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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 18.12.2025
Judgment pronounced on: 09.01.2026
+
RFA(COMM) 511/2024 & CM APPL. 73848/2025 (Seeking
extension of time for deposit of interest on the principal decretal
amount filed by the Appellant No. 2)
PUNJAB GASKET INDUSTRIES AND ANR. .....Appellants
Through:
Mr. Nagendra Benipal, Mr.
Vikas Khatri, Mr. Anmol Singh
and
Mr.
Manas
Khatri,
Advocates.
versus
MURTAZA ALI
.....Respondent
Through:
Mr. Mukesh Gupta, Mr. Farah
Shah and Mr. Sachin Singh
Shahi, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Appeal, filed under Section 13 of the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015 read with Section 96 of the Code of Civil
Procedure 19081, is directed against the Judgement dated
12.08.20242 passed by the learned District Judge, Commercial
CPC
Impugned Review Judgement
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:30:44
RFA(COMM) 511/2024
Court-02, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi3, in Review
Application No. MISC DJ 150/20244, arising out of the Judgment
dated 15.01.20245, passed in CIV DJ 896/2018, titled ‗Murtaza Ali v.
Punjab Gaskets Industries & Ors.‘.
2.
By way of the Impugned Review Judgment, the learned Trial
Court allowed the Review Application filed by the Plaintiff/
Respondent herein and, in consequence thereof, decided Issue Nos. 1
and 2 in his favour and against the Defendants/Appellants herein. The
learned Trial Court further proceeded to pass a decree for a sum of
Rs. 23,90,242.50/- along with costs. The Plaintiff/Respondent herein
was further held entitled to simple interest @ 12% per annum on the
outstanding amount for the period 01.09.2015 to 31.08.2018, as well
as pendente lite and future interest @ 12% per annum till the actual
realization of the decretal amount.
3.
It is pertinent to note that the Original Judgment had dismissed
the suit filed by the Plaintiff/Respondent herein solely on a limited
and specific ground, namely, that the Plaintiff had failed to place on
record the mandatory certificate under Section 65B of the Indian
Evidence Act, 18726, and had also not complied with the
requirements of Order XI Rule 6 of the CPC. On account of such noncompliance, the learned Trial Court held that the Plaintiff had failed to
duly prove the Ledger Account relied upon in support of his claims.
4.
For the sake of clarity, uniformity and consistency, the parties
to the present Appeal shall hereinafter be referred to in accordance
Trial Court
Review Application
Original Judgement
IE Act
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:30:44
RFA(COMM) 511/2024
with their respective ranks before the learned Trial Court.
BRIEF FACTS:
5.
Defendant No. 1 is a registered partnership firm engaged in the
business of manufacturing, trading, and exporting various automobile
parts to customers located outside India. Defendant No. 2,
Mr. Gursharan Singh, is a partner of Defendant No. 1 and is
responsible for managing and supervising the day-to-day affairs of the
said partnership firm. The Plaintiff, through M/s Printers, which is a
sole proprietorship concern, has been engaged in the business of the
sale and printing of packaging material.
6.
The Plaintiff and the Defendant-Firm were engaged in
commercial dealings during the period from 2010 to 2015. During the
course of these transactions, particularly in the years 2014 and 2015,
the Defendant-Firm allegedly began receiving frequent complaints
from its overseas customers regarding the inferior quality of
packaging material supplied by the Plaintiff.
7.
It is stated that the nature and frequency of the complaints
gradually intensified, resulting in rejection of certain consignments by
the customers of the Defendant-Firm on the ground of sub-standard
packaging quality. The customers allegedly threatened to discontinue
further business relations with the Defendant-Firm unless the quality
of the packaging material was rectified.
8.
The Defendant-Firm brought the aforesaid quality-related
concerns to the notice of the Plaintiff. In response, the Plaintiff issued
credit notes in respect of the rejected goods and assured the
Defendant-Firm that the quality of the packaging material would be
improved in future supplies.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:30:44
RFA(COMM) 511/2024
9.
It is further stated that, acting upon the assurances extended by
the Plaintiff, the Defendant-Firm continued to export goods packaged
with the material supplied by the Plaintiff. However, the DefendantFirm received further letters of rejection from its customers in respect
of goods exported during the months of July 2014andNovember 2014.
The Defendant-Firm thereafter made repeated representations to its
customers seeking reconsideration of the rejected consignments,
assuring them of improved quality in future supplies.
10.
According to the Defendant-Firm, the customers did not accede
to its representations and consequently withheld payment for the
rejected consignments. This allegedly resulted in substantial financial
loss to the Defendant-Firm, including expenses incurred towards
manufacturing, export, warehousing, and storage of the rejected
goods, amounting in aggregate to Rs. 38,61,558/-.
11.
In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the Defendant-Firm
ceased placing further purchase orders upon the Plaintiff, with the last
purchase order having been issued on 30.06.2015, and the last
payment having been made on 20.08.2015. Subsequently, vide letter
dated 07.12.2015, the Defendant-Firm informed the Plaintiff of the
defects in the goods supplied and requested repayment in respect of
the defective products, along with their return. The Plaintiff allegedly
assured the Defendants that the losses would be adjusted against the
outstanding dues.
12.
After cessation of business transactions between the parties, and
as reflected in the ledger account maintained for the period 01.04.2010
to 31.03.2016, the Defendant-Firm was allegedly liable to pay a sum
of Rs. 23,90,242.50/- to the Plaintiff. Alleging failure on the part of
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:30:44
RFA(COMM) 511/2024
the Defendant-Firm to clear the outstanding amount, the Plaintiff
instituted a suit for recovery bearing CS/DJ No. 896/2018 on
06.08.2018 before the learned Trial Court, seeking recovery of
Rs. 34,65,852/-, comprising the principal amount along with interest,
and further claiming pendente lite and future interest.
13.
The learned Trial Court, vide the Original Judgment dated
15.01.2024, dismissed the suit filed by the Plaintiff on the ground of
non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 65B of
the IE Act, and Order XI Rule 6 of the CPC, holding that the ledger
accounts relied upon by the Plaintiff were inadmissible in evidence.
14.
Aggrieved by the said judgment, the Plaintiff preferred a
Review Application under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 151
of the CPC. By way of the judgment impugned herein, the learned
Trial Court allowed the Review Application and reversed its earlier
finding on the limited issue of admissibility of the ledger accounts,
and consequently decreed the suit in favour of the Plaintiff.
