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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on:- 04.02.2026.
Date of pronouncement:- 13.02.2026
+
LPA 733/2025, CM APPLs. 76001/2025, 76002/2025 & 76004/2025
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ORS.
Through:
.....Appellants
Mr.Saurabh Mishra, Sr.Adv with
Mr.Bitu Kumar Singh, Mr.Rajeev
Ranjan and Mr.Gunjan Kumar, Advs
versus
C.J. ARORA
.....Respondent
Through:
Dr. Ashwani Bhardwaj, Adv.
CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA
JUDGMENT
DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, C.J.
CHALLENGE
1.
This letter patent appeal instituted under Clause X of the Letter Patent
seeks to challenge the judgment and order dated 09.12.2024 passed by
learned Single Judge whereby W.P.(C) No.6696/2003 filed by the
respondent, was allowed, and the charge-sheet along with the Inquiry Report
dated 14.12.1995, punishment order of dismissal from service dated
17.08.1996, the order of the Appellate Authority dated 26.07.2002
dismissing the appeal against the order of punishment, and the order dated
Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
16:59:31
LPA 733/2025
08.04.2003 passed by Reviewing Authority dismissing the review, has been
quashed.
2.
Learned Single Judge has further held that the respondent shall be
entitled to notional reinstatement from the date of the order of penalty till
30.04.2011 when he retired on attaining the age of superannuation. Further
directions were also issued by learned Single Judge in the impugned
judgment and order that pay and allowances of the respondent shall be
calculated for the period of notional reinstatement for the purposes of retiral
benefits on this basis, and he shall accordingly be paid his pension from
30.04.2011 along with arrears.
FACTS
3.
Heard the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants and the learned
counsel for the respondent. We have also perused the records available
before us on this letters patent appeal.
4.
The facts as pleaded in this matter in brief are as follows:-
i.)
Before the merger of the Bank of India with the Punjab National
Bank, the respondent was working as Manager (MMG/S-II) at New Bank of
India till 07.01.1990. While working in the said position, a charge-sheet
was issued against him on 20.09.1990, whereby he was charged with
misconduct. The charges as mentioned in the Articles of Charge were that
the respondent acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Bank; he
failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty and diligence; he
failed to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank; he acted in manner
Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
16:59:31
LPA 733/2025
unbecoming of an Officer of the Bank; he acted otherwise than in his best
judgment while discharging his duties, he misused /abused his position and
status in the Bank, and therefore, such acts committed by the respondent
constituted misconduct under Regulation 24 of the New Bank of India
Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulation, 1982, which are punishable.
ii.)
The statement of allegations, which accompanied the Articles of
Charge, states that (a) the respondent directly or indirectly helped the firm
M/s Vishal Super Insulators, of which one Mr.Vijay Kumar and Mrs.Menka
Mehta were partners, to secure financial assistance from the Bank without
disclosing to the recommending authority or the sanctioning authority that
Mrs.Menka Mehta was his sister.
iii.)
The allegations against the respondent further were that he made
certain manipulations in the documents by changing the dates of note from
03.03.1988 to 19.02.1988 and got the financial assistance sanctioned by
misusing his position in respect of the proposal of M/s UKG Engineering
Private Limited, which was a sister company of M/s Vishal Super Insulators.
It was also stated in the allegation that limit of financial assistance was
enhanced within a period of one and a half month from Rs.4,00,000/- to
Rs.7,50,000/- on 08.04.1988, which was without jurisdiction, without
examining the operation of the account which showed divergence of fund to
the sister company and further that concerned branch of the Bank frequently
allowed excess drawing in the sanctioned limit recommended by the
respondent.
iv.)
As per the allegation, the respondent was asked to declare his
Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
16:59:31
LPA 733/2025
relationship with Mrs.Menka Mehta, and in order to mislead, he mentioned
the names of Directors of M/s Everest Promoters Private Limited as
Mr.U.K.Gupta and Mrs.Satya Bale, whereas the Bank record showed that
his sister Mrs.Menka Mehta was the Director of the company concerned,
who had executed documents. It was also alleged that the respondent also
helped various companies, which were sister companies of M/s Everest
Promoters Private Limited and M/s Vishal Super Insulators, where his sister
Mrs.Menka Mehta was Director/partner.
v.)
The statement of allegations also mentioned that in respect of credit
facility to M/s Everest Promoters Private Limited to the tune of
Rs.19,75,000/-, the respondent did not conveyed the fact that only
photocopy of title deed were held in the account and that he helped his
sister’s construction company to secure the housing loan and further that
such housing loans included a loan of Rs.1,00,000/- to the husband of
Mrs.Menka Mehta.
vi.)
The statement of allegations in support of Articles of Charge framed
against the respondent is extracted herein below:“STATEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF ARTICLES OF
CHARGE FRAMED AGAINST SHRI CJ ARORA, MANAGER, BO,
JANPATH
(PREVIOUSLY AT BO, L-BLOCK, CONNAUGHT PLACE, NEW
DELHI)
Shri CJ Arora while working as Manager (Loans) at BO, L-Block,
Connaught Place, New Delhi from 2.4.85 to 15.6.89 and later at BO,
Janpath, New Delhi w.e.f. 16.6.89 onwards till the date of suspension
was grossly negligent in discharge of his duties and committed the
following misconducts:-
Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
16:59:31
LPA 733/2025
1.
A/C M/S Vishal Super Insulators at BO, L-Block, New Delhi.
C/C Hyp. limit -
Bills Discounted -
Rs. 7 lacs
Rs.12.50 lacs
Bank's dues Rs.7,47,189.52
as on 1.9.90
-do-
Rs.4,15,077.72
Shri Vijay Kumar and Mrs. Menka Mehta are the partners of the firm.
