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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 28.09.2026
#
CNR No. DLHC011160802024
+
RC.REV. 143/2025 & CM APPL. 26209/2025 (Stay)
PREM SINGH & ORS.
Through:
.....Petitioners
Mr. Puneet Kumar Saxena, Mr.
C.M. Verma and Mr. Pavneet
Singh, Advs.
versus
LAL CHAND & ORS.
Through:
.....Respondents
Counsel (Appearance not
given).
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
1.
JUDGEMENT (Oral)
The present Petition has been filed under Section 25-B(1) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 19581, challenging the Order dated
24.10.20242, passed by the learned Administrative Civil Judgecum-Additional Rent Controller, Central District, Tis Hazari
Courts, Delhi3, in Eviction Petition being RC ARC 777/20184
whereby the leave to defend application filed on behalf of the
Petitioners herein was dismissed by the learned ARC and an Eviction
Order was passed in favour of the Respondent herein with respect to
Property No.6072, measuring 85 Sq. Yards, Gali Ravidas, Nabi
DRC Act
Impugned Order
learned ARC
Eviction Petition
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:04:51
RC.REV. 143/2025
Karim, Paharganj, New Delhi-1100555.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
2.
Learned counsel for the Petitioners confines his submissions to
the following grounds of challenge.
3.
Firstly, learned counsel submits that the Respondents have
failed to establish either their ownership over the subject premises or
the existence of any relationship of landlord and tenant between the
parties. It is contended that the very foundation of the eviction
proceedings is, therefore, absent.
4.
Secondly, learned counsel submits that the documents relied
upon by the Respondents in support of their asserted ownership are
forged and fabricated and, consequently, could not have been relied
upon for the purpose of non-suiting the Petitioners at the stage of
consideration of their application for leave to defend.
5.
Thirdly, learned counsel draws attention to an apparent
discrepancy in the description of the subject premises. He submits
that, while the premises are described as bearing No. 6072 in
paragraph No. 1 of the eviction petition, the number is stated as 6070
in Column No. 8 thereof. According to him, the subject premises are,
in fact, bearing No. 6072 and the aforesaid discrepancy goes to the
identity and description of the premises sought to be recovered.
6.
Lastly, learned counsel submits that the Respondents have
sufficient and reasonably suitable alternate accommodation available
and, consequently, the requirement pleaded in respect of the subject
premises cannot be said to warrant an order of eviction. It is
Subject Premises
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:04:51
RC.REV. 143/2025
contended that the learned ARC has failed to examine this aspect in its
proper perspective and in the context of the material placed on record.
7.
No other grounds have been urged by the learned counsel for
the Petitioners.
8.
Per Contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents supports the Impugned Order and submits that the
challenge falls within the limited revisional jurisdiction exercisable by
this Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act. He
submits that, while exercising such jurisdiction, this Court is not
required to re-appreciate the evidence or undertake a fresh
examination of the merits of the matter as though exercising appellate
jurisdiction. It is contended that, in the absence of any jurisdictional
error, material irregularity, perversity, patent illegality or other
infirmity in the decision-making process warranting interference, the
Impugned Order ought not to be disturbed.
ANALYSIS:
9.
This Court has heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of
the parties at length, and, with their able assistance, perused the
relevant documents as also the Impugned Order.
10.
Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
11.
The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:04:51
RC.REV. 143/2025
Co. Ltd.6, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
Singh7, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua8, has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
12.
The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.9, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
Grover10.
13.
In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
(1998) 8 SCC 119
(2014) 9 SCC 78
(2022) 6 SCC 30
2024:DHC:9322
2025:DHC:11285
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:04:51
RC.REV. 143/2025
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
14.
In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
15.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:04:51
RC.REV. 143/2025
jurisdiction may be warranted.
16.
It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
17.
In order to appreciate the challenge raised by the Petitioner
relating to the landlord-tenant relationship as well as the challenge
relating to the ownership of the Respondent herein, it would be
appropriate to examine the findings returned by the learned ARC. The
relevant portion of the Impugned Order is reproduced hereinbelow:
“I. Ownership of the petitioner over the tenanted shop as well
as existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the
petitioner and the respondents
10. Petitioner averred that late Sh. Umrao was the owner of the
property bearing no. 6072, Gali Ravidas Nabi Karim, Paharganj,
New Delhi having purchased the same from erstwhile owner Gopi
Krishna vide registered sale deed dated 07.05.1948. That late Sh.
