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Serial No.01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Arb.A.No.6/2023
Date of Order: 19.06.2023
Public Works Department
(National Highway)
Coram:
Vs.
M/s BSC-CC & JV, 6-2-913/914
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellant
: Mr. A. Kumar, Advocate-General with
Mr. S. Sengupta, Addl.Sr.GA
Mr. S. Sahay, GA
Mr. A.S. Pandey, GA
Ms. S. Laloo, GA
For the Respondent
: Mr. R. Prakash, Adv with
Mr. K. Ch. Gautam, Adv
Mr. K. Tiwari, Adv
Mr. S. Gangar, Adv
Mr. A. Pandey, Adv
i) Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
This is a complete waste of time and a reckless exercise
undertaken by an irresponsible appellant. The challenge here is under
Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to an order dated
May 17, 2023 passed by the Commercial Court, Shillong on a plea under
Section 34 of the Act challenging an arbitral award rendered on July 27,
2021.
2.
The arbitral award was made on an application under Section
31(6) of the Act. Such provision empowers an arbitral tribunal to pass an
interim arbitral award in respect of any matter that may be covered by a
final arbitral award.
3.
The appellant herein engaged the respondent for the two-laning
of the highway from Shillong to Nongstoin and beyond, possibly, up to
Tura. The claims in the reference pertained to the delay, disruption and
prolongation of the contract together with interest on account of delayed
payments and the like. There is no dispute that there was delay in the
execution of the contract and the appellant herein submits that it was for
such reason that the value of the contract had been revised and claims on
account of interest and the like for previous delayed payments had been
subsumed in the enhanced value of the contract.
4.
The contract itself provided for a two-tier mechanism for the
resolution of disputes. In such context, clause 25 of the contract is of
some relevance:
“25. Procedure for Disputes
25.1. The Dispute Review Expert (Board) shall give a decision
in writing within 28 days of receipt of a notification of a
dispute.
25.2. The Dispute Review Expert (Board) shall be paid daily at
the rate specified in the Contract Data together with
reimbursable expenses of the types specified in the Contract
Data and the cost shall be divided equally between the
Employer and the Contractor, whatever decision is reached by
the Dispute Review Expert. Either party may give notice to the
other to refer a decision of the Dispute Review Expert to an
Arbitrator within 28 days of the Dispute Review Expert‟s
written decision. If neither party refers the dispute to arbitration
within the next 28 days, the Dispute Review Expert‟s decision
will be final and binding.
25.3. The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the
arbitration procedure stated in the Special Conditions of
Contract.”
5.
Despite the value of the contract being enhanced, the contractor
sought to assert a claim on account of delayed payments of its regular
bills. In accordance with clause 25 of the contract, the Dispute Review
Expert Board considered such claim and, by a reasoned decision passed
on September 25, 2016, found that the contractor was entitled to a
substantial sum. Upon the contractor requiring the Dispute Review Expert
Board (DREB) to re-examine its claim since several aspects of the delay
had not been accounted for, a revised decision was passed by the DREB
on February 19, 2017 finding that the contractor was entitled to a sum in
excess of Rs.117 crore on account of interest for delayed payments and on
account of unpaid bills or delayed payments for bitumen.
6.
In accordance with clause 25.2 of the contract, such decision of
the DREB ought to have been challenged by the appellant employer
within 28 days. However, even if it be accepted for argument‟s sake that
the abridgement of the time would fall foul of Section 28 of the Contract
Act, 1872, what is evident is that there never was any challenge at all to
such decision of the DREB of February 19, 2017 which incorporated the
earlier decision of September 25, 2016 within its fold.
7.
On the remainder of the disputes between the parties pertaining
to delay, disruption and prolongation of the contract, a separate decision
was rendered by the DREB on September 25, 2018.
8.
Prior to the second decision of the DREB being pronounced on
the delay, disruption and prolongation aspect, since the amount awarded
by the DREB on February 19, 2017 remained outstanding for a long time,
the contractor wrote to the appellant herein on June 11, 2018 seeking
arbitration. The relevant letter, at paragraph 11.0 thereof, specifically
invoked clause 25.3 of the agreement read with the relevant clause of the
special conditions of the contract and the disputes described in such
paragraph pertained to three specific heads: additional usage of bitumen;
reimbursement of labour cess; and, interest on delayed payments.
9.
It would appear that the claim on account of delayed payments
included the quantum awarded by the DREB as there is a reference,
earlier in the said letter, to the DREB decisions of September 25, 2016
and February 19, 2017.
10.
In response to the contractor‟s letter of June 11, 2018, the
appellant claimed that the appellant was “to appeal against the order of
the Dispute Review Board and the matter is being communicated to the
DRB accordingly.” This assertion made no sense at all and was
completely contrary to clause 25 of the contract between the parties that
required the dispute to be carried to the appropriate forum within a
specific period. Even if such specified period is ignored, a dispute had to
be raised and the appellant had to pursue such dispute and bring it to a
logical conclusion.
