings under Section 188 of the IPC and Section 51 of the
Disaster Management Act were withdrawn, but they are
continuing for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 269 and 270 of the IPC.
3.
Being aggrieved by the filing of the charge sheet, the
petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the
petitioner had gone to Chandigarh for the medical treatment of
his brother. He apprised the police about this fact, but the police
2026:HHC:22395
registered the FIR against him. The petitioner was kept under
quarantine in a designated COVID Centre for 23 days. His report
was found to be negative. The offence punishable under Section
188 of the IPC is non-cognizable, and the complaint by the public
servant is mandatory. The petitioner was not suffering from any
infection and could not have spread any disease. Therefore, it
was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and
consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed.
4.
A status report reproducing the contents of the FIR
and the steps taken during the investigation was filed.
5.
I have heard Mr Mohar Singh, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent State.
6.
Mr. Mohar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely
implicated. The petitioner was found to be negative for COVID19, and he could not have spread any infection to anyone. The
allegations in the FIR do not constitute the commission of any
offence, even if they are taken to be correct. Therefore, he prayed
that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and
2026:HHC:22395
consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. He relied
upon the judgments of Sidak Singh Sandhu Vs. U.T. Chandigarh
and another Cr.M-M-19407-2022 (O&M), decided on 27.7.2022
and Tanveer and another Vs. State of H.P. and another, Cr.MP(M)
No.119 of 2022, decided on 13.5.2022
in support of his
submissions.
7.
Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent-State, submitted that the State has
already withdrawn the complaint regarding the commission of
offences punishable under Section 188 of the IPC and Section 51
of the Disaster Management Act. The matter is pending
regarding Sections 269 and 270 of the IPC. The petitioner had
violated the COVID-19 protocol, and he is being rightly
prosecuted. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
8.
I
have
given
a
considerable
thought
to
the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records
carefully.
9.
2026:HHC:22395
The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to
be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised
some
of
the
principles
under
which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers
2026:HHC:22395
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable based on which no prudent person
can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted)
to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings, and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)
would be of relevance to us in this case.
2026:HHC:22395
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
10.
This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,
may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes
or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature
of this authority, the High Court must exercise it
sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are
embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing
the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of
process or where intervention is essential to uphold the
ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and
guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-
2026:HHC:22395
empting the Prosecution from building its case before the
Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,
contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal
complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR
represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie
offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.)
the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations;
and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the
dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335).
11.
A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State
of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:
“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear
that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of
any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the
ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only
empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its
inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new
power on the High Court but rather saves the power which
the High Court already possesses, from before the
enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very
existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate
for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the
High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it
may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the
proceedings would serve the ends of justice.”
12.
The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
13.
The petitioner has specifically stated in his petition
that he was found negative for COVID-29. The status report does
not mention that the petitioner was found to be COVID-19
2026:HHC:22395
positive. The only allegation is that he was moving around
without a valid curfew pass. It was laid down by the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in Sidak Singh Sandhu (supra) that before a
person can be prosecuted for the commission of offences
punishable under Section 269 and 270 of IPC, it must be proved
that he had knowledge that he is likely to spread infection of any
disease. In the absence of any such evidence, he cannot be so
prosecuted. It was observed: 12. A Division Bench of Bombay High Court has held in
Criminal Application No. 453 of 2020, decided on 21.09.2020,
titled as HLA SHWE v. State of Maharashtra, that the person
sought to be prosecuted under Sections 269 and 270 IPC
must commit an act with the knowledge that he is likely to
spread infection of any disease. The relevant extract of the
observation recorded by the Division Bench of the Bombay
High Court is extracted as under:
14. To attract ingredients of Sections 269 and 270,
the person must commit any act which he knows is
likely to spread infection of any disease which is
dangerous to life. It is not in dispute that the
applicants had undergone a COVID-19 test during
their period of quarantine, i.e. from 03.04.2020, and
their test report for infection with COVID-19 was
negative. It is also not disputed that they were kept
in isolation from 24.03.2020 till 31.03.2020 under
the supervision of Dr Khawaj, NMC Zonal Officer,
Mominpura, Nagpur. There is no material on record
to prove that applicants had indulged in any act that
was likely to spread infection of COVID-19.