Umrao expired in 1954, leaving behind a Will dt. 27.12.1953, in
favour of his wife, Smt. Pyaari. After the death of Smt. Pyaari, the
property devolved upon her four sons, namely Shankar,
Bishambhar, Bihari and Madan Lal and two daughters Daropdi and
Chando. That the petitioner is the son of Sh. Shankar who expired
in the year 1959, leaving behind two sons, namely Lalchand, the
petitioner herein and Chain Sukh.
10.1 It is further averred by the petitioner that late Sh. Umrao had
let out the ground floor, of property No.6072, Gali Ravidas, Nabi
Karim, paharganj, New Delhi-55 to Late Sh. Natholi and after the
death of Sh. Natholi, Sh. Amar Singh and Hari Singh became the
tenants in the premises in question. That Amar Singh and Hari
Singh, illegally and unlawfully constructed an unauthorized first
and second floor upon the tenanted premises without the
knowledge, consent and permission of the owners. That Sh. Amar
Singh has also expired and after his death of respondent no.1,2 & 3
beings sons of late Sh. Amar Singh, stepped into his shoes as
tenants. That at the time of initiating the tenancy the rent was fixed
@ Rs. 6.25/- per month, which the tenants have not paid since last
many years.
10.2 The respondent, on the other hand denied the ownership and
landlordship of the petitioner and averred that there exist no
relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and
respondents never paid any rent to the petitioners and even no
notice of being owner was ever given by the petitioners to the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:04:51
RC.REV. 143/2025
respondents. Respondents have averred in para no. 5 of the
respective affidavits that “mother of the respondent no.1 was
owner of the property after the death of Late Natholi who had
become owner after the death of Nebo his mother, father of
respondent no.1 and than same is in use and possession of us/the
respondents and one Sushila, and one Hari Singh who have not
been impleaded as a party however in the year 1972 the Custodian
sent a notice that the property is enemy property and that
government has acquired the property and now DDA custodian
has become owner and that all occupants should pay rent to the
DDA slum, and now same has been succeeded by the cusotodian of
enemy property, who was the owner of the property”.
10.3 Apparently the respondents have made only vague and bald
assertions. It is nowhere clarified that how mother of respondent
no. 1 was related to Natholi and Nebo and how they had become
owners. It is also not clear as to who Sushila and Hari Om are and
how come they are in possession of the suit premises. In para 14 of
leave to defend affidavit the respondent has again contented that
“in the entire petition it has been mentioned that Hero devi was the
owner of after the death of Natholi who was grandmother and
father of respondent no. 1 who left behind 4 sons namely Amar
Chand, Amar Singh, Hari Singh and 3 daughters namely Munni
devi, Shanti Devi, Shaymo devi however the said Ameer Chand has
3 sons Ramesh (now dead), Suresh (now dead), Vinod (now dead),
3 sons 1 daughter, Vicky” which once again is very vague and
ambiguous and document has been placed on record to substantiate
any of these averments. It is important to note here that it is also
not the case of the respondent that the sale deed dated 07.05.1948
executed by Gopi Kishan in favour of Sh. Umrao is a forged and
fabricated document.
10.4 Respondent claims to have become owner by adverse
possession. Here would be pertinent to take note of well settled law
in this regard. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Brij Narayan
Shukla (D) thr LRs Vs. Sudesh Kumar @ Suresh Kumar (D)
Thr. LRs & Ors (2024 Livelaw (SC) 17) in C.A No. 7502/2012,
has held that the tenants cannot claim adverse possession against
their landlord since their possession is permissive in nature. Similar
view was taken by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in RC Rev. No.
76/2022 (in para 6) in “Ramesh Kumar Banga Vs. Kailash
Makkar & Anrs (decided on 21.04.2022) that a tenant cannot be
said to be in adverse possession of the property. It is interesting to
note that on one hand, the respondent is claiming ownership on the
basis of adverse possession and on the other hand claiming that
second floor is also part of their tenancy. The respondents are
blowing hot and cold in same breath.