15.
The Defendants, being aggrieved by the Impugned Review
Judgment dated 12.08.2024, have preferred the present Appeal.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS/ DEFENDANTS:
16.
Learned counsel for the Defendants would submit that the
learned Trial Court gravely erred in reversing the Original Judgment
solely on the premise that a certificate under Section 65B of the IE
Act was found to be available on record, inasmuch as the mere
existence or physical presence of such a certificate could not, by itself,
justify the recall or alteration of the Original Judgment, particularly in
the absence of any independent, substantive, or corroborative evidence
to establish the genuineness and correctness of the ledger account and
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:30:44
RFA(COMM) 511/2024
the invoices relied upon by the Plaintiff.
17.
Learned counsel for the Defendants would further contend that
the Plaintiff manifestly failed to discharge the burden of proving the
alleged outstanding dues, since the only persons competent to prove
the invoices and the computer-generated ledger account, namely, the
billing clerk, Mr. Naveen Pandit, and the accountant, Mr. Tilak Raj
Kohli, were admittedly not examined, despite the Plaintiff‘s
categorical admission that the invoices were issued by the former and
the ledger was maintained by the latter, and, therefore, in the absence
of their examination, the oral testimony of PW-1/Plaintiff was wholly
insufficient to establish the authenticity, accuracy, and admissibility of
the documents relied upon.
18.
Learned counsel for the Defendants would submit that, even
otherwise, the certificate under Section 65B of the IE Act was not
issued by a competent or authorized person, inasmuch as it stood
admitted that the computer system containing and generating the
ledger account was operated and maintained by the accountant, Mr.
Tilak Raj Kohli, who neither issued the said certificate nor stepped
into for his depostion, thereby rendering the certificate non est in the
eyes of law and inadmissible in evidence, and consequently, the suit
of the Plaintiff ought to have been dismissed on this ground alone.
19.
It would further be urged by the learned counsel for the
Defendants that the ledger statement relied upon by the Plaintiff
purportedly covered an extensive period from the year 2010 to 2016,
whereas the invoices placed on record were confined only to the
limited period of 2014-2015, and, in the absence of any independent
witness to prove the ledger or complete and corresponding invoices to
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:30:44
RFA(COMM) 511/2024
corroborate the entries therein, the ledger could not have been relied
upon to fasten liability upon the Defendants. It would further be
submitted that, in view of the mandate of Section 34 of the IE Act,
entries in books of account, including those maintained in electronic
form, cannot by themselves create or fasten liability, and, therefore,
the mere presence of a certificate under Section 65B of the IE Act
could not have been treated as sufficient to hold that the ledger
account stood duly proved.
20.
It would also be submitted by the learned counsel for the
Defendants that the Defendants had already made payments against
the invoices relied upon by the Plaintiff and that, in fact, no
outstanding dues were payable, and, on the contrary, owing to the
substandard quality of goods supplied by the Plaintiff, the customers
of the Defendants had withheld payments, thereby causing financial
loss to the Defendants.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT/ PLAINTIFF:
21.
Per contra, learned counsel for the Plaintiff would support the
findings recorded in the Impugned Review Judgment and would urge
that the ledger account maintained by the Plaintiff for the period
01.04.2010 to 31.03.2016 unequivocally reflects that a sum of
Rs. 23,90,242.50/- remains outstanding and payable by the Defendants
towards the price of goods duly supplied.
22.
Learned counsel for the Plaintiff would submit that despite the
lapse of more than thirty-four months from the date of the last
payment, the Defendants failed and neglected to discharge their lawful
liability, and, in such circumstances, the Plaintiff would be entitled not
only to recovery of the principal outstanding amount but also to
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:30:44
RFA(COMM) 511/2024
interest thereon, as awarded by the learned Trial Court.
23.
Learned counsel for the Plaintiff would submit that vide the
Original Judgment, the learned Trial Court had, in paragraphs 11 to
19, undertaken a detailed and reasoned examination of the pleadings
as well as the evidence on record, duly applying its mind to the facts
of the case and assigning cogent reasons therefor; however, while
deciding Issue Nos. 1 and 2 against the Plaintiff in paragraphs 20 and
21, the learned Trial Court dismissed the suit solely on the erroneous
premise that the certificate under Section 65B of the IE Act had not
been filed.
24.
Learned counsel for the Plaintiff would further submit that the
aforesaid finding was factually incorrect, since the certificate under
Section 65B of the IE Act had already been placed on record at the
very stage of institution of the suit, and therefore, the learned Trial
Court rightly exercised its review jurisdiction and committed no error
in reversing the Original Judgment by way of the Impugned Review
Judgment, since the non-consideration of an existing certificate
constituted an error apparent on the face of the record, and
consequently, the learned Trial Court rightly decreed the suit in favour
of the Plaintiff.
25.
Learned counsel for the Plaintiff would submit that from the
evidence on record, it stood conclusively established that none of the
partners of the Defendant-Firm entered for their deposition in support
of the defence, thereby warranting an adverse inference against the
Defendants.
26.
It would further be submitted that while the Plaintiff duly
proved the ledger account relied upon, the Defendants failed to
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:30:44
RFA(COMM) 511/2024
produce any rebuttal ledger, and, on the contrary, DW-1 admitted in
his testimony that the relevant ledger had been destroyed; further, the
invoices exhibited as Ex. PW-1/B bore the signatures of one ―Ravi‖,
and DW-1, namely, Ravi Saxena, during cross-examination, gave
evasive and misleading answers in relation to the said invoices.
27.
It would also be submitted that the Defendants failed to place
on record any credit notes to substantiate their allegation that the
material supplied by the Plaintiff was defective in any manner, and
additionally, no specific suggestions were put to PW-1 during crossexamination furnishing particulars or details of any alleged defective
material with reference to any invoice or bill, thereby further
strengthening the Plaintiff‘s claim as held in the Impugned Review
Judgment.
28.
Except as noted above, no other substantial arguments were
advanced by the parties.
ANALYSIS:
29.
We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties at
considerable length and, with their able assistance, have carefully
examined the pleadings, documents, and evidence placed on record.
We have also perused the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court
in both the Original Judgment as well as the Impugned Review
Judgment, in addition to the post-hearing written submissions filed by
the respective parties.
30.
