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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 13.01.2026
Judgment pronounced on:28.01.2026
ARB.P. 1610/2025
PURI CONSTRUCTIONS PVT LTD & ORS.
Through:
.....Petitioners
Mr. M.R. Shamshad, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Sarwar
Raza, Mr. Arijit Sarkar and Ms.
Devanshi Yadav, Advs.
Mr. Himanshu Juneja A.R.
versus
LARSEN AND TOUBRO LIMITED
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Akhil Sibal, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Sameer
Parekh, Mr. Sumit Goel, Mr.
Abhishek
Thakral,
Ms.
Sreeparna Basak, Mr. Jayant
Bajaj and Ms. Sugandh Shahi,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Petition, under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 19961, has been filed seeking the appointment
of a Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the unadjudicated issues/
quantification of claims of the Claimant/ Petitioner herein pursuant to
the Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment dated 21.04.2025 in Civil
Appeal Nos. 2575-2581 of 2016 in relation to common Arbitration
Act
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BHATIA
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Agreement as set out in the Development Agreement dated
10.03.19982.
2.
The material on record indicates that the Petitioners, on behalf
of and in the name of PCPL, purchased land in Sector 53 and 54,
Gurgaon, Haryana, with the objective of developing a Group Housing
Project. In the year 1995, ITC Ltd., through its wholly owned
subsidiary, ITC Classic Real Estate Finance Ltd.3, intended to
jointly develop the project with the Petitioners. However, ITCREF
subsequently exited the real estate sector.
3.
Pursuant to this, an Exit Agreement dated 30.07.1997 was
entered into between the Petitioners and ITCREF, under which
ITCREF was assured a specified built-up area in the project.
4.
The project was thereafter assigned to Larsen & Toubro Ltd4,
the Respondent herein. Accordingly, the Development Agreement
dated 10.03.1998 was executed between the Petitioners and the
Respondents, with ITCREF as the consenting party. The Development
Agreement at Clause 45 contained the Arbitration Clause, which reads
as follows:
“45. All disputes arising out of or in connection with this
Agreement shall be resolved by mutual discussions between the
parties failing which, such disputes shall be referred to Arbitration.
The procedure of arbitration shall be as per the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act 1996. This agreement shall be subject to the
jurisdiction of Courts at New Delhi only.”
5.
Thereafter, it is stated in the Petition that certain disputes arose
between the parties and the Petitioners herein, vide Legal Notice dated
18.09.2000, invoked arbitration.
Agreement
ITCREF
L&T
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BHATIA
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6.
It is further stated that the Petitioners thereafter filed an
Arbitration Petition bearing A.A. No. 241 of 2000, under Section
11(6) of the Act, seeking the appointment of an Arbitrator to
adjudicate upon the disputes that had arisen between the parties.
7.
Thereafter, vide Consent Order dated 14.02.2001, this Court
appointed Hon’ble Mr. Justice G. N. Ray (Retd.), former Judge of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, as the learned Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate
the disputes inter se the parties. The learned Arbitrator rendered the
Arbitral Award on 28.12.20025.
8.
Material on record further indicates that aggrieved by the
Arbitral Award, the Respondent filed objections under section 34 of
the Act before this Court in OMP No. 26 of 20036, which was
consequently allowed by a Co-ordinate bench of this Court, vide Order
dated 26.11.2008 and the Arbitral Award was set aside.
9.
The aforesaid Order passed in the Section 34 Petition was
challenged by both parties by way of cross Appeals under Section 37
of the Act. The Division Bench of this Court vide order dated
30.04.2015, partly allowed the Appeal preferred by the Petitioners
herein, thereby upholding the Arbitral Award, and setting aside only
the damages component of the same.
10.