10.5 It is averred by the respondent in leave to defend affidavit that
petitioner has not filed the correct site plan and petition is vague
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:04:51
RC.REV. 143/2025
and ambiguous as it not clear that which portion petitioner wants to
be evicted, some of the area in possession of others is also shown
as part of property in plan. One Sushila is residing in one room of
the plan shown, one Ajay is also in possession, Deepak @ Monu
and Sharad, Chintu @ Umesh are also in possession not stated in
the petition and without them the possession can be taken of the
property as stated in site plan. The roof of the second floor is also
forming part of the respondent’s tenancy.
10.6 It is to be noted that no counter site plan has been filed by the
respondent. Also no other document has been placed on record to
establish the extent of tenancy. In the case titled as R.K.
Bhatnagar vs. Sushila Bhargava AIR 1987 Delhi 363; the
Hon'ble High Court of Delhi observed as under:“He has not filed any site plan wither to show that the site
plan filed by the respondent- landlady is incorrect in any
way. Hence, I see no reasons to doubt the veracity of the
facts stated by the respondent in her affidavit. Likewise, I
assume that the site plan filed by her showing the entire
accommodation in her occupation is correct.”
10.7 Hence, this court is of the considered view that there arises no
triable issue with respect to ownership of petitioner and
landlord/tenant relationship between petitioner and respondent.”
18.
The principal challenge raised by the Petitioners concerns the
very foundation of the eviction proceedings, namely, the ownership of
the Respondent and the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. On
this aspect, the learned ARC has not proceeded merely on the basis of
a bare assertion of ownership. The Impugned Order records the
pleaded chain of title commencing from the registered sale deed dated
07.05.1948 executed by Gopi Kishan in favour of Sh. Umrao, the
subsequent devolution of the property, and the case set up by the
Respondent regarding the induction of the predecessors of the
Petitioners as tenants. In contrast, the defence set up by the
Petitioners, as noticed by the learned ARC, is not supported by any
cogent documentary material explaining the asserted title through
Natholi, Nebo or the other persons referred to in the leave to defend
affidavit. Thus, the conclusion of the learned ARC that no triable issue
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:04:51
RC.REV. 143/2025
arose on ownership or landlord-tenant relationship is founded upon an
appreciation of the competing pleadings and the material placed
before it and cannot be characterised as perverse or unsupported by
the record.
19.
The plea that the documents relied upon by the Respondents are
forged and fabricated does not appear to have been part of the defence
raised by the Petitioners before the learned ARC. Neither the
application seeking leave to defend nor the affidavit filed in support
thereof, as placed before this Court, reflects any such challenge to the
authenticity of the documents relied upon by the Respondents. The
said contention has been urged for the first time in the present
proceedings. This assumes significance in the context of the statutory
scheme under Section 25B of the DRC Act, which requires the tenant
seeking leave to defend to disclose the facts constituting the basis of
the defence and the grounds on which the tenant contends that the
landlord is not entitled to an order of eviction, so as to enable the
learned ARC to determine whether any triable issue arises.
20.
The plea of forgery is essentially a factual plea and cannot be
examined in isolation without the factual foundation on which such an
allegation is sought to be sustained. Had the Petitioners intended to
rely upon such a defence, the same ought to have been specifically
pleaded before the learned ARC, along with the particulars and
material forming the basis of the challenge, so as to enable the learned
ARC to examine whether the plea disclosed a triable issue. Having not
raised such a defence before the learned ARC, the Petitioners cannot,
at the revisional stage, seek an examination of a factual issue which
did not arise for consideration before the learned ARC.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:04:51
RC.REV. 143/2025
21.
This is particularly so since the Impugned Order records that the
Petitioners had not disputed the registered Sale Deed dated 07.05.1948
on the ground of forgery or fabrication. Thus, there was no occasion
before the learned ARC to adjudicate upon the authenticity of the said
document. In the absence of the plea having been raised before the
learned ARC and there being no material placed before this Court to
substantiate the allegation, the said contention cannot be permitted to
constitute a ground for interference with the Impugned Order.
22.
The position is further fortified by the nature of the defence
itself. As noticed by the learned ARC, the Petitioners, on the one
hand, dispute the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship and
assert ownership on the basis of adverse possession, while, on the
other hand, they seek to assert that the second floor forms part of their
tenancy. The learned ARC has considered this apparent inconsistency
and has applied the principles laid down in Brij Narayan Shukla
(supra) and Ramesh Kumar Banga (supra). The Petitioners have not
demonstrated before this Court any error in the legal approach adopted
by the learned ARC, much less one which would render its conclusion
perverse or legally unsustainable.