11.
Since the agreement between the parties provided for
arbitration as specifically recorded in clause 25.3 thereof read with the
special conditions of the contract, the only meaningful way in which the
appellant could have disputed the DREB decision of February 19, 2017
(which included the earlier decision of September 15, 2016) was by
referring the matter to arbitration. Till date no step has been taken by the
appellant in such regard.
12.
On the contrary, on some frivolous grounds that the contractor
need not have taken into account at all, the appellant wrote on July 18,
2018 for the notice of June 11, 2018 to be recalled. The appellant has not
been able to demonstrate that the contractor withdrew such notice.
13.
By the appellant‟s letter of January 16, 2019 a reference was
made to arbitration. It may do well to notice the entirety of such letter
from where it quotes the subject till where the substance of the letter ends:
“Sub: 2-laning of Shillong – Nongstoin section of NH 44 and
Nongstoin – Rongjeng – Tura State road in the State of
Meghalaya under Phase „A‟ of SARDP-NE – Nomination of
Arbitrator – reg.
Ref: No.RW/NH/12018/142012MG/SARDP-NE (part-1)
Dt. 20.12.2018.
Sir,
With reference to the subject cited above, I am directed
to forward herewith a copy of the letter under reference above
received from Ministry of Road Transport and Highways
regarding the nomination of Shri K.K. Jalan IAS (Retired) as
Arbitrator to represent the Ministry and State PWD,
Meghalaya.
This is for your information and necessary action.
Enclo: As stated above.”
14.
It is evident that the nomination of the arbitrator that was made
was in respect of the matter covered by the subject referred to in the
relevant letter. The subject was, quite clearly, “Nongstoin section of NH
44 and Nongstoin – Rongjeng – Tura State road...” There is no doubt that
the relevant letter of January 16, 2019 referred to a letter dated December
20, 2018 that had been received by the appellant from the Union Ministry
of Road Transport and Highways and it is equally possible that a copy of
such letter was also forwarded by the appellant to the contractor.
However, what cannot be missed is that the nomination of the arbitrator
was in respect of the subject-matter which was clearly indicated in the
letter though the letter also carried a reference to the previous letter
received from the relevant Union Ministry.
15.
The contractor responded to such nomination of arbitrator by
the appellant by the contractor‟s letter of February 1, 2019. Much is
sought to be made out by the appellant of the first paragraph of such letter
of the contractor which reads as follows:
“We are in receipt of your letter dated 16.01.2019, cited above
at sl.no 9, whereby we were informed the appointment of Mr.
K.K. Jalan IAS (Retd.) as your nominee Arbitrator to adjudicate
on “Decision of the DRB on Claim of the Contractor regarding,
Delay, disruption and prolongation cost” only.”
16.
The contractor‟s reply, thereafter, proceeded to record the
history of the relationship between the parties before culminating in a
request made at paragraph 10.0 to the effect that all the decisions of the
DREB ought to be referred to the arbitral tribunal. A table-form chart was
included in such paragraph and the claims indicated therein included the
one on delayed payments and another for interest on delayed payments
for bitumen. These two matters were covered by the DREB decision of
February 19, 2017 (including the previous decision of September 26,
2016).
17.
Significantly, the appellant herein did not respond to the letter
of February 1, 2019 and the contractor‟s request for all disputes to be
referred to arbitration may be inferred to have been acceded to.
18.
It was in such circumstances that the arbitral tribunal came to
be constituted with two nominees of the two parties and a third arbitrator
who was appointed in accordance with the agreement between the parties.
At the first sitting of the reference held on April 10, 2019, copious
minutes have been recorded. However, there is no submission or
clarification by the representatives of the appellant present at such
meeting to confine the terms of reference of the arbitral tribunal to only
the claims on account of delay, disruption and prolongation of the work or
to exclude the claim on account of the decision of the DREB rendered on
February 19, 2017 (including the earlier decision of September 25, 2016).
19.
It was only after the contractor‟s statement of claim was placed
before the arbitral reference in the end of May, 2019 that an application
under Section 16 of the Act was filed by the appellant herein. Such
application was filed on July 30, 2019. It is necessary to ascertain the
scope and purport of the relevant application from the pleadings therein.
20.
At paragraph 2 of such application, the appellant exhorted that
the arbitral tribunal could acquire jurisdiction only in the manner laid
down in the contract between the parties and further asserted that the
claims which had been raised by the claimant but had not been referred to
arbitration in terms of the contract could not be entertained by the
tribunal. Despite the appellant having nominated its person on the arbitral
tribunal, the two nominees of the parties having decided on the third
arbitrator in accordance with law and no objection raised by the appellant,
not only at the first hearing in the reference but for a period of more than
three months thereafter, the appellant finally claimed in the relevant
application that since there was no dispute between the parties in respect
of the decisions rendered by the DREB on September 25, 2016 and
February 19, 2017, such claim carried by the contractor to the reference
was not arbitrable.