The parties, thereafter, preferred Civil Appeal Nos. 2575-2581
of 2016 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, seeking to challenge the
Order dated 30.04.2015. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, upon
adjudication, in those appeals held as follows:
“56. The powers of the Appellate Court under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act are not broader than those of the Court under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Therefore, what cannot be done
Arbitral Award
Section 34 Petition
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BHATIA
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in the exercise of the powers under Section 34 cannot be done in an
Appeal under Section 37. An Arbitral Award cannot be modified.
Thus, even after recording the conclusions in paragraph no. 119,
the Division Bench has not modified the Award by partly setting
aside the Judgment under Section 34. In paragraph 121 of the
Judgment, the Division Bench held thus:
“121. In light of the above conclusions, parties are left to
pursue the appropriate course of action under law. This
Court notices that since the dispute has been in subsistence
for a considerable period of time, an attempt may be made
at settling the claims through mediation. FAO (OS)
21/2009, 22/2009 and 23/2009 are partly allowed to the
above extent; FAO (OS) 194/2009 is dismissed, for the
same reason.”
On a conjoint reading of Paragraph 119 and 121, we find that the
remedy of PCL has been kept open to pursue appropriate course of
action under law as there cannot be a remand to the Arbitral
Tribunal for quantification of monetary claim. As the finding of the
Arbitral Tribunal regarding breaches committed by L&T was
affirmed, the Division Bench has rightly segregated that part of the
Award by which, cost of arbitration was ordered to be paid to PCL
by L&T. This part has been severed from rest of the Award.
Therefore, this part of the Award must be complied with by L&T,
if not already done. As documents of title were deposited with the
Registrar, the direction to hand over the same to PCL cannot be
faulted with. We cannot find any fault with the operative part in
paragraph 120.”
11.
Pursuant to the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the
Petitioners issued a fresh notice dated 14.05.2025 to the Respondent,
invoking arbitration as per Clause 45 of the Development Agreement.
12.
Thereafter, the parties attempted to resolve the dispute through
mediation; however, the same was unsuccessful.
13.
Consequently, the Petitioners preferred the present Petition,
under 11(6) of the Act, seeking the appointment of an Arbitrator.
14.
It is, however, pertinent to note that the Petitioners herein, in the
prayer clause of the present Petition, have prayed for adjudication on a
limited aspect of the “unadjudicated issues/quantification of claims of
the Petitioner/Claimant”.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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15.
The learned Senior Counsel for the parties, on instructions,
initially submitted that they are ad idem that the matter be referred to
arbitration for the adjudication of disputes that had arisen between the
parties. However, the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners, on
instructions, vehemently pressed on the prayer that the matter be
referred to arbitration only upon the unadjudicated aspect of the
quantification of damages/claims.
16.
Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners would submit that
the claims and counter-claims have already been dealt with in the
earlier Arbitral Award, and it has attained finality in view of the
Judgment dated 30.04.2015 of the Division Bench of this Court,
which upheld the Arbitral Award after setting aside the severable part
of the award dealing with quantification of damages. The Judgement
of the Division Bench was further upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court vide Judgment dated 21.04.2025 while permitting the
Petitioners to pursue an appropriate course of action under law.
Therefore, he would submit that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
granted the liberty to pursue appropriate remedies, limited to the
aspect of quantifying the damages.
17.
Resultantly, the learned Senior Counsel would submit that the
issue of quantification of damages is the only aspect that needs to be
adjudicated by the learned Arbitrator, as and when the matter is
referred to arbitration and accordingly, would seek the directions of
this Court to direct the learned Arbitrator to only adjudicate upon the
remaining and limited aspect of quantification.
18.
Per Contra, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent would
vociferously oppose the said prayer. He would submit that the scope
of Section 11 of the Act is limited. He would submit that the issue of
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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ARB.P. 1610/2025
adjudication of disputes to be referred to the Arbitrator, including
permissible defences and counterclaims are all within the scope of
jurisdiction of the learned Arbitrator. He would rely upon the
Judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Goa v. Praveen
Enterprises7.