23.
As regards the discrepancy in the description of the subject
premises, this Court is unable to discern any jurisdictional infirmity
merely from the fact that the number 6070 appears in Column No. 8 of
the Eviction Petition, whereas the premises are otherwise described as
bearing No. 6072. It is pertinent to note that, except for the reference
to Property No. 6070 in Column No. 8, the Eviction Petition,
including the very first paragraph being Column 1 thereof,
consistently describes the subject premises as Property No. 6072, Gali
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:04:51
RC.REV. 143/2025
Ravidas, Nabi Karim, Paharganj. The Petitioners have not
demonstrated that the said discrepancy resulted in any genuine
uncertainty as to the identity of the premises in respect of which
eviction was sought, nor have they shown that the learned ARC was
unable to identify the premises forming the subject matter of the
proceedings. The Impugned Order, in fact, proceeds throughout with
reference to Property No. 6072, Gali Ravidas, Nabi Karim, Paharganj,
and the Petitioners have not placed any material before this Court to
establish that the discrepancy caused them any prejudice or materially
impaired their defence. It is also material to note that the said
objection was not raised before the learned ARC and has been urged
before this Court for the first time. This Court has already held
hereinabove that a factual plea which was not raised before the
learned ARC cannot be introduced for the first time at the revisional
stage so as to invite an examination of an issue which did not arise for
consideration before the learned ARC. The objection, therefore, does
not disclose any error apparent on the face of the record or any
material irregularity warranting revisional interference.
24.
Insofar as the contention of the Petitioners in relation to there
being an alternative suitable accommodation is concerned, it would be
apposite to peruse the relevant portion of the Impugned Order in that
aspect. The relevant portion of the Impugned Order is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“II.
Bonafide requirement and suitable alternate
accommodation.
11.
It is averred by the petitioner that Smt. Pyari expired
leaving behind four sons namely, Shankar(now deceased), Goma
@ Bishamber (now deceased), Bihari @ Nanne(now deceased) and
Madanlal (now deceased) and daughters namely Dropadi(now
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:04:51
RC.REV. 143/2025
deceased) and Chandu(now deceased). That Sh. Shankar S/o Late
Sh. Umrao expired in the year 1959 leaving behind two sons
namely Lal Chand and Chainsukh. That Sh. Goma @ Bishamber
S/o Late Sh. Umrao expired leaving behind five sons namely,
Puran(now deceased), Gauri (now deceased), Trilok Chand (now
deceased), Sukan (now deceased) and Jugal. Puran has expired
leaving behind two sons namely, Mahesh and Ashish and three
daughters namely, Rani, Nikki and Poonam. Trilok Chand expired
leaving behind five sons namely, Dilip, Rajesh, Rakesh (now
deceased), Sanjay and Sunil and three daughters namely, Rajjo,
Indra and Rani. Sukan and Rakesh expired leaving behind no legal
heirs. That Sh. Madanlal S/o Late Sh. Umrao expired leaving
behind five sons namely, Bal Mukund, Bharat, Kailash, Manoj
Kumar and Sanjay Kumar. That the petitioner no.1,2,3,4,5,6,7,17
& 18 with their families have been residing in property no.6070,
measuring 85 sq. yds. Gali Ravidas, Nabi Karim, Paharganj, New
Delhi-55 which consists of ground floor and first floor. At ground
floor, four rooms with attached kitchen, bathroom and one
common hall/drawing room are constructed and same structure
comprising of four rooms with attached kitchen, bathroom and one
common hall/drawing room are constructed at first floor.
That the family of petitioner no.1 consists of himself, three sons
namely, Somnath, Dharam Prakash, and Ved Prakash and two
daughters namely, Neetu and Mamta. One son Somnath and both
the daughters are married. Both unmarried sons Dharam Prakash
and Ved Prakash are residing separately from the petitioner no.1
due to lack of accommodation. However, the petitioner no.1 is in
the use and occupation of two rooms at first floor of the property
no.6070 with his son Somnath, who is married and his family
consists of himself, his wife Sarita and two kids namely Shekhar
and Sachin aged about 18 years and 14 years.