At the outset, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the analysis
and findings recorded by the learned Trial Court in the Original
Judgment on the issues that arose for consideration. The relevant
paragraphs thereof have been extracted hereinabove:
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:30:44
RFA(COMM) 511/2024
―6. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned ADJ framed the
following issues vide order dated 26.11.2018:
ISSUES:
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for therecovery of Rs.
34,65,852? OPP
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for interest,if yes, at what rate
and for what period? OPP
3. Relief.
*****
8. I have heard the arguments addressed by Sh. Abhishek Sharma,
learned counsel for plaintiff and Sh. Suraj Kumar Jaiswal, learned
counsel for defendants. I have also perused the entire court record
and the written submissions filed on behalf of the parties with
utmost care.
9. At the outset, it was urged by Learned Counsel for defendants
that suit was liable to be dismissed for nonjoinder of necessary
parties. The argument of Learned Counsel for defendants deserves
outright rejection as Order 30 of CPC deals with suits by or against
firms and persons carrying on business in names other than their
own. Order 30 Rule 1(1) CPC provides that any two or more
persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on
business in India may sue or be sued in the name of the firm, if
any, of which such persons were partners at the time of accruing of
cause of action. Order 30 Rule 1 (2) CPC provides that where
persons sue or are sued as partners in the name of their firm under
Sub Rule (1), it shall, in the case of any pleading or other document
required by or under this Court to be signed, verified or certified by
the plaintiff or the defendant, be sufficient if such pleading or other
document is signed, verified or certified by any of such persons. In
a case cited as BHARAT SARVODAYA MILLS COMPANY
LTD VS. MOHATTA BROTHERS reported as AIR 1969 GUJ.
178, Hon‘ble High Court of Gujarat relied upon the decisions of
Hon'ble Supreme Court and observed as under:
―In Purushottam & Co. v. Manilal & Sons, AIR 1961 SC
325, at p. 328 their Lordships of the Supreme Court
considered the definition of the term 'firm' in Section 4 of
the Act, and observed that it was clear from the provisions
of the Act that the word 'firm' or the 'firm name' was
merely a compendious description of all the partners
collectively. It followed, therefore, that where a suit was
filed in the name of a firm it was still a suit by all the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:30:44
RFA(COMM) 511/2024
partners of the firm unless it was proved that all the
partners had not authorised the suit. A firm is not a legal
entity in the sense of a company and when a suit is filed in
the name of the firm it is in reality a suit by all the partners
of the firm. At p. 329 also their Lordships observed that
the provisions of Rule 2 show that although the suit was
filed in the name of the firm a disclosure had to be made,
on demand in writing or on behalf of any defendant, of
names and places of residence of all the persons
constituting the firm, on whose behalf the suit was
instituted. The provisions of Rule 2 would indicate that
although the suit was filed in the name of the firm it was
nonetheless a suit by all the partners of the firm because if
a disclosure of the names of the partners was asked for by
any defendant, on such disclosure, the suit must proceed
as if the partners had been named as plaintiffs in the suit,
even though the proceedings would nevertheless be
continued in the name of the firm. It was, therefore, clear
that the provisions of Order 30. Rules 1 and 2 were
enabling provisions to permit several persons who were
doing business as partners to sue or be sued in the name of
the firm. Their Lordships observed that Rule 2 would not
have been in the form it was if the suit instituted in the
name of the firm was not regarded as, in fact a suit by the
partners of the firm. Their Lordships again considered the
question in Mandalse Devi v. M. Ramnarain Private Ltd.,
AIR 1965 SC 1718 at p. 1720. Their Lordships observed
that for the sake of convenience Order 30 of the Code
permits a firm to sue or be sued in the firm name "as if it
were a corporate body". Their Lordships, however,
observed that the legal fiction must not be carried too far.
For some purposes the law has extended a limited
personality to a firm—See Bhagwati Morarji Gokuldas v.
Alembic Works Co. Ltd., AIR 1948 PC 100 -- but the firm
is not a legal entity. See AIR 1961 SC 325 at p. 339.
Lindley on Partnership, 12th Edition pp. 27-28. The
persons who are individually called partners are
collectively called a firm, and the name under which their
business is carried on is called the firm name. See Section
4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Order 30, Rule 1 of
the Code enables two or more persons claiming or being
liable as partners and carrying on business in India to sue
or be sued in the name of the firm of which they were
partners at the time of the accrual of the cause of action.
Rule 1 shows that individual partners sue or are sued in
their collective firm name. Rule 2 provides that on
disclosure of the names of partners of the plaintiff firm,
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:30:44
RFA(COMM) 511/2024
the suit proceeds as if they are named as plaintiffs in the
plaint. Rule 6 provides that the persons sued in the firm
name must appear individually in their own names. A suit
by or in the name of a firm is thus really a suit by or in the
name of all its partners. See Rodriquez v. Speyer Brothers,
1919 AC 59 and AIR 1961 SC 325 at pages 328. 329, 330.
So also a suit against the firm is really a suit against all the
partners of the firm. Their Lordships quoted a passage of
Lindley L. J. in Western National Bank of City of New
York V. Perez, Trisanna and Co., 1891-1 QB 304 at p. 314
as under :-―When a firm's name is used, it is only a
convenient method of denoting those persons
who compose the firm at the time, when that
name is used, and a plaintiff who sues partners
in the name of their firm in truth sues them
individually, just as much as if he had set out
all their names.‖
The decree passed in the suit, though in form against the
firm, is in effect a decree against all the partners. After
laying down this legal position, their Lordships applied
that ratio to the facts of that case. In that case the firm of
Jagatsons International Corporation was sued. As the suit
was brought against that firm, their Lordships held that the
Maharaja of Sirmur and all other partners were sued as if
the plaint had set out their names, and the decree passed in
the suit was in reality a decree against all the partners of
the
firm
including
the
Maharaja
of
Sirmur...................................................................................
..................... From this subsequent decision by their
Lordships of the Supreme Court it appears to be a settled
position that such suits by or against a firm under Order 30
are in reality suits by partners or against the partners at the
"time when the cause of action accrued.‖
(emphasis supplied)
10. In the instant case, plaintiff impleaded the partnership firm as
defendant No.1 which implied that plaintiff was suing the partners
of the firm individually. Therefore, in view of the ratio cited above,
it is crystal clear that the suit of the plaintiff cannot be dismissed
for non-joinder of second partner of defendant no.2.