19.
Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent would further seek
to rely on the Judgement of the Apex Court in SBI General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg.8, to submit that the scope of enquiry at the stage
of appointment of arbitrator i.e., Court exercising jurisdiction under
Section 11 of the Act, is limited to the scrutiny of prima facie
existence of the arbitration agreement, and nothing else.
20.
We have heard the learned Senior Counsel for the parties,
perused the paper book and material on record.
21.
This Court, at the very outset, rejects the prayer of the
Petitioners for seeking a limited adjudication on disputes as
misconceived and incorrect.
22.
This Court is cognizant of the scope of interference at the stage
of a Section 11(6) Petition. The law with respect to the scope and
standard of judicial scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the Act has been
fairly well settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in SBI General
Insurance Co. Ltd. (Supra) has crystallised the law in the following
manner:
“114. The use of the term “examination” under Section 11(6-A) as
distinguished from the use of the term “rule” under Section 16
implies that the scope of enquiry under Section 11(6-A) is limited
to a prima facie scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration
(2012) 12 SCC 581
(2024) 12 SCC 1
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BHATIA
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agreement, and does not include a contested or laborious enquiry,
which is left for the Arbitral Tribunal to “rule” under Section 16.
The prima facie view on existence of the arbitration agreement
taken by the Referral Court does not bind either the Arbitral
Tribunal or the Court enforcing the arbitral award.
****
117. In view of the observations made by this Court in Interplay
Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996 &
the Stamp Act, 1899, In re [Interplay Between Arbitration
Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act,
1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1 : 2023 INSC 1066] , it is clear that the
scope of enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited
to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it difficult to
hold that the observations made in Vidya Drolia [Vidya
Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 : (2021) 1 SCC
(Civ) 549] and adopted in NTPC Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd. [NTPC
Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd., (2023) 9 SCC 385 : (2023) 4 SCC (Civ)
342] that the jurisdiction of the Referral Court when dealing with
the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under Section 11 extends to
weeding out ex facie non-arbitrable and frivolous disputes would
continue to apply despite the subsequent decision in Interplay
Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996 &
the Stamp Act, 1899, In re[Interplay Between Arbitration
Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act,
1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1 : 2023 INSC 1066] .
****
121. Tests like the “eye of the needle” and “ex facie meritless”,
although try to minimise the extent of judicial interference, yet
they require the Referral Court to examine contested facts and
appreciate prima facie evidence (however limited the scope of
enquiry may be) and thus are not in conformity with the principles
of modern arbitration which place arbitral autonomy and judicial
non-interference on the highest pedestal.”
23.
It is trite law that the Courts, while exercising their jurisdiction
under Section 11(6) of the Act, shall not identify the disputes or refer
the same to the Arbitral Tribunal for adjudication. This Court is
guided by the Judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of
Goa (supra) as also the Judgement of this Court, passed by a CoSignature Not Verified
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BHATIA
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ordinate Bench in Pradhaan Air Express (P) Ltd. v. Air Works India
Engineering (P) Ltd9. The Apex Court in State of Goa (supra) has
held as follows:
“28. Section 11 of the Act requires the Chief Justice or his
designate only to appoint the arbitrator(s). It does not require the
Chief Justice or his designate to identify the disputes or refer them
to the Arbitral Tribunal for adjudication. Where the appointment
procedure in an arbitration agreement requires disputes to be
formulated and specifically referred to the arbitrator and confers
jurisdiction upon the arbitrator to decide only such referred
disputes, when an application is filed under Section 11(6) of the
Act, alleging that such procedure is not followed, the Chief Justice
or his designate will take necessary measures under Section 11(6)
of the Act to ensure compliance by the parties with such procedure.