Mrs. Menka Mehta is the sister of Shri CJ Arora, who was Manager of
BO, L-Block from 2.4.85 to 15.6.89 and was Incharge of Loans. Shri
Arora did not disclose to the recommending authority or to the
sanctioning authority his relationship with one of the partners of the
firm i.e. Mrs. Manka Mehta. On the other hand, Sh. Arora directly or
indirectly helped the firm to secure financial assistance from the bank
despite the existence of lacunae and shortcomings. During his tenure as
Manager in Loans Department of BO, L-Block, he got the limits
sanctioned to the above party. By this process he helped his sister to get
the facilities sanctioned from the bank and also frequent enhancements
from time to time as per details given below:
Initially a limit of C/C (Hyp.) of Rs.2 lacs and Term loan of Rs.2 lacs
was sanctioned by the then Sr. Manager, Shri ML Mahajan on 14.4.86.
Shri Arora was then working as Manager Incharge of Loans
Department. He did not disclose that his sister is one of the partners.
On 16.1.87 a further Bill Discounting limit of 8.2 lacs was sanctioned.
The limits were further increased by placing a note dt. 8.2.88 before the
Sr. Manager by Sh.CJ Arora as follows: Cash Credit (Hyp.) limit of Rs.2 lacs to Rs.5 lacs. No financial papers
were obtained to justify the increased limits. Sh.Arora himself
interviewed the party and recommended increase in limit on the basis of
personal Interview. The cash credit (hyp.) limit was further increased to
Rs. 7 lacs and the BD limit to Rs. 12.50 lacs by getting the sanction of
Asst. General Manager, RO, Delhi on the branch's letter itself. No
renewal papers and latest financial papers, showing the working results
of this company were obtained. The Increase in limits were
recommended just at the party's request without any supporting
financial papers. Not even such figures were obtained. While
recommending BD limit Rs. 12.50 lacs on DA basis, the names of the
drawers were not ascertained and their financial standing studied. In
Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
16:59:31
LPA 733/2025
the recommendations it was just stated "Reputed parties". Though the
Asst. Gen. Manager, RO sanctioned the increased limit only for three
months with a condition that proposal must be submitted within this
period of three months, no efforts were made to submit the renewal
proposal and the enhanced limits were continued without obtaining
regular renewed sanction.
Thus, undue favour was shown to the party by Sh.Arora.
2.
M/S U.K.G. Engg. Pvt. Ltd. A/C at BO, L-Block, New Delhi
This is a sister concern of M/S Vishal Super Insulators. The proposal of
M/s UKG Engg. Pvt. Ltd. was sent to RO, Delhi for sanction, duly
recommended by the Senior Manager, Sh.ML Mahajan on 12.2.88 and
Regional office had returned the proposal with the letter that the
proposal falls under Sr.Manager’s discretionary powers having
aggregate powers upto 2.20 lacs vide Regional Office letter no.
ROD:L:4727 dated 23.2.88.
After receipt of letter dated 23.2.88 from Regional Office a
note/sanction memorandum dated 3.3.88 was put up by Sh.CJ Arora. As
per circular no. LD/8/88 dt. 17.2.88 the Sr.Manager was not
empowered to sanction the limits as recommended in the said note. In
order to overcome this Sh.CJ Arora changed the dates of the note from
3.3.88 to 19.2.88 and got the limit sanctioned from the Sr.Manager with
dated 19.2.88. This is a clear case of misuse of his position. Since the
Regional office advised the branch only on 23.2.88 and hence there
cannot be any note for sanction of the facilities by the Sr.Manager prior
to this date.
Further the limits were enhanced within a period of one and a half
months from Rs. 4 lacs to Rs. 7.50 lacs on 8.4.88 without any
Justification and just simply on the request of the party. The operation
of the account from the date of previous sanctioned was not at all
examined. The operation of the account clearly shows diversion of firm
funds invested in the sister concern only as shown hereunder:Date
Amount
20.02.88
Rs.25,000/-
22.2.88
Rs.50,000/-
Name of the sister concern
To M/S Raja Sons-Mr. UK Gupta, who is
directors of the firm, is also proprietor
of M/S Raja Sons
To M/S Sona Machine & Engg.
Works Group: Concern
Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
16:59:31
LPA 733/2025
22.2.88
3.3.88
Rs.50,000/Rs.20,000/-
3.3.88
7.3.88
10.3.88
11.3.88
Rs. 4,000/Rs.30,000/Rs.50,000/Rs.50,000/-
-doTo Sh. Umesh Kumar Gupta
(Director)
-doTo M/S Sona Machinery & Engg. Works
To self
To M/S Sona Machinery &
Engg.Works
Rs.2,79,000/
The debit and credit submission for the period upto 8.4.88 are as
follows:Credit
Debit
Rs.5,69,697/Rs.85,835.22
Thus it clearly shows that for a period of 45 days the credit summation
was only Rs.85,835.22.
The branch frequently allowed excess drawings upto Rs. 9.51 lacs аs
against a limit of Rs. 7.50 lacs and the action upto 23.4.89 was
confirmed by the then Asst. Gen. Manager, Delhi, Sh. K.L. Chandna.
The over drawings were continued and the balance as at 3.9.90 stood at
Rs.11.31 lacs against the sanctioned limit of Rs. 7.50 lacs.
In the sanction memorandum recommended by Shri CJ Arora it was
stated that the applicant has offered a collateral security viz mortgage
of property by way of security bond comprising the premises at 1/641
Loni Road, Shahdra and valued at Rs.7.20 lacs.
It has not been brought to the notice of the sanctioning authority in the
note that the original title deed of the property are not available. In the
legal opinion dt. 8.2.88 there have been corrections suggesting that the
Legal Advisor Sh. Ravi Kant Chadha first recommended a regular
mortgage in the absence of original title deed which was subsequently
corrected as Deed of Security Bond.
The fact that the original title deeds are not available and the
whereabout of the original title deeds were purposely not
shown/disclosed in the sanction note put up by Sh. CJ Arora.
In the absence of deposit of original title deeds or a registered
Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
16:59:31
LPA 733/2025
mortgage, bank does not have any hold in the property.