*******
13. It is relevant to note that the information given by the learned
counsel for defendants was w.r.t. account No. 90411000098 held
by defendant No.1 at the then Syndicate Bank (now Canara Bank),
Sadar Bazar Branch which is an OD Account and not wr.t.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:30:44
RFA(COMM) 511/2024
transfers made from account No. 170100500 of Syndicate Bank,
Sadar Bazar Branch. The said fact was also verified by Manager,
Canara Bank (erstwhile Syndicate Bank), Sadar Bazar Branch who
retrieved Statement of its Ledger Account No. 170100500 for the
date 20.08.2015. In view of the aforesaid documents which are of
sterling quality and are unimpeachable, there is not an iota of doubt
that the last payment was made by the defendant on 20.08.2015.
Consequently, it is held that the present suit was instituted well
within the period of limitation and therefore, is not barred by
limitation.
14. My findings on issue Nos. 1 and 2 are as follows:
Issue Nos. 1 and 2:
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the recovery of
Rs. 34,65,852? OPP
2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for interest, if yes, at what
rate and for what period? OPP
To prove its case, plaintiff examined Sh. Murtaza Ali, partner of
plaintiff firm as PW1 who tendered his evidence by way of
affidavit as Exhibit PW1/1 wherein he reiterated the contents of
plaint and relied upon the following relevant documents:
1. Ledger Account for the period from 01.04.2010 to
31.03.2016 (Ex.PW1/A);
2. Carbon copies of invoices (Ex. PW1/B colly.).
15. To rebut the claim of plaintiff, defendants examined AR/
Manager of defendants i.e Ravi Saxena as DW1. In his evidence by
way of affidavit (Ex.DW1/1), Ravi Saxena/ DW1 relied upon the
following documents:
1. Special Power of Attorney dated 13.11.2018
(Ex.DW1/A);
2. True Copy of partnership deed (Ex.DW1/B);
3. Copy of letters dated 12.08.2014 and 17.11.2014 (Mark
A and Mark B colly.);
4. Copy of letter dated 07.12.2015 (Mark PW1/D1).
16. The case of the plaintiff is primarily based upon the ledger
account (Ex.PW1/A) for the period 01.04.2010 to 31.03.2016 and
invoices (Ex.PW1/B) which pertain to the business transactions
between the plaintiff and defendants. It is an undisputed fact that
plaintiff and defendants were in a business relationship since long
and the plaintiff was supplying packaging material to the
defendants against invoices including invoices (Ex. PW1/B). The
perusal of the Written Statement reflects that the defendants did not
dispute that the packaging material was supplied to the defendants
vide invoices (Ex. PW1/B) which are dated 03.04.2014,
08.04.2014, 19.04.2014, 20.05.2014, 12.06.2014, 15.06.2014,
10.07.2014, 24.07.2014, 31.07.2014, 07.09.2014, 16.09.2014,
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:30:44
RFA(COMM) 511/2024
27.09.2014, 08.11.2014, 22.11.2014, 01.12.2014, 10.12.2014,
10.01.2015, 28.02.2015, 27.04.2015 and 30.06.2015. The only
defence which was raised by defendants was that due to the substandard defective packaging material supplied by plaintiff, the
defendants suffered a loss of Rs. 38,61,558/-. It was claimed that
the foreign customers of defendants refused to make payments to
defendants as the goods exported by defendants which were
packaged in the material supplied by plaintiff got rusted. Pursuant
thereto, the defendants had vide letter dated 07.12.2015 which was
admittedly received by the plaintiff, had informed the plaintiff qua
the defective packaging material and had requested to take back the
same. The plaintiff, however, turned a blind eye and did not take
back the defective goods. Suit of the plaintiff was also defended on
the ground that the defendants had already made payments qua the
invoices (Ex. PW1/B) and that the Ledger Account (Ex. PW1/A) of
the plaintiff was incorrect.
17. It was simultaneously claimed by the defendants that sincethe
defendants had received complaints from its foreigncustomers and
they had raised serious concern with theplaintiff, the plaintiff had
issued credit notes against thepayments already received against
the supply of defectivegoods.
18. In the nutshell, the case of the defendants is that the defendants
had already made payments against the invoices (Ex. PW1/B) and
no amount was due and payable to the plaintiff. Rather, it was the
defendants who had sustained a loss of Rs. 38,61,558/-.
19. The plaintiff in order to establish that the payments against
invoices (Ex. PW1/B) was due and payable, placed on record the
print out of its Ledger Account (Ex. PW1/A). Since, the entries in
the Ledger Account (Ex. PW1/A) were strongly refuted by the
learned counsel for defendants, therefore, in order to prove the
entries in
Ledger Account (Ex. PW1/A), it was imperative that the plaintiff
proved the print out of Ledger Account in accordance with law or
in the alternative, place on record the complete bank statement
from the time, the parties had business relationship (since
11.05.2010).
20. It is noteworthy that plaintiff neither filed any certificate u/s
65B of the Indian Evidence Act nor complied with the provision of
Order XI Rule 6 CPC to prove Ledger Account (Ex. PW1/A). It is
no more res integra that certificate under Section 65B of the Indian
Evidence Act is mandatory to prove any electronic record. In
judgment titled as STATE OF KARNATAKA VS. T. NASEER @
NASIR @ THANDIANTAVIDA NASEER decided on 06.11.2023
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:30:44
RFA(COMM) 511/2024
in SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 6548 OF 2022, the
Hon‘ble Supreme Court discussed both the landmark judgments
(ANWAR P.V. VS. P.K. BASHEER & ORS., reported as 2014
(10) SCC 473 and ARJUN PANDITRAO KHOTKAR VS.