29. Where the arbitration agreement requires the disputes to be
formulated and referred to arbitration by an appointing authority,
and the appointing authority fails to do so, the Chief Justice or his
designate will direct the appointing authority to formulate the
disputes for reference as required by the arbitration agreement. The
assumption by the courts below that a reference of specific
disputes to the arbitrator by the Chief Justice or his designate is
necessary while making appointment of arbitrator under Section 11
of the Act, is without any basis. Equally baseless is the assumption
that where one party filed an application under Section 11 and gets
an arbitrator appointed the arbitrator can decide only the disputes
raised by the applicant under Section 11 of the Act and not the
counterclaims of the respondent.
****
41. The position emerging from the above discussion may be
summed up as follows:
(a) Section 11 of the Act requires the Chief Justice or his
designate to either appoint the arbitrator(s) or take necessary
measures in accordance with the appointment procedure
contained in the arbitration agreement. The Chief Justice or the
designate is not required to draw up the list of disputes and
refer them to arbitration. The appointment of the Arbitral
Tribunal is an implied reference in terms of the arbitration
agreement.
(b) Where the arbitration agreement provides for referring all
disputes between the parties (whether without any exceptions
2025 SCC OnLine Del 3022
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BHATIA
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ARB.P. 1610/2025
or subject to exceptions), the arbitrator will have jurisdiction to
entertain any counterclaim, even though it was not raised at a
stage earlier to the stage of pleadings before the arbitrator.
(c) Where however the arbitration agreement requires specific
disputes to be referred to arbitration and provides that the
arbitrator will have the jurisdiction to decide only the disputes
so referred, the arbitrator's jurisdiction is controlled by the
specific reference and he cannot travel beyond the reference,
nor entertain any additional claims or counterclaims which are
not part of the disputes specifically referred to arbitration.”
24.
Despite the law being well settled, the learned Senior Counsel
for the Petitioners, after agreeing to the matter being referred to
arbitration without any qualification, upon being prodded by his
client, despite being cautioned by this Court, relentlessly pursued the
prayer to limit the scope of the reference of the learned Arbitrator.
25.
Since the learned Senior Counsel for the parties are ad idem that
the matter be referred to arbitration, this Court deems it appropriate to
allow the present Petition to the extent that a learned Arbitrator be
appointed for the said purpose, rejecting the prayer seeking to limit the
adjudication only to the aspect of quantification of damages, with a
cost of Rs. 50,000/- to be deposited by the Petitioners with the
Delhi High Court Bar Association, within a period of two weeks
from the date of this Order, failing which the Registry is directed to
list the matter before the Court for necessary directions, in this regard.
26.
Since, the Petitioner is a fairly large company and the small
amount imposed as costs, for a Company, which is worth hundreds of
crores, is only to serve as a reminder that judicial time is precious and
injudicious and frivolous arguments should be eschewed. The queue
for justice stretches several decades, and Counsel and litigants, like in
the present case, who can afford to litigate endlessly, in the opinion of
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BHATIA
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this Court, would need a timely reminder to respect the cause of
justice to all litigants and cooperate with the judicial system.
27.
In view thereof, this Court requests Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mukul
Mudgal (Retired) (Mob. No. 9818000250), to enter into the reference
as the learned Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes inter se the parties.
28.
The learned sole Arbitrator may proceed with the arbitration
proceedings, subject to furnishing to the parties the requisite
disclosures as required under Section 12(2) of the Act.
29.
The learned sole Arbitrator shall be entitled to fees in
accordance with the Fourth Schedule of the Act or as may otherwise
be agreed to between the parties and the learned sole Arbitrator.
30.
The parties shall share the learned sole Arbitrator's fee and
arbitral costs equally.
31.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counterclaims are kept open, to be decided by the learned sole
Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.
32.
Needless to state, nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy.
All rights and contentions of the parties in this regard are reserved.
33.
Let a copy of the said order be sent to the learned sole
Arbitrator through the electronic mode as well.
34.
Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending
application(s), is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JANUARY 28, 2026/va
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:58:24
ARB.P. 1610/2025
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