The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
14. 11.2025 passed by the learned Judge, Special Court, Amritsar, whereby extension of time for presentation of challan had been accorded to the Investigating Agency, and subsequent impugned order dated 19.11.2025 passed by the abovementioned Court, whereby the application for bail filed by the petitioner under Section 187(3) of the BNSS, has been dismissed, are illegal, perverse. Thus, it is hereby held that by accepting both the petitions, both the impugned orders deserve to be set aside. 2026.03.09 17:51 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRR-3143-2025 & CRM-M-71567-2025 (O&M)
20. Accordingly, both these petitions are hereby allowed and the impugned orders are hereby set aside. The learned trial Court is hereby directed to re-consider both the applications, i.e. application for extension of time and the application for bail, in the light of observations recorded in the foregoing paragraphs and pass fresh orders within a period of one week from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
Full Judgment Text
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The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
CRR-3143-2025 & CRM-M-71567-2025 (O&M)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRR-3143-2025 (O&M)
Prince
..... Petitioner
VERSUS
State of Punjab
..... Respondent
CRM-M-71567-2025 (O&M)
Prince
..... Petitioner
VERSUS
State of Punjab
..... Respondent
RESERVED ON
PRONOUNCED ON
:
:
27.02.2026
07.03.2026
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SURYA PARTAP SINGH
Argued by : Mr. Rishu Mahajan, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Eklavya Darshi, DAG Punjab.
SURYA PARTAP SINGH, J.
*****
By virtue of order dated 14.11.2025, the learned Judge, Special
Court, Amritsar has accorded permission to the Investigating Agency to
present challan beyond the period of 180 days, and by virtue of order dated
19.11.2025 passed by the learned Judge, Special Court, Amritsar, the
application for bail filed by the petitioner, while invoking the provisions of
GAURAV THAKUR
2026.03.09 17:51
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integrity of this document
CRR-3143-2025 & CRM-M-71567-2025 (O&M)
Section 187(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, has been
dismissed.
2.
Aggrieved of the abovementioned order dated 14.11.2025, the
present petition seeking for quashing of abovesaid order under Section 528
of BNSS has been filed, and with regard to subsequent order dated
19.11.2025, the revision petition, detailed in the headnote, has been
preferred. Since the issues involved in both the petitions are interconnected,
both the petitions are being disposed of by single order.
3.
In nut-shell, the facts emerging from record are that, that on
20.05.2025, the petitioner was arrested by the police with the allegations that
he had committed an offence punishable under Sections 21/21-C/27-A of
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, hereinafter being
referred to as ‘NDPS’ only. As per mandate under the law, the challan for
the commission of abovementioned offence was supposed to be filed by the
Investigating Agency within a period of 180 days, i.e. latest by 16.11.2025.
However, before expiry of abovementioned period, i.e. on 13.11.2025, the
Investigating Agency, through Public Prosecutor, moved an application and
prayed for extension of time meant for presentation of challan. Although the
abovementioned application was opposed by the petitioner, yet, by virtue of
order dated 14.11.2025, the same was allowed.
4.
Aggrieved of the abovementioned order, the present Revision
Petition has been preferred by the petitioner primarily on the ground that the
benefit of extension of time has been accorded to the Investigating Agency
without following the relevant law, and that the learned trial Court at the
GAURAV THAKUR
2026.03.09 17:51
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CRR-3143-2025 & CRM-M-71567-2025 (O&M)
time of according the abovementioned extension has not followed the
mandatory provisions enshrined under the law.
5.
Heard.
6.
It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that
the failure of Investigating Agency to submit the challan within the fixed
timeframe, i.e. 180 days from the date of arrest of petitioner, confirms an
absolute right to the accused, i.e. the right to seek bail, and that the extension
of time has been accorded in the present case on 14.11.2025, which has
resulted into denial of abovementioned right to the accused by virtue of
order dated 19.11.2025 and therefore, the extension of time for presentation
of challan, accorded in the present case, is not the routine business of the
Court.
7.
It has been further contended by learned counsel for the
petitioner that the benefit of extension of time for presentation of challan has
been accorded to the prosecution not only in a very casual manner, but also
in violation of the mandatory provisions of law, which prescribes for the
report of Public Prosecutor. As per learned counsel for the petitioner, for
want of compliance of Section 36A(4) of NDPS Act, the impugned orders
are bad in law and deserves to be set-aside.