11.1
It is further averred by the petitioner that the family of the
petitioner no.2 consists of himself, his wife Omwati, three
daughters namely, Sonia, Monia and Taruna and one son namely
Pawan. Two daughters Sonia and Monai have been married. The
petitioner no.2 is in the use and occupation of one room at ground
floor of the property no.6072, Gali Ravidas, Nabi Karim,
Paharganj, New Delhi-110055 with his unmarried child Pawan and
Taruna. That the petitioner no.3,4,5,6 & 7 who are unmarried are in
the use and occupation of two rooms at ground floor of the
property no.6072, Gali Ravidas, Nabi Karim, Paharganj, New
Delhi-110055. That the family of petitioner no.17 consists of
himself, his wife, and two daughters aged about 5 and 3 years. The
petitioner no.17 with his family is in the use and occupation of one
room at first floor of the property no. 6072, Gali Ravidas, Nabi
Karim, Paharganj, New Delhi-110055.
That the family of petitioner no.18 consists of himself, his wife
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:04:51
RC.REV. 143/2025
Geeta and two daughters namely Keerti and Komal and one son
Raja. One daughter Keerti has been married. The petitioner no.18
with his unmarried children Komal and Raja is in the use and
occupation of one room at first floor of the property no.6072, Gali
Ravidas, Nabi Karim, Paharganj, New Delhi-110055. That due to
lack of accommodation in the property no.6070, Gali Ravidas,
Nabi Karim, Paharganj, New Delhi-110055, the petitioner no.1 & 2
with their families want to shift at the tenanted premises. That the
petitioners are having no other alternative residential
accommodation in their names except the tenanted premises.
11.2
On the other hand, it is averred by the respondent through
his leave to defend application that the petitioner has more than
sufficient accommodation available to him lying vacant as the
petitioner in portion in his possession has shown less rooms and in
property number 6070 itself there are about 20 rooms at ground
floor there are 2 rooms set consisting of latrine, bath room, kitchen
in each set, total 6 rooms, 3 kitchen, 3 bath rooms, one open space
in kitchen of all; and at first floor also there is same the six rooms
with 3 separate 2 rooms set, and separate kitchen, latrine, bath
room etc. and similarly at second floor also there are 3 set of 2
rooms with separate latrine, bath room and kitchen and there is big
open space at the centre. Not only this there are other properties
like property number 8105 having 4 rooms 50 sq.yds at ground
floor with latrine, bath room and kitchen and similarly at first floor
there are 2 rooms, latrine, bath room kitchen and small open space
in the said property. The petitioner also have possession of
property number 6290 of about 60-70 sq yds consisting of 2 rooms,
latrine, bath room, open space and 2 portions with one passage in
between 4 rooms at another side. Triloki's family was residing
there and now they have rented out the property to some tenants
and have started residing in Karol Bagh address of which is not
known to the respondents.
11.3
That one family is residing at A-33, Police Colony,
Paharganj, Delhi in house/flat allotted by government of India,
Delhi Police. The petitioners also have one plot in Nangloi of 100
Sq.Yds recently which has not been disclosed in the petition.
11.4 Respondent have further averred that petition as filed is not
for the entire property and construction of the property is in such a
manner that possession of half portion cannot be taken without the
possession of portion in possession of other persons not made party
and legal heirs of Late Natholi and portion is constructed at forth
floor also wherein Ajay is residing with family in the property,
hence petition is liable to be dismissed at the ground also. Once
again it can be noted that the averments of respondent are very
ambiguous and not substantiated by any document/photograph or
site plan.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:04:51
RC.REV. 143/2025
11.5 That the property was constructed by the we/the respondents
and their forefather since 1921 in their possession and permission
was sought in that time from MCD. However, no document placed
on record to substantiate this averment.
11.6 The respondent in his leave to defend has neither denied the
bonafide need stated by the petitioner and the extent of family of
the petitioner. In the case titled as Sudesh Kumar Soni & Ors.
Vs. Prabha Khanna & Ors. 153 (2008) DLT 652 it was
observed that:“24. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to
dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust
himself without getting possession of the tenanted
premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the
requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to
make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have
adjusted himself.