21.
Indeed, it is necessary to see the exact words of the appellant
used in the relevant application, sans the sub-paragraphs that followed:
“6. It is respectfully submitted that the Claimant is liable to be
non-suited on each of the above preliminary grounds which are
more particularly detailed hereinafter:
1. IN RE: CLAIM NO.1: Claims relating to the due payable
interest on the delayed/late payments of IPC‟s and accrued
payable due interest on principal amounts awarded and
paid to the Claimant by the Respondent, as per the
decision of the Dispute Review Board dated 25.09.2016
and 19.02.2017.:
a. No-existence of ‘dispute’ in terms of provisions of
contract warranting invocation of dispute resolution
process:
...”
22.
(Emphasis in original)
Thus, what is evident from the relevant application is not any
assertion that the dispute pertaining to the non-payment of the sum as
decided by the DREB on February 19, 2017 (inclusive of the amount as
decided on September 25, 2019) had not been referred to arbitration, but
only that since no dispute in such regard had been raised by the appellant,
there was nothing to adjudicate in such regard in the arbitration.
23.
Classically, in the early days of arbitration law in this country,
it was also the understanding of some courts that the mere non-payment
without any attempt to justify such non-payment would not be a dispute
which would be covered by an arbitration agreement to be referred to
arbitration. Indeed, the understanding in such regard has undergone a
transformation over the last century or so and even the mere non-payment
now amounts to a dispute, since without any adjudication thereof, despite
there being no dispute, the party claiming the money has no recourse to
the same.
24.
What is even more significant is that the appellant herein
admitted categorically and unequivocally that it had not raised any dispute
in respect of the DREB decision of September 25, 2016 as modified and
enhanced by the subsequent order of February 19, 2017. In clear words,
the appellant herein admitted, accepted and acknowledged that it was
liable to pay such amount; only that the arbitral tribunal could not go into
it since there was no dispute in such regard and, as a consequence, the
matter was not amenable to arbitration or any form of adjudication.
25.
In the light of the nomination made by the appellant herein in
its letter of January 16, 2019 and the subject-matter therein covering the
entire gamut of the transactions between the appellant and the contractor,
it was a possible view that the arbitrators could take. It is not necessary in
this jurisdiction to hold that the view taken by the arbitrators was the
correct view or the only possible view. It would pass muster if it is
recognised that one of the possible views was taken by the arbitrators.
26.
In addition, it must not be missed that the immediate response
of the contractor, following the reference of the disputes to arbitrator by
the appellant, in the contractor‟s letter of February 1, 2019, was to call for
all the outstanding matters to be taken to the reference. To this, there was
no reply from the appellant. In the backdrop of the contractor‟s letter of
February 1, 2019, the complete lack of response thereto by the appellant
herein and the arbitral tribunal being constituted thereupon, it was
possible for the arbitral tribunal to assume that the entirety of the disputes
between the parties pertaining to the contract had been referred to such
arbitral tribunal.
27.
The award that was rendered and which is challenged in the
present proceedings was made on July 27, 2021. Such award was made
following an application by the contractor under Section 31(6) of the Act.
In the award, the arbitral tribunal reckoned that since no dispute had been
raised at all by the appellant in respect of the decisions rendered by
DREB on September 25, 2016 and February 19, 2017, the appellant
herein could no longer object to the total amount decided in favour of the
contractor being made the subject-matter of an award.
28.
Indeed, if one were to be hyper-critical, one would question
why the arbitral tribunal went into the issue of interest on interest and
duplication of interest since such matters had never been canvassed by the
appellant herein upon the appellant failing to raise any form of dispute to
the two decisions of the DREB made on September 25, 2016 and
February 19, 2017.
29.
The appellant seeks to distort the order passed on March 21,
2020 on its application under Section 16 of the Act. At paragraph 46 of
the relevant order, the arbitral tribunal observed that till the date of the
appellant herein filing its application under Section 16 of the Act on July
19, 2019 it remained silent “and thus it would amount to giving
acquiescence to notice dated 01.02.2019 for consolidation of both the
claims.” It is evident that the arbitral award read the conduct of the
appellant herein exactly as this Court has done in inferring that upon the
appellant herein not responding the letter of February 1, 2019 and not
indicating the bounds of the arbitral tribunal‟s authority in course of
previous hearings in the reference, the authority of the arbitrators
extended to the entirety of the contract between the parties.
30.