KAILASH KUSHANRAO GORANTYAL AND ORS. decided on
14.07.2020 reported as 2020(3) SCC 216) of the Apex Court in this
regard. The relevant text is reproduced hereunder:
―8. This Court in Anwar‘s case (supra) has opined that a
certificate under Section 65B of the Act is not required if
electronic record is used as a primary evidence. Relevant
paragraph thereof is quoted herein below:
―24. The situation would have been different
had the appellant adduced primary evidence,
by making available in evidence, the CDs used
for announcement and songs. Had those CDs
used
for
objectionable
songs
or
announcements been duly got seized through
the police or Election Commission and had the
same been used as primary evidence, the High
Court could have played the same in court to
see whether the allegations were true. That is
not the situation in this case. The speeches,
songs and announcements were recorded using
other instruments and by feeding them into a
computer, CDs were made therefrom which
were produced in court, without due
certification. Those CDs cannot be admitted in
evidence since the mandatory requirements of
Section 65-B of the Evidence Act are not
satisfied. It is clarified that notwithstanding
what we have stated herein in the preceding
paragraphs on the secondary evidence of
electronic record with reference to Sections
59, 65-A and 65-B of the Evidence Act, if an
electronic record as such is used as primary
evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence
Act, the same is admissible in evidence,
without compliance with the conditions in
Section 65-B of the Evidence Act.‖ (Emphasis
added)
9. The aforesaid issue was subsequently considered by this Court in
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar‘s case (supra). It was opined that there is
a difference between the original information contained in a
computer itself and the copies made therefrom. The former is
primary evidence and the latter is secondary one. The certificate
under Section 65-B of the Act is unnecessary when the original
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document (i.e., primary evidence) itself is produced. Relevant
paragraph ‗33‘ thereof is extracted below:
―33. The non obstante clause in sub-section (1)
makes it clear that when it comes to
information contained in an electronic record,
admissibility and proof thereof must follow the
drill of Section 65-B, which is a special
provision in this behalf — Sections 62 to 65
being irrelevant for this purpose. However,
Section 65-B(1) clearly differentiates between
the ―original‖ document — which would be
the original―electronic record‖ contained in the
―computer‖ in which the original information
is first stored — and the computer output
containing such information, which then
maybe treated as evidence of the contents of
the ―original‖ document. All this necessarily
shows that Section 65-B differentiates between
the original information contained in the
―computer‖ itself and copies made therefrom
— the former being primary evidence, and the
latter being secondary evidence.‖ (Emphasis
added)‖
21. Since, it is not in dispute that no certificate u/s 65B of Indian
Evidence Act was filed by the plaintiff, applying the ratio of the
judgment (Supra) to the facts of the instant case, it is crystal clear
that Ledger Account (Ex.PW1/B) is not admissible in evidence.
Therefore, in my considered opinion, the plaintiff failed to prove
that he is entitled to recover Rs.34,65,852/- from the defendants.
In view of aforesaid discussion, issue Nos. 1 and 2 are decided
against the plaintiff. Suit is dismissed accordingly.
No order to cost.
Decree sheet be drawn accordingly.‖
31.
From a bare reading of the extracted portion of the Original
Judgment, it is evident that after framing the issues for adjudication in
paragraph 6, the learned Trial Court first proceeded to examine the
preliminary objections relating to maintainability under Rule 1 Order
XXX of the CPC and the issue of limitation, which exercise was
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undertaken in paragraphs 9 to 13.
32.
Thereafter, the learned Trial Court proceeded to examine the
principal issues, namely, Issue Nos. 1 and 2, conjointly, as Issue No. 1
relating to entitlement of recovery was the substantive issue, while
Issue No. 2 pertained to entitlement of interest and was consequential
in nature. While undertaking this exercise, the learned Trial Court
took note of the evidence adduced by both parties.
33.
However, in paragraph 19 of the Original Judgment, the learned
Trial Court observed that in order to prove the entries in the Ledger
Account (Ex. PW1/A), it was imperative for the Plaintiff either to
prove the printout of the ledger in accordance with law or, in the
alternative, to place on record the complete bank statements covering
the entire period of business dealings between the parties commencing
from 11.05.2010.
34.
Having found that the ledger account relied upon by the
Plaintiff constituted electronic evidence which, according to the
learned Trial Court, was not supported by a certificate under Section
65B of the IE Act, the learned Trial Court dismissed the suit,
particularly since the alternative mode suggested by it, namely, the
production of complete bank statements from the inception of the
business relationship, was also not available on record.
35.
As the certificate under Section 65B of the IE Act was already
available on record, the Plaintiff preferred the Review Application,
which came to be allowed by the learned Trial Court upon noticing an
error apparent on the face of the record, namely, the non-consideration
of the Section 65B certificate despite its presence on the judicial file.
36.
Upon allowing the review, the learned Trial Court proceeded to
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re-examine the matter in light of the existing Section 65B certificate
and also considered the objection raised by the Defendants that the
said certificate had not been formally exhibited. After examining these
aspects in detail and applying the settled legal position governing
electronic evidence, the learned Trial Court ultimately decreed the suit
in favour of the Plaintiff. The relevant extract of the Impugned
Review Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
―5. In order to settle the issue in question, it will not be out of place
to revisit the legal position with respect to requirement of
certificate under Section 65 B of Indian Evidence Act. In the
judgment titled as STATE OF KARNATAKA VS. T. NASEER @
NASIR @ THANDIANTAVIDA NASEER decided on 06.11.2023
in SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 6548 OF 2022, the
Hon‘ble Supreme Court discussed both the landmark judgments
(ANWAR P.V. VS. P.K. BASHEER & ORS., reported as 2014
(10) SCC 473 and ARJUN PANDITRAO KHOTKAR VS.