25. Suitability has to be seen from the convenience of the
landlord and his family members and on the basis of the
circumstances including their profession, vocation, style of
living, habits and background. Landlord is the best judge
of his residential requirement”.
11.7 In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta AIR
1999 SC 2507, at pg-2512 in para 14 & 15, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that:“14. The availability of an alternate accommodation with
the landlord i.e. an accommodation other than the one in
occupation of the tenant wherefrom he is sought to be
evicted has a dual relevancy. Firstly, the availability of
another accommodation, suitable and convenient in all
respects as the suit accommodation, may have an adverse
bearing on the finding as to bonafides of the landlord if he
unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to
satisfy his alleged need. Availability of such circumstance
would enable the Court drawing an inference that the
need of the landlord was not a felt need or the state of
mind of the landlord was not honest, sincere, and natural.
Secondly, another principal ingredient of Clause (e) of
Sub-section (1) of Section 14, which speaks of nonavailability of any other reasonably suitable residential
accommodation to the landlord, would not be satisfied.
Wherever another residential accommodation is shown to
exist as available than the court has to ask the landlord
why he is not occupying such other available
accommodation to satisfy his need. The landlord may
convince the court that the alternate residential
accommodation though available is still of no
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consequence as the same is not reasonably suitable to
satisfy the felt need which the landlord has succeeded in
demonstrating objectively to exist. Needless to say that an
alternate accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of
the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in
comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the
landlord is seeking eviction. Convenience and safety of the
landlord and his family members would be relevant
factors. While considering the totality of the
circumstances, the court may keep in view the profession
or vocation of the landlord and his family members, their
style of living, their habits and the background wherefrom
they come.”
11.8 In the case titled as Sudesh Kumar Soni & Ors. Vs. Prabha
Khanna & Ors. 153 (2008) DLT 652 it was observed that:“24. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to
dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust
himself without getting possession of the tenanted
premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the
requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to
make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have
adjusted himself. 25. Suitability has to be seen from the
convenience of the landlord and his family members and
on the basis of the circumstances including their
profession, vocation, style of living, habits and
background. Landlord is the best judge of his residential
requirement”.
11.9 It is also pertinent to note that respondent has not denied the
need stated by the petitioner and has just emphasized on the issue
that petitioner has sufficient and suitable alternative
accommodation to fulfill his need. Here it is important to quote the
following observation made in “Shri Satish Chand Vs. Girdhar
Gopal Gupta decided on 10.01.2023:“……21. In the present petition there is no plea challenging the
finding of the Trial Court with respect to the bona fide need of the
landlord and his son addressed during the arguments. It is not
disputed that Sh. Amit Gupta, son of the landlord is carrying on
business and therefore the contention of the landlord that he needs
the tenanted premises for his son's business stands sufficiently
established on record.
22. As per Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the landlord/landlady,
is required to prove his/her bona fide need for the tenanted
premises as well as that he/she has no other reasonably suitable
accommodation, to satisfy their requirement. However, recently the
Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam (Supra) has held that in an
eviction petition filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, the
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Court is concerned only with the requirement of a bona fide need
and that the plea of alternative accommodation is 'incidental one'
2023/DHC/000162 at best. The relevant paragraph of the said
judgment read as under:
"29. Section 14(1)(e) deals with only the requirement of a bona
fide purpose. The contention regarding alternative
accommodation can at best be only an incidental one. Such a
requirement has not been found to be incorrect by the High
Court, though it is not even open to it to do so, in view of the
limited jurisdiction which it was supposed to exercise.
Therefore, the very basis upon which the revision was allowed
is obviously wrong being contrary to the very provision
contained in Section 14(1)(e) and Section 25B(8)."