By allowing further withdrawals over and above the limit the party was
allowed to divert funds to the sister concerns as per details given below
:
Date
14.9.88
14.9.88
12.10.88
12.10.88
Amount
Rs.20,000/Rs.90,000/Rs.2,00,000/Rs.50,000/-
15.11.88
29.11.88
29.11.88
Rs.1,50,000/Rs.1,25,000/Rs.1,00,000/-
Group concerns
To M/S Vishal Super Insulators
To M/S Sona Super Insulators
-doTo M/S Sona Machinery & Engg.
(P) Ltd.
-do-doTo M/S Sidharth Investment
The party was defaulter in the term loan account from the very
beginning i.e. from March/June 1988 and inspite of this c/c hyp. & BD
limits were increased and excess withdrawal over the limits were
allowed without taking any steps to recover the instalments in arrear.
The above acts of Shri CJ Arora clearly establish that he has shown
favour to this company acting as Manager (Loans) in the said branch.
The Vigilance Department asked Shri Arora to declare his relationship
with Mrs. Menka Mehta vide letter dated 18.6.90. Sh.CJ Arora in order
to mislead, mentioned the names of the Director of M/S Everest
Promoters (P) Ltd., as Shri UK Gupta and Mrs. Satya Bala vide his
reply dated 9.7.90 and further stated that both these directors were not
related to him. Whereas the bank's record show that Shri UK Gupta and
Mrs. Menka Mehta are still the Directors of the company and Mrs.
Menka Mehta had executed documents on behalf of the company.
The search in the office of the Registrar of Companies made on 23.7.90
by the bank through the Chartered Accountant clearly established that
Shri UK Gupta and Mrs. Menka Mehta are Directors from the date of
incorporation and no change has been reported to the Registrar of
companies.
A second letter dated 20.7.90 was issued to Shri CJ Arora asking him to
Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
16:59:31
LPA 733/2025
clarify the relationship, Shri CJ Arora received letter on 24.7.90 and
finally admitted vide his reply dated 6.9.90 that Mrs. Menka Mehta is
his sister.
Further Shri CJ Arora while working as Manager at BO, L-Block and
90, Janpath also helped the following companies to get facilities from
the bank and these companies are sister concerns of M/S Everest
Promoters (P) Ltd. and M/S Vishal Super Insulators where Mrs. Menka
Mehta, his sister is a director/partner.
Name of the party
M/S UKG Engg. (P) Ltd.
Limit
C/C- 7.50 lacs
T/L- 1.50 lacs
T/L- 0.90 lacs
M/S Sona Machines C/C- 7.50 lacs
Engg. India (P) Ltd.
Hyp.
M/S
Vishal
Super C/C- 7.00 lacs
Insulator
Hyp.
B/D- 12.50 lacs
M/S Standard Super C/C- 5.00 lacs
Industries
Hyp.
T/L- 4.90 lacs
Outstanding
23.6.90
10,88,887.01
1,23,674.80
76,684.20
9,00,533.26
as
on
4,24,071.71
8,11,499.03
6,20,645.37
5,60,341.11
Shri Arora never disclosed his relationship with the Director/partner
Mrs. Menka Mehta to the Bank and he allowed favour to this group.
3. M/S Everest Promoters (P) Ltd. A/C at BO, Janpath
In this account Shri UK Gupta and Mrs. Menka Mehta were the
Directors. For this company a proposal was submitted in February,
1989 at BO, Janpath and a cash credit (Hyp.) limit of Rs.19.75 lacs was
sanctioned by RO, Delhi. One of the terms and conditions of
recommendations/sanction was that "DP shall be allowed only against
paid up stocks. The party shall seek bank's permission before sale of any
flat and the sale proceeds shall be deposited direct to the party's
account with the bank and DP shall be reduced accordingly."
Shri CJ Arora while working as Manager in BO, L-Block issued a letter
to Chief Manager, BO, Janpath confirming that the securities already
charged in the account of M/S Sona Machineries and Engineers India
Digiltally Signed
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LPA 733/2025
Pvt. Ltd. and M/S UKG Engineering Pvt. Ltd. have also been charged in
the account of M/S Everest Promoters (P) Ltd. He had signed this letter
as Sr.Manager of the branch which is highly irregular. The fact that
only photocopies of title deeds are held in the account of M/S Everest
Promoters (P) Ltd. was not conveyed.
No documents, i.e. L-39 A and L-40A for creating this additional charge
was obtained and since his sister Mrs. Menka Mehta was Director in the
said company, i.e. M/S Everest Promoters (P) Ltd.. he had issued this
letter without taking proper documents, to safeguard the bank's interest.
Shri CJ Arora was transferred from BO, L-Block to BO, Janpath during
June 1989 where he was posted as Manager in the Loans Department.
In his capacity as Manager in the Loans Deptt. at BO Janpath he
further helped his sister's construction company in getting housing
loans sanctioned from the same branch as per particulars given below.
The sanctions were made by the Chief Manager on the
recommendations of Shri CJ Arora as Manager (Loans).
Name of the Dt.of Adv.
party
Suresh Kumar
18.9.89
Naresh Chand
18.9.89
Subhash Chander 18.9.89
Suresh Aggarwal 18.9.89
Raja Ram
19.9.89
M.L.Sharma
19.9.89
K.S.Prashar
19.9.89
K.Gopal
20.9.89
R.P.Mehta
20.9.89
Smt.Suman
20.9.89
Aggarwal
Smt.Savitri
20.9.89
Aggarwal
Limit
1,00,000/1,15,000/1,00,000/1,15,000/1,15,000/1,20,000/1,20,000/1,20,000/1,00,000/1,20,000/-
B.dues as
16.7.90
95,901.20
1,10,972.70
95.897.30
1,10,972.70
1,09,905.20
95,897.30
1,15,840.00
1,15,813.60
95,876,70
1,15,813.60
1,20,000/-
1,15,813.60
on
Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
16:59:31
LPA 733/2025
The housing loans released for purchase of flats from M/S Everest
Promoters (P) Ltd. also include loan of Rs. 1.00 lacs allowed to Shri RP
Mehta Husband of Mrs. Menka Mehta.