Again, paragraph 49 of the order dated March 21, 2020 is
sought to be twisted out of context by the appellant as the appellant
suggests that such paragraph held out a promise by the arbitral tribunal to
adjudicate on the disputes pertaining to the claim on interest at a later
stage; but while passing the impugned award on July 27, 2021 the arbitral
tribunal quite facetiously indicated that the matter had already been
decided in its previous order of March 21, 2020. It is necessary that the
relevant paragraph be seen in its entirety:
“49. It is well settled that the question of limitation is a mixed
question of fact and law. Moreover, there are triable issues in
the present case, since Respondent has not made payments to
the Claimant in terms of the order of DRB-I and DRB-II. Thus,
there has been no final settlement between the parties.
Therefore, such disputes are to be considered by the Arbitrator
and not by the Civil Court. On this point we are supported by
the following decision: ...”
31.
It is clear that what the arbitral tribunal sought to indicate in the
relevant paragraph was that there was no final settlement between the
parties by payment and accord. The arbitral tribunal also noticed that no
dispute had ever been raised by the appellant pertaining to the claim on
account of interest for delayed payments which called for adjudication.
The arbitrators finally held that in view of the arbitration agreement
contained in the matrix contract between the parties, there was no
mandate for either party to approach any civil court as all disputes had to
be finally decided in accordance with the arbitration agreement and not
otherwise. There is no element of promise held out in the relevant
paragraph that the matter pertaining to interest for delayed payments or
any purported dispute in such regard would be considered at a later stage.
32.
The argument appears to be a figment of the appellant‟s
imagination.
33.
Here is a case of a contract being stretched beyond its original
period and payments not being tendered within reasonable time. There
was a mechanism which was established in the agreement and the
contractor succeeded by obtaining favourable decisions from the authority
that was tasked with such duty to adjudicate such disputes within the
framework of the contract. Indeed, there are letters on record which reveal
that the contractor offered to give up a substantial part of the amount that
had been adjudicated in its favour by the DREB and even enhanced the
quantum of rebate, if only to prompt the appellant to making immediate
payment. However, the appellant did not relent.
34.
There are other specious excuses which are proffered and
irrelevant references made in this matter which has been a complete waste
of judicial time. Notwithstanding the contract being between the appellant
and the contractor, a fact which is undeniable and is clearly admitted, the
appellant refers to the correspondence it exchanged with the relevant
Union Ministry and the advice that it is received from such Ministry. In a
contract between two parties, neither is governed by the conduct of a third
party, whatever may be such third party‟s control over the other party.
Indeed, an issue has been sought to be raised quite seriously that the
Union Ministry of Road Transport and Highways was a necessary and a
proper party to the present proceedings. Surprises never cease. Such
ludicrous assertion may probably be because the officials who are behind
the appellant; who do not need to pay from their own pockets for their
recalcitrance and it is the tax-payers‟ money that being squandered.
35.
The court of the first instance was perfectly justified in not
touching the award. The award rendered on July 27, 2021 is
unimpeachable, it is based on the clear and tacit admission on the part of
the appellant herein and the appellant could never have turned around to
question its own admission or seek to deny the payment of what was
found by the DREB on February 19, 2017 (including the decision of
September 25, 2016) to be due and owing to the contractor. In making the
interim award, which is as efficaciously executable as a final award, the
arbitral tribunal has only given the contractor a part of its dues that had
remained outstanding for a long time. The court of the first instance, quite
appropriately, quoted the relevant paragraphs from the impugned award
with approval and observed that the same did not call for any interference.
36.
It has become fashionable, particularly for public sector
undertakings and government litigants, to throw sheafs of paper at the
court and believe that such voluminous tomes would dissuade judges
from looking deep into the matter and be frightened enough to grant an
adjournment and delay the inevitable. It is time that unworthy litigants
with frivolous causes give up the habit of preying on the court‟s delays
and the only way this can be ensured is by imposing actual and primitive
costs for such misadventure.
37.
The greater malaise is how the system works, particularly, the
manner in which works contracts are issued by government agencies.
Oftentimes, ridiculous and incredibly low rates are quoted by the regular
contractors to beg the contract and, thereafter, rely on their allies in the
government agencies to create grounds that allow claims for enhancement
to be made. The ultimate enhanced value, possibly, makes for the profit of
the contractor and the service charges that it needs to defray to its allies in
the system. Rather than waging only a verbal war against corruption from
every possible pulpit, persons in authority may serve the system better by
setting the government house in order in such regard.
38.
The real tragedy is not in the appellant as a litigant shying away
from payment or its officials being too clever and a half; the tragedy is in
the erroneous expert advice that is rendered to the litigants as the
appellant.
39.
Arb.A.No.6 of 2023 is dismissed with costs assessed at Rs.10
lakh which will be paid over and in addition to the amount awarded.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
19.06.2023
“Lam DR-PS
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