The word 'incidental' as defined in the Oxford dictionary, sixth
edition, refers to 'occurring as something casual or of
secondary importance'. This would mean that availability of
alternate accommodation should not become the decisive or
pivotal factor in eviction proceedings. Therefore, in view of
the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid
decision, once a landlord/landlady has sufficiently established
his/her plea of bona fide need, the mere availability of
alternate accommodation at the disposal of the
landlord/landlady is but a secondary factor and not a primary
one and therefore the same cannot become the sole basis for
permitting the tenant to retain the tenanted accommodation to
the peril of the landlord/landlady, particularly once the other
factors entitling him/her to recovery the premises have been
established. The landlord/landlady having duly disclosed the
alternate available accommodation and having reasonably
explained that the same are not adequately suitable for his/her
requirement, the fact that tenant contends that the said alternate
accommodation is suitable cannot detain the Court from
passing the eviction order. The Court will reject the
explanation offered by the landlord/landlady with respect to
the unsuitability of the alternate accommodation only if it is
perverse, however the Court need not substitute the preference
for tenanted premises shown by landlord/landlady
2023/DHC/000162 with the dictates of the tenant. The
preference shown by landlord/landlady for the possession of
the tenanted premises vis-à-vis another alternative
accommodation available to him/her cannot be rejected on the
say-so of the tenant so as to set at naught the salutary purpose
of Section 25B of the DRC Act. [The Technological Institute
of Textiles and Sciences v. M/s Shree Nath Ji Developers, RC.
REV. 174/2020].…”
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11.10 Therefore, it can be concluded that need of the petitioner
is bonafide and there is no other reasonable suitable alternate
accommodation is available with the petitioner.”
25.
As regards the plea of bona fide requirement, it is pertinent to
note that the Petitioners herein, in their leave to defend application,
have not disputed the bona fide need pleaded by the Respondent or the
extent of his family. The challenge is essentially premised on the
assertion that sufficient alternative accommodation is available with
the Respondent.
26.
On
the
issue
of
availability
of
suitable
alternative
accommodation, the Petitioners have referred to various properties,
including Property No. 6070, Property No. 6105, Property No. 6290,
accommodation at A-33, Police Colony, Paharganj, and a plot at
Nangloi. However, these assertions have not been supported by any
document, photograph or site plan demonstrating the availability,
nature or suitability of the alleged alternative accommodation. In this
regard, this Court in Lalta Prasad Gupta v. Sita Ram11, has held that
where a tenant seeks to controvert the landlord’s requirement on the
ground of availability of alternative accommodation, the tenant must
plead the necessary particulars and place material in support thereof,
including as to the suitability of such accommodation for the
requirement pleaded. In the present case, no such material was placed
before the learned ARC. The learned ARC, therefore, cannot be said
to have failed to consider the said defence or to have returned a
finding unsupported by the record. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
2017 SCC OnLine Del 13026
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“18. Thus, if the tenant seeks leave to defend controverting the
requirement pleaded by landlord on the ground of the landlord,
though at the time of requirement having alternate premises,
having not used the same and instead having commercially
exploited the same, the tenant must plead (a) the particulars of such
premises; (b) the right/title of the landlord to the same; (c) that the
said premises were vacant and available for use at the time of the
pleaded requirement of landlord; (d) how the said premises were
suitable for the pleaded requirement; and (e) how the landlord has
deprived himself thereof i.e. by sale or letting and support the said
pleas with material on the basis whereof such pleas will be proved.
I say that it is essential to place such material before the Rent
Controller because the purpose of trial, resulting from grant of
leave to defend, is to prove the said pleas and if the tenant has
nothing from which he can possibly prove the said pleas, the trial
also will not result in the landlord being “disentitled from obtaining
an order for recovery of possession of premises on the ground
specified in Clause (e) of proviso to sub Section (1) of Section 14”
of the Act, within the meaning of Section 25B(5) supra. This is not
to say that the tenant should file fool proof documentary evidence
at the stage of leave to defend. However there must be placed on
record all the requisite particulars. The onus on the tenant, at the
stage of seeking leave to defend, is thus somewhere in between
fool proof documentary evidence and a totally vague, bereft of any
particulars plea. Where, in between the said onus lies, depends on
facts of each case.”
27.
Thus, on a consideration of each of the grounds urged by the
Petitioners, this Court finds that the learned ARC has dealt with the
material pleas which went to the root of the application for leave to
defend and has returned findings upon the pleadings and material
before it.
28.
The challenge raised before this Court, in substance, seeks a re-
appreciation of the same material and a substitution of the view taken
by the learned ARC with another possible view. Such an exercise is
outside the permissible bounds of the revisional jurisdiction under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act. No jurisdictional error,
manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity or failure to
adjudicate a material plea has been demonstrated.
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29.
For the reasons as stated above, this Court finds no merit in the
present Petition. The present Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
30.
The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the above terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
SEPTEMBER 28, 2026/rk/ma
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