Housing loans amounting to Rs.12.25 lacs and the margin
money/amounts were credited in the account of M/S Everest Promoters
Pvt. Ltd. without reducing the DP and the limit to this extent as per
terms of the sanction. The original limit of Rs. 19.75 lacs was continued
to be availed by the construction company by Shri CJ Arora.
Further Shri CJ Arora had also allowed excess accommodation in the
account of M/S Everest Promoters Pvt. Ltd. as under, as, reported by
Shri SK Soni, then Chief Manager, BO, Janpath:
i) On 27.1.90 he passed a cheque for Rs. 50,000/- when the balance
outstanding against the firm stood at Rs. 21.06 lacs as against the limit
of Rs. 19.75 lacs. This was allowed in spite of the specific instructions of
Chief Manager on page no.70 of the overdraft register not to pass this
cheque. Shri CJ Arora overlooking the instructions of Chief Manager
passed the cheque with the help of Accountant, Shri NK Gupta.
ii) On 23.1.90 two cheques for Rs.75,000/- and Rs.30,000/- were
presented in clearing when the balance stood at Rs. 20.05 lacs against a
limit of Rs. 19.75 lacs. The Chief Manager ordered return of these
cheques. The cheques were returned unpaid. However, the same cheque
for Rs. 75,000/- was again presented on 25.1.90 in the clearing. In spite
of the specific instructions of Chief Manager that the cheque should not
be passed the same was passed by Sh.Arora. Sh. CJ Arora also
tampered with the overdraft sanction register at page no.70.
It has now been reported by the Chief Manager, BO, Janpath that the
register is missing now. In order to avoid action being taken against
him the register has been removed.
Sd/Assistant General Manager (P)
(Disciplinary Authority)
Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
16:59:31
LPA 733/2025
vii.) The respondent denied the allegations mentioned in the charge-sheet
and submitted his reply with the prayer that he be discharged.
The
disciplinary proceedings, accordingly, proceeded against the respondent and
the Inquiry Officer submitted the Inquiry Report dated 02.04.1992 (the first
inquiry report) to the disciplinary authority, who vide order dated
28.12.1992 directed re-inquiry in respect of the charge-sheet dated
20.09.1990 by stating that re-inquiry has been ordered afresh in view of
apprehension raised about the Inquiry Report in the manner it was prepared.
The said order dated 28.12.1992 is extracted herein below:“NEW BANK OF INDIA
Head Office
1 Tolstoy Marg, New Delhi-1
DISCIPLINARY CASES
DISPOSAL CELL
DCDC/8/92/7540
December 28, 1992
REGISTERED
Shri C.J. Arora,
Manager (Under suspension)
A-23, Hans Apartments,
East Arjun Nagar, Shahdara,
DELHI
Dear Sir,
Reg: Charge Sheet dated 20.9.1990
The undersigned hereby order re-enquiry in respect of Charge Sheet
dated 20.9.90. Enquiry has been reconstituted afresh in view of the
apprehensions raised about the enquiry report in the manner it was
prepared.
You are also informed that Shri S.C. Gupta, Commissioner for
Departmental Enquiries, Jamnagar House Hutments, Akbar Road, New
Delhi has been appointed as Inquiring Authority. Shri R.K. Goel,
Accountant, Enquiry Cell, Head Office will continue to act as
Presenting Officer. You are advised to cooperate in the enquiry
Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
16:59:31
LPA 733/2025
proceedings. Please note that till completion of the case, you will
continue to be under suspension.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/ASST. GENERAL MANAGER (Personnel)
(Disciplinary Authority)
viii.) After conducting the de novo inquiry, another Inquiry Report dated
14.12.1995 (second inquiry report) was submitted to the Disciplinary
Authority, a copy of which was supplied to the respondent, requiring him to
file his objections to the findings recorded in this Inquiry Report. Based on
this Inquiry Report dated 14.12.1995, the Disciplinary Authority passed an
order dated 17.08.1996, imposing the penalty of dismissal from service of
the Bank, upon the respondent.
ix.)
It appears that against the dismissal order dated 17.08.1996, the
respondent preferred a writ petition before this Court, which was disposed of
vide order dated 29.01.2002 permitting the respondent to file a statutory
appeal before the Appellate Authority. The respondent thereafter instituted
the proceedings of the statutory appeal before the Appellate Authority under
the relevant rules, which, however, was rejected by the Appellate Authority
by means of its order dated 26.07.2002.
Challenging the Appellate
Authority’s order dated 26.07.2002, the respondent preferred a review
petition, which, too, was dismissed by the Reviewing Authority vide order
dated 08.04.2003.
x.)
Challenging the Second Inquiry Report dated 14.12.1995, the order of
punishment of dismissal from service dated 17.08.1996, the order dated
26.07.2002 of the Appellate Authority whereby his appeal against the
Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
16:59:31
LPA 733/2025
dismissal was rejected, and order of Reviewing Authority dated 08.04.2003,
W.P.(C) No.6696/2003 was instituted by the respondent, which has been
partially allowed by the impugned judgment and order dated 09.12.2024,
which is under challenge herein.
ISSUES
5.
The sole ground on which the punishment order along with the
appellate order, the order on review, and the second inquiry report, has been
quashed by the learned Single Judge is that while passing the order dated
28.12.1992, ordering for a de novo inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has
not given any cogent reasons in absence whereof the order is vitiated, and
therefore, consequential action which resulted in punishment of dismissal
from service of the respondent is also illegal.
6.
Following issues emerge for our consideration and adjudication in this
appeal;
a.
As to whether in the facts of the case and keeping in view the relevant
rule regulating the disciplinary proceedings, the order dated 28.12.1992
passed by the Disciplinary Authority directing for a de novo inquiry was bad
in law, and;
b.
As to whether by participating in the de novo inquiry, instituted vide
order dated 28.12.1992 by the Disciplinary Authority, without any protest or
demur the respondent, any challenge to institution of such de novo inquiry
on behalf of the respondent is barred in view of the doctrine of waiver and
acquiescence.
Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
16:59:31
LPA 733/2025
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
7.
Before adverting to the respective submissions made by learned
counsel for the parties in support and opposition of the instant appeal, it
would be apposite to extract Regulation 7 of the Punjab National Bank
Officer Employees' (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1977 (hereinafter
referred to as Regulation), which is as under:“Regulation - 7. Action On the Inquiry Report
(1) The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the Inquiring
Authority, may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit
the case to the Inquiring Authority for fresh or further inquiry
and report and the Inquiring Authority shall thereupon proceed
to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of
Regulation 6 as far as may be.
(2) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the
findings of the Inquiring Authority on any article of charge,
record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own
findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient
for the purpose.
(3) If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings on
all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that any of
the penalties specified in regulation 4 should be imposed on the
officer employee it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in
regulation 8, make an order imposing such penalty.
(4) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on
all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that no
penalty is called for, it may pass an order exonerating the officer
employee concerned.”
8.
Regulation 7 as quoted above prescribes the procedure to be followed
by the Disciplinary Authority on receipt of the Inquiry Report submitted by
Digiltally Signed
By:SREERAM L
16:59:31
LPA 733/2025
the Inquiry Officer after conclusion of the inquiry proceedings. Clause (1) of
Regulation 7 provides that in a situation where the Disciplinary Authority is
not the Inquiring Authority, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing,
remit the case to the Inquiring Authority for fresh or further inquiry and
report and the Inquiring Authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the
further inquiry according to the provisions of Regulation 6 as far as may be.
9.
Clause (2) of Regulation 7 operates in a situation where the
Disciplinary Authority, disagrees with the findings of the Inquiring
Authority of any Article of Charge. It requires that the Disciplinary
Authority shall record its reason for such disagreement and record its own
findings on such charge if the evidence on record is sufficient for the
purpose. Thereupon, the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its finding
on the Articles of Charges, will form its opinion that any of the penalties
specified in Regulation 4 should be imposed on the charged officer, and it
shall make an order imposing such penalty.
In a situation where the
Disciplinary Authority is of the opinion that no penalty is called for, it may
pass an order exonerating the charged officer.
10.
So far as the instant case is concerned, the order dated 28.12.1992
passed by the Disciplinary Authority directing a de novo inquiry on receipt
of the First Inquiry Report is referable to Regulation 7(1) as quoted above.
The condition precedent in terms of Regulation 7(1) for ordering a fresh or
further inquiry is that the Disciplinary Authority has to record in writing its
reasons for remitting the case for further or fresh inquiry. Accordingly, so
far as the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Authority to pass the order dated
28.12.1992 is concerned, there is no dispute, as has already been held by the
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learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order.
11.
However, learned Single Judge has gone to observe, while passing the
impugned judgment and order, that for remitting the case to the Inquiring
Authority for fresh inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority should record reasons
which should be cogent warranting fresh inquiry and in the instant case the
order dated 28.12.1992 does not reflect a reason for ordering a de novo
inquiry, which can be said to be cogent and sufficient, for the said purpose.
12.
While examining the said finding recorded by the learned Single
Judge in the impugned judgment and order, we must note that the
Disciplinary Authority, while passing the said order dated 28.12.1992, has
clearly observed that a fresh inquiry has been ordered in view of the
apprehensions raised about the Inquiry Report in the manner it was
prepared. In our opinion, what all is required by the Disciplinary Authority
for exercising its powers under Regulation 7(1) for ordering inquiry afresh is
that it should record reasons for remitting the case for the said purpose. As a
matter of fact, an opinion as to whether a de novo inquiry is required or the
Inquiry Report ought to be accepted is to be formed by the Disciplinary
Authority. For ordering a de novo inquiry, the only requirement under
Regulation 7(1) is that the Disciplinary Authority should record its reasons.
Such an opinion, in our considered view, of course has to be based on some
material on record; however, having regard to the language in which
Regulation 7(1) is couched, it is not for the Court, in exercise of its
jurisdiction of judicial review, to go into the sufficiency of material. If the
Disciplinary Authority has given reason that certain apprehensions were
raised about the Inquiry Report, such reason would suffice for the
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Disciplinary Authority to remit to the Inquiry Authority for fresh or further
inquiry.
13.
It is also to be noticed that there is no provision in the Regulations for
furnishing a copy of the Inquiry Report in respect of which the Disciplinary
Authority forms its opinion that matter requires de novo inquiry. It is on the
basis of the facts and circumstances and founded on some material that the
Disciplinary Authority has to form its opinion by giving reasons, which are
to be recorded in writing. In the instant case, the reason has been recorded
by the Disciplinary Authority while passing the order dated 28.12.1992
directing de novo inquiry, and the reason indicated is that the Disciplinary
Authority found certain apprehensions about the Inquiry Report. In such a
situation, since the opinion has been formed by the Disciplinary Authority
for ordering de novo inquiry based on certain material available before it,
may be the Inquiring Report, the power of judicial review does not go to the
extent of examining as to whether the reasons are cogent or not or as to
whether the material on which such opinion is formed is sufficient or not.
14.
For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find ourselves in agreement with
the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge to the effect that the order
dated 28.12.1992 directing a de novo inquiry against the respondent was bad
or vitiated. Learned Single Judge has placed heavy reliance for arriving at
such conclusion in the impugned judgment and order on K.R.Deb v. The
Collector of Central Excise, Shillong [1971 (2) SCC 102]. A reading of the
said judgment of Supreme Court in K.R.Deb (supra) shows that the relevant
rules under which inquiry against the Charged Officer was conducted in the
said matter, does not have any provision vesting any power in the
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Disciplinary Authority for ordering a de novo inquiry post submission of
Inquiry Report whereas, as already noticed above, Regulation 7(1) does vest
such power in the Disciplinary Authority.
K.R.Deb (supra) pertains to
disciplinary action against the Charged Officer under the provisions of
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957
(hereinafter referred to as 1957, Rules).
15.