KAILASH KUSHANRAO GORANTYAL AND ORS. decided on
14.07.2020 reported as 2020(3) SCC 216) of the Apex Court in this
regard. The relevant text is reproduced hereunder:
―8. This Court in Anwar‘s case (supra) has opined that a
certificate under Section 65B of the Act is not required if
electronic record is used as a primary evidence. Relevant
paragraph thereof is quoted herein below:
―24. The situation would have been different
had the appellant adduced primary evidence,
by making available in evidence, the CDs used
for announcement and songs. Had those CDs
used
for
objectionable
songs
or
announcements been duly got seized through
the police or Election Commission and had the
same been used as primary evidence, the High
Court could have played the same in court to
see whether the allegations were true. That is
not the situation in this case. The speeches,
songs and announcements were recorded using
other instruments and by feeding them into a
computer, CDs were made therefrom which
were produced in court, without due
certification. Those CDs cannot be admitted in
evidence since the mandatory requirements of
Section 65-B of the Evidence Act are not
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satisfied. It is clarified that notwithstanding
what we have stated herein in the preceding
paragraphs on the secondary evidence of
electronic record with reference to Sections
59, 65-A and 65-B of the Evidence Act, if an
electronic record as such is used as primary
evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence
Act, the same is admissible in evidence,
without compliance with the conditions in
Section 65-B of the Evidence Act.‖ (Emphasis
added)
9. The aforesaid issue was subsequently considered by this Court in
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar‘s case (supra). It was opined that there is
a difference between the original information contained in a
computer itself and the copies made therefrom. The former is
primary evidence and the latter is secondary one. The certificate
under Section 65-B of the Act is unnecessary when the original
document (i.e., primary evidence) itself is produced. Relevant
paragraph ‗33‘ thereof is extracted below:
―33. The non obstante clause in sub-section (1)
makes it clear that when it comes to
information contained in an electronic record,
admissibility and proof thereof must follow the
drill of Section 65-B, which is a special
provision in this behalf — Sections62 to 65
being irrelevant for this purpose. However,
Section 65-B(1) clearly differentiates between
the ―original‖ document — which would be
the original ―electronic record‖ contained in
the ―computer‖ in which the original
information is first stored — and the computer
output containing such information, which
then maybe treated as evidence of the contents
of the ―original‖ document. All this
necessarily shows that Section 65-B
differentiates between the original information
contained in the ―computer‖ itself and copies
made therefrom — the former being primary
evidence, and the latter being secondary
evidence.‖ (Emphasis added)‖
6. The Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the judgment (supra) apart from
reiterating that certificate under Section 65 B of Indian Evidence
Act is the mandatory requirement also held a liberal view that
parties can file certificate under Section 65 B of Indian Evidence
Act at any stage of the trial and not necessarily with the electronic
evidence. From the plain reading of the judgment, therefore an
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inference can be drawn that the certificate under Section 65B of
Indian Evidence Act, although is a mandatory requirement to prove
electronic evidence, it does not have to be mandatorily exhibited or
proved in evidence. The practice directions under Section 18 of
The Commercial Courts Act, Commercial Division and
Commercial Appellate Division of The High Court Act‘ 2015 also
provides a clue and supports this view of mine. The Rule 2 of the
practice directions provides as under:
―Where parties seek to rely upon any documentary
evidence, they must include the same alongwith the plaint
and identify the relevant content of such documentary
evidence on which they rely. Where the documentary
evidence is in electronic form, parties shall furnish
requisite affidavit under Section 65 B of the Indian
Evidence Act,1872, in support of the said electronic
record. They shall also state in such affidavit that to the
best of the deponent‘s knowledge and belief, such
computer system operated properly at the material time,
the deponent was provided with relevant data, and the
printout in question represents correctly, or it is
appropriately derived from, relevant data.‖
7. The Rule 2 in clear terms states that ―where the documentary
evidence is in electronic form, parties shall furnish requisite
affidavit under Section 65 B of the Indian Evidence Act‘1872, in
support of the said electronic record.‖ The language used in Rule 2
is FURNISH and not EXHIBIT. Therefore, in my opinion, as long
as the party which relies upon any electronic record furnishes a
certificate under Section 65 B of the Indian Evidence Act
supporting the electronic record and complies with the pre
requisites of Section 65 B of Indian Evidence Act, the same would
suffice and electronic record would be deemed proved.
8. In the instant case, there is not an iota of doubt that it was only
due to an inadvertent error and oversight of this Court that
certificate under Section 65 B of Indian Evidence Act which was
already on record, was not considered. Since, it was already on
record, I am of the view that mere filing and not exhibition was
sufficient for plaintiff to considered opinion that the plaintiff
successfully proved his Ledger Account (Ex.PW1/A) in
accordance with law.
9. Accordingly, para 20 of the judgment dated 15.01.2024 be read
as under:
*****
Since, it is not in dispute that certificate u/s 65B of Indian Evidence
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Act was filed by the plaintiff, applying the ratio of the judgment
(Supra) to the facts of the instant case, it is crystal clear that Ledger
Account (Ex.PW1/A) is admissible in evidence. Therefore, in my
considered opinion, the plaintiff has proved that he is entitled to
recover principle amount of Rs.23,90,242.50 from the defendants.
Plaintiff has claimed interest amount of Rs. 10,75,609.50
calculated @ 15% per annum from the date of invoices. Perusal of
invoices (Ex. PW1/B, colly) reflects that the same do not bear any
interest clause on outstanding payment. However, in the interest of
justice, plaintiff is entitled to simple interest @ 12% per annum on
the outstanding amount w.e.f. 01.09.2015 till 31.08.2018. In so far
as pendentilite and future interest @15% is concerned, I am of the
considered view that interest of justice would be met with if
interest @12% per annum is granted to the plaintiff.
So far as pendente lite and future interest @15% is concerned, I am
of the considered opinion that simple interest @ 12% per annum is
just and reasonable and would meet the ends of justice. Thus,
plaintiff is also held entitled to pendente lite and future interest @
12% per annum w.e.f. the date of institution of the present suit till
its actual realization.
In view of aforesaid discussion, issue Nos. 1 and 2 are decided in
favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants.
RELIEF
In view of my aforesaid discussion, present suit is decreed in
favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant for a principal
amount of Rs.23,90,242.50 along with cost. Plaintiff is also held
entitled to simple interest @ 12% per annum on the outstanding
amount w.e.f. 01.09.2015 till 31.08.2018 with pendente lite and
future interest @ 12% per annum till its actual realization.
Pre-institution mediation fees, if any, be also added to the cost.
Decree sheet be drawn accordingly.
File be consigned to Record Room.‖
37.
A cumulative reading of both the Original Judgment and the
Impugned Review Judgment passed by the learned Trial Court clearly
demonstrates that the case was examined in depth on facts as well as
on law. The learned Trial Court had, in the Original Judgment,
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comprehensively recorded the factual background, framed the issues,
and evaluated the evidence led by the parties. The dismissal of the suit
in the Original Judgment was not on merits, but solely on a technical
ground, namely, the perceived absence of a certificate under Section
65B of the IE Act, which was considered fatal since the Plaintiff‘s
claim was founded primarily on electronic evidence.
38.
Once it was brought to the notice of the learned Trial Court, in
review proceedings, that the Section 65B certificate was already on
record and that its non-consideration was the result of an inadvertent
oversight, the learned Trial Court correctly exercised its review
jurisdiction. Upon rectifying the said error apparent on the face of the
record, the learned Trial Court proceeded to evaluate the admissibility
and evidentiary value of the ledger account in accordance with law,
and thereafter passed the decree in favour of the Plaintiff.
39.
It is therefore evident that the Impugned Review Judgment
cannot be read in isolation or divorced from the Original Judgment.
Both judgments are required to be read conjointly and harmoniously.