8.
While referring to the principles of law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of ‘Sanjay Kumar Kedia
@Sanjay Kedia V/s Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau & Anr.’
2009(17) SCC 631, and by this Court in the cases of ‘Bharat Bhushan V/s
GAURAV THAKUR
2026.03.09 17:51
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integrity of this document
CRR-3143-2025 & CRM-M-71567-2025 (O&M)
State of Haryana’ 2024(2) Law Herald 960, ‘Ravinder @Bhola V/s State of
Haryana’ CRR-2100-2023, and ‘Rajender V/s State of Haryana’ CRR-5072021, it has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that factual
matrix of the present case is squarely covered by the abovementioned
principles and therefore, there is need for indulgence and interference of this
Court, in the impugned orders.
9.
The abovementioned arguments have been controverted by the
learned State Counsel. It has been contended by learned State Counsel that
present case is a case, wherein well before the expiry of prescribed time
period, the application seeking for extension of time for presentation of
challan was moved by the Investigating Agency, as the application was filed
on 13.11.2025 and the time period of 180 days, from the date of arrest of the
petitioner, was going to expire on 16.11.2025.
10.
According to learned State Counsel, a very cogent and valid
reasons were mentioned in the abovementioned application, i.e. non-receipt
of FSL report, and therefore, this argument has got no force that any error of
judgment has been committed by the learned trial Court, while accepting the
application for extension of time and rejecting the bail application filed by
the petitioner under Section 187(2) of BNSS. While defending the impugned
orders, it has been contended by learned State Counsel that the present
petitions have been filed with mala fide intentions, which have no force and
deserve dismissal.
11.
GAURAV THAKUR
2026.03.09 17:51
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integrity of this document
The record has been perused carefully.
CRR-3143-2025 & CRM-M-71567-2025 (O&M)
12.
As far as the present petitions are concerned, at the very outset
it is relevant to mention here that Section 36A(4) of NDPS Act provides as
under:“In respect of persons accused of an offence punishable under
section 19 or section 24 or section 27A or for offences involving
commercial quantity the references in sub-section (2) of section
167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)
thereof to “ninety days”, where they occur, shall be construed
as reference to “one hundred and eighty days”:
Provided that, if it is not possible to complete the investigation
within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the
Special Court may extend the said period up to one year on the
report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the
investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the
accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty
days.”
13.
With regard to abovementioned legal proposition, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of ‘Sanjay Kumar Kedia’ (supra) has
observed that in a case, wherein the investigation is not complete in 180
days and application seeking for extension of time is moved by invoking
Section 36A(4) of NDPS Act, before granting extension of time, notice must
be issued to the accused, and that following conditions must be satisfied:(i) that there is the report of the public prosecutor, indicating the
progress of the investigation, and
(ii) that there must be specific and compelling reasons for seeking
the detention of the accused beyond the period of 180 days and
(iii) that notice of the application has been given to the accused.
GAURAV THAKUR
2026.03.09 17:51
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integrity of this document
CRR-3143-2025 & CRM-M-71567-2025 (O&M)
14.
While dealing with similar issues, this Court in the case of
‘Bharat Bhushan’ (supra) has observed that ‘authority to seek extension of
time is, thus, not vested solely in the investigating agency, and that Section
36A(4) of NDPS Act explicitly stipulates that the Court may grant an
extension only upon receipt of a report from the Public Prosecutor’. In the
abovementioned case, the application seeking for extension of time was
prepared by the Investigating Officer and forwarded by the Public
Prosecutor, but no report was submitted by the Investigating Officer,
indicating the progress of investigation and the specific reasons for detention
of the accused beyond the period of 180 days. In view of abovementioned
facts and circumstances, this Court, in the abovementioned case, observed
that granting permission for extension of time was illegal. Similar views
have been taken by this Court in the case of ‘Ravinder @Bhola’ (supra) and
‘Rajender’ (supra).
15.