In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has noticed various
clauses of Rule 15 of 1957, Rules. Rule 15 of the 1957 Rules is extracted
herein below:“15.Procedure for imposing major Penalties --.
(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants
(Inquiry) Act, 1850, no order imposing on a Government
Procedure for servant any of the penalties specified in clauses
(iv) to (vii) of rule 13 shall be passed except after an inquiry,
held as for as may be, in the manner hereinafter provided.
(2) The Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite charges on the
basis of the allegations on which the enquiry is proposed to be
held. Such charges, together with a statement of the allegations
on which they are based, shall be communicated in writing to the
Government servants and he shall be required to submit, within
such time as may be specified by the Disciplinary Authority a
written statement of his defence and also to state whether he
desires to be heard in person.
Explanation. In this sub-rule, and in sub-rule (3), the
expression "the Disciplinary Authority" shall include the
authority competent under these rules to impose upon the
Government servant any of the penalties specified in clauses (i)
to (iii) of rule 13.
(3) The Government servant shall, for the purpose of preparing
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his defence, be permitted to inspect and take extracts from such
official records as he may specify, provided that such permission
may be refused if, for reasons to be recorded in writing, in the
opinion of the disciplinary Authority such records are not
relevant for the purpose or public interest to allow him access
thereto.
(4) On receipt of the written statement of defence, or if no such
statement is received within the time specified, the Disciplinary
Authority may itself inquire into such of the charges as are not
admitted or, if it considers it necessary so to do, appoint a Board
of Inquiry or an inquiring Officer for the purpose
(5) The Disciplinary Authority may nominate any person to
present the case in support of the charges before the authority
inquiring into the charges (hereinafter referred to as the
Inquiring Authority. The Government servant may present his
case with the assistance of other Government servant, but may
not engage a legal practitioner the purpose unless the person
nominated by the Disciplinary Authority as aforesaid is a legal
practitioner or unless the Disciplinary, Authority having regard
to the circumstances of the case, so permits.
(6) The Inquiring Authority shall, in the course of the inquiry,
consider such documentary evidence and take such oral evidence
as may be relevant or material in regard to the charges. The
Government servant shall, be entitled to cross-examine witnesses
examined in support of the charges and to give evidence in
person. The person presenting the case in support of the charges
shall be entitled to cross-examine the Government servant and
the witnesses examined in his defence. If the Inquiring Authority
declines to examine any witness on the ground that his evidence
is not relevant or material, it shall record its reasons in writing
(7) At the conclusion of the inquiry, the Inquiring Authority shall
prepare a report of the inquiry, recording its findings on each of
the charges together with reasons therefor. If in the opinion of
such authority the proceedings of the inquiry establish charges
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different from those originally framed it may record findings on
such charges provided that findings on such charges shall not be
recorded unless the Government servant has admitted the facts
constituting them or has had an opportunity of defending himself
against them.
(8) The record of the inquiry shall include:(i) the charges framed against the Government servant and
the statement of allegations furnished to him under sub-rule
(2)
(ii) his written statement of defence, if any i
(iii) the oral evidence taken in the course of the inquiry :
(iv) the documentary evidence considered in the course of the
inquiry:
(v) the orders, if any, made by the Disciplinary Authority and
the Inquiring Authority in regard to the inquiry ; and
(vi) a report setting out the findings on each charge and the
reasons therefor.
(9) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the Inquiring
Authority, consider the record of the inquiry and record its
findings on each charge.
(10) (i) If the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to its findings
on the charges, is of the opinion that any of the penalties
specified in clause (iv) to (vii) of rule 13 should be imposed, it
shall(a) furnish to the Government servant a copy of the report of the
Inquiring Authority and, where the Disciplinary Authority is not
the Inquiring Authority, a statement of its findings together with
brief reasons for disagreement if any, with the findings of the
Inquiring Authority; and
(b) give him a notice stating the penalty proposed to be imposed
on him and calling upon him to submit within a specified time
such representation as he may wish to make on the proposed
penalty, provided that such representation shall be based only on
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the evidence adduced during the inquiry.
(ii) (a) In every case in which it is necessary to consult the
Commission, the record of the inquiry, together with a copy of
the notice given under clause (1) and the representation made in
response to such notice, if any, shall be forwarded by the
Disciplinary Authority to the Commission for its advice.
(b) On receipt of the advice of the Commission, the Disciplinary
Authority shall consider the representation, if any, made by the
Government servant as aforesaid, and the advice given by the
Commission and determine what penalty, if any, should be
imposed on the Government servant and pass appropriate orders
on the case.
(iii) In any case in which it is not necessary to consult the
Commission, the Disciplinary Authority shall consider the
representation, if any, made by the Government servant in
response to the notice under clause (i) and determine what
penalty, if any should be imposed on the Government servant and
pass appropriate orders on the case.
(11) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings is
of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (1) to
(iii) of the rule 13 should be imposed, it shall pass appropriate
orders in the case.
Provided that in every case in which it is necessary to consult the
Commission, the record of the inquiry shall be forwarded by the
Disciplinary Authority to the Commission for its advice and such
advice taken into consideration before passing the orders.
(12) Orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority shall be
communicated to the Government servant who shall also be
supplied with a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority and,
where the Disciplinary Authority is not the Inquiring Authority, a
statement of its findings together with brief reason for
disagreement, if any. with the findings of the Inquiring Authority,
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unless they have already been supplied to him, and also a copy of
the advice, if any, given by the Commission and, where the
Disciplinary Authority has not accepted the advice of the
Commission, a brief statement o brief statement of the reasons
for such non acceptance.”
16.