The Impugned Review Judgment merely cures a technical defect
which had earlier resulted in dismissal of the suit and carries the
adjudicatory process to its logical conclusion after considering
material that was already part of the record. The review proceedings
did not amount to a rehearing of the matter or reappreciation of
evidence beyond permissible limits, but were confined to correcting a
manifest procedural error.
40.
Upon such correction, the learned Trial Court continued its
examination of the plaintiff‘s claim, found that the ledger account
stood duly proved in accordance with law, and consequently decreed
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the suit in favour of the Plaintiff along with interest, costs, and
ancillary reliefs, as detailed in the Impugned Review Judgment.
41.
Having thus clarified the factual and procedural position as
hereinabove, we now proceed to examine the principal contention
raised by the Defendants in the present Appeal, wherein they
challenge the sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence adduced by
the Plaintiff and contend that the reliance placed by the learned Trial
Court on the Plaintiff‘s ledger account is legally unsustainable.
42.
The principal submission of the Defendants, founded upon
Section 34 of the IE Act, is that entries in the books of account,
including a ledger, must necessarily be corroborated by independent
evidence, and that such entries by themselves are insufficient to fasten
liability.
43.
We find merit in the legal proposition canvassed by the
Defendants to the extent that Section 34 of the IE Act indeed provides
that though entries in books of account regularly kept in the course of
business are relevant, such entries ―shall not alone‖ be sufficient
evidence to charge any person with liability.
44.
However, when the present case is examined in its entirety,
including the oral and documentary evidence placed before the learned
Trial Court, which examination is well within the jurisdiction of this
Court as a First Appellate Court, the factual position that emerges is
that the Plaintiff‘s case is not founded solely upon the ledger account.
Rather, the ledger is duly corroborated by surrounding facts and
circumstances, documentary material, and consistent oral testimony
led by the Plaintiff.
45.
In his cross-examination before the learned Trial Court, the
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Plaintiff consistently deposed that he was personally involved in the
business transactions with the Defendant-Firm. Further, the Plaintiff
categorically denied the Defendants‘ assertion that payments had been
made against the invoices/bills filed along with the suit. Despite
extensive cross-examination, no material contradiction or infirmity
could be elicited so as to discredit the Plaintiff‘s testimony.
46.
On the other hand, a bare perusal of the testimony of the sole
defence witness, who was the Manager of Defendant No. 1 and
examined on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney, reveals that
his evidence falls short of substantiating the defence set up by the
Defendants. His deposition is largely evasive, lacks specificity, and
does not inspire confidence so as to probabilize the defence version on
the face of the record.
47.
It is also significant that the Plaintiff‘s consistent case was that
the business dealings were primarily conducted with Defendant No. 2,
who was a partner of Defendant No. 1. In such circumstances, it
would have been far more plausible and natural for one of the partners
of the Defendant-Firm, who was directly involved in the transactions,
to enter the witness box and depose in support of the defence.
48.
Notably, during the course of oral arguments before us, a
specific query was put to the learned counsel appearing for the
Defendants as to why none of the partners stepped forward for their
deposition. The response offered was evasive and failed to
satisfactorily explain this conspicuous omission.
49.
The Defendants also attempted to set up a case that, on account
of the alleged sub-standard supply of goods by the Plaintiff, they
suffered
substantial
losses
amounting
to
approximately
Rs.
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38,61,558/-. However, beyond bald assertions, no cogent material has
been placed on record to substantiate such alleged losses. It is
pertinent to note that neither was any counter-claim filed nor was any
independent proceeding initiated by the Defendants to recover the
alleged loss, which significantly weakens the credibility of this
defence.
50.
It is a well-settled principle of civil jurisprudence that disputes
of a civil nature are required to be adjudicated on the touchstone of
‘preponderance of probabilities’ and not on the strict standard of
proof applicable to criminal proceedings. The burden initially lies
upon the Plaintiff to establish a prima facie case in support of the
claim put forth. Once such initial burden is discharged by leading
cogent, reliable, and admissible evidence, the onus thereafter shifts
upon the Defendants to rebut the Plaintiff‘s case by producing
evidence of an equal or greater probative value so as to tilt the balance
of probabilities in their favour.
51.
In the present case, the Plaintiff has not rested his claim merely
upon a solitary piece of evidence. On the contrary, the Plaintiff has
supported his claim through a duly proved ledger account,
corroborated by contemporaneous invoices and vouchers for the
period from 01.04.2014 to 31.03.2016(Ex. PW1/B), which clearly
reflect the course of commercial dealings between the parties.
52.
The Plaintiff has further fortified his case by leading consistent
and credible oral evidence, which has remained largely unshaken
during cross-examination. The documentary and oral evidence
produced by the Plaintiff, when read conjointly, forms a coherent and
consistent chain establishing the liability of the Defendants.
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53.
In stark contrast, the Defendants have failed to discharge the
onus that shifted upon them. They have neither produced any
documentary material to contradict the entries in the Plaintiff‘s ledger
nor placed on record any bank statements, receipts, or other
contemporaneous records to substantiate their assertion of payment or
to probabilize their defence.
54.
Equally, the oral evidence led on behalf of the Defendants lacks
clarity, specificity, and credibility, and does not inspire confidence. In
the absence of any material of comparable evidentiary worth, the
defence raised remains speculative and unsupported.Viewed in this
backdrop, the evidentiary balance clearly tilts in favour of the
Plaintiff. Consequently, the challenge raised by the Defendants to the
sufficiency and reliability of the Plaintiff‘s evidence is wholly
untenable.
55.
So far as the contention raised by the Defendants is concerned
that the certificate under Section 65B of the IE Act was filed by the
Plaintiff himself and not by his accountant, Mr. Tilak Raj Kohli, and
that for this reason the said certificate is not in accordance with law,
the same does not merit acceptance.
56.
We find no force in the aforesaid submission for more than one
reason. At the outset, it is undisputed that the Plaintiff is running a
sole proprietorship concern and is personally managing the affairs of
the business. Being the sole proprietor, the Plaintiff is fully conversant
with the facts, transactions, and circumstances forming the subject
matter of the dispute. He is, therefore, competent to depose in respect
thereof and to certify the manner in which the electronic records were
generated, stored, and produced.
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57.