Therefore, from the material produced in the
charge-sheet, there is no evidence to substantiate
2026:HHC:22395
the fulfilment of the ingredients of Sections 269 and
270 of the Penal Code, 1860.
****
13. Furthermore, the aforesaid issue was also
examined by this Court in CRM-M-51595 of 2021
titled as Pawan Giri v. State of Haryana, which reads
thus: —
10. A perusal of Section 269 IPC shows that in
order to attract the same, the act of an accused
must be one which is likely to spread infection of
any disease dangerous to life. A perusal of the
report filed by the respondent under Section 173
Cr. P.C. does not indicate any prima facie
evidence collected by the Police as to whether the
petitioner or the other members of the family
were suffering from any infectious disease or
would have caused the spread of any infectious
disease. In the absence thereof, it cannot be
assumed that the petitioners were either the
carriers of infection or would have caused the
spread thereof. Apart from that, the report also
does not indicate the exact guideline purportedly
alleged to have been violated. In the absence of
any such specific guidelines that are alleged to
have been violated, there is no presumption that
the act of the petitioners was unlawful. Further,
perusal of the notification dated 01.04.2020
shows that the said notification was in the nature
of a prohibition imposed upon the shops selling
medicines and was not against any other person.
Hence, the action of the petitioners in seeking
procurement of essential medicines during the
permissible hours of operation cannot be held to
be unlawful. In the absence of the respondents to
refer to any order, the disobedience whereof is
sought to be alleged against the petitioners, it
cannot be perceived that the petitioners have
committed an offence under Section 269 IPC.
2026:HHC:22395
***
16. A perusal of the FIR and the final report fails to
make out the essential ingredients of the offence
under Section 269 IPC, and the case would fall in
category (1) and (3)
14.
A similar view was taken in Konan Kodio Ganstone v.
State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 869, wherein it was
observed:
42. The chargesheet is filed for the offence punishable
under section 269 of the IPC, which provides for a penalty
when there is a negligent act which is likely to spread
infection of a disease dangerous to life. For this offence,
punishment of imprisonment for six months or a fine is
provided. The chargesheet is filed for the offence
punishable under section 270 of I.P.C., also, it shows that
when a person malignantly does an act which he knows or
he has reason to believe is likely to spread infection
dangerous to life, and in such a case, the penalty provided
is imprisonment for two years or fine. In respect of the
offences punishable under sections 269 and 270 of the
IPC, this Court has already discussed the relevant
material, and it has already observed that it is not possible
to infer under any circumstances that these persons were
infected when they arrived in India. It is also not possible
to infer that their acts amount to offences punishable
under sections 269 and 270 of the IPC...
15.
A similar view was taken by this Court in Tanveer
(supra), wherein it was observed:
11. Section 269 of the IPC provides that whoever
unlawfully or negligently does any act which is, and which
he knows or has reason to believe to be, likely to spread
the infection of any disease dangerous to life, shall be
punished with imprisonment or fine or with both.
2026:HHC:22395
12. In the present case, as has been reported by the police,
the petitioners were not suffering from Covid 19;
therefore, there was no question of knowing or having
reason to believe to be likely to spread the infection of any
disease dangerous to life by the petitioners. Hence,
provisions of Section 269 of the IPC are not attracted in
the present case.
16.
In the present case also, there is nothing on record to
show that the petitioner had any disease or that he was likely to
spread any disease. Hence, the allegations in the FIR, even if
taken to be correct, do not show the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 269 and 270 of the IPC.
17.
The State has already withdrawn the charge sheet for
the commission of offences punishable under Section 188 of the
IPC and 51 of the Disaster Management Act. Hence, the
proceedings against the petitioner will not survive.
18.
In view of the above, the present petition is allowed
and the FIR No.43 of 2020, dated 24.5.2020 registered at police
station Fatehpur, District Kangra, H.P. for the commission of
offences punishable and Sections 188, 269 and 270 of Indian
Penal Code IPC and Section 51 of Disaster Management Act and
consequential proceedings pending before learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P. are ordered to
be quashed qua the petitioner.
19.
2026:HHC:22395
The observations made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing
whatsoever on the merits of the case.
16th June, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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