As to how the matter should proceed after receipt of the Inquiry
Report submitted by the Inquiring Authority under 1957 Rules can be found
in sub-Rule (9) of Rule 15 of 1957 Rules, according to which on receipt of
the Inquiry Report the Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the Inquiring
Authority, consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on each
charge. Sub-Rule (10) provides that if the Disciplinary Authority is of the
opinion, on the basis of its finding on the charges, that any of the penalties
specified in the Rules is to be imposed, it shall furnish the charged
government servant a copy of the Inquiry Report and where the Disciplinary
Authority is not the Inquiring Authority it shall furnish a statement of its
findings together with brief reasons for disagreement, if any, with the
findings of the Inquiry Authority giving the Charged Officer notice stating
the penalty proposed to be imposed on him and calling upon him to submit
his representation on the proposed penalty. Thus, the provision akin to
Regulation 7(1) of the Regulation, is absent in the Rules, 1957, and
accordingly the reliance placed by the learned Single Judge on K.R.Deb
(supra) to arrive at the conclusion, in our opinion, does not appear to be
correct. Further, in K.R.Deb (supra) an Inquiry Report was submitted by the
Inquiring Authority firstly on 03.07.1961, whereupon the Disciplinary
Authority vide its order dated 22.08.1961 ordered another Inquiry Officer to
conduct a supplementary inquiry, who submitted his report on 12.10.1961.
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It is to be noticed that in both the Inquiry Reports dated 03.07.1961 and
12.10.1961, the charges against the Charged Officer were not found to be
proved.
The Disciplinary Authority, however, vide order dated 20.12.1961,
expressed its disagreement and directed the Inquiry Officer to examine
certain witnesses and thereafter submit the final Inquiry Report. Thus, the
third Inquiry Report was submitted against the Charged Officer on
20.01.1962, wherein as well it was recorded that no conclusive proof was
coming to establish the charge against the Charged Officer; however, the
conduct of the Charged Officer must not be above board. On receipt of the
third Inquiry Report dated 20.01.1962, the Disciplinary Authority again
passed an order on 13.02.1962 appointing yet another Inquiry Officer to
inquire into the charges against the Charged Officer, whereupon the fourth
Inquiry Report was submitted on 06.03.1962, wherein the charge of
misappropriation of certain amount was found proved, basis which an order
of dismissal was passed by the Disciplinary Authority.
17.
From a perusal of the facts as narrated in K.R.Deb (supra) it is
apparent that the inquiry afresh in the said matter vide order dated
13.02.1962 by the Disciplinary Authority was ordered in terms of Rule 15(4)
of the 1957, Rules which is applicable as per the Scheme of Rule 15 of the
said Rules at a stage of pre-submission of the Inquiry Report and not postsubmission of the Inquiry Report. Thus, the Scheme of the Rules under
which the inquiry was conducted are not akin to the Regulations under
which the inquiry against the respondent has been conducted and concluded
in the instant case. In this view of the matter as well, the reliance placed by
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the learned Single Judge in K.R.Deb (supra), in our opinion, is highly
misplaced.
18.
Accordingly, we conclude that having regard to the facts and
circumstances of this case, as also the provisions of Regulation 7 of the
Regulations under which the disciplinary proceedings were conducted
against the respondent, the order dated 28.12.1992 passed by the
Disciplinary Authority directing a de novo inquiry against the respondent,
cannot be said to be vitiated.
19.
Addressing the issue ‘b’ as culled out above, we may note that on
institution of the de novo inquiry by the Disciplinary Authority vide its order
dated 28.12.1992, the respondent participated in the disciplinary proceedings
without any protest or demur. In other words, he did not object to the
initiation of de novo inquiry as ordered by the Disciplinary Authority by
passing the order dated 28.12.1992. Having participated in the de novo
inquiry which was conducted pursuant to the order dated 28.12.1992, it is, in
our considered opinion, not open to the respondent to challenge the said
order for the reason that he would be said to have acquiesced and waived his
right to challenge the same.
20.
It has been stated in this regard by learned counsel for the respondent
that, as a matter of fact, the respondent, while filing the first writ petition
challenging the order of dismissal, had raised this issue and has also raised
the issue relating to the order dated 28.12.1992 constituting the de novo
inquiry to be bad, while the respondent filed the statutory appeal against the
dismissal order. However, we are of the opinion that having participated in
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the disciplinary proceedings pursuant to the order dated 28.12.1992, on
conclusion of the said inquiry proceedings not only at the end of the
Inquiring Authority but also at the end of Disciplinary Authority, even if he
challenged this initiation of de novo inquiry in statutory appeal, the same is
of no avail to the respondent in view of the settled legal principle that issue
of jurisdiction etc., has to be raised by the party concerned at the first
instances itself and not at any subsequent stage.
21.
Regard may be had in this respect to a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in H.V.Nirmala v. Karnataka State Financial Corporation and
Others. [(2008) 7 SCC 639]. The facts in H.V.Nirmala (supra), are that
after serving the charge-sheet on the Charged Officer, a legal advisor was
appointed as an Inquiry Officer, who arrived at a finding of guilt against the
Charged Officer, and the disciplinary proceedings ended in penalty of
dismissal from service, which was imposed by the Disciplinary Authority.
The penalty of dismissal was challenged by the Charged Officer by
preferring an appeal, which was treated as a petition for review, which too
was dismissed. A writ petition, thereafter, was filed by the Charged Officer
before the High Court of Karnataka challenging the order of dismissal and
the order rejecting the petition for review. The writ petition was dismissed
by the learned Single Judge, whereupon an intra-court appeal was preferred
by the Charged Officer, which too was dismissed by the Division Bench of
the High Court. The matter reached the Hon’ble Supreme Court, where a
plea, amongst others, was taken that the legal advisor could not have been
appointed as Inquiry Officer.
In the above facts, Hon’ble Supreme Court, as recorded in paragraph
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11 of the judgment in H.V.Nirmala (supra), did not agree with the
submission made on behalf of the Charged Officer that since the
appointment of the legal advisor as Enquiry Officer was a matter of
jurisdiction, and a contention which goes to the root of jurisdiction cannot be
urged at any stage.
The Apex Court, while disagreeing with such
contention, further proceeded to observe that appointment of an incompetent
Inquiry Officer may not vitiate the entire proceedings and that such right can
be waived, and further that in relation thereto even the principle of estoppels
and acquiescence would apply. In H.V.Nirmala (supra) judgment in SBI v.