As far as the instant case is concerned, to arrive at any
conclusion the observations recorded by the learned trial Court while
according extension of time, to the prosecution, are very much relevant. The
findings recorded by learned trial Court, while according extension of time
makes it abundantly clear that the learned trial Court despite being aware of
the fact that there was no report of Public Prosecutor, indicating the progress
of the investigation, and also the specific reasons for detention of accused
beyond the period of 180 days, has observed that the application under
Section 36A(4) of NDPS Act need not to be accompanied by an extra report
or in a particular format. According to learned trial Court, the objective of an
GAURAV THAKUR
2026.03.09 17:51
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integrity of this document
CRR-3143-2025 & CRM-M-71567-2025 (O&M)
application under Section 36A(4) of NDPS Act is to require the Public
Prosecutor to intimate the Court regarding the progress of investigation and
the specific reasons for detention of accused beyond the period of 180 days.
The learned trial Court has further observed that the validity of the
application and the soundness of the reason is not to be assessed.
16.
The abovementioned finding recorded by the learned trial Court
generates an impression that merely on the submission of application duly
forwarded by Public Prosecutor, but without a report as specified under
Section 36A(4) of NDPS Act, the prosecution has got a right to seek
extension of time. This is very strange to note that the learned trial Court has
acted in a manner as if it has got no jurisdiction to look into the fact as to
whether there existed a valid ground for the extension of time or not. On the
other hand, the bare perusal of the provision comprised under Section
36A(4) of NDPS Act, and the principles of law laid down in the cases of
‘Sanjay Kumar Kedia’ (supra) and ‘Bharat Bhushan’ (supra), make it clear
that the Public Prosecutor is supposed to report the progress of the
investigation and the specific reasons for detention of accused beyond the
period of 180 days. The words ‘specific reasons for detention of accused
beyond the period of 180 days’ in itself make it abundantly clear that the
reasons must be a convincing reason and to find out as to whether reasons
mentioned in the report is convincing or not, it is only the learned trial
Court, who can take a decisioin.
17.
In the present case, the observations of the learned trial Court
that validity of the application and the soundness of the reason cannot be
GAURAV THAKUR
2026.03.09 17:51
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integrity of this document
CRR-3143-2025 & CRM-M-71567-2025 (O&M)
assessed, by the learned trial Court, are not in conformity with the settled
law and therefore, it is hereby held that there is need for indulgence and
interference of revisional jurisdiction of this Court in the impugned orders.
18.
In addition to above, another glaring defect in the impugned
orders is that contrary to the settled principles of law, as laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of ‘Sanjay Kumar Kedia’
(supra) and by this Court in the case of ‘Bharat Bhushan’ (supra), the report
of Public Prosecutor is supposed to be there along with an application
seeking for extension of time for presentation of challan. But in the case in
hand, merely on the basis of grounds mentioned by the Investigating Officer
in his application, and without the report of Public Prosecutor, the
application has been allowed. The abovementioned procedure adopted by
the learned trial Court, too, is contrary to the settled principles of law and
needs interference of revisional jurisdiction of this Court in the impugned
orders.
19.
Taking into consideration the observations made in the
foregoing paragraphs, it is hereby held that the impugned order dated
14.11.2025 passed by the learned Judge, Special Court, Amritsar, whereby
extension of time for presentation of challan had been accorded to the
Investigating Agency, and subsequent impugned order dated 19.11.2025
passed by the abovementioned Court, whereby the application for bail filed
by the petitioner under Section 187(3) of the BNSS, has been dismissed, are
illegal, perverse. Thus, it is hereby held that by accepting both the petitions,
both the impugned orders deserve to be set aside.
GAURAV THAKUR
2026.03.09 17:51
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
CRR-3143-2025 & CRM-M-71567-2025 (O&M)
20.
Accordingly, both these petitions are hereby allowed and the
impugned orders are hereby set aside. The learned trial Court is hereby
directed to re-consider both the applications, i.e. application for extension of
time and the application for bail, in the light of observations recorded in the
foregoing paragraphs and pass fresh orders within a period of one week from
the date of receipt of copy of this order.
21.
Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s)
disposed of, accordingly.
22.
Photocopy of this order be placed on the file of connected case.
(SURYA PARTAP SINGH)
JUDGE
07.03.2026
Gaurav Thakur
GAURAV THAKUR
2026.03.09 17:51
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integrity of this document
Whether speaking / reasoned
Whether Reportable
Yes/No
Yes
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