More importantly, Section 65B(4) of the IE Act does not
mandate that the certificate must necessarily be issued by an
accountant or by any particular designated person. The statutory
requirement is that the certificate must be signed by a person
occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of
the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities, as the
case may be. The provision further clarifies that it shall be sufficient if
the matters stated in the certificate are based on the best of the
knowledge and belief of the person issuing it. The relevant portion of
Section 65B of the IE Act is reproduced hereunder:
―65B. Admissibility of electronic records.
*****
(4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in
evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the
following things, that is to say, ––
(a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and
describing the manner in which it was produced;
(b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the
production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for
the purpose of showing that the electronic record was
produced by a computer;
(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions
mentioned in sub-section (2) relate,
and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible
official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device
or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is
appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the
certificate; and for the purposes of this subsection it shall be
sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and
belief of the person stating it.‖
58.
The language of Section 65B(4) of the IE Act, which has been
reproduced hereinabove, is explicit and leaves no manner of doubt
that the legislature has consciously adopted a flexible and pragmatic
approach, keeping in view the realities of business and technological
operations.
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59.
The legislative intent for such flexibility is clearly provided in
the use of the phrase ―in relation to the operation of the relevant
device‖, which is then followed by the phrase ―or the management of
the relevant activities‖. The provision does not read that the signatory
has to be a person occupying a responsible position who operates the
device. To our mind, in the case of a sole proprietorship, the
proprietor is usually a person who is fully tuned into the transactions
of the business and would certainly be a ―person occupying a
responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant
device a person‖.
60.
The usage of the phrase ―in relation to‖, confers a certain
amount of flexibility as respects the person who may issue the
certificate. Assuming arguendo that a hypertechnical approach were
to be taken, one certainly cannot contend that the proprietor is not a
―person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the
management of the relevant activities‖.
61.
We also take note of the fact that the express terms of the
provision do not mandate that the certificate is necessarily to be issued
by the author of the document itself. It is only to be given by a person
who is in a sufficiently responsible position to identify the record and
the manner in which it was produced, as well as to give the particulars
of the device(s) involved in its production.
62.
The said provision does not mandate that the certificate must
necessarily be issued by the author of the document or the operator of
the concerned device. In fact, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court, in Mohd. Arif v. State (NCT of Delhi)7, after an
(2023) 3 SCC 654
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exhaustive exposition of the law on the subject and reiterating the
principles laid down in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash
Kushanrao Gorantyal8, held that such a certificate may be issued by a
person who is the owner and/or the operator of the device. The
relevant extract from Mohd. Arif (supra) is reproduced below:
―22. The last decision on the point is a three-Judge Bench decision
of this Court inArjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao
Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, which was rendered on a reference to
a larger Bench because of the observations inShafhi
Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801. The Bench
concluded in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao
Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 as under :
―73. The reference is thus answered by stating that:
73.1.Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, as
clarified by us hereinabove, is the law declared by this
Court on Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. The judgment
inTomaso Bruno v. State of U.P., (2015) 7 SCC 178,
being per incuriam, does not lay down the law correctly.
Also, the judgment inShafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P.,
(2018) 2 SCC 801, and the judgment dated 3-4-2018
reported asShafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 5
SCC 311, do not lay down the law correctly and are
therefore overruled.
73.2. The clarification referred to above is that the
required certificate under Section 65-B(4) is unnecessary
if the original document itself is produced. This can be
done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet
or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box
and proving that the device concerned, on which the
original information is first stored, is owned and/or
operated by him. In cases where the ―computer‖ happens
to be a part of a ―computer system‖ or ―computer
network‖ and it becomes impossible to physically bring
such system or network to the court, then the only means
of providing information contained in such electronic
record can be in accordance with Section 65-B(1),
together with the requisite certificate under Section 65B(4). The last sentence in para 24 inAnvar P.V. v. P.K.
Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, which reads as ‗… if an
electronic record as such is used as primary evidence
under Section 62 of the Evidence Act …‘ is thus clarified;
(2020) 7 SCC 1
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it is to be read without the words ‗under Section 62 of the
Evidence Act, …‘. With this clarification, the law stated in
para 24 ofAnvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473
does not need to be revisited.
73.3. The general directions issued in para 64 (supra) shall
hereafter be followed by courts that deal with electronic
evidence, to ensure their preservation, and production of
certificate at the appropriate stage. These directions shall
apply in all proceedings, till rules and directions under
Section 67-C of the Information Technology Act and data
retention conditions are formulated for compliance by
telecom and internet service providers.
73.4. Appropriate rules and directions should be framed in
exercise of the Information Technology Act, by exercising
powers such as in Section 67-C, and also framing suitable
rules for the retention of data involved in trial of offences,
their segregation, rules of chain of custody, stamping and
record maintenance, for the entire duration of trials and
appeals, and also in regard to preservation of the metadata
to avoid corruption. Likewise, appropriate rules for
preservation, retrieval and production of electronic record,
should be framed as indicated earlier, after considering the
report of the Committee constituted by the Chief Justices‘
Conference in April 2016.‖
(emphasis supplied)
It must now be taken to have been settled that the decision of this
Court inAnvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 as
clarified inArjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao
Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 is the law declared on Section 65-B of
the Evidence Act.‖
63.
Assuming that the hyper-technical argument of the Defendants
that the Plaintiff himself was not the operator/ author, there appears to
be no denial that the Plaintiff was not the owner of the device.
64.
In the present case, the Plaintiff, who is also the proprietor, has
furnished the Section 65B certificate affirming the manner in which
the electronic ledger was maintained and produced, and the certificate
satisfies the statutory requirements contemplated therein.
65.
In view of the clear statutory mandate and the factual matrix of
the present case, the objection raised by the Defendants is devoid of
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any legal substance. Consequently, we hold that the certificate under
Section 65B of the IE Act filed by the Plaintiff is in accordance with
law, and the contention of the Defendants to the contrary is
accordingly rejected.
DECISION:
66.
In view of the foregoing discussion, detailed analysis of the
evidence on record, and the settled principles of law, we are of the
considered opinion that the present Appeal is wholly devoid of merit.
The Impugned Review Judgment dated 12.08.2024, read with the
Original Judgment dated 15.01.2024, passed by the learned Trial
Court, reflects a correct and judicious appreciation of the facts and the
applicable law and does not suffer from any infirmity warranting
interference by this Court. Accordingly, the present Appeal is
dismissed.
67.
The present Appeal, along with pending application(s), if any,
stand disposed of in the above terms.
68.
No Order as to costs.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JANUARY 09, 2026/sm/her
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:30:44
RFA(COMM) 511/2024
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