Ram Das [(2003) 12 SCC474] was referred to, wherein it has been laid
down that where a party, despite knowledge of the defect in the jurisdiction,
participates in the proceedings without any kind of objections by his
conduct, such a party disentitles himself from raising such a question in
subsequent proceedings.
22.
The Court even went to observe that where the appointment of an
Inquiring Officer may have something to do only for carrying out the
procedural aspect of the matter, strict adherence to the rules may not be
insisted upon and further that the superior Courts in a case of such nature
may not permit such a question to be raised for the first time. Paragraphs
11, 12 and 20 of H.V.Nirmala (supra) are relevant here, which are extracted
herein below:“11. Mr Patil, however, would submit that such a contention which
goes to the root of jurisdiction can be urged at any stage. We do not
agree. Appointment of an incompetent enquiry officer may not
vitiate the entire proceeding. Such a right can be waived. In
relation thereto even the principle of estoppel and acquiescence
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would apply.
12. In SBI v. Ram Das [(2003) 12 SCC 474] this Court held: (SCC
p. 484, para 27)
“27. … It is an established view of law that where a party despite
knowledge of the defect in the jurisdiction or bias or malice of an
arbitrator participated in the proceedings without any kind of
objection, by his conduct it disentitles itself from raising such a
question in the subsequent proceedings. What we find is that the
appellant despite numerous opportunities made available to it,
although it was aware of the defect in the award of the umpire, at
no stage made out any case of bias against the umpire. We,
therefore, find that the appellant cannot be permitted to raise the
question of bias for the first time before this Court.”
***
20. We may, however, notice that in a case of this nature where
appointment of the enquiry officer may have something to do only
for carrying out the procedural aspect of the matter, strict
adherence to the rules may not be insisted upon. Superior courts in
a case of this nature may not permit such a question to be raised for
the first time. (See Sohan Singh v. Ordnance Factory [1984 Supp
SCC 661 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 361 : AIR 1981 SC 1862] .)”
23.
We may also refer to another judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd. [(2021) 10 SCC
401], where the Doctrine of Waiver has been discussed in detail, quoting
Halsbury’s Laws of England.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalpraj
Dharamshi (supra) has also observed that for considering as to whether a
party has waived its right or not, it is relevant to consider the conduct of a
party and for establishing waiver, it needs to be established that the party
expressly or by its conduct acted in a manner which is inconsistent with the
continuance of its rights.
Paragraphs 117, 118 and 119 of Kalpraj
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Dharamshi (supra) read as under:“117. The word “waiver” has been described in Halsbury's Laws
of England, 4th Edn., Para 1471, which reads thus:
“1471. Waiver.—Waiver is the abandonment of a right in such a
way that the other party is entitled to plead the abandonment by
way of confession and avoidance if the right is thereafter asserted,
and is either express or implied from conduct. … A person who is
entitled to rely on a stipulation, existing for his benefit alone, in a
contract or of a statutory provision, may waive it, and allow the
contract or transaction to proceed as though the stipulation or
provision did not exist. Waiver of this kind depends upon consent,
and the fact that the other party has acted on it is sufficient
consideration. …
It seems that, in general, where one party has, by his words or
conduct, made to the other a promise or assurance which was
intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted
on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his
word and acted on it, so as to alter his position, the party who gave
the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to
the previous legal relationship as if no such promise or assurance
had been made by him, but he must accept their legal relations
subject to the qualification which he has himself so introduced,
even though it is not supported in point of law by any
consideration.”
118. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 16(2), 4th Edn., Para
907, it is stated:
“The expression “waiver” may, in law, bear different meanings.
The primary meaning has been said to be the abandonment of a
right in such a way that the other party is entitled to plead the
abandonment by way of confession and avoidance if the right is
thereafter asserted, and is either express or implied from conduct. It
may arise from a party making an election, for example whether or
not to exercise a contractual right… Waiver may also be by virtue
of equitable or promissory estoppel; unlike waiver arising from an
election, no question arises of any particular knowledge on the part
of the person making the representation, and the estoppel may be
suspensory only… Where the waiver is not express, it may be
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implied from conduct which is inconsistent with the continuance of
the right, without the need for writing or for consideration moving
from, or detriment to, the party who benefits by the waiver, but
mere acts of indulgence will not amount to waiver; nor may a party
benefit from the waiver unless he has altered his position in
reliance on it.”
119. For considering, as to whether a party has waived its rights or
not, it will be relevant to consider the conduct of a party. For
establishing waiver, it will have to be established, that a party
expressly or by its conduct acted in a manner, which is inconsistent
with the continuance of its rights. However, the mere acts of
indulgence will not amount to waiver. A party claiming waiver
would also not be entitled to claim the benefit of waiver, unless it
has altered its position in reliance on the same.”
24.
If we apply the Doctrine of Waiver as explained by Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Kalpraj Dharamshi (supra), what we find is that the respondent by
participating in the de novo inquiry ordered by the Disciplinary Authority
vide order dated 28.12.1992, conducted himself in a manner which is
opposed to continuance of his right not to participate in the de novo
proceedings for the reason that, the respondent asserted that the de novo
inquiry could not have been ordered only after participating in the same.
Having participated in the de novo inquiry as ordered by the Disciplinary
Authority vide order dated 28.12.1992, in our opinion, the respondent
abandoned his right to challenge the same. For these reasons, we conclude,
applying the Doctrine of Waiver and Acquiescence in the facts of the instant
case, that it was not open to the respondent to challenge the order dated
28.12.1992, as he submitted to the said order and participated in the de novo
inquiry.
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25.
For the aforesaid reasons, we find ourselves in complete disagreement
with the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned
judgment and order dated 09.12.2024.
26.
Resultantly, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order dated
09.12.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.6696/2003 is
hereby set aside. The pending applications(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
27.
There shall be no orders as to costs.
(DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA)
CHIEF JUSTICE
(TEJAS KARIA)
JUDGE
FEBRUARY 13, 2026
S.Rawat
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